Summary: (a) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)--- ----Ss. 8, 9, 11-F(2), 11-G(2) & 11-W(2)---Prohibition of acts intended or likely to stir up sectarian hatred, proscribed organization, support and meetings relating to a proscribed organization, projection of proscribed organization, act of terrorism--- Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Prosecution case was that 22 pamphlets containing hate statements against the Shia community, stickers, cellphone and other material were recovered from the appellant---Trial Court acquitted the appellant of the charge under S.9 of the Act, 1997---Prosecution witnesses confirmed that the hate pamphlets and stickers were recovered from an envelope and were neither in open view nor otherwise visible---Said witnesses admitted that the appellant did not distribute hate pamphlets or stickers to anyone in their presence---Said witnesses had not seen the appellant engaging in any activity linked to a proscribed organization---No private person came forward to confirm any such connection---Trial Court recorded a categoric findings that the prosecution had failed to prove that the appellant had projected, supported, propagated or promoted SSP terrorists with intent to incite sectarian hatred---Trial Court interpreted S.8 of the Act, 1997, in accordance with the statutory and the evidence on record and therefore, rightly acquitted the appellant of the charge under S.9---To that extent, appeal was disposed of. (b) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)--- ----Ss. 8, 9, 11-F(2), 11-G(2) & 11-W(2)---Prohibition of acts intended or likely to stir up sectarian hatred,proscribed organization, support and meetings relating to a proscribed organization, projection of proscribed organization, act of terrorism--- Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Accused acquitted under a different section 9 of the Act, 1997 on same set of evidence--- Effect--- Prosecution case was that 22 pamphlets containing hate statements against the Shia community, stickers, cell phone and other material were recovered from the appellant---Trial Court convicted the appellant under S.11-G of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, on the ground that possession of the objectionable pamphlets and stickers indicated appellant’s membership and support for the proscribed organization---Appellant’s conviction under S.11-G of the Act, 1997, was unsustainable because it was based on the same evidence for which he was acquitted under S.9---Once the Court found that the material had not been distributed or displayed, was recovered in the concealed form, and was unsupported by corroborating evidence of affiliation, a conviction under S.11-G could not follow---To the extent of said offence, appeal was allowed, in circumstances. Bourne (Inspector of Taxes) v. Norwich Crematorium Ltd. [1967) 1 WLR 691; Shakeel Shah v. The State and others 2022 SCMR 1; Barkhurdar v. Appellate Tribunal/Additional District and Sessions Judge, and others PlD 2016 Lah. 101; M/s Asfaq Trading Company v. Collector of Customs 2016 PTD 2111 and Messrs Kashmir Pottery Works v. The Commissioner of Sales Tax PLD 1973 Lah. 837 = 1973 PTD 453 rel. Syed Zeeshan Haider for Appellant. Ch. Asghar Ali Gill, Deputy/Prosecutor General with Farrukh Zareen/Inspector and Muhammad Zubair/SI, CTD for the State. Date of hearing: 12th May, 2025.

Summary: 482I.C.A- ICA (Writ)- ICA Service 244-24 GOP VS ZIA AKRAM ETC Mr. Justice Malik Javid Iqbal Wains 08-05- 2025 2025 LHC 4069

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act (XLII of 2012)--- ----Ss. 2(33), 3, 6(3) & 7 [as introduced through the Punjab Finance Act, 2014]---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 70(4), Fourth Schedule, Entry No. 49---Persons providing service for security purposes---Payment to Security personnel etc.---Whether tax leviable---Whether tax on entire invoice amount or not---"Gross amount"---Scope---Petitioners/ registered persons were providing service for security purposes ('service providers') at the sites described in the related agreements to the recipients of the services ('recipients of service')---Claim of the respondents-authorities was that the tax was leviable on the entire invoice amount including salaries or other allowances ('the salaries') that were paid by the service providers to security personnel, labour and manpower (the individuals)---Validity---Provisions of Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012 ('the Act, 2012') clearly reflect that for a service to be taxable, it must be an economic activity of the service providers conducted as a business, profession, or trade, whether or not for profit---The words "gross amount" in S. 7 of the Act, 2012 were introduced, through the Punjab Finance Act, 2014 to clarify that tax is to be levied on the amount that includes all the taxes or duties, Federal or Provincial besides sales tax on services---The words "gross amount of" if given construction to include the salaries results into redundancy of S. 6(3) of the Act, 2012---No provision of an enactment can be treated as redundant or surplus and should be given its meaning and effect---Courts should avoid any interpretation of an enactment or rules that flouts common sense and results into absurdity and the Court should always give effect to the same by interpreting it in the manner that is in accordance with the judicially presumed Parliamentary concern for common sense and justice---The Courts should also avoid clash of seemingly contradicting provisions and must harmonize the contradictory provisions by interpreting not only the provisions but also the wisdom of the legislature in order to give effect to both the provisions---Thus, respondents-authorities while demanding tax on the salaries of the individuals had also overlooked that while interpreting a taxing statute, one had to look into the words of the statute and then to interpret it in the light of what is expressed in the relevant provision as well as its surrounding provisions---What is not expressed cannot be implied---There is no room of import or imputing something in a fiscal statute---At the same time, when more than one interpretation is fairly and reasonably possible then one which leads to manifest absurdity or injustice must be avoided---The power to tax service is derived by the Province from Entry No. 49 of Fourth Schedule, under Art. 70(4) of the Constitution---Federal Government has exclusive power to legislate with respect to the federal legislation list and the Provinces can only make laws, which are not enumerated in the said list --The exception in the said entry permits the respondent-authorities to impose the sales tax purely on services---Thus, only the quantum and component of service is taxable and not the amount being reimbursed by the recipient as salaries of the individuals to the service providers---Constitutional petitions were allowed accordingly. Sindh Revenue Board through Secretary Government of Sindh, Karachi and others v. Messrs Quick Food Industries (Pvt.) Limited and others 2023 SCMR 1776; Ahsan Khan v. Government of the Punjab and others 2023 CLC 825; Muhammad Ahsan Ullah Khan and others v. Muhammad Sami Ullah Khan and others PLD 1964 (W.P.) Lahore 101; Maryon-Wilson's Will Trusts, Blofield v. St. Hill 1966 M.No. 4666 1968 Ch. 268; Messrs Gas Masters CNG Station v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2019 PTD 25; Allied Bank Limited v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Lahore and others 2023 SCMR 1166; Messrs Saadullah Khan and Brothers (SKB) v. Appellate Tribunal of Inland Revenue and others 2019 PTD 776; Mrs. Naila Naeem Younus and others v. Messrs Indus Services Limited through Chief Executive and others 2022 SCMR 1171 and Sami Pharmaceuticals (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Province of Sindh and others (C.P No. 5220-2017) ref. Barrister Muhammad Hamza Akhtar and Syed Hasnain Abbas for Petitioner. Muhammad Nasim Saqlain, Assistant Attorney General for Respondent No.1. Salman Asif Warraich, Assistant Advocate General for Respondent No.2. Sajid Ijaz Hotiana, Tanzeel-ur-Rehman, Ali Javaid Bajwa, Abubakar Attique and Muhammad Nouman Yahya, Legal Advisors of Punjab Revenue Authority for Respondents No.3 to 5. Khurram Shahbaz Butt, Amicus Curiae. Date of hearing: 28th April, 2025.

Summary: (a) Federal Excise Act, 2005 ----S. 3(5)(c)---Franchise services---Liability to pay duty---Legal incidence of excise duty---Franchiser vs franchisee---Scope and interpretation Dispute regarding who bears legal incidence of excise duty on franchise services provided within Pakistan—Department contended liability lay on the respondent franchiser under S. 3(5)(c), while taxpayer argued Rule 43A shifted liability to franchisees—Held, parent statute clearly fixed legal obligation to pay duty on the person providing the service, i.e., the franchiser—Statutory scheme admits no exception unless expressly provided—Franchisees made liable only where franchiser is located outside Pakistan—Court reaffirmed distinction between legal incidence of tax (imposed by statute) and its economic burden (commercially passed on)—Held, delegated legislation cannot override or alter express provisions of parent statute—High Court and Tribunal erred in placing reliance on Rule 43A—Appeal allowed and legal incidence affirmed on franchiser. Cited Case: • British India Corporation Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise AIR 1963 SC 104 (relied) (b) Interpretation of Statutes ----Delegated legislation---Limits---Subordinate legislation cannot override express provision of statute---Franchise excise regime Rule 43A of the Federal Excise Rules, 2005 held to be inapplicable to franchise agreements between Pakistani entities—Court observed that Rule 43A, though validly framed before insertion of S. 3(5), could not continue to operate once legal incidence was expressly codified in the parent statute—Any attempt to shift liability via rule-making beyond what is provided in the statute declared ultra vires—Distinguished from Sales Tax Act, 1990, where express power exists under S. 3(3A) to shift tax burden—No such enabling clause in the Federal Excise Act, 2005—Court clarified that tax rules cannot create primary liability where none exists under statute. (c) Tax Procedure---Reference under wrong statute ----Federal Excise Act, 2005---S. 34A---Sales Tax Act, 1990---S. 47---Wrong statutory provision invoked in tax reference---Effect Respondent argued that department filed reference before High Court under wrong law, i.e., S. 47 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 instead of S. 34A of Federal Excise Act, 2005—Court held this to be a procedural irregularity of no consequence—No objection raised before High Court, and same cause of action and forum involved—Petition maintained and appeal proceeded on merits.

Summary: (a) Customs Act, 1969 read with S.R.O. 565(I)/2006 dated 05.06.2006 as amended by S.R.O. 474(I)/2016 dated 24.06.2016 ----Exemption from customs duty---HS Codes 3402.1300 & 3402.1190---Manufacturers and formulators of agricultural pesticides---Approval by Ministry of National Food Security & Research---Scope---**Petitioner, importer and manufacturer of agricultural surfactants/surface-active agents such as stabilizers, emulsifiers, and solvents, sought customs duty exemption under SRO 565 as amended by SRO 474---Claim denied on ground that petitioner was not approved or recognized by Ministry of National Food Security & Research as a manufacturer/formulator of agricultural pesticides---Held, exemption under Column (3) of Table at Serial (3) of the SRO was subject to conditions mentioned in Column (2), including mandatory approval by Ministry---Mere classification under HS Code was insufficient to claim benefit of zero percent duty---Obligations under SRO were binding and petitioner’s failure to meet prerequisites disentitled it from exemption---No vested right was curtailed and petitioner may still challenge vires of SRO before appropriate forum if so advised---Petitions dismissed and leave to appeal refused. (b) Interpretation of SROs and Tax Exemptions ----Conditional exemptions---Legislative intent---SRO-based tax exemptions not absolute and must be interpreted strictly---Held, exemption clauses in SROs are construed narrowly, and compliance with specified conditions is mandatory---Failure to fulfill qualifying requirements renders claim untenable irrespective of nature of imported goods or similarity to exempted items---Distinction drawn between provisions of Sales Tax Act, 1990 and subject SRO held valid as former lacked comparable restrictive language.

Summary: (a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----Ss. 45-B, 46 & 74---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Order passed under S. 74 of Sales Tax Act, 1990, assailing of---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Perusal of Ss. 45-B and 46 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (‘the Act 1990’), which are the provisions conferring right of appeal, clearly spell out that an appeal under S.45-B read with S.46 of the Act, 1990 is only available against orders passed under S. 10, 11, 25, 36 or 66 of the Act, 1990---Section 74 under which the impugned order has been passed, is not an appealable order, therefore, the only remedy available with the petitioner, particularly in the wake of the fact that impugned order has allegedly been issued without notice or an opportunity f hearing, is by way of filing a Constitutional petition as the petitioner cannot be left remediless. (b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----S. 74---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Order passed under S.74 of Sales Tax Act, 1990, assailing of---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Submission was that the appeal(s), if required to be filed, would become available once proceedings on the basis of Show-Cause Notices commenced---Held: Such submission tantamounts to avoid inevitable consequences of an inchoate, arbitrary and fanciful order---The edifice of the Show-Cause Notices solely hinges upon the vires of the impugned order---Where a superstructure is built on illegal and void order(s), the same is meant to collapse if such an order is declared illegal and unlawful---Thus, the impugned order being devoid of any reasons, having been issued without an opportunity of hearing, could not withstand any test of due process and administration of justice---High Court set-aside the Impugned Order with the result that the Show-Cause Notices issued on the basis of the impugned order were declared bad in law and of no legal effect---Constitutional petition, filed by Company/Registered Person, was allowed accordingly. Yousaf Ali v. Muhammad Aslam Zia and 2 others PLD 1958 SC 104; Mir Wali Khan and another v. Manager, Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan, Muzaffargarh and another PLD 2003 SC 500; Moulana Atta-ur-Rehman v. Al-Hajj Sardar Umar Farooq and others PLD 2008 SC 663; Vice Chancellor Agriculture University, Peshawar and others 2024 SCMR 527; Superintendent of Police, Headquarters, Lahore and others v. Ijaz Aslam and others 2024 SCMR 1831 and Ghulam Mustafa Lund v. National Accountability Bureau through Chairman, Islamabad and others PLD 2024 SC 54 ref. (c) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----S. 74---Condonation of time-limit---Order passed under S.74 of Sales Tax Act, 1990---Officer of the Inland Revenue, powers of---Scope---Limitation, importance of---Section 74 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (‘the Act, 1990’), makes it abundantly clear that the condonation of delay for exposing a taxpayer to the rigors of process after the lapse of statutory period is not a routine and usual exercise; an order for condonation can only be issued in exceptional circumstances, which exceptional circumstances can only be supplemented by supplying reasons and the reasons must ooze out from such orders---It cannot be the true import, intent and purpose of the law that the matter of condonation may be left at the whims of an officer of the Inland Revenue as the limitation is not merely a technicality; it has to be more robustly applied in the financial matters particularly in the taxation matters, enabling the taxpayer as well as the revenue hierarchy to have estimations of their respective financial outlook so that the available revenue, the expenditure required and the planning to be rolled out may be assessed with some degree of certainty---Thus, the impugned order being devoid of any reasons, having been issued without an opportunity of hearing, could not withstand any test of due process and administration of justice---High Court set-aside the impugned order with the result that the Show-Cause Notices issued on the basis of the impugned order are declared bad in law and of no legal effect---Constitutional petition, filed by Company/ Registered Person, was allowed accordingly. Messrs Mehr Dastgir Leather and Footwear Industries (Pvt.) Limited v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Finance and others 2025 PTD 16 and Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue, Audit Range, Zone-I and others v. Messrs Eden Builders Limited and others 2018 SCMR 991 ref. (d) Limitation--- ----Significance---True import of statute of limitation, its significance and essence stated:-(i) The law of limitation is a statute of repose, designed to quieten title and to bar stale and water-logged disputes and is to be strictly complied with---There is no scope in law of limitation for any equitable or ethical construction to get over them; justice, equity and good conscience do not override the law of limitation;(ii) The hurdles of limitation cannot be crossed under the guise of any hardships or imagined inherent discretionary jurisdiction of the Court---Ignorance, negligence, mistake or hardship does not save limitation, nor does poverty of the parties;(iii) There is absolutely no room for the exercise of any imagined judicial discretion vis-a-vis interpretation of a provision, whatever hardship may result from following strictly the statutory provision---There is no scope for any equity---The Court cannot claim any special inherent equity jurisdiction;(iv) The law of limitation is an artificial mode conceived to terminate justiciable disputes---Therefore, it is to be construed strictly with a leaning to benefit the suitor. Khushi Muhammad through L.Rs. and others v. Mst. Fazal Bibi and others PLD 2016 SC 872 ref. (e) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----S. 74---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S. 24A---Condonation of time-limit---Order passed under S.74 of Sales Tax Act, 1990---Reasons to be given---Pre-requisite---Though there should be no room to escape tax liability through official and institutional manipulation, however, in such cases, the Federal Board of Revenue / Respondent has to lay the reasons at the outset, which are conspicuously missing in the present case---It is axiomatic that no statute can muffle fundamental rights and must at all times advance the public interest and remain constitutionaly compliant---If the competent authority is of the view and opinion that the case of the petitioner /taxpayer falls within the mischiefs, which require condonation of delay for opening a past and closed transaction, there should have been reasons to do so---Forming an opinion by a competent authority requires that such opinion be supplemented with reasons---The Respondents / Department were bound to supply the reasons and petitioner / taxpayer was entitled to a reasoned order---Supplying reasons in an order or decision is not a choice, instead, it is incumbent upon the authority and an essential attribute of a sustainable order---The chain between the conclusion and fact in a decision is broken if there are no reasons---Term ‘reasons’ has not been defined in statutory law, but in common parlance or in terms of reasonable prudence, the presence of reasons is what confirms whether an order or decision is lawful, reasonable and complies with the provisions of law and element of reasonableness---The reason is very life of law, for when the reason of a law once ceases, the law itself generally ceases, because reason is the foundation of all our laws(Wharton’s Law Lexicon)---Order passed by an authority must contain reasons, enabling an affectee to challenge the same before appropriate forum but if such an order does not contain reasons, the availing of remedy was of no avail as there will be no grounds to test the vires of such an order, which is meant to collapse for its own liability---Thus, the impugned order being devoid of any reasons, having been issued without an opportunity of hearing, could not withstand any test of due process and administration of justice---High Court set-aside the impugned order with the result that the Show-Cause Notices issued on the basis of the impugned order were declared bad in law and of no legal effect---Constitutional petition, filed by Company / Registered Person, was allowed accordingly. Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, Regional Tax Officer (RTO), Mayo Road, Rawalpindi and another v. Messra Sarwaq Traders, 216/1-A, Adamjee Road, Rawalpindi and another 2022 SCMR 1333 and Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-III RTO, Rawalpindi and others v. Messra Sarwaq Traders, Rawalpindi and others 2025 SCMR 341 ref. (f) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----S. 74---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S.24A---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 4, 10A & 199---Condonation of delay---Opportunity of hearing, non-affording of---Due process, absence of---Judicial review of public ations---Fairness, due process of law and natural justice are important constitutional elements as grounds for judicial review of public actions ; they fall to be dealt with under two provisions, one constitutional and the other statutory---The constitutional provisions are Art. 4 and Art. 10A of the Constitution which guarantee fair trial and due process of law---In the presence of a statutory provision like S.24A of General Clauses Act, 1897, it is hard to see how our Courts can shy away from enforcing the duty to give reasons where authorities are acting in an administrative or quasi-judicial capacity---The mandatory requirements to give reasons must be applied with complete vigor, particularly in financial matters---High Court is mindful of the fact and does not expect the revenue officers to demonstrate as if they are trained legal minds and must know the jurisprudence to entirety, however, the least which is expected from them is that their orders must be well founded and rooted in reasons on the basis of plain meanings and contours of a statutory provisions, which they tend to invoke---Even though the right of reasoned order is not formally recognized as one of the principles of natural justice, it is one in spirit and practice, continually gaining prominence as a tenet of natural justice---Thus, it can be said: “Reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion and without the same, it becomes lifeless”---In the matters pertaining to the rights of the citizens/persons, particularly, where it is complained that rights guaranteed under Arts. 4 and 10A of the Constitution have been breached, the effective supervision by the Courts comes in and such supervision for guarding the alleged infringed rights requires the rationale for the duty to give reasons---Wouldn’t a duty arise in any case where the underlying decision is subject to judicial review?---Courts may run into some difficulties when there is an attempt to justify a reason-giving requirement on this basis---Some limitations must be devised---Supply of reasons and openness as a rationale for the present case is coherent with effective supervision as a general rationale for a duty to give reasons---Separation of powers, rule of law and good administration concerns can provide justification for a reason-giving requirement even in situations where the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions make no such imposition on administrative decision-makers---Article 4 of the Constitution is the bedrock of the Rule of Law and an antithesis to the rule of men in our country; it is a restraint on the executive and judicial organs of the State to abide by the rule of law---Article 4 of the Constitution ordains that it is an inalienable right of every citizen, wherever he may be and any person whenever he is in Pakistan, to have and enjoy the protection of law and to be treated in accordance with law---Thus, the impugned order being devoid of any reasons, having been issued without an opportunity of hearing, could not withstand any test of due process and administration of justice---High Court set-aside the impugned order with the result that the Show-Cause Notices issued on the basis of the Impugned Order were declared bad in law and of no legal effect---Constitutional petition, filed by Company/ Registered Person, was allowed accordingly. Doody v. Secretary of State for Home Department (1993) 3 All ER 92, 106; Government of Pakistan and another v. Dada Amir Haider Khan PLD 1987 SC 504; Khalid Iqbal and others v. Shahid Iqbal and others 2021 CLC 1880; Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar, JT (2003) Supp 2 SC 354 and AIR 2004 SC 1794 ref. (g) General Clauses Act (X of 1897)--- ----S. 24A---Passing of order---Reasons to be given---Object and purpose---General Clauses Act, 1897, has been called the legislative dictionary; the object is to promote brevity and uniformity in the language of the statutes---A number of expressions have been defined in the Acts, making them of general application, except where an intention to the contrary appears in the particular Act in which they may be used---The General Clauses Act, the Provincial Acts and their definitions and rules of construction automatically apply to all statutes, unless contrary be expressed or the context otherwise requires and must, therefore, be always borne in mind in the construction of statutes---In other words, the rules enacted in these Acts have a binding effect---Section 24A accords legislative recognition to the well-known rule that all persons exercising State power have to act fairly, justly and honestly---Section 24A of the General Clauses Act, 1897, gives legislative recognition to the view that the duty to give reasons is part of the duty to uphold the rule of law in the sense indicated above, by providing that the statutory decision-maker shall "so far as necessary or appropriate, give reasons for making the order or, as the case may be, for issuing directions..."; it also gives effect to the principles of fairness---Decision-making power is subject to an implied duty to give reasons. Bahadur and another v. The State and another PLD 1985 SC 62; Messrs Airport Support Services v. The Airport Manager, Quaid-e-Azam International Airport, Karachi and others 1998 SCMR 2268; Zain Yar Khan v. Chief Engineer C.R.B. C. WAPDA, D.I. Khan and another 1998 PLC (C.S.) 1484; Ch. Zahur Illahi v. Secretary to Government of Pakistan Ministry of Home and Kashmir Affairs, Rawalpindi PLD 1975 Lah. 499 and S.S. Miranda Ltd. v. The Chief Commissioner, Karachi and another PLD 1959 SC 134 ref. (h) Judicial review--- ----Administrative decisions---Reasons for a decision, non-providing of---Indian perspective---The requirement to give reasons for a decision has been expanded by increasing the scope of judicial review of administrative decisions---What started as a mere exception (that of providing reasons for a decision) has now replaced the established proposition which stated that reasons need notbe afforded for administrative decisions---Said development has been brought about through various judicial pronouncements in India and other foreign jurisdictions---A right to reasoned decision has become, over time, to be an indispensable part of a system based on judicial review and is considered to be an integral part of fairness and justice now---Notably, the requirement to give reasons has advantages and the necessary disadvantages associated with it---However, the advantages clearly outweigh the disadvantages of such a requirement, and as such the requirement is deemed to be an essential part of any system of law---In India, there is no specific statute governing such administrative decisions, the general rule is that a purely administrative authority has no requirement to state reasons for its actions or the determination it has reached---However, to establish the balance between claims of individual justice and administrative flexibility, the courts in India have grafted exceptions to this rule, observing that an administrative authority shall record and furnish reasons for its decisions; one, where the body is quasi-judicial; two, where the decision would affect the civil rights of the individual; three, by bringing such decisions within the purview of judicial review and lastly, four, by incorporating the requirement of reasons to be an integral part of principles of natural justice---Thus, in India, an administrative body is required to give reasons for its decision based on the broad heads of grounds namely, statutory and constitutional perspective and vision of reasoned decision as a facet of natural justice. (i) Judicial review--- ----Reasons for a decision, non-providing of---English perspective---In English law, even if provisions of relevant law provides that the decision maker “shall not be required to assign any reason” yet such provisions does not prevent the Court to exercise its power of judicial review on the usual traditional grounds; the fact that the decision is not subject to appeal or review does not affect the obligation of the decision maker to be fair---Thus, under English Law, though there is no general duty to give reasons, however, it can be seen that the position has been evolving to cast a more expansive duty on decision makers to accord reasons for their decisions---Yet it cannot be said that there is a duty in all cases to do so---Of course, the position under English law is distinguishable from our law because in Pakistan as by virtue of S.24A of General Clauses Act, 1897 , this duty has been accorded statutory recognition and thus would necessarily make it of a wider import than under English law. R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Fayed (1997) 1All ER 228, 230;. Ex Parte Fayed and Attorney-General v. Ryan (1980) AC 718 PC; [Doody (1993) 3 All ER 92, 110; R v Civil Service Appeal Board, ex parte Cunningham [1991] 4 All ER 310 (CA) and R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Fayed [1997] 1 All ER 228 (CA), 248) ref. (j) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----S. 74---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Order passed under S.74 of the Sales Tax Act , 1990---Opportunity of hearing, non-affording of---Judicial review---Grievance of the petitioners was that they had not even been heard before passing the impugned order---Validity---Such course of action was fatal to the vires of the impugned Order---The days when it used to be said that a person seeking even a privilege was not entitled to be heard were long gone---It is hard to see how the High Courts can fulfill their judicial review responsibility under Art. 199 of the Constitution, which is a responsibility to see that public authorities keep within the limits of their authority and act lawfully, unless the decisions impugned before the High Court(s) contain the reasons for them---Thus, the impugned order being devoid of any reasons, having been issued without an opportunity of hearing, which could not withstand any test of due process and administration of justice---High Court set-aside the impugned order with the result that the Show-Cause Notices issued on the basis of the impugned order were declared bad in law and of no legal effect---Constitutional petition, filed by Company / Registered Person, was allowed accordingly. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery (318 US 80) ref. Muhammad Shoaib Rashid and Minahil Khan for Petitioner. Shahjahan Khan for Respondents. Date of hearing: 17th April, 2025.

Summary: Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----Ss.11, 26, 33 & 47---Reference---Imposing of maximum penalty---Non-filing of sales tax returns---Element of mens rea, absence of---Effect---Petitioner / taxpayer was aggrieved of show cause notice issued by authorities under S. 11(1) of Sales Tax Act, 1990 with regard to imposing of penalty for alleged violation of non-filing of certain sales tax returns---Validity---When there was violation of S. 26 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 only then provision of S. 33 (1) of Sales Tax Act, 1990 was relevant---No separate show-cause notice for violation of S. 26 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 was issued---There was no corresponding amendment in S. 33 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 therefore, general principle of law i.e. for imposition of penalty an element of mens rea must be present was attracted---There was no apparent element of mens rea on the part of applicant / taxpayer in non-filing of its sales tax returns for period in question---There was no short levied amount of sale tax determined against applicant / taxpayer, therefore, maximum penalty so imposed could not be sustained---High Court set aside orders passed by the forums below---Reference was allowed, in circumstances. Haris Trading Co. v. Deputy Collector of Customs, Export 2021 PTD 1901; Messrs Khatri Brothers v. Federation of Pakistan and 3 others 2014 PTD 966; Commissioner (Legal Division) v. Pakistan Services Limited 2023 PTD 773; Pakistan International Airlines Corporation v. Collector of Customs (Preventive), Karachi Special Customs Appeal No. 30 of 2004; Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Byco Petroleum Pakistan Ltd. (C.P. No.122-K of 2022); Pakistan through the Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Rawalpindi and others v. Hardcastle Waud (Pakistan) Ltd., Karachi PLD 1967 SC 1; D.G. Khan Cement Company Ltd., The Federation of Pakistan and others 2004 SCMR 456; Deputy Collector of Customs v. ICI Pakistan 2006 SCMR 626; Coca Cola Beverages Ltd. v. Customs and Excise Appellate Tribunal 2017 PTD 2380; Shamroz Khan v. Muhammad Amin PLD 1978 SC 89 and G.M. Pakistan Railways v. Muhammad Rafique 2013 SCMR 372 rel. Taimoor Ahmed Qureshi for Applicant. Barrister Syed Ahsan Ali Shah for Respondent. Date of hearing: 16th April, 2025.

Summary: Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----Ss. 14, 25 & 47---Sales Tax Rules, 2006, Rr.5(3) & 7---Reference---Audit and analysis of data---Distinction---Applicant / taxpayer was aggrieved of issuance of show-cause notice by authorities alleging misclassification and evasion / short-payment of sales tax on the basis of analysis of data / desk audit---Validity---Audit must be conducted under S. 25 of Sales Tax Act, 1990---‘Desk audit’ or mere ‘analysis of data’ is not a substitute for a proper audit under law---Such analysis may generate information that can lead to a proper audit under S. 25 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 but it cannot itself be the basis for imposition of tax liability---No notice for audit under S. 25 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 read with STGO No. 3/2004 was ever issued to applicant / taxpayer---Commissioner Inland Revenue, under S. 14 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 and R.5(3) read with R. 7 of Sales Tax Rules, 2006, could have initiated proceedings to alter registration status of applicant / taxpayer---Entire proceedings, from their very inception were without jurisdiction, without lawful authority, void and of no legal effect, as no such notice or proceedings were ever undertaken by authorities---High Court answered the reference in positive and the orders passed by the fora below were set aside, along with all consequential proceedings---Reference was allowed accordingly. Nestle Pakistan Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan 2021 PTD 521; F.M. Textile’s case 2017 PTD 1875; Amanullah Khan’s case 1990 SCMR 1092 and Waseem Ahmed and another v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2014 PTD 1733 ref. Mudassar Malik and Waheed Shahzad for Applicant. Khurram Ghias Khan and Syed Waqas Naqvi for Respondents. Date of hearing: 10th April, 2025.

Summary: (a) Federal Excise Act, 2005 (FEA, 2005) **---S. 3 & S. 7---Sales Tax Act, 1990---Issuance of consolidated show-cause notice under distinct fiscal statutes---Jurisdictional defect---Illegality---Scope---**Petitioners challenged show-cause notices (SCNs) issued under both FEA, 2005 and Sales Tax Act, 1990 through a single, combined instrument---Held, FEA, 2005 and STA, 1990 are separate, independent fiscal statutes with distinct procedural frameworks governing assessment, adjudication, and appeal---Issuance of a consolidated SCN under both Acts is unlawful, without jurisdiction, and contrary to legislative intent---Tax proceedings must be conducted under the distinct authority of each statute---Conflation of two separate taxing statutes into a single SCN vitiates due process and renders the notice void ab initio. Cited Cases: • Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Rose Food Industries 2023 SCMR 2070 • Cement Company Ltd. v. CIR (Appeals-II), Karachi 2018 PTD 388 • CIR v. Allied Stainless Steel Industries 2022 PTD 1930 • PLD 1964 SC 113 (Muhammad Younus v. CBR) (b) Constitution of Pakistan **---Arts. 4, 10-A & 199---Show-cause notice---Maintainability of constitutional petition---Exception to bar---Scope---**Petitioners challenged SCNs on grounds of being ultra vires, jurisdictionally defective, and issued without statutory authority---Held, although ordinarily writ petitions are not entertained against SCNs, an exception exists where the notice is patently without jurisdiction or issued in violation of law---Court can exercise constitutional jurisdiction to prevent abuse of power and denial of fair trial---Where SCN is issued without authority under relevant law or combines distinct statutory regimes, such illegality justifies intervention under Art. 199. Cited Cases: • Pakistan Oilfields Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan 2020 PTD 110 (IHC) • Gatron Industries Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan 1999 SCMR 1072 • Chairman NAB v. Nasar Ullah PLD 2022 SC 497 • Federation of Pakistan v. E-Movers (Pvt.) Ltd. 2022 SCMR 1021 (c) Tax Law & Procedure **---Due process---Specificity of charge---Requirement of fair adjudication---Scope---**Held, SCNs must contain precise allegations, specific statutory references, and must not rely on vague or inconclusive secondary data---Issuance of SCN must be backed by jurisdiction, law, and procedural propriety---Any action without adherence to statutory framework violates due process and cannot be sustained in law---Combined SCN, based on inconclusive data and arbitrary authority, denied petitioners the right to a fair opportunity of defence. Cited Cases: • Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Millat Tractors Ltd. 2024 SCMR 700 • Federation of Pakistan v. M/s Hashwani Hotels Ltd. PLD 1990 SC 68 • M/s Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Govt. of Sindh 1993 SCMR 920 (d) Fiscal Statutes Interpretation **---Strict construction---No room for intendment---Scope---**Held, fiscal laws must be interpreted strictly; no tax can be imposed or collected unless clearly authorized by statute---No implied authority exists to issue consolidated SCNs across different taxing regimes unless expressly provided---Any departure from explicit procedure vitiates the legality of the entire proceedings. Cited Cases: • Govt. of West Pakistan v. M/s Jabees Ltd. PLD 1991 SC 870 • CIT v. Mst. Khatija Begum PLD 1965 SC 472 (e) Administrative Law **---Ultra vires action---Public authority acting beyond conferred powers---Scope---**Held, a statutory authority cannot act outside the limits prescribed by law---Any attempt to combine powers not authorized by statute renders such action void---The department retains liberty to issue fresh notices under respective laws but must adhere to procedural safeguards. Disposition: Writ Petition No.2399/2016 and connected petitions allowed; consolidated SCNs declared unlawful, without jurisdiction, and void ab initio. Connected Cases (Annex-A): • W.P. No. 2400/2016 • W.P. No. 2565/2016 • W.P. No. 2571/2016 • W.P. No. 909/2017 • W.P. No. 50/2021