Summary: (a) Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 (PEEDA) ---- ----Ss. 4(1)(c), 13(3), (4) & (5)—Show-cause notice—Minimum legal requirements—Fair trial and due process—Deputy Commissioner, Muzaffargarh, withdrew petitioner’s promotion and selection grade granted in 2005, on the basis of a defective show-cause notice—Held, notice lacked particulars of charge, proposed penalty, statutory provision invoked, and copy of inquiry report; such omission offended the essentials of S.13(4), PEEDA and the principle of audi alteram partem—A notice void for vagueness cannot sustain disciplinary proceedings—Right to fair hearing under Art.10-A, Constitution, violated. Sana Ullah Sani v. Secretary Education Schools (2024 SCMR 80) and Muhammad Arshad v. Deputy District Food, Multan (2025 SCP 227), followed. (b) Administrative law ---- ----Natural justice—Scope—Administrative, quasi-judicial, or disciplinary actions affecting vested rights must conform to natural justice—Failure to provide clear notice, opportunity of explanation, and disclosure of inquiry findings vitiates the proceedings. Mall Syare Residents Association v. Mall Developers (PLD 1997 Karachi 1) and Chief Commissioner Karachi v. Dina Sohrab Katrik (PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 45), applied. (c) Doctrine of locus poenitentiae ---- ----Withdrawal of long-standing promotion—Vested rights—Once a lawful administrative order confers benefits, acted upon for years, it cannot be withdrawn unless illegality or incompetence is shown—Petitioner’s promotion of 2005 had been validly granted and implemented; withdrawal in 2018 was hit by locus poenitentiae—State barred from revisiting concluded administrative matters absent proven fraud or lack of jurisdiction. Mst. Basharat Jehan v. DG FGEI (C/Q) (2015 SCMR 1418), Govt. of Punjab v. Aamir Junaid (2015 SCMR 74), Flt Lt (R) Farrukh Rashid (2008 SCMR 544), followed. (d) Disciplinary proceedings ---- ----Penalty—Competence and proportionality—Withdrawal of promotion and reversion not a punishment prescribed under S.4, PEEDA—Recovery of benefits requires proof of quantified loss and causal misconduct—Absent such findings, withdrawal and recovery orders are without lawful authority—Shams-ur-Rahman v. Military Accountant General (2020 SCMR 188), applied. (e) Inquiry proceedings ---- ----Partial and discriminatory inquiry—Failure to examine signatory of original promotion order or members of Departmental Promotion Committee—Proceedings one-sided, violative of fair trial and natural justice; rendered void. Held, proceedings under PEEDA and impugned withdrawal order were void ab initio; locus poenitentiae protected the petitioner’s vested rights. Petition converted into appeal and allowed; Punjab Service Tribunal’s judgment dated 15.03.2022 set aside; order dated 01.10.2018 and connected proceedings declared unlawful; promotion and selection grade restored with consequential arrears to be paid within sixty days.

Summary: (a) Civil service- -Ante-dated / proforma promotion-Successive super sessions on the basis of adverse remarks-Grant of promotion in the year 2020 after expunction of adverse remarks-Representation for proforma promotion filed by the respondent/employee before appellant-department was rejected, whereas, the appeal preferred before Federal Service Tribunal was accepted-Contention of the department was that respondent never challenged the DPC decision for 2015 to 2019 and as those orders of the supersession still subsist, he could not now claim ante-dated or proforma promotion-Validity-Once the adverse remarks were expunged by the Tribunal and that finding was upheld by the Supreme Court, they ceased to exist in the service record ab initio and in the eyes of law they were deemed never to have been recorded, thus, any supersession resting entirely on those remarks collapsed with them-Orders of supersession were derivative and consequential in nature; once their premise was extinguished, they stood denuded of all legal effect-Non-challenge to such supersession orders, therefore, carried no independent significance-One cannot be compelled to challenge a shadow of decision whose substratum has been judicially erased-Insistence that the respondent should have separately impugned those orders amounts to requiring a meaningless formality; an exercise in futility that the law does not demand-Leave to appeal was refused-Civil petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Abdul Ghani Chaudhry v. Secretary Establishment, Islamabad and others 1998 SCMR 2544 Distinguished. (b) Administration of justice- -When the foundation of an administrative order disappears, the superstructure built upon it cannot survive.

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 02.11.2022 of the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad in Appeal No. 813(R)CS of 2021). (a) Civil service--- ----Ante-dated / proforma promotion---Successive super sessions on the basis of adverse remarks---Grant of promotion in the year 2020 after expunction of adverse remarks---Representation for proforma promotion filed by the respondent/employee before appellant-department was rejected, whereas, the appeal preferred before Federal Service Tribunal was accepted---Contention of the department was that respondent never challenged the DPC decision for 2015 to 2019 and as those orders of the supersession still subsist, he could not now claim ante-dated or proforma promotion---Validity---Once the adverse remarks were expunged by the Tribunal and that finding was upheld by the Supreme Court, they ceased to exist in the service record ab initio and in the eyes of law they were deemed never to have been recorded, thus, any supersession resting entirely on those remarks collapsed with them---Orders of supersession were derivative and consequential in nature; once their premise was extinguished, they stood denuded of all legal effect---Non-challenge to such supersession orders, therefore, carried no independent significance---One cannot be compelled to challenge a shadow of decision whose substratum has been judicially erased---Insistence that the respondent should have separately impugned those orders amounts to requiring a meaningless formality; an exercise in futility that the law does not demand---Leave to appeal was refused---Civil petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Abdul Ghani Chaudhry v. Secretary Establishment, Islamabad and others 1998 SCMR 2544 Distinguished. (b) Administration of justice--- ----When the foundation of an administrative order disappears, the superstructure built upon it cannot survive. Barrister Umer Aslam Khan, Additional Attorney General Pakistan for Petitioners. Zubair Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent. Date of hearing: 13th October, 2025.

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 02.11.2022 of the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad in Appeal No. 813(R)CS of 2021). (a) Civil service--- ----Ante-dated / proforma promotion---Successive super sessions on the basis of adverse remarks---Grant of promotion in the year 2020 after expunction of adverse remarks---Representation for proforma promotion filed by the respondent/employee before appellant-department was rejected, whereas, the appeal preferred before Federal Service Tribunal was accepted---Contention of the department was that respondent never challenged the DPC decision for 2015 to 2019 and as those orders of the supersession still subsist, he could not now claim ante-dated or proforma promotion---Validity---Once the adverse remarks were expunged by the Tribunal and that finding was upheld by the Supreme Court, they ceased to exist in the service record ab initio and in the eyes of law they were deemed never to have been recorded, thus, any supersession resting entirely on those remarks collapsed with them---Orders of supersession were derivative and consequential in nature; once their premise was extinguished, they stood denuded of all legal effect---Non-challenge to such supersession orders, therefore, carried no independent significance---One cannot be compelled to challenge a shadow of decision whose substratum has been judicially erased---Insistence that the respondent should have separately impugned those orders amounts to requiring a meaningless formality; an exercise in futility that the law does not demand---Leave to appeal was refused---Civil petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Abdul Ghani Chaudhry v. Secretary Establishment, Islamabad and others 1998 SCMR 2544 Distinguished. (b) Administration of justice--- ----When the foundation of an administrative order disappears, the superstructure built upon it cannot survive. Barrister Umer Aslam Khan, Additional Attorney General Pakistan for Petitioners. Zubair Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent. Date of hearing: 13th October, 2025.

Summary: (a) Service Law ----Adverse remarks—Promotion—Supersession—Effect of expunged adverse remarks on subsequent DPC decisions—Held: Once adverse remarks recorded in the respondent’s Annual Confidential Report were judicially set aside by the Federal Service Tribunal and the judgment attained finality up to the Supreme Court, such remarks stood obliterated from the service record ab initio. Any supersession based solely on those remarks automatically lost legal effect. Administrative orders resting on a foundation that has ceased to exist cannot survive. Non-challenge to individual DPC supersession orders, being derivative in nature, is of no consequence; law does not require a futile challenge to orders whose substratum has already been judicially extinguished. (b) Service Law ----Limitation—Condonation of delay—Tribunal’s discretion—Departmental representation filed after limitation period—Held: The Federal Service Tribunal recorded sufficient cause and exercised discretion judiciously in condoning the delay considering factual circumstances including security and access constraints of the respondent’s posting—No jurisdictional or legal error shown; interference by the Supreme Court unwarranted. (c) Promotion—Ante-dated or pro-forma promotion—Entitlement—Where adverse remarks forming the sole basis of supersession are subsequently expunged, the officer’s right to promotion relates back to the date he first became eligible—The respondent, having been wrongly superseded on a ground later declared void, was rightly granted promotion from 2015, when his entitlement first matured. (d) Case Distinction— Abdul Ghani Chaudhry v. Secretary Establishment (1998 SCMR 2544) distinguished; that case did not involve the setting aside of adverse remarks forming the foundation of supersession, hence its ratio inapplicable to the present facts. Cited Cases: • Abdul Ghani Chaudhry v. Secretary Establishment, Islamabad & others, 1998 SCMR 2544 (distinguished) Disposition: Leave to appeal declined—Petition dismissed—Federal Service Tribunal judgment dated 02.11.2022 upheld; respondent entitled to promotion retrospectively from 27.07.2015.

Summary: (a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 2011-Sanaullah Sani v. Secretary Education Schools and others 2024 SCMR 80 rel. Cecil Hicks, District Attorney for County of Orange, California, Acting on Behalf of Alta Sue Feiock v. Phillip William Feiock. 485 U.S. 624; United States v. United Mine Workers of America 330 U.S. 258 and Salvatore Shillitani v. United States of America 384 U.S. 364, 1966 ref. (b) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 2011- -R.2(1)(l)-Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police Rules, 1975, R.2(iii)-Termination from service-Employee sent to civil prison in execution of a civil liability-Civil imprisonment considered as a ‘conviction’ by department by terming it as misconduct-Legality-Misconduct-Scope-In case a civil servant has been sent to civil prison on his failure to deposit the decretal amount pursuant to a judgment or decree in a civil suit, it does not fall within the definition of misconduct, for the reason that civil servant is not charged for any moral offence, nor is convicted by Court of law for a criminal offence. Muhammad Arshad v. Deputy District Food, Multan and others C.P.L.A. No. 1919-L/2016 rel. Assisted by: Ms. Zainab Bashir, Judicial Law Clerk, Supreme Court of Pakistan.

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 28.02.2023 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Mingora Bench in W.P. No. 665-M of 2022). (a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 2011--- ----R.2(1)(l)---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police Rules, 1975, R.2(iii)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.51---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.185(3)---Employee of police department terminated from service on account of him being sent to civil prison under an execution of a civil liability---Department considering such civil imprisonment as conviction---Legality---Non-mentioning of the relevant law under which the employee being proceeded---Effect---Departmental proceedings would be unlawful on this score alone---Brief facts of the matter were that the respondent was appointed as a ‘special police officer’ and was removed from service after being sent to civil prison for non-payment of a decretal amount arising from execution proceedings---He was reinstated by High Court for a fresh inquiry, after which the department again terminated him on the basis that his civil imprisonment amounted to misconduct---High Court set aside this second termination and reinstated him---The core legal question requiring determination before the Supreme Court was “whether civil imprisonment under execution proceedings of a civil liability amounted to a ‘conviction’ for purposes of service law, thereby justifying dismissal from service”?---Held: Respondent was issued the charge-sheet and statement of allegations while treating the period of three months when the respondent remained in the civil prison as period of conviction---The department while proceeding against the respondent failed to make mention of the law or the rules under which the departmental proceedings were initiated against the respondent---There was no mention of any law or the rules neither in the charge-sheet, statement of allegation, nor in show cause notice and in the order of the competent authority---This fact alone was sufficient to declare the entire proceedings initiated by the department against the respondent as nullity in the eyes of law for the reason that the respondent was not confronted with the relevant law and the rule according to which respondent was held liable to be proceeded and dismissed from service---From perusal of definition of the term "conviction" as defined in dictionaries it emerged that conviction was the result of a criminal trial in respect of a criminal offence and did not relate to civil proceedings---Therefore, even if a civil servant was sent to civil prison pursuant to execution proceedings in a civil suit it could not amount to his conviction---Moreover, the primary objective of arrest and detention under Section 51(c), C.P.C., was to recover the decretal amount and not to punish the judgment-debtor---Civil imprisonment/detention was not a punitive measure but a coercive and remedial tool to enforce orders and decrees of the court and could be purged upon compliance of the court order---Civil imprisonment as a consequence of execution of a civil liability did not amount to conviction, and, therefore, did not affect the terms and conditions of service of the civil servant---The impugned judgment passed by the High Court was unexceptionable---Present petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and dismissed. Sanaullah Sani v. Secretary Education Schools and others 2024 SCMR 80 rel. Cecil Hicks, District Attorney for County of Orange, California, Acting on Behalf of Alta Sue Feiock v. Phillip William Feiock. 485 U.S. 624; United States v. United Mine Workers of America 330 U.S. 258 and Salvatore Shillitani v. United States of America 384 U.S. 364, 1966 ref. (b) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 2011--- ----R.2(1)(l)---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police Rules, 1975, R.2(iii)---Termination from service---Employee sent to civil prison in execution of a civil liability---Civil imprisonment considered as a ‘conviction’ by department by terming it as misconduct---Legality---Misconduct---Scope---In case a civil servant has been sent to civil prison on his failure to deposit the decretal amount pursuant to a judgment or decree in a civil suit, it does not fall within the definition of misconduct, for the reason that civil servant is not charged for any moral offence, nor is convicted by Court of law for a criminal offence. Muhammad Arshad v. Deputy District Food, Multan and others C.P.L.A. No. 1919-L/2016 rel. Zahid Yousaf Qureshi, Advocate-on-Record for AG Khyber Pakhtunkhwa along with Shakirullah S.O (Home) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa along with Muslim Shah, DSP for Petitioners. Amicus Curiae: Syed Ghulam Shabir Shah, Advocate Supreme Court. Nemo for Respondent. Assisted by: Ms. Zainab Bashir, Judicial Law Clerk, Supreme Court of Pakistan. Date of hearing: 9th October, 2025. (i) conduct prejudicial to good order or service discipline; or

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 28.02.2023 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Mingora Bench in W.P. No. 665-M of 2022). (a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 2011--- ----R.2(1)(l)---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police Rules, 1975, R.2(iii)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.51---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.185(3)---Employee of police department terminated from service on account of him being sent to civil prison under an execution of a civil liability---Department considering such civil imprisonment as conviction---Legality---Non-mentioning of the relevant law under which the employee being proceeded---Effect---Departmental proceedings would be unlawful on this score alone---Brief facts of the matter were that the respondent was appointed as a ‘special police officer’ and was removed from service after being sent to civil prison for non-payment of a decretal amount arising from execution proceedings---He was reinstated by High Court for a fresh inquiry, after which the department again terminated him on the basis that his civil imprisonment amounted to misconduct---High Court set aside this second termination and reinstated him---The core legal question requiring determination before the Supreme Court was “whether civil imprisonment under execution proceedings of a civil liability amounted to a ‘conviction’ for purposes of service law, thereby justifying dismissal from service”?---Held: Respondent was issued the charge-sheet and statement of allegations while treating the period of three months when the respondent remained in the civil prison as period of conviction---The department while proceeding against the respondent failed to make mention of the law or the rules under which the departmental proceedings were initiated against the respondent---There was no mention of any law or the rules neither in the charge-sheet, statement of allegation, nor in show cause notice and in the order of the competent authority---This fact alone was sufficient to declare the entire proceedings initiated by the department against the respondent as nullity in the eyes of law for the reason that the respondent was not confronted with the relevant law and the rule according to which respondent was held liable to be proceeded and dismissed from service---From perusal of definition of the term "conviction" as defined in dictionaries it emerged that conviction was the result of a criminal trial in respect of a criminal offence and did not relate to civil proceedings---Therefore, even if a civil servant was sent to civil prison pursuant to execution proceedings in a civil suit it could not amount to his conviction---Moreover, the primary objective of arrest and detention under Section 51(c), C.P.C., was to recover the decretal amount and not to punish the judgment-debtor---Civil imprisonment/detention was not a punitive measure but a coercive and remedial tool to enforce orders and decrees of the court and could be purged upon compliance of the court order---Civil imprisonment as a consequence of execution of a civil liability did not amount to conviction, and, therefore, did not affect the terms and conditions of service of the civil servant---The impugned judgment passed by the High Court was unexceptionable---Present petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and dismissed. Sanaullah Sani v. Secretary Education Schools and others 2024 SCMR 80 rel. Cecil Hicks, District Attorney for County of Orange, California, Acting on Behalf of Alta Sue Feiock v. Phillip William Feiock. 485 U.S. 624; United States v. United Mine Workers of America 330 U.S. 258 and Salvatore Shillitani v. United States of America 384 U.S. 364, 1966 ref. (b) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 2011--- ----R.2(1)(l)---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police Rules, 1975, R.2(iii)---Termination from service---Employee sent to civil prison in execution of a civil liability---Civil imprisonment considered as a ‘conviction’ by department by terming it as misconduct---Legality---Misconduct---Scope---In case a civil servant has been sent to civil prison on his failure to deposit the decretal amount pursuant to a judgment or decree in a civil suit, it does not fall within the definition of misconduct, for the reason that civil servant is not charged for any moral offence, nor is convicted by Court of law for a criminal offence. Muhammad Arshad v. Deputy District Food, Multan and others C.P.L.A. No. 1919-L/2016 rel. Zahid Yousaf Qureshi, Advocate-on-Record for AG Khyber Pakhtunkhwa along with Shakirullah S.O (Home) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa along with Muslim Shah, DSP for Petitioners. Amicus Curiae: Syed Ghulam Shabir Shah, Advocate Supreme Court. Nemo for Respondent. Assisted by: Ms. Zainab Bashir, Judicial Law Clerk, Supreme Court of Pakistan. Date of hearing: 9th October, 2025. (i) conduct prejudicial to good order or service discipline; or

Summary: The Punjab Civil Servants Recruitment (Relaxation of Upper Age) Rules, 1976 are not applicable to the candidates for recruitment of Sub-Inspector (Direct/Initial Recruitments) in Police Department regarding relaxation of upper age limit. 205Crl. Misc. 106558/17 Muhammad Rashid Vs ASJ Sargodha etc. Mr. Justice Muhammad Jawad Zafar 08- 10- 2025 2025 LHC 7168

Summary: (a) Service law ---- ----Civil imprisonment in execution proceedings—Whether amounts to “conviction” for service consequences—Held, no—Detention as a judgment-debtor under S.51, C.P.C. is a coercive civil measure to enforce a decree, not a penal sentence following a criminal trial; the term “conviction” in service law is reserved for a formal finding of guilt in criminal proceedings—Civil imprisonment, therefore, neither constitutes “conviction” nor, per se, affects terms and conditions of service. (b) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Government Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 2011, R.2(l) & R.8; Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police Rules, 1975, R.2(iii) ---- ----“Misconduct” and dismissal on conviction—Scope—Where the only imputation against a police S.P.O. was civil imprisonment for non-payment of a civil decree, the case did not fall within “conviction for a moral offence” or any other head of “misconduct” under the 2011 Rules/1975 Rules—Civil detention cannot be equated with criminal conviction; dismissal on that basis was without lawful foundation. (c) Disciplinary proceedings ---- ----Foundational legality, notice of rule-basis, due process, and proportionality—Charge-sheet, statement of allegations, show-cause and the final order did not cite the governing law/rules under which proceedings were initiated—Such omission vitiates the proceedings as a nullity; every step in discipline must align with natural justice and procedural fairness, failing which the ultimate order is liable to be set aside. Sanaullah Sani v. Secretary Education Schools (2024 SCMR 80) and order dated 16.05.2025 in CPLA No.1919-L/2016 (Muhammad Arshad v. Deputy District Food, Multan), applied. (d) Prisons Act, 1894—Definitions—“Criminal prisoner”, “convicted criminal prisoner” and “civil prisoner”—Read with S.51, C.P.C.—Distinction reaffirmed—Civil prisoner is not committed under criminal jurisdiction; object is compliance with decree, not punishment—Comparative jurisprudence also recognizes civil confinement as coercive/remedial, purgeable upon compliance (references noted by Court). (e) Police service—Lending/borrowing and private liabilities—Department may, in appropriate cases, examine underlying conduct under general “misconduct” heads (including Conduct Rules) only through a regular inquiry affording due process and applying proportionality; mere civil default or temporary civil detention, without more, cannot justify major penalty. Held, civil imprisonment arising from execution of a civil liability does not amount to “conviction” for service law purposes; the High Court rightly set aside the removal and ordered reinstatement. Petition converted into appeal and dismissed; personal costs imposed upon the District Police Officer reduced to Rs.50,000 to be deducted from salary. Cited cases: • Sanaullah Sani v. Secretary Education Schools (2024 SCMR 80) • Muhammad Arshad v. Deputy District Food, Multan (order dated 16.05.2025, CPLA No.1919-L/2016) [Comparative references noted: Cecil Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624; United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258; Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364]