Summary: Eye witness, not named in the FIR, can be believed if otherwise found truthful and confidence inspiring.

Summary: Sec. 497 CrPC Accused was admitted to bail as his case was one of further inquiry under Sec. 497 CrPC.

Summary: Art. 199, 247(7) Constitution of Pakistan 1973 conviction u/c CNSA. political authorities are competent to punish accused for offences under CNSA. Jurisdiction of High court has been ousted in matter related to FATA by virtue of Art. 247(7)

Summary: -The function of DDAC in development works in a district. - Executive Authority of the Provincial Govt.

Summary: When organization or institute has its own statutory rules then it cannot use general law as shield for denying or refusing the person entitled for the relief under its own rules,sub section 2 of section 46-C of university of science and technology, Bannu entitled the petitioners, who appointed under this section, that he shall not be less favorable then those admissible to him immediately before such appointment and shall be entitled to all benefits of his post of service.

Summary: In this case, the central issue revolves around whether a banking court, as defined in the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, has the authority to restore a lawsuit that was dismissed due to non-prosecution. This judgment also has implications for similar cases. There have been conflicting views on this matter in previous court decisions.The judgment discusses the distinction between final orders and interlocutory orders. Final orders completely dispose of a case, while interlocutory orders address procedural matters and do not determine the case's merits. The judgment examines whether an order dismissing a lawsuit for non-prosecution is considered a final order and subject to appeal under the Ordinance.The court looks into the relevant sections of the Ordinance, particularly Sections 22 and 27, to determine the scope of final orders. It concludes that orders dismissing suits for non-prosecution are interlocutory in nature, as they pertain to procedural issues and do not finally decide the case's substance. Consequently, the court holds that such orders can be recalled using the provisions of Order IX Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC).Furthermore, the judgment emphasizes the importance of expeditious disposal of banking cases and notes that the legislature intended to restrict the right to appeal against interlocutory orders in the interest of timely resolution.In summary, the judgment clarifies the distinction between final and interlocutory orders and asserts that orders dismissing suits for non-prosecution fall into the latter category. This allows for the possibility of recalling such orders under the CPC, rather than appealing them under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.

Summary: The case involves M/s Sefam (Pvt.) Ltd., a private company engaged in exporting and selling textile products in Pakistan and abroad under various brand names.The issue arose when it was discovered during a sales tax audit that the company was diverting a significant portion of its sales proceeds to a secret bank account held at Standard Chartered Bank Limited, Shadman Branch, Lahore, in the names of Aftab Ahmad and Asif Mehmood, without disclosing this account in its financial records. The auditors also found that the company's various outlets were sending their sale receipts to the head office, with some proceeds deposited into the company's official account and others into the undisclosed Benami account.Based on this information, the tax authorities initiated proceedings against the company under Section 122(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and issued a Show Cause Notice under Sections 122(9)/122(1). The company's response was deemed unsatisfactory, leading to an order dated 30-6-2011, which determined that the company had suppressed sales amounting to Rs. 194,955,973 and made an addition to its income under Section 111 accordingly.The company appealed this decision, and the Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the order. However, the Tribunal, in its order dated 25-6-2012, ruled in favor of the company, stating that there was no "definite information" to justify proceedings against the company under Section 122(5) and that the addition made under Section 111(1)(b) was unlawful as it was based on Section 111(1)(d), which was added through the Finance Act, 2011, and could not be applied retrospectively to the company's case, which pertained to Tax Year-2005.The tax department then filed a reference application before the Lahore High Court, presenting two main questions for determination:Whether the Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that the transfer of sale proceeds from the company's branches to employees' bank accounts did not constitute "definite information" under Section 122 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.Whether the addition made under Section 111(1)(b) was unlawful based on the provisions of Section 111(1)(d), which was inserted through the Finance Act, 2011.The court concluded that the material obtained during the sales tax audit qualified as "definite information" under Section 122(5) and that the company's case fell under Section 111(1)(b), not Section 111(1)(d). Therefore, the court allowed the tax department's application.

Summary: The definition of "supply" in Section 2(33) of the Act is inclusive and covers cases where goods are acquired, produced, or manufactured in the course of business and are used for private, business, or non-business purposes.The court referred to the definition of "business" as any trading activity conducted regularly with the intent to make a profit. The term "in the course of" implies a connection or nexus with the business. "Goods" include movable property other than certain specified items.The court also emphasized that the liability for sales tax is determined based on the value of taxable supply and arises when a supply is made in the course or furtherance of business.The main issue in this case was whether the supply of LPG cylinders, which were determined to be taxable supplies, was subject to sales tax under Section 3(1) of the Act. The argument made by the petitioner that LPG cylinders were for their own use and not subject to tax was rejected, as previous court decisions held that even supplies for a company's internal use are subject to tax if they are made in the course and furtherance of business.The court also discussed the valuation of taxable supplies, stating that the value of supply is essentially the consideration received by the supplier for the supply, including all taxes except sales tax. It was determined that, in this case, the value of supply should be determined using the open market price under Section 2(46)(c) of the Act.The court noted that while the Revenue had relied on sale receipts from certain distributors, those receipts were dated after the relevant period. Thus, the matter was remanded to the Adjudicating Officer for the determination of the market price based on relevant factors.Additionally, the court mentioned that a committee had recommended a minimum assessable value for empty LPG cylinders, and this report should be considered by the Adjudicating Officer for valuation purposes.In conclusion, the court partly allowed the application, with the case being remanded for the determination of the market price for LPG cylinders in accordance with the Sales Tax Act, 1990.

Summary: This order pertains to a legal case involving Italfarmaco S.P.A and Himont Pharmaceuticals. Italfarmaco S.P.A filed an application under Section 90(1)(b)(i) and Section 80(4) of the Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001, seeking a declaration of invalidity of the trademark FERPLEX registered in Himont Pharmaceuticals' name for pharmaceutical preparations used as iron supplements. The application claims that Himont's registration of the trademark is invalid.The background of the case involves a license agreement executed in 1994 between Italfarmaco S.P.A and Himont Pharmaceuticals, which allowed Himont to manufacture and sell products under the FERPLEX trademark. The license agreement was terminated by Italfarmaco S.P.A in 2009. Himont contested this termination and initiated a lawsuit against Italfarmaco S.P.A in the District Court, Lahore.In response, Italfarmaco S.P.A filed an application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) and another application under Order XXXIX, Rule 4 CPC, seeking various reliefs related to the FERPLEX trademark, including recalling products, removing signs, and transferring marketing approvals.The key issue addressed in this order is whether Italfarmaco S.P.A's application for the declaration of invalidity of the FERPLEX trademark should be heard in the High Court or District Court. The legal provision in question is Section 80(4) of the Trade Marks Ordinance, which states that an application for declaration of invalidity can be made to the Registrar, High Court, or District Court, with certain exceptions.Himont argued that since proceedings related to the trademark were already pending in the District Court, Lahore, Italfarmaco S.P.A's application should have been filed there. The order explains that the term "proceedings" encompasses all cases brought before the courts related to the trademark. It concludes that both the District Court cases and Italfarmaco S.P.A's application are "proceedings concerning the trademark in question," thus falling under the exception of Section 80(4) and requiring that they be heard in the District Court.The order emphasizes the legislative intent to avoid conflicting decisions and forum shopping and highlights the importance of consistent judgments in trademark-related cases. It also refers to Section 116 of the Trade Marks Ordinance, which reinforces the need for consistent decision-making on trademark matters.Ultimately, the order allows Italfarmaco S.P.A's application to be returned to be filed before the appropriate forum, which, in this case, is the District Court, Lahore.

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan-------Art.199---Constitutional petition---Permanent resident certificate---Authorities declined toissue permanent resident certificate to petitioners for their admission in Medical College---Plearaised by petitioners was that their family had been residing in Kharan District (Balochistan)since their forefathers---Validity---Petitioners were able to prove that they were bona fideresidents of Kharan and had been residing there since their forefathers---Old Identity Cards ofpetitioners wherein permanent residence of fathers and mothers of petitioners was shown as ofKharan City which cards were issued in years 1995, 1975 and 1990, besides issuance of localcertificate on 24-07-1994 to one of the petitioner's brother---Petition was allowed accordingly.