Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss.42 & 54 --- Balochistan Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967), S.52---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.115---Dispute regarding. inheritance and ownership rights among heirs---Daughters’ entitlement to ancestral property---Recognition and enforcement---Defendants relying on purported family settlement---Presumption of correctness as to entries recorded in record-of-rights---Scope---Respondents Nos. 1 and 2, real sisters and daughters of late “S” (one of the three sons of “WM”), filed a suit for declaration, partition, mesne profits, and permanent injunction regarding several ancestral properties left unpartitioned by “WM”---They alleged that the petitioners, who were descendants of “S’s” brothers “MD” and “B”, continued in possession and collected rent from the inherited properties without recognizing their lawful share under Muhammadan Law, and further attempted to sell portions of the estate---Trial Court decreed the suit in favor of the respondents, which was upheld by the appellate court, leading the petitioners/defendants to file the present civil revision challenging the concurrent findings of both courts below---Held: Admittedly the suit property was recorded in the revenue record in the name of father of respondents Nos.1 and 2, therefore, the petitioners bore a heavy burden to dislodge the inheritance claim of respondents Nos. 1 and 2---Agreement purported to have been entered into between parties was not registered which was a fatal defect---Such agreement was not only vague but also suffered from an inherent defect---Petitioners asserted exclusive purchase of the said property by their late father contrary to the revenue record and stance taken by them in 1971---The presumption of corrections attaching to the jamanbandi remained unrebutted; the admission implicit in the 1971 agreement, read with the doctrine of approbate and reprobate, estopped the party from taking a contrary stance---It was an admitted feature of the case that the suit property was joint property and that the sons of late “WM” and subsequently their legal heirs were entitled to receive their due shares in accordance with law---The defence plea regarding the family settlement was thoroughly examined by the fora below and in view of the multiple contradictions was rightly discarded---Further, it was an admitted fact that allegedly family settlement of 1971 found no reflection in the revenue record and the petitioners only advanced a patchwork of new, contradictory defences when mutation entries were lawfully effected in favour of the daughters of late “S” (respondents Nos. 1 and 2)---No party could be allowed to blow hot and cold in the same breath---Alleged family settlement surfaced only after mutation entries were attested in favour of daughters of respondents Nos. 1 and 2---Such belated and contradictory defenses aimed at depriving female heirs could not be countenanced in law---Women’s inheritance rights were held to be indefeasible and could not be defeated by technical pleas of unsubstantiated settlements---No illegality or irregularity was found in the impugned judgments and decrees of courts below---Civil revision was dismissed with cost of Rs.500,000/-. Mst. Kalsoom Bibi v. Muhammad Amin Agha (Deceased) through L.Rs. 2022 SCMR 929 rel. (b) Balochistan Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)--- ----S.52---Entries in record-of-rights or periodical record---Presumption---Scope---Entries made in the record-of-rights or in periodical record are presumed to be correct and accurate---This presumption remains in place unless compelling documentary evidence is presented to challenge it. (c) Registration Act (XVI of 1908)--- ----Ss.17 & 49---Compulsory registration of a document creating or extinguishing rights in immoveable property---Requirement---If a document / agreement purports to create or extinguish rights in immoveable property then same is compulsorily registrable and in absence of registration it cannot affect immoveable property nor create or extinguish ay right in immoveable property. Behlol Khan Kasi, Abdul Hadi Tareen and Saidal Khan Kakar for Petitioners. Jameel Ahmed Khan Babai for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Amanullah Tareen for Respondents Nos. 3 to 10. Allauddin Kakar, Additional Advocate General for Respondents Nos. 11 and 12. Date of hearing: 27th June, 2025.

Summary: (a) Muslim Family Laws— —Maintenance—Entitlement of wife—Effect of rukhsati or consummation—Scope— Marriage between parties solemnized but rukhsati not effected—Family Court decreed maintenance from date of marriage—Appellate Court enhanced amount—High Court set aside decree holding wife not entitled to maintenance as marriage was unconsummated—Supreme Court held that wife’s entitlement to maintenance flows from solemnization of valid marriage and is not contingent on rukhsati or consummation—Maintenance is a binding legal duty of the husband arising from the marital contract itself—Conditioning maintenance on consummation or rukhsati undermines dignity, equality, and non-discrimination guaranteed by Articles 14, 25 & 35 of the Constitution—Customary practice of rukhsati has no independent legal effect—Precedents: Muhammad Nawaz v. Khurshid Begum (PLD 1972 SC 302), Sardar Muhammad v. Nasima Bibi (PLD 1966 Lah. 703), Najam-ur-Rehman v. Masooma Hassan (2023 CLC 991), and Haseen Ullah v. Mst. Naheed Begum (PLD 2022 SC 686) relied upon. (b) Exceptions— —When may husband be excused from paying maintenance—Burden of proof— Husband may be excused only where he proves through clear and cogent evidence that wife has wholly and unjustifiably withdrawn from the marital relationship including emotional, residential, and relational aspects—Burden lies entirely on husband—Non-cohabitation arising from husband’s failure to provide residence, rukhsati arrangements, agreed dower, or living conditions does not disentitle wife—Wife’s right persists where husband’s own neglect causes absence of consummation—Concept of nushūz (rebellion) to be narrowly construed in line with Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah and constitutional guarantees—Cases referred: Tariq Mehmood v. Farah Shaheen (2010 YLR 349), Muhammad Sharif v. ADJ (2007 SCMR 49), Abdul Fahim v. Mst. Shahnaz Begum (2003 CLC 1450). (c) Constitutional Law— —Articles 14, 25 & 35—Right to dignity, equality, and family protection—Judicial duty to adopt gender-sensitive language— Court emphasized that patriarchal judicial formulations linking maintenance to “surrender,” “submission,” or consummation are inconsistent with constitutional values—Use of gendered, stereotypical expressions undermines equality and dignity of women—Judicial language in family law must affirm equal status of women as autonomous persons—Courts bear constitutional duty to employ rights-based, gender-sensitive reasoning—Precedents: Zahida Parveen v. Govt. of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (2025 SCP 107), Mst. Khurshid Bibi v. Baboo Muhammad Amin (PLD 1967 SC 97). (d) Role of Amicus Curiae— Court recorded appreciation for scholarly assistance of amici curiae (Professor Khaled Abou El Fadl, Dr. Muhammad Zubair Abbasi, and Ms. Fatima Yasmin Bokhari), emphasizing the importance of inclusive and comparative perspectives in matters of public importance and constitutional significance. Cited Cases Muhammad Nawaz v. Khurshid Begum PLD 1972 SC 302 Sardar Muhammad v. Nasima Bibi PLD 1966 Lah. 703 Mst. Khurshid Bibi v. Baboo Muhammad Amin PLD 1967 SC 97 Najam-ur-Rehman v. Masooma Hassan 2023 CLC 991 Haseen Ullah v. Mst. Naheed Begum PLD 2022 SC 686 Tariq Mehmood v. Farah Shaheen 2010 YLR 349 Muhammad Sharif v. ADJ 2007 SCMR 49 Abdul Fahim v. Mst. Shahnaz Begum 2003 CLC 1450 Zahida Parveen v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 2025 SCP 107 Disposition Petition accepted—Impugned judgment set aside—Wife held entitled to maintenance from date of marriage at Rs. 5,000/- per month till dissolution of marriage and including iddat period.

Summary: (a) Punjab Rented Premises Ordinance (XXI of 2007)-[since repealed] -Ss. 5(2), 8 & 9(a)-Punjab Rented Premises Act (VII of 2009), S.15-Eviction petition-Landlord and tenant relationship, existence of-Proof-Requirement of entering the particulars of tenancy with the rent registrar, non-compliance of-Effect-Whether such defect was curable-Landlord-tenant relationship, denial of-Tenant claiming to be owner of rented property by filing a suit for declaration-Effect-Brief facts of the matter were that the appellant (landlady) filed an eviction petition before the rent tribunal seeking respondent No.3’s (tenant) eviction-Rent tribunal allowed eviction and also directed payment of rent arrears-Respondent No.3 (tenant) filed an appeal and appellate court set aside the rent tribunal’s findings by holding that the appellant (landlady) had not proved a landlord-tenant relationship-Against the appellate judgment the appellant filed a constitutional petition which was dismissed and the present appeal before the Supreme Court challenged that dismissal-Held: Section 8 of the 2007 Ordinance provided that an existing landlord and tenant as soon as possible, but not later than two years from the date of coming into force the said Ordinance, had to bring the tenancy in conformity with the provisions of the said Ordinance, whereas, Section 9 of the said Ordinance provided inter alia that if a tenancy did not conform with the provisions of the said Ordinance the rent tribunal could not entertain an application under the said Ordinance on behalf of the landlord, unless he had deposited a fine equivalent to ten percent of the annual value of the rent of the premises in the government treasury-Appellant(landlady) and respondent No. 3 (tenant) had until 16.11.2010, to enter the particulars of the tenancy with the rent registrar so as to make it compliant with the requirements of Section 5(2) of the 2007 Ordinance-This requirement, remained unfulfilled till the present day-The vital question that needed to be determined was whether as a result of such non-compliance, the eviction petition was to be dismissed at the alter or whether an opportunity was to be given to the eviction petitioner to cure such defect-When the eviction petition was filed on 09.01.2008, the two-year grace period within which the tenancy agreement was required to be presented before the rent registrar had not lapsed-Omission to present the tenancy agreement before the rent registrar in accordance with Section 5(2) of the 2007 Ordinance within the two-year grace period could neither render the party seeking eviction of a tenant liable to pay the penalty/fine nor could the eviction petition be rejected on this ground-In the present case, the two-year grace period expired on 16.11.2009 and by that time, the appellant’s eviction petition had not been decided-It was at this stage that either the rent tribunal could have required the appellant (landlady) to bring the tenancy in conformity with the requirements under Section 5(2) or Respondent No. 3 (tenant) could have taken objection as to the non-compliance with the requirements of the said provisions-Neither was done-Once such omission on the appellant’s (landlady’s) part was brought to the notice of the High Court, it ought to have given an opportunity to the appellant to cure the defect by paying the fine in terms of Section 9(a) of the said Ordinance-Impugned judgment of the High Court was not sustainable on this score-With respect to the tenant/respondent No. 3 claiming to be the owner of the rented property, if and when he would succeed to get a decree from the civil court he could have the same executed by getting the possession of the rented property, however, until then he (tenant) could not arrogate to himself the status of the owner-Appellate court erred by requiring the appellant (landlady) to defend her title in the civil suit and unlawfully made this the basis for setting aside the eviction order passed by rent tribunal-It was deemed not proper to remand the matter to the rent tribunal-Impugned judgment passed by the High Court as well as the judgment passed by the appellate court were set aside and the matter was remanded to the appellate court instead of the rent tribunal to decide Respondent No.3’s (tenant) appeal after affording him opportunity to pay the fine contemplated by Section 9(a) of the 2007 Ordinance for not having shown compliance with the requirements of Section 5(2) of the said Ordinance-Present appeal was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Punjab Rented Premises Ordinance (XXI of 2007)-[since repealed] -Ss.5(1), 5(2), 5(3) & 5(5)-Relationship of landlord and tenant, existence of-Proof-Execution and presentation of a tenancy agreement before the rent registrar-Pre-requisite-Requirement-Section 5(1) of the 2007 Ordinance mandated that a landlord shall not rent out a premises to a tenant except by a tenancy agreement, whereas Section 5(2) required a landlord to present the tenancy agreement before the rent registrar-Additionally, Section 5(3) required the rent registrar to enter the particulars of the tenancy in a register, affix his official seal on the tenancy agreement, retain a copy thereof and return the original tenancy agreement to the landlord-It is the entry of the tenancy agreement in the office of the rent registrar which Section 5(5) of the said Ordinance treated as proof of the relationship of landlord and tenant. (c) Punjab Rented Premises Act (VII of 2009)- -S.15-Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.42-Tenant claiming ownership over rented property by filing a suit for declaration-Repercussions-Pendency of a civil suit filed by a tenant claiming to be an owner of rented premises cannot be a ground in an eviction petition either to dismiss or stay the proceedings before the rent tribunal. Mst. Musarrat Shaheen v. Mst. Verbeena Khan Afroz 2024 SCMR 1796; Nisar Khan v. Nadia Ali Butt 2024 SCMR 452; Muhammad Nisar v. Izhar Ahmed Sheikh PLD 2014 SC 347; Abdul Rasheed v. Maqbool Ahmed 2011 SCMR 320; Barkat Masih v. Manzoor Ahmad 2006 SCMR 1068; Jumma Khan v. Zarin Khan PLD 1999 SC 1101; Iqbal v. Rabia Bibi PLD 1991 SC 242 and Rehmatullah v. Ali Muhammad 1983 SCMR 106 rel. (d) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)- -Art.84-Comparison of handwriting or signatures by court-Scope-Court making comparison on its own motion without any expert-Cautious approach-Courts have the power to compare the admitted signatures with the ones in dispute-But the rule of prudence is that comparison of signatures by courts as a mode of ascertaining the truth should be used with great care and caution-Where a Judge compares the handwriting or signatures with other documents which are produced before him and which are not challenged as fabricated, such a process of comparison by the court upon its own initiative and without the guidance of an expert is hazardous and recognizably inconclusive. Sumaira Malik v. Umar Aslam Awan 2018 SCMR 1432 and Rehmat Ali Ismaila v. Khalid Mehmood 2004 SCMR 361 rel. Assisted by: Mehboob Irshad, Law Clerk, Supreme Court of Pakistan.

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 07.05.2012 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in W.P. No. 28906 of 2011). (a) Punjab Rented Premises Ordinance (XXI of 2007)---[since repealed] ----Ss. 5(2), 8 & 9(a)---Punjab Rented Premises Act (VII of 2009), S.15---Eviction petition---Landlord and tenant relationship, existence of--- Proof---Requirement of entering the particulars of tenancy with the rent registrar, non-compliance of---Effect---Whether such defect was curable---Landlord-tenant relationship, denial of---Tenant claiming to be owner of rented property by filing a suit for declaration---Effect---Brief facts of the matter were that the appellant (landlady) filed an eviction petition before the rent tribunal seeking respondent No.3’s (tenant) eviction---Rent tribunal allowed eviction and also directed payment of rent arrears---Respondent No.3 (tenant) filed an appeal and appellate court set aside the rent tribunal’s findings by holding that the appellant (landlady) had not proved a landlord-tenant relationship---Against the appellate judgment the appellant filed a constitutional petition which was dismissed and the present appeal before the Supreme Court challenged that dismissal---Held: Section 8 of the 2007 Ordinance provided that an existing landlord and tenant as soon as possible, but not later than two years from the date of coming into force the said Ordinance, had to bring the tenancy in conformity with the provisions of the said Ordinance, whereas, Section 9 of the said Ordinance provided inter alia that if a tenancy did not conform with the provisions of the said Ordinance the rent tribunal could not entertain an application under the said Ordinance on behalf of the landlord, unless he had deposited a fine equivalent to ten percent of the annual value of the rent of the premises in the government treasury---Appellant(landlady) and respondent No. 3 (tenant) had until 16.11.2010, to enter the particulars of the tenancy with the rent registrar so as to make it compliant with the requirements of Section 5(2) of the 2007 Ordinance---This requirement, remained unfulfilled till the present day---The vital question that needed to be determined was whether as a result of such non-compliance, the eviction petition was to be dismissed at the alter or whether an opportunity was to be given to the eviction petitioner to cure such defect---When the eviction petition was filed on 09.01.2008, the two-year grace period within which the tenancy agreement was required to be presented before the rent registrar had not lapsed---Omission to present the tenancy agreement before the rent registrar in accordance with Section 5(2) of the 2007 Ordinance within the two-year grace period could neither render the party seeking eviction of a tenant liable to pay the penalty/fine nor could the eviction petition be rejected on this ground---In the present case, the two-year grace period expired on 16.11.2009 and by that time, the appellant’s eviction petition had not been decided---It was at this stage that either the rent tribunal could have required the appellant (landlady) to bring the tenancy in conformity with the requirements under Section 5(2) or Respondent No. 3 (tenant) could have taken objection as to the non-compliance with the requirements of the said provisions---Neither was done---Once such omission on the appellant’s (landlady’s) part was brought to the notice of the High Court, it ought to have given an opportunity to the appellant to cure the defect by paying the fine in terms of Section 9(a) of the said Ordinance---Impugned judgment of the High Court was not sustainable on this score---With respect to the tenant/respondent No. 3 claiming to be the owner of the rented property, if and when he would succeed to get a decree from the civil court he could have the same executed by getting the possession of the rented property, however, until then he (tenant) could not arrogate to himself the status of the owner---Appellate court erred by requiring the appellant (landlady) to defend her title in the civil suit and unlawfully made this the basis for setting aside the eviction order passed by rent tribunal---It was deemed not proper to remand the matter to the rent tribunal---Impugned judgment passed by the High Court as well as the judgment passed by the appellate court were set aside and the matter was remanded to the appellate court instead of the rent tribunal to decide Respondent No.3’s (tenant) appeal after affording him opportunity to pay the fine contemplated by Section 9(a) of the 2007 Ordinance for not having shown compliance with the requirements of Section 5(2) of the said Ordinance---Present appeal was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Punjab Rented Premises Ordinance (XXI of 2007)---[since repealed] ----Ss.5(1), 5(2), 5(3) & 5(5)---Relationship of landlord and tenant, existence of---Proof---Execution and presentation of a tenancy agreement before the rent registrar---Pre-requisite---Requirement---Section 5(1) of the 2007 Ordinance mandated that a landlord shall not rent out a premises to a tenant except by a tenancy agreement, whereas Section 5(2) required a landlord to present the tenancy agreement before the rent registrar---Additionally, Section 5(3) required the rent registrar to enter the particulars of the tenancy in a register, affix his official seal on the tenancy agreement, retain a copy thereof and return the original tenancy agreement to the landlord---It is the entry of the tenancy agreement in the office of the rent registrar which Section 5(5) of the said Ordinance treated as proof of the relationship of landlord and tenant. (c) Punjab Rented Premises Act (VII of 2009)--- ----S.15---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.42---Tenant claiming ownership over rented property by filing a suit for declaration---Repercussions---Pendency of a civil suit filed by a tenant claiming to be an owner of rented premises cannot be a ground in an eviction petition either to dismiss or stay the proceedings before the rent tribunal. Mst. Musarrat Shaheen v. Mst. Verbeena Khan Afroz 2024 SCMR 1796; Nisar Khan v. Nadia Ali Butt 2024 SCMR 452; Muhammad Nisar v. Izhar Ahmed Sheikh PLD 2014 SC 347; Abdul Rasheed v. Maqbool Ahmed 2011 SCMR 320; Barkat Masih v. Manzoor Ahmad 2006 SCMR 1068; Jumma Khan v. Zarin Khan PLD 1999 SC 1101; Iqbal v. Rabia Bibi PLD 1991 SC 242 and Rehmatullah v. Ali Muhammad 1983 SCMR 106 rel. (d) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ----Art.84---Comparison of handwriting or signatures by court---Scope---Court making comparison on its own motion without any expert--- Cautious approach---Courts have the power to compare the admitted signatures with the ones in dispute---But the rule of prudence is that comparison of signatures by courts as a mode of ascertaining the truth should be used with great care and caution---Where a Judge compares the handwriting or signatures with other documents which are produced before him and which are not challenged as fabricated, such a process of comparison by the court upon its own initiative and without the guidance of an expert is hazardous and recognizably inconclusive. Sumaira Malik v. Umar Aslam Awan 2018 SCMR 1432 and Rehmat Ali Ismaila v. Khalid Mehmood 2004 SCMR 361 rel. Salman Mansoor, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant (via video link Karachi). Ch. Muhammad Masud Akhtar Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (via Video link (Lahore). Assisted by: Mehboob Irshad, Law Clerk, Supreme Court of Pakistan. Date of hearing: 10th September, 2025.

Summary: (a) Contract Act (IX of 1872)--- ----S. 176---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S. 9---Suit for recovery of damages filed by the customer---Sale of pledged securities by Bank---Prior notice to customer / pawnor---Reasonability---Act(s) of Bank---Non-prudence / diligence alleged against Bank---Cause of action, accrual of---Banking Court dismissed the suit for recovery of damages filed by customer / company (appellant) for want of cause of action---Appellant availed a finance facility and ,in order to secure the financing, had pledged shares /securities, which were, after receiving permission from customer in wake of notice, sold by the Bank ; against said act (sale) the Appellant filed suit for recovery of damages of Rs.29.5 million---Plea of appellant ( plaintiff / customer) was that the bank did not act diligently in disposing of the pledged shares ; that the bank was required to dispose of the shares immediately in the wake of loss in the marginal requirements without even giving a notice to the appellant ; as in such eventuality, the appellant would have been saved from the loss of Rs.29.5 million---Validity---Section 176 of the Contract Act, 1872 stipulates a reasonable notice of the sale of pledged securities to be given to the pawnor---In the present case, the pledged shares were sold with permission of the appellant given to the bank vide a letter, wherein the appellant had shown its inability to either repay the finance facility or to pledge further shares in order to adjust the outstanding dues---Bank (defendant / respondent), in fact, acted wisely in adhering to the principles of natural justice by serving a notice to the appellant to makeup for the short fall and then by reminding him repeatedly about it---Appellant, on the contrary, always indulged in delaying performance of obligation in the contract and giving its clear-cut response to the bank to sell off the pledged shares in order to compensate the short fall---Having an option to dispose of the pledged shares on its own without giving a notice to the appellant would not mean that bank was restrained from giving a notice to the appellant before proceeding to sell off the pledged shares, or giving a notice meant that the bank acted mala fide---Said option in the agreement i.e. to sell off the pledged shares/securities without a notice to pawnor had been given to the bank to meet exigent situation, when otherwise all efforts and opportunities given to the borrower for recovery of amount etc. bore no fruit and no option was left to the bank to recover the defaulted amount except by selling off the pledged securities---However, before exercising such drastic step i.e. selling off the pledged share, if the bank had thought to give a notice to the appellant and thereby afford it an opportunity to adjust the outstanding dues, it could not be deemed to have acted negligently or imprudently, and more so, out of malafidely, nor the same could be construed as a breach of the contract enabling the appellant to sue for damages---Thus, the bank followed a normal recourse by giving notices to the appellant to top up the marginal requirement---Appellant in reply only kept on seeking time and ultimately gave permission vide a letter to the bank to sell off the pledged securities---At the time of giving such permission vide letter, the appellant did not take a plea either that the bank had acted malafidely by giving it notices rather than disposing of the pledged securities on its own---Subsequently, taking a U-turn and stating that the act of the bank in disposing of the pledged shares was rooted in mala fide was nothing but an afterthought---From a reading of the (permitting) letter, it was apparent that appellant was trying to arrange for further collateral to adjust the outstanding dues but when finally due to force majeure did not succeed, it allowed the bank to sell off the collateral available with it to recover outstanding dues---Banking Court rightly concluded that no cause of action had accrued to appellant to file the suit against the bank for recovery of damages, when availing of financial facility by it was admitted, its obligation to maintain the value of the pledged shares at 50% over and above outstanding liabilities was not disputed; failure of the appellant to make up for the loss was borne on the record; competency of the bank to sell off the pledged shares was not disputed; and the permission by the appellant to the bank to sell off the pledged shares was in blank and white through a letter which was a part of the record---High/Appellate Court upheld the impugned judgment passed by the Banking Court---Appeal, filed by the customer, was dismissed. (b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----S. 9---Suit for recovery of damages filed by the customer---Sale of pledged securities by Bank---Non-diligence/prudence alleged against Bank---Damages, claim for---Evidence, absence of---Assumption---Banking Court dismissed the suit for recovery of damages filed by customer / company (appellant ) for want of cause of action---Appellant availed a finance facility and ,in order to secure the financing, had pledged shares /securities, which were, after receiving permission from customer in wake of notice, sold by the Bank ; against said act (sale) the Appellant filed suit for recovery of damages of Rs.29.5 million---Plea of appellant (plaintiff / customer) was that the bank did not act diligently in disposing of the pledged shares ; that the bank was required to dispose of the shares immediately in the wake of loss in the marginal requirements without even giving a notice to the appellant ; as in such eventuality, the appellant would have been saved from the loss of Rs.29.5 million---Held: The entire case of the appellant was based on a hypothesis---Neither any detail nor any supporting documentary evidence had been furnished along with the plaint showing that the value of the pledged shares on the day of disposal was less than the value of the shares when the appellant was given a notice to make up for the loss in the margin---So essentially, said plea/statement (that the shares were sold on less price, due to depletion of value, than the actual price prevalent on the day of notice) was based merely on assumptions and presumptions, without there being any sold evidence to support it---So, irrespective of merit of the claim whether the bank acted prudently or not, it was clear that the claim was founded on weak footings---Thus, the criteria had not been qualified by the appellant and there was no chance that in absence thereof it would succeed---High/Appellate Court upheld the impugned judgment passed by the Banking Court---Appeal, filed by the customer, was dismissed. (c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----S. 9---Suit for recovery of damages filed by the customer---Sale of pledged securities by Bank---Act(s) of Bank---Mala fide alleged against Bank---Scope---Banking Court dismissed the suit for recovery of damages filed by customer / company (appellant) for want of cause of action---Appellant availed a finance facility and in order to secure the financing, had pledged shares /securities, which were, after receiving permission from customer in wake of notice, sold by the Bank ; against said act (sale) the appellant filed suit for recovery of damages---Plea of the appellant/plaintiff was that the act of the bank was rooted in mala fide as that the bank did not act diligently in disposing of the pledged shares ; that the bank was required to dispose of the shares immediately in the wake of loss in the marginal requirements without even giving a notice to the appellant ; as in such eventuality, the appellant would have been saved from the loss of Rs.29.5 million---Validity---Such plea was without any substantial proof---Although it is very difficult to prove mala fide in a particular act which is taken lawfully and is permissible in law---Heavy burden lies on the one who claims so but at least in order to attract attention of the Court to lean in favour of continuation of the proceedings for recovery of damages on that ground, the appellant was required to come up with reasonable facts entailing an inquiry to justify life of such proceedings---The entire claim of the appellantwas based on presumptions and assumptions without there being any evidence to support it---In the circumstances, continuation of the proceedings with the end result in failure would be nothing but an abuse of process of law---Thus, the criteria had not been qualified by the appellant and there was no chance that in absence thereof it would succeed---High/Appellate Court upheld the impugned judgment passed by the Banking Court---Appeal, filed by the customer, was dismissed. (d) Damages--- ----‘General damages’ and ‘special damages’---Distinction---Generally there are two types of damages: special damages and general damages---General damages are defined as immediate, direct, and approximate result of the wrong complained of---The law presumes general damages to flow from the negligence complained of---These damages have to be proved but it is not necessary to allege them in detail in the pleadings---The general damages are governed by the rule of thumb whereas special damages are required to be specifically pleaded and proved---General damages are those which the law implies even if not specially pleaded, which includes compensation for pain and suffering and the like, and if the injuries suffered are such as to lead to continuing or permanent disability, compensation for loss of earning power in the future---Special damages are explained as actual but not necessarily the result of injury complained of---Special damages mean some specific item of loss which the plaintiff alleges is the result of the defendant's negligence in the particular case, although the law does not presume it to flow from the negligence as a matter of course---Special damage consists of out-of-pocket expenses and loss of earnings incurred down to the date of trial and are generally capable of substantially exact pecuniary assessment----The basic principle so far as loss of earnings and out-of-pocket expenses is concerned is that the injured person should be placed in the same financial position, so far as can be done by an award of money, as he would have been had the accident, not happened---In simple words ,the damages are intended to put a person in the same position as he would have been in, had he not received the injury. Abdul Majeed Khan v. Tawseen Abdul Haleem and others PLD 2012 SC 80; Qazi Dost Muhammad v. Malik Dost Muhammad 1997 CLC 546 and C.B. Singh v. Agra Cantonment AIR 1974 Allhabad 147 ref. Muhammad Immad Qamar for Appellant. Ijaz Ahmed Zahid for Respondent. Date of hearing: 10th September, 2025.

Summary: Article 199 of Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. Writ Jurisdiction.--- Waqf Property?. Graveyard (Ghair Mumkin Qabristan), the imposition of any administrative condition restraining the non-local residents from burial of their deceased in a graveyard is contrary to injunctions of Islam. Denial to burial of non- residents is not only unjust in legal terms but also violative to the moral and ethical foundations laid down in the Shariah. Land reserved as graveyard attains a sacred character, and its sale or imposition of discriminative restriction is illegal. Writ Petition allowed and impugned restriction was set at naught. 283Misc. Writ 80758/23 Vishal Ahmad Shakir Vs Federation of Pakistan etc. Mr. Justice Ali Zia Bajwa 10-09- 2025 2025 LHC 5858

Summary: (a) Punjab Rented Premises Ordinance, 2007 ---- Ss. 5, 8 & 9 ---- Existing tenancy not brought in conformity with the Ordinance ---- Non-payment of fine by landlord ---- Effect ---- Opportunity to cure defect. Eviction petition was filed on 09.01.2008 under the Punjab Rented Premises Ordinance, 2007, though the rent agreement dated 31.12.1996 had not been presented before the Rent Registrar under S.5(2) nor was fine under S.9 deposited. High Court dismissed the appellant-landlord’s writ petition holding that the tenancy was non-compliant with the Ordinance. Held, that S.8 allows two years’ grace period from 16.11.2007 to bring existing tenancies in conformity, and omission to present the tenancy agreement before the Rent Registrar within that period does not automatically render an eviction petition incompetent. Under Abdul Hameed Talib v. Additional District Judge, Lahore (PLD 2013 SC 775), the Rent Tribunal should halt proceedings and give opportunity to the applicant to deposit fine under S.9 rather than dismissing the petition outright. High Court erred by dismissing the writ petition without affording appellant opportunity to cure the defect. (b) Punjab Rented Premises Ordinance, 2007 ---- Ss. 5(2), 8 & 9 ---- Scope and interaction of provisions. Sections 8 and 9 must be read harmoniously: S.8 provides the time frame for compliance by existing tenancies, while S.9 imposes obligation to pay fine when a landlord seeks to invoke the Ordinance’s remedies despite non-registration. Non-compliance does not extinguish the tenancy or bar eviction proceedings; it only requires payment of the statutory fine before further proceedings. Failure of the Rent Tribunal to direct deposit of fine, and of respondent-tenant to raise objection, could not justify dismissal of eviction petition by appellate or High Court. (c) Civil and Rent Jurisdiction ---- Pendency of ownership suit ---- Effect on rent proceedings. Respondent-tenant claimed ownership of the demised premises and pendency of a declaratory civil suit, alleging that appellant-landlord was a benami owner. Appellate Court wrongly set aside eviction order on this ground. Held, pendency of ownership litigation does not bar or stay rent proceedings. Until civil court decrees ownership in favour of respondent, appellant remains recorded owner and entitled to maintain eviction petition. Reliance placed on Mst. Musarrat Shaheen v. Mst. Verbeena Khan Afroz (2024 SCMR 1796), Nisar Khan v. Nadia Ali Butt (2024 SCMR 452), Muhammad Nisar v. Izhar Ahmed Sheikh (PLD 2014 SC 347), Abdul Rasheed v. Maqbool Ahmed (2011 SCMR 320), and others. (d) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order (X of 1984) ---- Art. 84 ---- Comparison of signatures by court ---- Caution and evidentiary limitations. Appellate Court compared respondent-tenant’s signatures on rent agreement with those on identity documents and relied upon a private letter (Exh.R-1/A) without producing bank officer or account-opening forms in evidence. Held, that comparison of handwriting or signatures by court without expert opinion or corroborating evidence is unsafe and inconclusive. Reference made to Sumaira Malik v. Umar Aslam Awan (2018 SCMR 1432) and Rehmat Ali Ismaila v. Khalid Mehmood (2004 SCMR 361). Appellate Court’s findings based on such comparison were unsustainable. Disposition: Appeal allowed. Judgments of High Court (07.05.2012) and appellate court (06.07.2011) set aside. Matter remanded to appellate court to decide afresh after granting appellant opportunity to deposit fine under S.9(a) of the 2007 Ordinance. Status quo regarding possession of demised premises to continue during pendency of appeal.

Summary: Customs Act (IV of 1969)--- ----Ss. 2(s), 139 & 179(1)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 24---Declaration of baggage by passenger/crew---Possession of foreign currency---Smuggling, allegation of---Confiscation of such currency---Requirements, non-observance of---Effect---Staff of Khyber Rifles seized baggage containing foreign currency at Michni Post as on demand, the owners failed to produce any legal documents of the said currency---Customs Appellate Tribunal, by allowing the appeal filed by the owners / possessors of foreign currency (respondents), ordered release of confiscated foreign currency---Validity---Getting hold of the currency without providing opportunity of declaring the contents of their baggage and that too at the appropriate place to the appropriate officers of Customs, is denial of fundamental rights of the citizens guaranteed under Art. 24 of the Constitution, which mandates that no person shall be deprived of his property save in accordance with law, besides, it does not fulfil the requirements of S. 139 of the Customs Act, 1969---Record revealed that the respondents were found in possession of currency at Michni Check Post on their way to Landi Kotal/Torkham Border with Afghanistan, which fell within the limits of Pakistan, per se, and thus would not be hit by an attempt of smuggling---Moreover, the provisions relating to smuggling could not be attracted in a situation when the respondents were not afforded any opportunity to make declaration to the Customs---In the present case, the case (of impugned currency) was adjudicated at the original stage by the Deputy Collector Customs (Adjudication), Peshawar, who passed Order-in-Original ,however, there was nothing on record to show that he was entrusted with the powers of Additional Collector or Collector to adjudicate the case, which point prevailed with the Appellate Tribunal---No illegality, irregularity, misreading or non-reading of evidence had been pointed out---Thus, the questions of law formulated were answered in the negative i.e. against the Applicant / Collectorate---Special Customs Reference Application, being merit-less, was dismissed. Saifullah Muhib Kakakhel for Petitioner. Ajoon Khan for Respondents. Date of hearing: 9th September, 2025.

Summary: Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----Ss. 3 (2), 9 & 10---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 114---Bankers’ Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), S. 4---Suit for recovery of finance---Estoppel, doctrine of---Applicability---Cost of funds---Statement of account---Presumption---Plaintiff / bank filed suit for recovery of finance but defendant / customer raised the plea of signing of blank documents---Validity---Where executant admis execution of an instrument, he cannot be allowed to plead that he in fact executed blank papers---Law of estoppel did not allow defendant / borrower to admit execution of finance documents and at the same time dispute its contents by stating that at the time of execution of the instruments, they were left blank and were later filled in---Defendant / borrower defaulted in discharge of principal sum---Such default not only incurred cost of funds under S. 3(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 rather was actionable under S. 9 of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Plaintiff / bank was entitled for cost of funds from pleaded date of default---Statement of accounts annexed with plaint were certified in accordance with law, which was prima facie evidence of entries contained there in under S. 4 of Bankers’ Books Evidence Act, 1891---Application for leave to defend the suit was rejected---Suit was decreed in circumstances. Mohd. Siddiq Mohd. Umar v. Australasia Bank Ltd. PLD 1966 SC 684; Muhammad Naveed v. Habib Bank Limited 2024 CLD 648; Decent Builders and Developers v. Standard Chartered Bank (Pakistan) Ltd. 2021 CLD 130; Abdul Khaliq v. MCB Bank Limited 2021 CLD 776; Jamal Tube (Pvt.) Ltd. Lahore v. First Punjab Modarba, Lahore 2021 CLD 1372; Bank of Punjab v. Fazal Abbas 2020 CLD 977; Anees-ur-Rehman v. Faysal Bank Limited 2019 CLD 1031; Murshid Ali v. United Bank Limited 2016 CLD 1471; Asia Motor Company v. NIB Bank Limited 2016 CLD 609; Pak Oman Investment Company Ltd. v. Chenab Ltd. 2016 CLD 1903; Haroon Traders v. K.A.S.B. Bank Ltd. 2015 CLD 645; Bank Alfalah Limited v. Presiding Officer 2014 CLD 160; Habib Metropolitan Bank Ltd. v. Abid Nisar 2014 CLD 1367; Elbow Room v. MCB Bank Limited 2014 CLD 985; Telecard Limited v. Pakistan Telecommunication Authority 2014 CLD 415; Apollo Textile Mills Ltd. v. Soneri Bank Ltd. 2012 CLD 337; Shaz Packages v. Bank Alfalah Limited 2011 CLD 790; Bankers Equity Ltd. v. Bentonite Pakistan Ltd. 2010 CLD 651; National Bank of Pakistan v. Mujahid Nawaz 2007 CLD 678; Bank of Punjab v. Mah Tallat Sultan 2006 CLD 773; United Dairies Farms (Pvt.) Ltd. v. United Bank Ltd. 2005 CLD 569; Government of Pakistan v. Premier Sugar Mills PLD 1991 Lah. 381; Australasia Bank Ltd. v. H.S. Mahmood Hassan PLD 1983 Kar. 431 and SDO, PESCO v. Wadan Sher 2023 SCMR 236 distinguished. Ajmal Khan Kasi for Plaintiff. Zayyad Khan Abbasi for Defendants. Date of hearing: 29th August, 2025.

Summary: (a) West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 ---- Ss. 10(4), 10(5) & 10(6) --- Punjab Family Courts (Amendment) Act, 2015 --- Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 ---- S. 7 --- Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 ---- S. 2 --- Dower --- Khula --- Dissolution of Marriage --- Maintainability --- Through this judgment, we propose to decide C.P.L.A. Nos.2555 and 2556 of 2022 since they entail common features with same contesting parties --- Record shows that Adeel Akhter ("respondent") and Wajiha Rasheed ("petitioner") got married on 05.04.2001 --- Rukhsati did not take place until 28.06.2004 --- As per contents of Nikahnama, dower was fixed at Rs.10,00,000/- on demand in addition to Plot No.6, Sector-D, Ghazikot Township, Mansehra ("Plot No.6") --- Couple lived in United Kingdom for about three years after which petitioner returned to Pakistan --- After respondent's father, Muhammad Akhter sold Plot No.6 to one Riaz Ahmed, petitioner, on 20.12.2010, filed suit for declaration, permanent injunction and possession ("Suit No.216/FC of 2010") before family court against respondent as well as Muhammad Akhter and Riaz Ahmed praying inter alia for declaration to effect that she is owner of Plot No.6 on basis of entries in Nikahnama dated 05.08.2001 --- Petitioner had impleaded Riaz Ahmed as defendant in suit as he had purchased Plot No.6 from petitioner's father-in-law through Transfer Deed No.1194 dated 30.04.2004 --- This suit was decreed vide judgment and decree dated 18.10.2011 --- By this time, marriage between petitioner and respondent was intact --- Respondent's appeal against family court's said judgment and decree dated 18.10.2011, was dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 09.06.2012 --- Respondent filed writ petition No.548-A/2012 before high court against said concurrent judgments and decrees --- At this juncture, we deem it appropriate to make reference to suit for dissolution of marriage, recovery of maintenance allowance, dower and dowry articles ("Family Suit No.45 of 2012") filed by petitioner on 01.02.2012 before family court against respondent and his father --- On 09.10.2012, petitioner made statement before family court that there was no chance of reconciliation between parties; that on account of hatred and aversion that she had developed for respondent, she does not want to live with him; that she has not been paid her dower; and that she has no intention of relinquishing her dower --- After recording petitioner's statement, family court, vide order dated 08.11.2012 dissolved marriage and proceeded to frame issues --- One of issues framed was whether petitioner was entitled to recover dower amounting to Rs.10,00,000/- from respondent --- It appears that issue whether she was entitled to Plot No.6 as dower was not framed as by time issues were framed, she had already obtained decree with respect to said plot in her favour in Suit No.216/FC of 2010 --- As petitioner had alleged cruelty at hands of respondent, and had not relinquished her dower, family court proceeded further with trial --- Trial culminated in judgment and decree dated 06.11.2014 whereby petitioner was held entitled to recovery of dowry articles or their alternative depreciated value of Rs.200,000/- as well as to maintenance allowance of Rs.20,000/- per month for three-month Iddat period --- Family court turned down petitioner's claim for recovery of gold ornaments --- Her claim for recovery of dower was also turned down as she had not been able to prove cruelty or brutality at hands of respondent --- Petitioner's appeal against family court's said judgment and decree was dismissed by appellate court vide judgment and decree dated 01.03.2016 --- Petitioner preferred writ petition No.1007/2016 before high court against said concurrent judgments and decrees --- High court decided writ petition No.548-A/2012 titled "Adeel Akhter etc. Vs. Wajiha Rasheed etc." (reference to which has been made in paragraph-4 above) and writ petition No.1007/2016 titled "Wajiha Rasheed Vs. Additional District Judge, etc." vide two separate judgments dated 17.03.2022 --- In its judgment passed in writ petition No.1007/2016, high court did not interfere with concurrent judgments and decrees of family court and appellate court passed in Family Suit No.45 of 2012 --- As regards writ petition No.548-A/2012, high court allowed same by holding that since marriage had been dissolved on basis of khula, petitioner would not be entitled to recovery of dower --- In holding so, high court had taken cognizance of development subsequent to judgment and decree passed in Suit No.216/FC of 2010 i.e. judgment and decree passed by family court in Family Suit No.45 of 2012 --- In fact, high court reproduced operative part of family court's order dated 08.11.2012 whereby marriage between petitioner and respondent, was dissolved --- High court did not give benefit of amendments made in section 10(5) and (6) of West-Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 through Punjab Family Courts (Amendment) Act, 2015 whereby in case of dissolution of marriage through khula, wife is to surrender up to 50% of her deferred dower or up to 25% of her admitted prompt dower to husband, whereas in case of decree for dissolution of marriage, family court is to direct husband to pay whole or part of outstanding deferred dower to wife --- High court took view, and correctly so, that since decree for dissolution of marriage pre-dates enactment of Punjab Family Courts (Amendment) Act, 2015, it could not be given retrospective effect --- Learned counsel for petitioner's submissions centered around petitioner's entitlement to her dower --- She asserted that concurrent judgments and decrees of family court and appellate court in Suit No.216/FC of 2010 entitling petitioner to Plot No.6 on basis of entries in Nikahnama could not have been interfered with by high court simply because in subsequent suit (Family Suit No.45 of 2012) for dissolution of marriage etc., petitioner had not been able to prove cruelty at hands of respondent --- Furthermore, it was submitted that even if petitioner was required to return dower, it should have been only to extent as provided in section 10(5) and (6) of West-Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 as amended by Punjab Family Courts (Amendment) Act, 2015 --- We have heard learned counsel for petitioner and perused record with her able assistance --- Although order dated 08.11.2012 (passed in Family Suit No.45 of 2012), whereby family court dissolved marriage between petitioner and respondent makes no mention of "khula", it does explicitly state that "marriage between parties is hereby dissolved under proviso [to] section 10 of Family Courts Act, 1964" --- Proviso to section 10(4) of said Act provides that in suit for dissolution of marriage, if reconciliation fails, family court shall pass decree for dissolution of marriage forthwith and "also restore to husband haq mahr received by wife" in consideration of marriage at time of marriage --- Through order dated 08.11.2012, marriage between petitioner and respondent was dissolved, but no order was passed as to return of dower --- This is because petitioner had alleged cruelty at hands of respondent, and she had to prove same in her evidence --- Family court and appellate court, after appraisal of evidence came to conclusion that petitioner had not been able to prove cruelty at hands of respondent in any form and therefore, she was liable to return dower --- Since petitioner had obtained decree for Plot No.6 (which was part of her dower), from another court in earlier suit (Suit No.216/FC of 2010), high court was well within its rights to allow respondent's writ petition and disentitle petitioner to such dower --- Petitioner's claim to Plot No.6 was based on entries in Nikahnama --- She had filed Suit No.216/FC of 2010 for declaration as to ownership of Plot No.6 on 20.12.2010 --- This suit was decreed on 18.10.2011 --- It is after this decree that petitioner, on 01.02.2012 had filed Family Suit No.45 of 2012 for dissolution of marriage and recovery of dower etc --- After order dated 08.11.2012 for dissolution of marriage, petitioner's entitlement to dower was dependent on whether she was compelled to leave her matrimonial abode or she had done so on her own volition for reasons not attributable to respondent --- Since family court, in its judgment and decree dated 06.11.2014 passed in Family Suit No.45 of 2012 had clearly held that she had not been able to prove cruelty at hands of respondent in any manner, therefore, her claim to ownership of Plot No.6 (which was part of her dower) even though based on earlier judgment and decree dated 18.10.2011 passed in earlier Suit No.216/FC of 2010 would cease --- Family court's finding that petitioner has to restore Haq Mahr/dower to respondent has been given due recognition by high court by setting aside concurrent judgments and decrees whereby Plot No.6 was declared to be petitioner's property on basis of entries in Nikahnama --- We tend to agree with findings of family court that it would have been different matter had petitioner been able to prove cruelty or brutality at hands of respondent --- In such eventuality, petitioner would have been entitled to retain her dower and there would have been no reason for high court to interfere with judgment and decree dated 06.11.2014 passed by family court in Family Suit No.45 of 2012 --- Dissolution of marriage under judgment and decree dated 06.11.2014 passed in Family Suit No.45 of 2012 not entitling petitioner to retain or obtain Haq Mahr was crucial development subsequent to filing of Suit No.216/FC of 2010 and had profound bearing on decree that petitioner had got regarding Plot No.6 prior to dissolution of her marriage --- It is well settled that courts can look into subsequent events at time of deciding cases --- Reference in this regard may be made to law laid down in cases of Mst. Amina Begum Vs. Mehar Ghulam Dastgir (PLD 1978 SC 220), Muhammadi Vs. Ghulam Nabi (2007 SCMR 761), Khushi Muhammad Vs. Abdul Ghafoor (2006 SCMR 839) and Evacuee Trust Property Board Vs. Sakina Bibi (2007 SCMR 262) --- With passing of decree dated 06.11.2014 in Family Suit No.45 of 2012 (which has been upheld by appellate court and high court), decree dated 18.10.2011 that was given in petitioner's favour in Suit No.216/FC of 2010 had become obsolete or unserviceable --- In case of Muhammad Arif Vs. Saima Noreen (2015 SCMR 804), it was held that where family court had reached conclusion that no cruelty could be proved by wife, it could not grant decree for dissolution of marriage on basis of cruelty under Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 --- Furthermore, it was held that only logical conclusion was that marriage should have been dissolved on basis of khula in which event wife would have to forgo dower amount --- Since we do not find any legal infirmity in impugned judgments dated 17.03.2022 passed by high court in writ petitions No. 548-A/2012 and 1007/2016, leave to appeal is declined and petitions are dismissed --- Petitions were dismissed accordingly.