Summary: SRO 170(I)/2017 dated 17.03.2017 is for "imported goods only" and was not applied to parallel or grey market imports and de-minimis imports.Powers to take action, detention, seizure, confiscation of goods imported into or taken out of Pakistan were/are always available with the customs officials and it is not that SRO 170(i)/2017 that has empowered them, it only set the process to be initiated by custom officials in relation to goods being imported. What was amended by virtue of SRO 768(I)/2014 is also very material. In Section 3CC and 3E of Customs Act, 1969 formation of the Director General of Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement was redesigned along with its functions, jurisdiction and powers. In the present case Tribunal could only pass order to the extent of trade mark being an infringed one or otherwise and to restrain it from being violated. The Procedural action of custom officials was not questioned independently by respondent. Once the effect of infringement was determined by tribunal the customs officials would definitely have followed it.Color and color scheme also at time claimed to be an inventive one but that is not the case here as no one has claimed livery or color scheme or get up to be a mark of distinction under any intellectual property rights. Both parties are contesting over one mark i.e Tabiat and no one has claimed any exclusive right over livery or dress up of mark. So everything is a disclaimer except "Tabiat". If there are deceptive liveries of common product like rice, with one trade mark "Tabiat" in the absence of a right claimed under the liveries, the buyer would definitely get confuse and jump to some other brand as a natural course.In terms of Section 5(2) of Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001 goods even if not meant for a local consumption but only to enter the port for onwards journey, would mean the use of mark within jurisdiction. Unless goods in transit are defined otherwise, only aforesaid meaning is deducible. Construction of our Trade Mark Ordinance, 2001 is also based on same scheme and there is no inconsistency as far as framing of relevant provision trade mark is concerned.The word import or export (exclusively or inclusively) not defined under the law in hand differently that is dealing with goods in transit. The case of the appellant is on better footing since the attempt is made to export the goods from the territory where the mark is registeredThe word "use" as explained above is also applicable to goods "for export only" and hence Section 5(2) read with section 40 of Trade Mark ordinance 2001 would be interpreted accordingly as use within territory of Pakistan.

Summary: 1.Effect of disclaimer made under section 21 of the Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001 from exclusive use of a name. 2.The principle that registration of a trade mark gives rise to a prima facie case, balance of convenience and likelihood of irreparable loss, that principle would be applicable where the trade mark was registered without a disclaimer. 3.In view of section 42(3) of the Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001, the use of the disclaimed feature of the mark in question would not constitute trade mark infringement. 4.An action for passing-off is essentially to protect property in goods based on the reputation of those goods, as distinct from an action to protect a trade mark which is a property in itself. ---- Issue: Whether the use of "by Junaid Jamshed" by Jazaa Foods constitutes trademark infringement or passing-off against U&I Garments' "JunaidJ.Jamshed" trademark.Holding: The court dismissed U&I Garments' application for a temporary injunction (CMA No. 933/2020) and granted Jazaa Foods' application for a temporary injunction (CMA No. 745/2020), thereby allowing Jazaa Foods to continue using "by Junaid Jamshed" in conjunction with their registered trademark "Jazaa."Reasoning:The court noted that U&I Garments' trademark registration included a disclaimer denying exclusive rights to the use of the name "Junaid Jamshed," indicating that the name could be used by others in a non-deceptive manner.The court found no substantial similarity in the use of "Junaid Jamshed" by Jazaa Foods to that of U&I Garments, thus no trademark infringement occurred.The court also found no evidence of passing-off since U&I Garments had not established a reputation in the food products market that could be confused with Jazaa Foods' products.The balance of convenience and potential for irreparable harm favored Jazaa Foods, as they had been using "by Junaid Jamshed" since 2016 without objection, and Junaid Jamshed himself had authorized the use of his name for Jazaa Foods during his lifetime.Order: The Defendants in Suit No. 94/2020 (U&I Garments and others) are restrained from interfering with Jazaa Foods' use of "by Junaid Jamshed" in conjunction with their registered trademark "Jazaa."

Summary: (a) Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act (XXII of 2012)-------Ss. 17, 18 & 13---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 561-A, 249-A & 417---Federal Investigation Agency Act, 1974 (VIII of 1975), Preamble & S. 3---Inherent powersof High Court---Intellectual Property dispute (pirated books)---Power of Magistrate to acquitaccused at any stage---Constitution of the Agency---Powers, functions and jurisdiction ofIntellectual Property Organization---Dispute between private parties---Scope---Accused wasalleged to have been engaged in selling pirated books---FIR was created under FederalInvestigation Agency Act, 1974, Preamble of which showed that the agency was created forinvestigation of certain offences committed in connection with the matters concerningFederal Government and for matters connected thereto---Dispute in the present case wasbetween the private parties in respect of pirated books and their alleged sale in the openmarket---Complainant was a private organization which was doing business in Pakistanprivately and no government work was involved, therefore, FIA had no jurisdiction in respectof infringement of copyright between the private parties as dispute was civil in nature---Tribunal created under Intellectual Property Organization of Pakistan Act, 2012 had theexclusive jurisdiction to try the offences with respect to Intellectual Property laws---Cognizance taken by FIA was illegal and beyond their jurisdiction---Appeal filed under S.417, Cr.P.C. was converted into an application under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C. and the FIR wasquashed.Syed Iqbal Raza v. Justice of Peace, Islamabad 2019 PCr.LJ 1059 ref.(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------Ss. 561-A, 249-A & 265-K---Inherent powers of High Court---Power of Magistrate toacquit accused at any stage---Power of Court to acquit accused at any stage---Scope---Section 561-A, Cr.P.C. confers upon High Court inherent powers to make such orders as maybe necessary to give effect to any order under the Criminal Procedure Code or to preventabuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice---Such powers arevery wide and can be exercised by High Court at any time---High Court ordinarily does not quash proceedings under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C. unless Trial Court exercises its powers under S.249-A or 265-K, Cr.P.C. which are incidentally of the same nature and in a way akin to andco-related with quashing of proceedings as envisaged under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C.---High Courtcan, in exceptional cases, exercise its jurisdiction under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C., without waitingfor Trial Court to pass orders under S. 249-A or 265-K, Cr.P.C. if the facts of the case sowarrant to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

Summary: Appeal Allowed---The appellant is restrained from using its registered trademark "Rami" due to the proceedings before the Registrar of Trademarks initiated by the respondent. The respondent sought an interim injunction against the appellant's use of the trademark while the opposition proceedings were pending. The appellant's counsel argues that the trademark "Rani" had not been in use for a substantial period, while the appellant's trademark "Rami" had been in use since 2008. The counsel also points out that the proceedings before the Registrar were ongoing and that the injunction granted by the Single Judge effectively stymied those proceedings. The respondent's counsel, on the other hand, contends that the appellant's trademark is deceptively similar to theirs and that the appellant's trademark should never have been registered. Ultimately, the Judges concluded that the interim injunction granted by the learned Single Judge is not sustainable. They determine that the order goes beyond preserving the status quo and grants final relief at an interim stage, which is not justifiable. Therefore, they set aside the Impugned Order and revive the application for the determination of the injunction, directing that it be re-evaluated by a learned Single Judge in accordance with the law.

Summary: The appellant argued that the Impugned Order was not in conformity with the law and exceeded the scope of both the application and the suit itself. The appellant, a manufacturer of confectionery items, marketed products under trademarks like Candyland, Bisconni, Snacks City, and Astropack. They introduced a sandwich biscuit named "RITE" under a registered trademark, which was protected by copyright law as well. The appellant received a legal notice from the respondents, Mondelez International, dated 28th November 2013, demanding that they cease the production and distribution of RITE biscuits. In response, the appellant filed a suit for declaration, permanent injunction, and damages against the respondents under the Trademarks Ordinance, 2001. The court, in its judgment, noted that the Impugned Order's contradictory statements and observations beyond the scope of the application were problematic. It highlighted the purpose of interim orders to preserve the status quo or the corpus of litigation. The Impugned Order did not fulfill this purpose and appeared to grant rights that were not adjudicated upon. As a result, the court set aside the Impugned Order and revived the application for further consideration by a learned Single Judge in accordance with the law.

Summary: The interpretation of subsection 2 of Section 10 of TrademarkAct, 1940, in view of the above, cannot be restricted to a simpleconcurrent use irrespective of any agreement. Use of trademark underthe agreement is not only permissive use but conclusive rights werebeing delegated and hence the use is concurrent to the use of theinventor. The subject use thus would come within honest concurrent useunder the circumstances described in the agreement. It is inconceivablethat the appellant would enjoy the consideration of a rental premises ifthe right of trademark is excluded. Certainly the consideration was for aparticular territory i.e. Lahore division which was taken care of by theRegistrar

Summary: The case involves a trademark dispute over the ownership and use of the "Peek Freans" trademark, which is alleged to have been abandoned. The applicant, claiming to be the registered proprietor of the subject trademark, filed an application under section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) seeking a stay of proceedings in a related suit (No. 1562 of 2002). The applicant argues that the relief sought in the suit overlaps with the relief that may be granted in a pending appeal related to the trademark. The applicant's counsel argues that the issues in the subject suit and the appeal are substantially the same, particularly concerning ownership of the trademark, and that a decision in the suit would operate as res judicata in the appeal. They also rely on various legal precedents to support their arguments. On the other hand, the respondent's counsel challenges the maintainability of the Revision Application, asserting that the District Judge had jurisdiction to decide the application under section 10 CPC. The judgment discussed the applicability of section 10 CPC and the conditions under which a stay of proceedings can be granted. It also considered the possibility of conflicting decisions and the potential for res judicata. The judgment ultimately concluded that the civil/district court can proceed with the trial but should not pass a final judgment until the disposal of the pending appeal. The judge emphasized the importance of avoiding conflicting decisions and ensuring that justice is served in the case. The judgment also refers to relevant legal provisions and precedents to support the decision.

Summary: Trademark---The case involved disputes over the use of design and trademark. ORO Industries sought an injunction against Muhammad Hanif from using the design of Design owned by ORO Industries and using the trademark "ZORRO" on the basis of alleged similarity to their registered trademark "ORO." The court acknowledged that ORO Industries possessed the registered trademark "ORO" and the design of pencils under dispute, registered as per the Registered Designs Ordinance, 2000. The court reviewed evidence of the alleged similarities between the pencils manufactured by the Defendant and those of ORO Industries, including the use of the "ZORRO" trademark. The court emphasized that for a design to be registered, it must exhibit newness or originality under the Ordinance, and the lack of such elements precludes registration. The court cited the definition of "design" in the Ordinance and explained the requirement of global newness or originality for registration under the 2000 Ordinance. In assessing the case, the court noted that triangular-shaped pencils, similar to those registered by ORO Industries, were widely available for decades and not new or original. The court cited a lack of creative ingenuity and novelty in the design and ruled in favor of the Defendant in the cancellation case. However, in the context of the trademark dispute, the court found that the Defendant's pencils bore a striking resemblance to those of ORO Industries, using a similar color scheme and the "ZORRO" trademark that closely resembled ORO Industries' "ORO" trademark. As a result, ORO Industries' application for an injunction against the Defendant's use of the "ZORRO" trademarked pencils succeeded, despite the cancellation of their design registration.

Summary: This order pertains to a legal case involving Italfarmaco S.P.A and Himont Pharmaceuticals. Italfarmaco S.P.A filed an application under Section 90(1)(b)(i) and Section 80(4) of the Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001, seeking a declaration of invalidity of the trademark FERPLEX registered in Himont Pharmaceuticals' name for pharmaceutical preparations used as iron supplements. The application claims that Himont's registration of the trademark is invalid.The background of the case involves a license agreement executed in 1994 between Italfarmaco S.P.A and Himont Pharmaceuticals, which allowed Himont to manufacture and sell products under the FERPLEX trademark. The license agreement was terminated by Italfarmaco S.P.A in 2009. Himont contested this termination and initiated a lawsuit against Italfarmaco S.P.A in the District Court, Lahore.In response, Italfarmaco S.P.A filed an application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) and another application under Order XXXIX, Rule 4 CPC, seeking various reliefs related to the FERPLEX trademark, including recalling products, removing signs, and transferring marketing approvals.The key issue addressed in this order is whether Italfarmaco S.P.A's application for the declaration of invalidity of the FERPLEX trademark should be heard in the High Court or District Court. The legal provision in question is Section 80(4) of the Trade Marks Ordinance, which states that an application for declaration of invalidity can be made to the Registrar, High Court, or District Court, with certain exceptions.Himont argued that since proceedings related to the trademark were already pending in the District Court, Lahore, Italfarmaco S.P.A's application should have been filed there. The order explains that the term "proceedings" encompasses all cases brought before the courts related to the trademark. It concludes that both the District Court cases and Italfarmaco S.P.A's application are "proceedings concerning the trademark in question," thus falling under the exception of Section 80(4) and requiring that they be heard in the District Court.The order emphasizes the legislative intent to avoid conflicting decisions and forum shopping and highlights the importance of consistent judgments in trademark-related cases. It also refers to Section 116 of the Trade Marks Ordinance, which reinforces the need for consistent decision-making on trademark matters.Ultimately, the order allows Italfarmaco S.P.A's application to be returned to be filed before the appropriate forum, which, in this case, is the District Court, Lahore.

Summary: The appellant, had entered into an agreement with the respondent, in 1993, wherein he obtained exclusive rights to publish and promote the book. However, during the pendency of the suit, the respondent argued that the suit was barred by Section 14(1) of the Copyrights Act, 1962, which limited the assignment of copyright to 10 years. The court examined the legal framework around copyright and publication rights, emphasizing the significance of Section 14 of the Copyrights Act. It clarified that the Copyright Act limits the assignment of copyright to 10 years, after which the copyright reverts to the author or their representative. The court also discussed the nature of copyright as an acknowledgment of a creator's exclusive rights. Furthermore, the court considered Section 28 of the Copyrights Act, which protects the typographical arrangement of an edition for 25 years. The judgment concluded that the agreement between the parties was subject to the legal limitations set forth in the Copyrights Act, which restricted the assignment of copyright to 10 years. Since the suit was filed after nearly 17 years from the date of the agreement, it was found to be barred by law. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, upholding the original judgment that rejected the plaintiff's claim. The judgment sheet highlighted the importance of complying with legal provisions and the limitations imposed by the Copyrights Act when entering into agreements related to copyright and publication rights.