Summary: In this case, the plaintiff, the manufacturer and seller of personal care beauty creams, is seeking a declaration, permanent injunction, accounts, and damages against the defendant for allegedly distributing products using the plaintiff's brand name "Stillman's" in the local and international market. The plaintiff claims to be the registered trademark holder of the brand name.The court order mentions various legal arguments presented by both parties. The plaintiff argues that they acquired the rights to the "Stillman's" trademark through an assignment deed and that the defendant is distributing products using their brand name. The defendant, on the other hand, contends that they are a distributor of another company (Evan and Mayer), which is authorized to manufacture and sell "Stillman's" products. The defendant also raises issues related to the plaintiff's alleged concealment of certain facts and ongoing legal disputes.The court, after considering the arguments, emphasizes the complexity of the case due to multiple pending litigations involving the plaintiff, its directors, and Evan & Mayer. The court notes the importance of determining the actual ownership and rights to use the trademark, which is yet to be decided in the ongoing cases. Consequently, the court decides not to grant an injunction against the distributor (defendant No.1) at this stage and dismisses the application. The court criticizes the plaintiff for not disclosing various pending litigations and describes the conduct as "disgusting and repulsive."In summary, the court has not granted the requested injunction, emphasizing the need for a resolution of the underlying disputes regarding trademark ownership and use in other ongoing cases.

Summary: The appellant argued that the Impugned Order was not in conformity with the law and exceeded the scope of both the application and the suit itself. The appellant, a manufacturer of confectionery items, marketed products under trademarks like Candyland, Bisconni, Snacks City, and Astropack. They introduced a sandwich biscuit named "RITE" under a registered trademark, which was protected by copyright law as well. The appellant received a legal notice from the respondents, Mondelez International, dated 28th November 2013, demanding that they cease the production and distribution of RITE biscuits. In response, the appellant filed a suit for declaration, permanent injunction, and damages against the respondents under the Trademarks Ordinance, 2001. The court, in its judgment, noted that the Impugned Order's contradictory statements and observations beyond the scope of the application were problematic. It highlighted the purpose of interim orders to preserve the status quo or the corpus of litigation. The Impugned Order did not fulfill this purpose and appeared to grant rights that were not adjudicated upon. As a result, the court set aside the Impugned Order and revived the application for further consideration by a learned Single Judge in accordance with the law.

Summary: The interpretation of subsection 2 of Section 10 of TrademarkAct, 1940, in view of the above, cannot be restricted to a simpleconcurrent use irrespective of any agreement. Use of trademark underthe agreement is not only permissive use but conclusive rights werebeing delegated and hence the use is concurrent to the use of theinventor. The subject use thus would come within honest concurrent useunder the circumstances described in the agreement. It is inconceivablethat the appellant would enjoy the consideration of a rental premises ifthe right of trademark is excluded. Certainly the consideration was for aparticular territory i.e. Lahore division which was taken care of by theRegistrar

Summary: The case involves a trademark dispute over the ownership and use of the "Peek Freans" trademark, which is alleged to have been abandoned. The applicant, claiming to be the registered proprietor of the subject trademark, filed an application under section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) seeking a stay of proceedings in a related suit (No. 1562 of 2002). The applicant argues that the relief sought in the suit overlaps with the relief that may be granted in a pending appeal related to the trademark. The applicant's counsel argues that the issues in the subject suit and the appeal are substantially the same, particularly concerning ownership of the trademark, and that a decision in the suit would operate as res judicata in the appeal. They also rely on various legal precedents to support their arguments. On the other hand, the respondent's counsel challenges the maintainability of the Revision Application, asserting that the District Judge had jurisdiction to decide the application under section 10 CPC. The judgment discussed the applicability of section 10 CPC and the conditions under which a stay of proceedings can be granted. It also considered the possibility of conflicting decisions and the potential for res judicata. The judgment ultimately concluded that the civil/district court can proceed with the trial but should not pass a final judgment until the disposal of the pending appeal. The judge emphasized the importance of avoiding conflicting decisions and ensuring that justice is served in the case. The judgment also refers to relevant legal provisions and precedents to support the decision.

Summary: Trademark---The case involved disputes over the use of design and trademark. ORO Industries sought an injunction against Muhammad Hanif from using the design of Design owned by ORO Industries and using the trademark "ZORRO" on the basis of alleged similarity to their registered trademark "ORO." The court acknowledged that ORO Industries possessed the registered trademark "ORO" and the design of pencils under dispute, registered as per the Registered Designs Ordinance, 2000. The court reviewed evidence of the alleged similarities between the pencils manufactured by the Defendant and those of ORO Industries, including the use of the "ZORRO" trademark. The court emphasized that for a design to be registered, it must exhibit newness or originality under the Ordinance, and the lack of such elements precludes registration. The court cited the definition of "design" in the Ordinance and explained the requirement of global newness or originality for registration under the 2000 Ordinance. In assessing the case, the court noted that triangular-shaped pencils, similar to those registered by ORO Industries, were widely available for decades and not new or original. The court cited a lack of creative ingenuity and novelty in the design and ruled in favor of the Defendant in the cancellation case. However, in the context of the trademark dispute, the court found that the Defendant's pencils bore a striking resemblance to those of ORO Industries, using a similar color scheme and the "ZORRO" trademark that closely resembled ORO Industries' "ORO" trademark. As a result, ORO Industries' application for an injunction against the Defendant's use of the "ZORRO" trademarked pencils succeeded, despite the cancellation of their design registration.

Summary: This order pertains to a legal case involving Italfarmaco S.P.A and Himont Pharmaceuticals. Italfarmaco S.P.A filed an application under Section 90(1)(b)(i) and Section 80(4) of the Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001, seeking a declaration of invalidity of the trademark FERPLEX registered in Himont Pharmaceuticals' name for pharmaceutical preparations used as iron supplements. The application claims that Himont's registration of the trademark is invalid.The background of the case involves a license agreement executed in 1994 between Italfarmaco S.P.A and Himont Pharmaceuticals, which allowed Himont to manufacture and sell products under the FERPLEX trademark. The license agreement was terminated by Italfarmaco S.P.A in 2009. Himont contested this termination and initiated a lawsuit against Italfarmaco S.P.A in the District Court, Lahore.In response, Italfarmaco S.P.A filed an application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) and another application under Order XXXIX, Rule 4 CPC, seeking various reliefs related to the FERPLEX trademark, including recalling products, removing signs, and transferring marketing approvals.The key issue addressed in this order is whether Italfarmaco S.P.A's application for the declaration of invalidity of the FERPLEX trademark should be heard in the High Court or District Court. The legal provision in question is Section 80(4) of the Trade Marks Ordinance, which states that an application for declaration of invalidity can be made to the Registrar, High Court, or District Court, with certain exceptions.Himont argued that since proceedings related to the trademark were already pending in the District Court, Lahore, Italfarmaco S.P.A's application should have been filed there. The order explains that the term "proceedings" encompasses all cases brought before the courts related to the trademark. It concludes that both the District Court cases and Italfarmaco S.P.A's application are "proceedings concerning the trademark in question," thus falling under the exception of Section 80(4) and requiring that they be heard in the District Court.The order emphasizes the legislative intent to avoid conflicting decisions and forum shopping and highlights the importance of consistent judgments in trademark-related cases. It also refers to Section 116 of the Trade Marks Ordinance, which reinforces the need for consistent decision-making on trademark matters.Ultimately, the order allows Italfarmaco S.P.A's application to be returned to be filed before the appropriate forum, which, in this case, is the District Court, Lahore.

Summary: Background: The appellant, Rani Foods (Pvt.) Limited, challenged the interim injunction granted to the respondent, Rani Refreshment FZC, by the Additional District Judge, Islamabad. The injunction prohibited the appellant from using or advertising the trademark "RANI" for beverages and related products. The respondent claimed exclusive rights to the "RANI" trademark based on a deed of assignment and subsequent registration under the Trademarks Ordinance, 2001. The appellant argued that the respondent was not the registered proprietor at the time of initiating the first suit. -----Issues: 1- Whether the respondent had the legal standing to claim exclusive rights over the trademark "RANI" at the time of instituting the first suit. -----2- Whether the appellant could be restrained from using the trademark "RANI" given the respondent's subsequent registration. -----3- Whether the interim injunction was valid in light of subsequent developments. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Standing of the Respondent: At the time of instituting the first suit (15.02.2013), the respondent's name had not been entered in the register of trademarks as the proprietor of "RANI" under Registration No.200181. The registration was only approved on 12.10.2015, albeit retroactively effective from 18.03.2012. Consequently, the respondent lacked standing as a "proprietor" when the suit was filed. --Restraint on Trademark Usage: The court modified the interim injunction to exclude restrictions related to the trademark "RANI" under Registration No.200181, Class-32. This modification acknowledged that this particular trademark could not have been the subject of the first suit, as the respondent was not registered as its proprietor at that time. --Validity of Interim Injunction: While the court recognized the respondent’s eventual rights following registration, it limited the scope of the injunction to trademarks other than "RANI" under Registration No.200181. The court emphasized the need to differentiate between claims made in the first suit and subsequent proceedings. The court modified the injunction order dated 10.04.2013, allowing the appellant to use the trademark "RANI" specifically under Registration No.200181, Class-32. The appeal was disposed of accordingly. -----Citations/Precedents: Section 39(2), Trademarks Ordinance, 2001: Defines the exclusive rights of a registered trademark proprietor. Definition of 'Proprietor', Trademarks Ordinance, 2001: Establishes that rights arise upon registration in the Trademarks Register.

Summary: [TRADE MARK, Takaful Rules, 2012 (Rule 2)] Section 39 of the Trademark Ordinance, 2001 relates to the rightsconferred by registration whereas Section 40 of the Ordinance deals with the infringement of the registered trademark. In terms of Section 40 subsection 3(c) of the Ordinance a person shall infringe a registered trademark if the person uses in the course of a trade a mark which is identical with, or deceptively similar to, the trademark in relation to services of the same description as that of service in respect of which a trademark is registered. The proposition thus appears to be simple that service which is being dealt with by both the plaintiff and the defendant whether is of same description or otherwise to attract the provisions as referred above. I may refer to the international classification of goods and services and it seems that it is being dealt with by class-36 and there is no dispute in this regard as the defendant himself chooses to apply under the same class. The defence that they have been dealing with takaful business would not turn much as it is being dealt with by the same classification

Summary: Issue:Whether the trademarks registered by Wella should be removed from the register due to non-use, despite the import bans that prevented the sale of their products in Pakistan.Holding:The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the trademarks should not be removed. The non-use of trademarks by Wella was due to special circumstances (import bans) beyond their control, not due to any intention to abandon the trademarks.Reasoning:The Court noted that the import bans issued by the Government of Pakistan constituted special circumstances that justified the non-use of Wella's trademarks. The Court relied on the principle that non-use due to circumstances affecting the entire trade, and beyond the control of the trademark owner, does not warrant the removal of trademarks. The Court referred to the case of Cooper's Incorporated v. Pakistan General Stores & Another (1981 SCMR 1039) and Procter and Gamble Ltd. v. Registrar of Trade Marks (1988 CLC 252) to support its reasoning.Judgment:The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the judgment of the High Court of Sindh and the orders of the Registrar of Trademarks, dismissed the rectification cases, and restored Wella's registered trademarks.--- ''For seeking the relief of removal/revocation of a registered trade mark under S. 37(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940, specific minimum timeframe of five years has been provided during which there has been no bona fide use of such trademark by its proprietor, which is to be computed from a date one month before the date of application submitted by any aggrieved person in such regard. Burden of proof as to whether there was no bona fide use of the registered trademarks for a continuous period of five years up to a date one month before the date of the application without any lawful excuse or special circumstances as envisaged under S. 37(3) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940, is squarely upon the aggrieved party/applicant which has submitted the application for removing the trademark from the Register of Trademarks.''

Summary: "Trade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 2001)-------Ss. 8(1) & 40---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 54---Infringement of trade mark---Permanent Injunction---Application for grant of interim injunction under O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2, C.P.C.---Similarity and deceptivity in trade marks, determination as to--- Plaintiffs, pharmaceutical company owned trade mark ""LESCOL"" and got the same registered in year 1991---Trade mark ""DESCOL"" belonged to defendant, also a pharmaceutical company, which was registered in 2003---Plaintiff sought permanent injunction against use of defendant's trade mark and running of business thereunder contending that defendant's trade mark was phonetically, visually and structurally deceptive and confusingly similar and/or resembled plaintiff's trade mark and defendant's product was likely to pass off as that of plaintiff's product---Both trade marks involved sale of almost same medicinal product---Validity---Prescription of doctor and his expert opinion would be important factor in recommending medicine---Persons prescribing, dealing and offering medicines were specialist meant to protect passing of such medicine available at shop and sale of such medicine were carried out by authorized or licensed persons---Partially phonetically both trade marks were similar, but, for pharmaceutical products, the assigned names were given on basis of generics---No one could claim any proprietary right regarding such generic words as to its exclusive use---Trade mark was to be seen with complete getup, colour scheme, design and printing---Plaintiff's claim related to phonetic similarity between the two trade marks and not to the whole word or design or getup---No deceptive similarity existed between the two trade marks when seen as a whole---Pharmaceutical products were not ordinary goods which a person could point out at shop and buy at his choice---No case was made out for injunction---Application was dismissed, in circumstances."