Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S.497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302 & 34---Qatl-i-amd and common intention---Bail, grant of---Absconsion---Scope---Prosecution case was that the accused was presentalong with two co-accused persons, who fired and killed two persons---Accused wasnominated in the FIR but no role of firing was attributed to him---FIR was also silent as towhether the accused was armed or not---Witnesses, in their statements under S.161, Cr.P.C.,had although alleged that the accused was equipped with fire arm and had murdered thedeceased persons but such role was not ascribed to the accused in the FIR---Bail could begranted if the accused had a good prima facie case for bail on merits and his absconsionwould not come in the way while granting bail---Petition for grant of bail was allowed, incircumstances.Mitho Pitafi v. The State 2009 SCMR 299 rel.(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------Ss. 34 & 149---Common intention---Common object---Scope---Mere presence of anaccused at the time of commission of crime is not enough to hold him responsible forcommission of crime, unless the prosecution succeeds in establishing that the accused hadalso shared common intention or common object with his co-accomplices or helped orfacilitated them in the crime.(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S.497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302 & 34---Bail---Qatl-i-amd and commonintention---No overt act ascribed to accused---Scope---Whenever no overt act was ascribed toaccused, lenient view was required to be taken towards the accused for granting him theconcession of bail.Muhammad Khan alias Muhammad Bux v. The State 2015 PCr.LJ 69 and MuhammadTanveer v. The State 2014 PCr.LJ 1096 ref

Summary: (a) Illegal Dispossession Act (XI of 2005)-------Ss. 3, 4 & 5---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 540---Illegal dispossession---Summoning of witness---Scope---Petitioner filed application under S. 540, Cr.P.C., forcalling the concerned SHO to tender the proposed document as a witness, which applicationwas dismissed by the Trial Court---Validity---If it appeared to the court that a person'sevidence was essential to the just decision of the case then there was no discretion to preventsuch a person from being examined---Power under S. 540, Cr.P.C., to summon a witnessmight be exercised either by suo motu or on an application---Person who might not havebeen examined at the time of investigation or whose name was not included in the calendarof witnesses or in the challan could be summoned under S. 540, Cr.P.C.---In the present casethe parties were in dispute over the property, which they claimed to be the owners of onaccount of petitioners alleged dispossession from the same---Petitioner filed a complaintunder Ss. 3, 4 and 5 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 against the respondents for hisalleged dispossession---No doubt, the document which the petitioner wanted to place onrecord i.e. report of SHO dated 16.12.2019 was not filed at the time of filing the complaint---Perusal of the same prima-facie revealed that allegedly the accused/respondents tried toencroach the unsettled property and the petitioner intended to establish the conduct of therespondents as land grabbers through the said document---Trial Court did not make an effortto satisfy itself or to consider the two essential ingredients; firstly, whether the proposedperson was a material witness and, secondly, whether he was essential for a just decision ofthe case---Trial Court was required to take the entire material and the circumstances of thecase into consideration, so as to form an opinion whether summoning of the proposedwitness was essential for a just decision of the case---Trial court, while passing the impugnedorder, did not consider the principles and law laid down for deciding applications under S.540, Cr.P.C and thereby failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it, besides the illegality andmaterial irregularity---Grounds for dismissing the application under S. 540, Cr.P.C., wereneither tenable in law nor in consonance with the principles enunciated in that regard---Application was allowed by the High Court setting aside the impugned order and Trial Courtwas directed to call the proposed witness to place the said document on record according tolaw. Muhammad Saleem v. Muhammad Azan and another 2011 SCMR 474 and ShahbazMasih v. The State 2007 SCMR 1631 rel.(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 540---Summoning of witness---Scope---Most critical and fundamental considerationsfor a court while deciding such an application were twofold; firstly, it was to form an opinionas to whether the person was a material witness and secondly, that examining such a witnesswas essential for a just decision of the case---Timing of summoning such a person to beexamined as a witness was irrelevant, provided the court was satisfied that the evidencewould be essential to meet the ends of justice and for a just decision of the case---Likewise,it was also not a bar to examine such a material witness if, during the investigations, his/herstatement was not recorded under S. 161, Cr.P.C., or he did not appear in the calendar ofwitnesses.

Summary: Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O.XL, R.1---Receiver, appointment of---Scope and requirements---Words "just andconvenient"---Connotation---Plaintiffs during pendency of suit filed application forappointment of receiver, which was dismissed---Validity---Court had jurisdiction to appointreceiver of the suit property in order to protect and preserve the same---Such discretionshould be exercised judiciously by following the norms of law to protect the right of thecitizens---Party seeking relief of appointment of receiver should make out a prima facie caseand establish his title to the suit property---Such party should also show that suit propertywould be wasted and misappropriated if receiver was not appointed---Apprehension ofmismanagement or misappropriation alone was not sufficient for appointment of receiver---Appointment of receiver was the harshest remedy provided under Civil Procedure Code,1908---Power under O.XL, R.1 of C.P.C. should only be exercised when Court had come tothe conclusion that it was just and convenient to appoint receiver to preserve and protect theproperty during pendency of litigation---Words "just and convenient" used in O.XL, R.1 ofC.P.C. was to be interpreted depending upon the facts of each case---Said words denoteconvenience of the party and not that of the Court---Suit property in the present case was inpossession of defendants and revenue entries were also in their names---Appointment ofreceiver in circumstances, was not just and convenient as it would deprive the defendantsfrom usufruct of the properties---Plaintiffs had yet to prove their contention at the trial andthey had failed to show any emergency and loss demanding immediate action forappointment of receiver---No illegality or irregularity had been pointed out in the impugnedorders passed by the Courts below---Constitutional petition was dismissed in limine.

Summary: BackgroundThis case involves multiple appeals and petitions led by Gul Taiz Khan Marwat against various judicial bodies, including the Peshawar High Court and Lahore High Court, among others. The case references a series of legal disputes that deal primarily with the administrative, executive, and consultative actions of the Chief Justices and Judges of various High Courts across Pakistan. The appeals and petitions challenge these actions under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, which pertains to the constitutional jurisdiction of High Courts.---IssuesThe primary issue in this case was whether the actions of the Chief Justices or Judges of a High Court, in their executive, administrative, or consultative capacities, are amenable to the constitutional jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution. This issue revolves around the interpretation of the term "person" under Article 199(5) and whether it includes judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts when they act in non-judicial capacities.---Holding/Reasoning/OutcomeThe Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the actions of the Chief Justices and Judges, when acting in their executive, administrative, or consultative capacities, do not fall within the ambit of "person" as defined in Article 199(5) of the Constitution. Therefore, such actions are not amenable to the constitutional jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 199.The Court applied the "but for" test to determine the immunity of judicial actions from challenge under Article 199. It concluded that actions carried out by judges due to their roles inherently linked to their judicial positions are immune from challenge. The Court emphasized the need for judicial comity and maintaining the respect and hierarchical order essential for the judiciary's functioning and public trust.---Citations/PrecedentsCh. Muhammad Akram v. Registrar, Islamabad High Court and others PLD 2016 SC 961 was overruled.Abrar Hassan and Malik Asad were distinguished.Suleman Ali Haideri and another v. Government of Balochistan and others 2004 SCMR 354 referenced.Mujibur Rahman Shami and another v. A Judge of the High Court, Lahore PLD 1973 Lah. 778Mian Jamal Shah v. The Member, Election Commission and others PLD 1966 SC 1Federation of Pakistan v. Muhammad Akram Shaikh PLD 1989 SC 689Muhammad Iqbal and others v. Lahore High Court through Registrar and others 2010 SCMR 632Asif Saeed v. Registrar, Lahore High Court and others PLD 1999 Lah. 350Chief Justice of Pakistan Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry v. President of Pakistan through Secretary and others PLD 2010 SC 61Asif Naz v. Government of Punjab and others PLD 2017 Lah. 271Water and Sanitation Agency, Lahore through M.D. v. Lottee Akhtar Beverages (Pvt.) Ltd. Lahore and others 2019 SCMR 1146Ibrahim v. Muhammad Hussain PLD 1975 SC 457Habib Bank Ltd. v. The State and 6 others 1993 SCMR 1853Muhammad Yar Buttar and 4 others v. Board of Governors, Overseas Pakistanis Foundation, Islamabad and another 1999 SCMR 819

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Application received by post, whereby Hon'bl Chief Justice of this Court has directed that appplication be treated as petition under Article 199 of the Constitution (Applicant is condemn prisoner, confined in Central Prison, Rawalpindi))

Summary: Relevant facts of the case are that the above Suit was filed by the respondent claiming to be the sole and exclusive owner of property bearing C.S. No.4407, Ward G, out of R.S. No.27 and others in Deh Ghangra, situated at Phulelipar, Paretabad, Hyderabad Sindh (suit property)--The main concern raised on behalf of the applicant was that as the property in his possession is separate and distinct from the one claimed by the respondent, the impugned decree cannot be executed in respect of his property. In this context, it may be noted that there are already concurrent findings against the applicant and this Court has also affirmed the same. Be that as it may, needless to say that the executing Court cannot go behind the decree and the decree shall be executed only in respect of the property described therein after carefully identifying and ascertaining the same.