Summary: Since, petitioner was not a permanent workman who served throughout the year in the Factories but was a seasonal worker, whose length of service was counted for the days he served the respondents/ Factories, as such, it is the case of the petitioner that respondents have misapplied the formula for considering his length of service in terms of 365 days in a year, because, they, themselves, for certain period, considered his length of service as 312 days for a complete year, while, for another portion, 365 days are considered as complete year. The respondents are, however, required to have applied Section 2(q) of the EOB Act for calculating his length of service by dividing the total days he served by 312 days.

Summary: Bar of strike on previous dates is no ground to adjourn the case----The petitioner, Muhammad Ehsan, contested a suit filed by respondent No. 2 under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), seeking recovery of Rs. 5,00,000 based on a promissory note and receipt allegedly executed by the petitioner. Despite multiple opportunities, Muhammad Ehsan failed to produce evidence, leading to the closure of his evidence by the trial court. Muhammad Ehsan's counsel argued that he was not given adequate opportunity to produce evidence and that the order closing his evidence was harsh and untenable. However, the court found that Muhammad Ehsan had ample opportunities to produce evidence but failed to do so, leading to the invocation of penal provisions under Order XVII Rule 3 of the CPC. The court cited precedents, including Syed TAHIR HUSSAIN MEHMOODI vs. Agha Syed LIAQAT ALI and others (2014 SCMR 637) and Rana TANVEER KHAN vs. NASEER-UD-DIN and others (2015 SCMR 1401), emphasizing the strict application of penal provisions when a party fails to discharge its duties under the law. Furthermore, the court highlighted that the legal profession is subservient to the law, and lawyers cannot abstain from appearing in court, even during strikes. It referenced legal provisions and rules governing the conduct of lawyers, emphasizing their duty to uphold the dignity of the profession and diligently represent their clients. In conclusion, the court dismissed the writ petition, stating that it lacked merit and failed to demonstrate any illegality or irregularity in the order of the trial court.

Summary: The case involves a dispute over the ownership of land originally declared in excess of legal limits under Martial Law Regulation No.115 of 1972. Ansar Pervez, the brother of Mst. Yasmeen (respondent No.3), purportedly gifted the land to Yasmeen through a mutation sanctioned in 1972. However, the Land Commissioner declared the gift transaction illegal in 1974, and subsequent appeals by Yasmeen were dismissed. The land was eventually mutated in favor of the state. In 1996, Yasmeen filed a Revision Petition under Para 29 of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972, which was accepted by the Federal Land Commissioner, Islamabad, restoring the mutation in her favor.The main contention of the petitioners revolves around the timeliness of Yasmeen's revision petition, filed more than two decades after the original orders. Para 29 of the Regulation establishes a 60-day limitation period for filing revisions, and the Chairman of the Federal Land Commission was deemed incompetent to entertain such petitions after November 30, 1976, per legal precedents cited. The court found Yasmeen's petition time-barred and lacking jurisdiction, thus setting aside the Federal Land Commissioner's order as null and void. The decision was based on the principles of natural justice and procedural irregularities. Consequently, the writ petitions were allowed, and the impugned order was overturned.

Summary: The case revolved around the acquisition of land for the construction of a police station. Initially, land belonging to the Agricultural and Livestock Department was acquired, but objections were raised, and the acquisition was withdrawn. Subsequently, another property owned by respondent Nos. 2 to 4 was acquired but later de-notified. Eventually, the land owned by respondent No. 1 was notified under the Land Acquisition Act. The petitioner contended that the High Court's judgment was legally flawed and factually incorrect, and the acquisition was for a public purpose. They argued that the High Court made observations against individuals who were not parties to the proceedings. The Supreme Court examined the case and found that the High Court's reliance on the element of mala fide was unsupported by evidence presented prior to the filing of the writ petition. The Court noted that the aspect of alleged mala fide lacked a legal foundation. The High Court's restoration of the notification for land acquisition without providing notice to respondent Nos. 2 to 4 was also criticized, as the principle of audi alteram partem (the right to be heard) was not followed. The Court remanded the case back to the High Court for a fresh decision, emphasizing the need to afford an opportunity of hearing to all parties involved.

Summary: Background:The case involves Civil Petition No. 4500 of 2017 and several miscellaneous applications brought before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, concerning the development and management of infrastructure in Islamabad. The petitioner, Pak Gulf Construction (Pvt) Limited, raised issues regarding the jurisdiction and responsibilities of the Capital Development Authority (CDA) and the Municipal Corporation Islamabad (MCI) in relation to service roads and parking areas adjacent to the Centaurus Tower.Issues:Whether the jurisdictional confusion between the CDA and MCI regarding the lease of land for parking areas violates the petitioner's rights.Whether the CDA has fulfilled its obligations, as directed by the court, regarding the maintenance of roads, garbage collection, sewage treatment, and tree plantation in Islamabad.Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Chairman of the CDA informed the court that the area in question falls under the jurisdiction of the MCI, which had leased the land for parking purposes. He indicated that draft rules were being prepared to clarify the MCI's authority to lease such land, and the court directed the Deputy Attorney General to ensure the notification of these rules within one week.The Chairman of the CDA provided updates on various initiatives undertaken by the authority to improve infrastructure and environmental conditions in Islamabad. These initiatives included road repairs, garbage collection, sewage treatment, tree plantation, and the installation of portable toilets. The court acknowledged the progress made by the CDA and emphasized the importance of continued efforts to address these issues effectively.Citations/Precedents:Articles 18 and 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan: Protection of rights and equal treatment under the law.Relevant municipal laws and regulations governing the jurisdiction and responsibilities of the CDA and MCI.

Summary: Background:The Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) petitioned against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which allowed a writ petition filed by Muhammad Khurshid. The case originated from the acquisition of land for the construction of a police station. Initially, land belonging to the Agricultural and Livestock Department was acquired but later de-notified. Subsequently, another property owned by respondent Nos. 2 to 4 was acquired and later de-notified. Finally, the land belonging to Muhammad Khurshid was notified for acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.----Issues:Whether the High Court's finding of mala fides on the part of the acquiring department was justified.Whether the restoration of the notification for the acquisition of respondent Nos. 2 to 4's land without notice to them was lawful.Whether due process, including the principle of audi alteram partem, was followed in the proceedings.----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court found that the High Court's reliance on mala fides lacked sufficient evidence and legal foundation. While the Land Acquisition Act empowered the acquiring authority to issue notifications for public purposes, the absence of due process in the proceedings was noted. The restoration of the notification for the acquisition of land without notice to affected parties violated the principle of audi alteram partem. Consequently, the petition was converted into an appeal, allowed, and the impugned judgment was set aside. The case was remanded back to the High Court for a fresh decision, emphasizing the need for due process and the opportunity for all concerned parties to be heard.----Citations/Precedents:Land Acquisition Act, 1894Principle of audi alteram partemSection 12(2) of the Civil Procedure Code

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending