Summary: [A company could authorize any person to sign pleadings on its behalf, and in this case, the Chief Executive Officer's signature on the appeals should be regarded as ratification by the company] The petitioner had filed wealth tax returns declaring 'nil' wealth for the years 1993-94 to 1997-98, but the Wealth Tax Officer issued a notice regarding the market value of the car parking attached to the plaza owned by the petitioner. The petitioner argued that as the car parking area was leased from the Lahore Development Authority (LDA), they were not liable for wealth tax.The petitioner subsequently filed Wealth Tax Appeals before the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the appeals on the grounds that they were not accompanied by a resolution of the Board of Directors authorizing the Chief Executive to file the appeals. The Supreme Court noted that the High Court had dismissed the appeals on technical grounds without addressing the substantive issue of whether the petitioner was liable for wealth tax. The Supreme Court referred to a previous judgment stating that a company could authorize any person to sign pleadings on its behalf, and in this case, the Chief Executive Officer's signature on the appeals should be regarded as ratification by the company. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the case back to the High Court for a fresh decision on the appeals, emphasizing that the appeals should be decided on their merits and in accordance with the law.

Summary: [A company could authorize any person to sign pleadings on its behalf, and in this case, the Chief Executive Officer's signature on the appeals should be regarded as ratification by the company] The petitioner had filed wealth tax returns declaring 'nil' wealth for the years 1993-94 to 1997-98, but the Wealth Tax Officer issued a notice regarding the market value of the car parking attached to the plaza owned by the petitioner. The petitioner argued that as the car parking area was leased from the Lahore Development Authority (LDA), they were not liable for wealth tax.The petitioner subsequently filed Wealth Tax Appeals before the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the appeals on the grounds that they were not accompanied by a resolution of the Board of Directors authorizing the Chief Executive to file the appeals. The Supreme Court noted that the High Court had dismissed the appeals on technical grounds without addressing the substantive issue of whether the petitioner was liable for wealth tax. The Supreme Court referred to a previous judgment stating that a company could authorize any person to sign pleadings on its behalf, and in this case, the Chief Executive Officer's signature on the appeals should be regarded as ratification by the company. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the case back to the High Court for a fresh decision on the appeals, emphasizing that the appeals should be decided on their merits and in accordance with the law.

Summary: M/s Liberty Car Parking (Pvt.) Ltd. challenged the dismissal of its Wealth Tax Appeals by the Lahore High Court. The petitioner had filed returns declaring 'nil' wealth for five years, pertaining to a car parking area leased from LDA. The Assessing Officer assessed the car parking's value based on the balance sheet. Appeals led to the Tribunal remanding the case, but the High Court dismissed them due to a lack of accompanying resolution from the Board of Directors authorizing the Chief Executive to file the appeals.----Issues:Whether the High Court's dismissal of the appeals on the technical ground of lacking a Board of Directors' resolution was justified.Whether tax appeals are exclusively governed by the provisions of the Wealth Tax Act or subject to general corporate law principles.----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision was not based on proper legal appreciation. It reasoned that a company can ratify actions through its officers' signing of documents, even without explicit authorization. As per the Wealth Tax Act, the Chief Executive Officer's signature on the appeals constituted express ratification by the company. Therefore, the High Court erred in dismissing the appeals on a technicality. The case was remanded back to the High Court to decide the appeals on their merits.----Citations/Precedents:Rahat and Co. Vs. Trading Corporation of Pakistan (PLD 2020 SC 366)

Summary: Background:This case involves Sardar Muhammad and others (appellants) who filed an appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench. The High Court had reversed the concurrent findings of the lower courts, dismissing the appellants' suit that sought to set aside the orders dated 26.03.2002 and 19.08.2003 by the Deputy District Officer (DDO) and Executive District Officer (Revenue) (EDO), respectively. The suit also sought cancellation of a registered sale deed dated 29.03.2002 executed by Imam Bakhsh (predecessor in interest of Respondent No.1) in favor of Respondents No. 2 to 9.----Issues:Did the DDO (R) have the jurisdiction to cancel the sale mutation on the grounds of fraud and misrepresentation?Should the subsequent registered sale deed be canceled due to the cancellation of the initial sale mutation?Did the High Court err in reversing the concurrent findings of the lower courts?----Holding/Reasoning/OutcomeHolding: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the Lahore High Court and restoring the judgments of the lower courts.Reasoning:Jurisdiction of DDO (R): The Court held that the DDO (R) overstepped his authority by canceling the sale mutation on grounds of fraud and misrepresentation. Such issues require a full trial with evidence, which falls within the domain of civil courts, not summary proceedings before revenue authorities. The proceedings before revenue officers are summary in nature and do not permit the detailed examination required for allegations of fraud.Subsequent Sale Deed: Since the sale mutation was canceled without jurisdiction, the subsequent registered sale deed is also questionable. The respondents were aware of the disputed nature of the property when they purchased it.Concurrent Findings of Fact: The High Court improperly disregarded the concurrent findings of the trial and appellate courts, which had correctly assessed the facts and circumstances, including the mental and physical condition of Imam Bakhsh.Outcome: The appeal was allowed, and the impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside, restoring the judgments of the trial court and the appellate court.-----Citations/Precedents:Noor Muhammad vs. Allah Ditta (PLD 2009 Supreme Court 198)Fida Hussain vs. Abdul Aziz (PLD 2005 Supreme Court 343)Abad Muhammad (thr. LRs) vs. Mst. Sakina and another (PLJ 1987 (d) Revenue 22)Mst. Surraiya Bano vs. Nazia Bano (1996 CLC 1690)

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Petitioner is a renowned politician, active in PDM activity. seeks direction upon all IG's to remove any threat to the movements activities as well as to provide security.

Summary: It has now been well settled that for conviction of an accused person it would be highly unsafe to rely upon testimony of a chance witness when remained uncorroborated and for conviction of a accused on capital charge on the basis of testimony of chance witness, the court has to be at guard and corroboration has to be sought for relying upon such evidence.

Summary: it has now been well settled that once the accused is acquitted then strong and exceptional grounds would be required for setting aside the judgment of acquittal.