Summary: Succession Act, 1925---Appeal against grant/refusal of succession certificate ---Forum of appeal governed by Sections 384 & 388 of the Act and not by pecuniary jurisdiction under the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 ---Appeal from an order passed by a Civil Judge exercising delegated powers under Section 388 lies before the District Judge irrespective of the value of the estate. ---Returning the appeal on the ground that the estate exceeded pecuniary limits held to be a jurisdictional error; impugned order set aside and appeal restored for decision on merits.

Summary: (a) Specific performance --- Agreement to sell --- Admission in written statement --- Subsequent retraction --- Judicial estoppel --- Evidentiary value of unretracted admission --- Respondent No.1 instituted a suit for possession through specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 26.12.2001, allegedly executed by respondent No.2 (vendor) in his favour --- In the initial written statement, respondent No.2 acknowledged execution of the agreement, though asserting that respondent No.1 had failed to perform his part of the contract --- After the petitioners, who claimed to be subsequent purchasers through mutation dated 02.03.2010, were impleaded, a consolidated written statement was filed wherein respondent No.2 resiled from his earlier stance and denied execution --- Trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground that respondent No.1 had failed to establish continuous readiness and willingness, though relief of refund of earnest money was granted --- Appellate Court reversed and decreed specific performance, placing reliance upon the earlier admission of respondent No.2 and holding the petitioners not to be bona fide purchasers; High Court dismissed the civil revision --- Held, that respondent No.2, by virtue of his earlier pleading, was estopped to resile from it --- Doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents a litigant from taking a contradictory or inconsistent pleading --- An admission, unless satisfactorily explained or withdrawn in accordance with law, constitutes substantive evidence against the maker and cannot be permitted to be resiled from by taking a diametrically opposite stance in subsequent pleadings --- Respondent No.2 not only took inconsistent positions in successive written statements but also abstained from entering the witness box to substantiate the latter plea, thereby rendering such retraction devoid of evidentiary value --- Courts below rightly attached due weight to the initial admission, which stood further corroborated by the pleadings of respondent No.3. (b) Bona fide purchaser for value without notice --- Subsequent purchasers impleaded during pendency of suit --- Due diligence --- Held, that the record did not disclose any material to demonstrate that the petitioners had undertaken due diligence or made bona fide inquiries prior to acquiring the suit property, particularly when the transaction in their favour was effected during the pendency of litigation --- Concurrent finding that they were not entitled to the protection available to a bona fide purchaser did not suffer from any misreading or non-reading of evidence. (c) Specific performance --- Readiness and willingness --- Delay attributable to title of the vendor --- Argument that respondent No.1 had failed to establish readiness and willingness was duly considered in the context of the peculiar facts of the case, where the delay was attributable to circumstances relating to the title of the vendor --- No perversity was pointed out in the conclusions drawn by the appellate court and affirmed by the High Court. (d) Constitution of Pakistan ---- Art. 185(3) --- Concurrent findings --- Revisional jurisdiction --- Interference by Supreme Court --- Held, that this Court does not ordinarily interfere with concurrent findings of the courts below unless the same are shown to be the result of gross misreading or non-reading of evidence or suffer from a patent error of law --- No such infirmity was demonstrated --- High Court correctly appreciated the scope of revisional jurisdiction and declined interference for valid reasons --- No case for grant of leave made out. Disposition: Civil petition dismissed; leave to appeal refused. (C.P. No.712 of 2026, Supreme Court of Pakistan, order by Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, J. (Yahya Afridi, C.J. and Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, J. on the Bench), Islamabad, 09.06.2026; Approved for reporting.)

Summary: (a) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997) ---- S. 9(c) --- Recovery of narcotics --- Safe custody and identity of samples --- Contradiction as to who entrusted case property to Moharrir --- Petitioner was convicted under S. 9(c) of the Act and sentenced to imprisonment for life with fine of Rs.100,000 on the allegation that on 21.12.2021 a raiding party at Check Post Sakhi Sarwar intercepted double-cabin vehicle No.KWA-6262 and recovered twenty-seven packets of charas weighing one kilogram each from a secret cavity; conviction and sentence were maintained by the High Court --- Held, that where conviction is sought on the basis of recovery of narcotics, the prosecution must establish through trustworthy, confidence-inspiring and unimpeachable evidence that the narcotic substance allegedly recovered from the accused remained in safe custody and that the samples examined by the forensic laboratory were the very same samples allegedly drawn from the recovered substance --- According to P.W.1, after conducting investigation he handed over the case property to the Moharrir; conversely, evidence of P.W.2, the Moharrir, revealed that the case property and sample parcels were handed over to him by the complainant A.S.I. --- A material contradiction thus emerged regarding the identity of the person who actually entrusted the recovered narcotics to the Moharrir. (b) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997) ---- S. 9(c) --- Recovery from secret cavities of a vehicle --- Best evidence --- Production of vehicle or photographs --- Held, that where the prosecution seeks to attribute evidentiary value to alleged recovery of narcotic substances from specially designed or concealed secret cavities within a vehicle, such a claim cannot be accepted on the basis of oral testimony alone --- Existence, location, dimensions and functional capacity of such cavities constitute material facts requiring satisfactory proof through the best available evidence --- It is incumbent upon the prosecution to preferably produce the vehicle before the trial Court, where feasible, or at the very least place on record clear, unambiguous photographs depicting the secret cavities in their opened and closed states, their precise location within the vehicle, and the registration number of the vehicle to enable proper identification --- Mere bald assertions by police witnesses regarding existence of secret cavities, unsupported by any visual or tangible corroborative evidence, fall far short of the standard of proof required in criminal cases involving grave penal consequences --- Production of the vehicle or its photographic record is not a mere formality but a necessary safeguard to ensure transparency and fairness of investigation, to facilitate meaningful judicial scrutiny, and to eliminate possibility of exaggeration, embellishment or false implication --- Failure to meet this requirement creates a serious lacuna in the prosecution case, particularly when the alleged concealment forms the very foundation of the charge --- Prosecution failed to produce either the vehicle or photographs of the secret cavities. (c) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997) ---- S. 9(c) --- Conscious possession --- Ownership and exclusive possession of vehicle --- Non-production of Malkhana Register and road certificate --- No excise official was brought to give evidence regarding ownership record, and registration particulars of the vehicle were withheld --- Prosecution did not prove that the vehicle belonged to the petitioner, or that it was in his lawful and exclusive possession at the relevant time --- Although P.W.2 claimed that the recovered narcotics and sample parcels remained in his safe custody and were subsequently transmitted for forensic examination, no Malkhana Register was produced before the trial Court --- Prosecution also failed to produce the road certificate or any documentary material demonstrating actual transmission of the sample parcels from the Malkhana to the Punjab Forensic Science Agency; date, time, mode and manner of dispatch were left to be inferred from oral testimony alone --- When the alleged source of recovery was not produced, the secret cavities were not demonstrated, and the petitioner's connection with the vehicle was not proved through reliable evidence, the element of conscious possession became doubtful --- Such doubt must operate in favour of the petitioner. Disposition: Leave granted; criminal petition converted into appeal and allowed; petitioner Alam Khan son of Karam Khan acquitted of the charge under S. 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, and directed to be released forthwith if not required in any other case. (Crl.P. No.51 of 2023, Supreme Court of Pakistan, judgment by Salahuddin Panhwar, J. (Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ. on the Bench), Islamabad, 09.06.2026; Approved for reporting.)

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)----S. 302(b)---Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997----S. 7(a)---Terrorism nexus---Held, private motives without requisite nexus with ATA objectives do not attract ATA---Conviction and death under S. 302(b) PPC maintained; conviction and sentence under S. 7(a) ATA set aside. Disposition: Jail petition converted into appeal and partly allowed; ATA conviction/sentence set aside; remaining convictions including death under S. 302(b) PPC maintained. Dated 09.06.2026. Approved for Reporting.

Summary: (a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987----S. 13---Talb-e-Muwathibat---Mandatory pleading of date, time and place---Omission fatal---Respondent/plaintiff instituted a suit for possession on the basis of pre-emption in respect of land measuring 6 kanals and 8 marlas comprised in Khasra No.1312, village Bilitang, District Kohat, transferred by mutation No.4895 attested on 27.12.2003---Trial Court dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiff had failed to specifically plead the date and place of Talb-e-Muwathibat in the plaint as required by S. 13---District Judge decreed the suit and the High Court dismissed the civil revision---Leave had been granted to consider whether mention of date and time in the cause-of-action paragraph could substitute for specific pleading of Talb-e-Muwathibat---Held, that it was mandatory for a pre-emptor to specifically plead the date, place and time of Talb-e-Muwathibat as well as the date of issuance of notice regarding Talb-e-Ishhad, and omission of these particulars in the plaint was fatal to a suit for pre-emption---Talb-e-Muwathibat was a "jumping demand", an immediate and spontaneous assertion of the right upon acquiring knowledge of the sale, and its essence lay in immediacy, so that the law insisted upon strict proof of the exact date, time and place when knowledge was first acquired and the demand made---Date, time and place of Talb-e-Muwathibat were not mere formalities but the very foundation of the claim; if the foundational demand was not specifically pleaded and proved, the entire edifice collapsed---Making of Talb-e-Muwathibat was the foundation on which Talb-e-Ishhad and Talb-e-Khusumat rested, and the timelines in Ss. 13(3) and 13(4) depended entirely upon it---Omission to mention even one of the three particulars, namely date, time or place, would by itself result in dismissal of the suit---Right of pre-emption being weak and feeble, every requirement relating to Talbs had to be observed strictly---Where the plaint did not disclose the mandatory particulars of Talb, the claim was legally deficient at the threshold and no amount of subsequent evidence could cure the defect---Plaint in the present case admittedly did not contain the essential particulars regarding Talb-e-Muwathibat, particularly the date and place at which it was allegedly performed, which omission struck at the root of the claim. Cited Cases: • Mian Pir Muhammad and another v. Faqir Muhammad through L.Rs. and others PLD 2007 SC 302 • Haji Muhammad Salem v. Khuda Bakhsh PLD 2003 SC 315 • Fazal Suhhan and 11 others v. Mst. Sahib Jamala and others PLD 2005 SC 977 • Mir Muhammad Khan and 2 others v. Haider and others PLD 2020 Supreme Court 233 • Khyber Khan and others v. Haji Malik Amanullah Khan 2007 SCMR 1036 • Kashmali Khan and others v. Mst. Malala 2023 SCMR 1176 • Dr. Pir Muhammad Khan v. Khuda Bukhsh 2015 SCMR 1243 • Farid Ullah Khan v. Irfan Ullah Khan 2022 SCMR 1231 • Ghulam Abbas v. Abdul Sattar and another 2026 SCP 172 (b) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987----S. 13---Talb-e-Muwathibat---Chain of source of information of sale---Held, that only a complete chain of the source of information of the sale could establish the essential elements of Talb-e-Muwathibat, namely (i) the time, date and place when the pre-emptor obtained the first information of the sale, and (ii) the immediate declaration of intention to exercise the right then and there---In the present case the chain as to imparting of information regarding the disputed transaction was missing, the respondent having failed to plead from whom the informer received the information. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Riaz v. Muhammad Akram and others 2024 SCMR 692 • Farid Ullah Khan v. Irfan Ullah Khan 2022 SCMR 1231 (c) Pleadings---Party bound by pleadings---Pre-emption---Evidence cannot travel beyond plaint---Held, that a party cannot travel beyond its pleading and is bound by its pleadings---Law required not only proof but also precise pleading of the mandatory Talbs, and failure to satisfy either requirement was fatal---Appellate Court and High Court fell into patent error in treating the defect as curable through evidence and in overlooking the settled law laid down by the five-member Bench in Mian Pir Muhammad's case. Cited Cases: • Sh. Fateh Muhammad v. Muhammad Adil and others PLD 2008 SC 82 • Hyder Ali Bhimji v. Additional District Judge Karachi South and another PLD 2012 SC 279 (d) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987----S. 13---Talb-e-Ishhad---When not to be examined---Held, that when the first and primary Talb, namely Talb-e-Muwathibat, was found not to have been proved, the Court need not examine the evidence on Talb-e-Ishhad, for if Talb-e-Muwathibat was not made in accordance with law the entire superstructure collapsed and subsequent discussion regarding proof of Talb-e-Ishhad became largely inconsequential. Cited Cases: • Farid Ullah Khan v. Irfan Ullah Khan 2022 SCMR 1231 Disposition: Appeal allowed; judgments of the Peshawar High Court dated 06.03.2017 in C.R. No.374-P of 2011 and of the appellate Court set aside; judgment and decree of the trial Court dated 02.09.2009 dismissing the suit restored. (C.A. No.888 of 2020, Supreme Court of Pakistan, decided 09.06.2026 at Islamabad; approved for reporting.)

Summary: (a) Limitation Act----S. 3---High Court Rules and Orders (Lahore), Vol. V, Ch. I, Pt. A, Rr. 9, 9-A, 11 & 13---Income tax, sales tax and federal excise references---Office objections---Delayed compliance and re-filing after expiry of statutory limitation---Department instituted references before Lahore High Court within time, but office objections raised at scrutiny were not removed within the period allowed, and the statutory period of limitation had also expired by the time of re-filing---High Court dismissed the references as barred by limitation---Held, that the controversy was no longer res integra---Where office objections remain uncomplied with within the period allowed, the prescribed period of limitation expires in the meantime, and the defaulting party fails to furnish any satisfactory explanation, the proceedings, upon re-filing, are liable to be treated as barred by limitation---Compliance with office objections is not a matter of procedural formality but a procedural obligation, the deliberate or unexplained disregard of which attracts substantive legal consequences under the law of limitation---Mere initial presentation within limitation does not confer an indefeasible procedural advantage if the proceedings are not validly instituted by timely removal of objections which render the institution legally deficient or incompetent---Period granted by the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) for removal of objections does not suspend, arrest or enlarge statutory limitation---None of the petitioners having challenged the competence of the office to raise the objections or the validity of the objections themselves, and having accepted and belatedly complied with them after expiry of limitation, they could not thereafter contend that the objections were unwarranted. MCB Bank Limited v. Uzma Tehreem 2026 SCMR 533; Lahore Development Authority v. Muhammad Rashid 1997 SCMR 1224; Asad Ali v. Bank of Punjab PLD 2020 Supreme Court 736 rel. (b) Limitation---Contumacious conduct---Condonation of delay---Vigilance of litigant---Concept of contumacy denotes obstinacy, stubbornness or persistent disregard of a lawful direction of the Court or a requirement of law---Where a litigant, despite having been afforded an opportunity to rectify a procedural defect, fails to do so without reasonable justification, such conduct ceases to be a mere procedural lapse and assumes the character of contumacy, disentitling the litigant to claim procedural indulgence as of right---Condonation of delay is not granted on vague or generalised assertions and depends on a complete, credible and satisfactory explanation covering the entire period of default---A litigant is expected to remain vigilant and maintain contact with counsel, and cannot escape the consequences of procedural default by merely attributing the lapse to counsel or counsel's staff---Procedural relief is available only to a diligent litigant and not to one whose own conduct demonstrates obstinate or persistent disregard of lawful procedural requirements. Siddique Khan v. Abdul Shakur Khan PLD 1984 Supreme Court 289 and Collector Land Acquisition v. Fazal-ur-Rehman 2009 SCMR 767 rel. (c) Limitation Act----S. 3---Law of limitation---Statute of repose---Public policy---Held, that the law of limitation is a statute of repose, designed to quieten title and bar stale disputes, and is to be strictly complied with---Although it does not itself create substantive rights, it regulates enforcement of existing rights by prescribing the period within which remedies must be pursued, and upon expiry of that period the law interposes a bar against the remedy while protecting valuable rights that have accrued in favour of the opposite party---Limitation statutes admit of no equitable or ethical construction, and justice, equity and good conscience cannot be invoked to override the express command of the statute---S. 3 of the Act casts a mandatory obligation upon every Court to give effect to the law of limitation irrespective of whether the plea has been specifically raised---Maxim vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt (the law assists the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights) forms the cornerstone of the law of limitation---Condonation of delay remains an exception requiring a satisfactory and legally sustainable explanation rather than a matter of routine indulgence. Khushi Muhammad v. Fazal Bibi PLD 2016 Supreme Court 872; Akhtar Nasir Ahmed v. Province of Punjab PLD 2024 Supreme Court 1268; Secretary to Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, C & W Department v. M/s Parcon Associates Government Contractors PLD 2025 Supreme Court 371 and Dr. Muhammad Javaid Shafi v. Syed Rashid Arshad PLD 2015 Supreme Court 212 rel. (d) Precedent---Larger Bench---Stare decisis---Lahore Development Authority v. Muhammad Rashid (1997 SCMR 1224), decided by a Bench of three Judges, constituted the binding statement of law on delayed re-filing after office objections and was not displaced by subsequent decisions of Benches of lesser numerical strength---Authority of a judicial decision is institutional rather than chronological---Farman Ali v. Muhammad Ishaq (PLD 2013 Supreme Court 392) and Mst. Sabiran Bi v. Ahmad Khan (2000 SCMR 847), frequently relied upon to contend that delayed compliance with office objections does not attract limitation where proceedings were initially instituted within time, were explained in Asad Ali v. Bank of Punjab (PLD 2020 Supreme Court 736) as not laying down any such general proposition---Where the file has been received back and office objections remain unremoved until statutory limitation expires, the matter falls to be decided in accordance with Lahore Development Authority. Ghulam Hussain v. Bahadar PLD 1954 Lahore 361 ref. (e) High Court Rules and Orders (Lahore), Vol. V----R. 9-A---List of petitions ordered to be returned---Non-receipt of returned file---Held, that a plain reading of R. 9-A showed that any delay in placing a returned petition before the Court or issuing the list shall not furnish justification for non-receipt of the returned petition in time or non-compliance with the objection within the time specified by the Deputy Registrar (Judicial)---Rule 9-A reinforces that neither non-receipt of the returned file nor administrative delay in listing can justify delayed compliance with office objections---Observations, findings and conclusions were confined to the present cases, no direct challenge having been laid to the validity or constitutionality of R. 9-A---Unlike the Lahore High Court, the Sindh High Court does not have rules mandatorily requiring the officer to return the file---If the constitutionality or statutory transgression of R. 9-A is challenged, the same shall be considered and decided independently, without being influenced by observations in the judgment. Cited Cases: • MCB Bank Limited v. Uzma Tehreem 2026 SCMR 533 • Siddique Khan v. Abdul Shakur Khan PLD 1984 Supreme Court 289 • Collector Land Acquisition v. Fazal-ur-Rehman 2009 SCMR 767 • Khushi Muhammad v. Fazal Bibi PLD 2016 Supreme Court 872 • Akhtar Nasir Ahmed v. Province of Punjab PLD 2024 Supreme Court 1268 • Secretary to Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, C & W Department v. M/s Parcon Associates Government Contractors PLD 2025 Supreme Court 371 • Dr. Muhammad Javaid Shafi v. Syed Rashid Arshad PLD 2015 Supreme Court 212 • Lahore Development Authority v. Muhammad Rashid 1997 SCMR 1224 • Asad Ali v. Bank of Punjab PLD 2020 Supreme Court 736 • Farman Ali v. Muhammad Ishaq PLD 2013 Supreme Court 392 • Mst. Sabiran Bi v. Ahmad Khan 2000 SCMR 847 • Ghulam Hussain v. Bahadar PLD 1954 Lahore 361 Disposition: Civil Petitions for leave to appeal dismissed by short order dated 03.06.2026; detailed reasons recorded on 31.07.2026. (Civil Petitions No.41-L of 2026 etc., Commissioner Inland Revenue v. M/s. Al-Hamd Cotton Ginning Pressing Factory, Jhang and connected petitions, Supreme Court of Pakistan, Islamabad; Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, J. (Yahya Afridi, CJ and Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, J. on the Bench); Approved for Reporting)

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts. 188 & 10A---Review jurisdiction---Error apparent on the face of the record---Scope---Review petitions against order of Supreme Court dismissing civil petitions for leave against judgment of Service Tribunal in seniority matter---Petitioners, Sub-Inspectors of Sindh Police, claimed that their seniority list of 2015 was upset by the department in 2020 without notice or hearing---Held, that it was an admitted position that, while disturbing the seniority list of 2015 in 2020, no opportunity of hearing was provided to the petitioners to present their point of view---Such course was adopted in clear violation of the principles of audi alteram partem, due process of law and the mandate of Art. 10A of the Constitution---Said crucial aspect appeared to have escaped the attention of the Bench while deciding the matter under review---Omission was manifest from the record and constituted an error apparent on the face of the record, warranting interference in exercise of review jurisdiction---Mistakes or errors which are self-evident and found floating on the face of the record; orders based on erroneous assumption of material facts, or without adverting to a provision of law, or a departure from undisputed construction of law; misconstruction of law, misreading of evidence and non-consideration of pleas raised before a Court, may amount to error apparent on the face of the record---Expression "error apparent on the face of the record" cannot be defined with precision or exhaustiveness---Once a judgment is rendered it attains finality, but where decisions contain palpable errors, the judicial process must seek to remove injustice rather than entrench it under the guise of finality (curare defectum potius quam errorem perpetuare)---Review petitions allowed. Cited Cases: • Commissioner Inland Revenue Z-III, Corporate Regional Tax Office, Tax House, Karachi v. M/s MSC Switzerland Geneva and others 2023 SCMR 1011 = 2023 SCP 150 • Secretary Revenue Division v. Iftikhar Ahmed Tabbasum PLD 2019 SC 563 (b) Service matter---Seniority---Nature of right---Alteration of seniority list without hearing---Seniority in service is an asset characterizing accrued experience, institutional acquaintance and dependability, and an enforceable right with a legitimate expectation to be placed at the right place in the seniority list according to law and applicable service rules---Seniority paves the way to career progression though it does not guarantee automatic promotion---Seniority cannot be wiped away by abrupt administrative action---Even if seniority assigned is found to be contrary to the service rules, it cannot be unilaterally disturbed by the employer unless the affected employee is confronted and afforded a fair opportunity of being heard by following due process of law---If a seniority list is to be revised, revisited or upset, it is an onerous obligation of the competent authority to confront the issue to all persons likely to be affected---Revision without due process contravenes Art. 10A of the Constitution---Action taken without due process of law or in violation of natural justice and fair trial renders the structure built thereupon liable to be demolished. Cited Cases: • Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary Government of Sindh and others v. Raj Kumar Lohana and others 2026 SCMR 278 (c) Natural justice---Audi alteram partem---Administrative, quasi-judicial and judicial authorities---All judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative authorities must exercise their powers in a judicious and even-handed manner, in accordance with law and without violation of the principles of natural justice---Affected person must be afforded a fair opportunity to explain and contest before any adversarial action is taken against him. Disposition: Order dated 04.04.2024 recalled; civil petitions restored to their original numbers, converted into appeals and partially allowed; judgment of Service Tribunal set aside to the extent of the "First Set" of petitioners; department directed to afford adequate opportunity of hearing to petitioners and other affected persons and pass a speaking order in accordance with law; if petitioners' objections are found substantial and the upsetting of seniority found in violation of law, fresh seniority list to be issued within two months of receipt of the judgment; status quo regarding seniority list dated 18.11.2020 to be maintained in the meantime to the extent of the first set of petitioners. Civil Review Petitions Nos.521 to 541 and 764 to 782 of 2024, Supreme Court of Pakistan, judgment dated 09.06.2026 (Muhammad Ali Mazhar, Musarrat Hilali and Shahid Bilal Hassan, JJ). Approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Review jurisdiction----Error apparent on the face of the record---Scope---Review petitions against order dated 01.11.2023 of a three-member Bench in Civil Petition No.1309-L of 2021 filed by the petitioner and Civil Petition No.1590-L of 2021 filed by the Regional Police Officer, Multan, etc.---Held, that mistakes or errors perpetuating illegality and injustice, if found floating on the face of the record, should be corrected without hesitation---Orders based on an erroneous assumption of material facts, or without adverting to a provision of law, or a departure from undisputed construction of law and Constitution, may amount to an error apparent on the face of the record, which includes misconstruction of law and misreading of the evidence on record---Where the judgment under review is found to have directed the doing of something which is in conflict with the Constitution or law, it is the duty of the Court to amend such error---A judgment cannot be reviewed merely because a different view could have been taken; a review petition would lie only when there is an alleged error in the judgment which is evident and can be established without elaborate arguments, and does not mean to allow re-hearing of a decided case, more so when the Court has given a conscious and deliberate decision on the point of law as well as of fact---Grounds not urged or raised at the time of hearing cannot be allowed to be raised in review proceedings---Expression "error apparent on the face of the record" cannot be defined with precision or exhaustiveness, and there would always remain an element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature---It is to be determined in each case on the basis of its own peculiar facts, but a mere repetition, through different counsel, of old and overruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually covered ground, or minor mistakes of inconsequential import, are obviously insufficient---Court may also reopen its judgment if a manifest wrong has been done and it is necessary to pass an order to do full and effective justice. Cited Cases: • Commissioner Inland Revenue Z-III, Corporate Regional Tax Office, Tax House, Karachi v. M/s MSC Switzerland Geneva and others 2023 SCMR 1011 = 2023 SCP 150 (b) Service law----Dismissal from service---Principle of consistency and parity---Co-accused reinstated and remanded for regular inquiry---Error in treating original dismissal as still operative after subsequent reinstatement---Petitioner, a police official, had challenged successive dismissal orders before the Punjab Service Tribunal---By judgment dated 15.12.2015 his Service Appeal No.4415 of 2014 was allowed, he was reinstated and the department was left at liberty to conduct a de novo inquiry; he was again dismissed on 10.01.2017; Service Appeal No.3878 of 2017 was allowed on 13.12.2018 and he was again reinstated; while implementing that judgment the department itself reinstated him on 08.01.2019; he was again dismissed on 05.10.2019; Service Appeal No.82 of 2020 was allowed on 02.04.2021 and he was reinstated subject to outcome of regular inquiry, with direction to the department to decide the intervening period after the final outcome of the inquiry---Co-accused Asif Nadeem and Sohail Anwar, proceeded against on the same allegations, were reinstated and their case was remanded to the competent authority for holding a regular inquiry by affording ample opportunity of fair trial, vide order dated 24.02.2020 of the Tribunal in Service Appeals Nos.5033 and 5034 of 2019---Keeping in view the principle of consistency and parity, the Tribunal remanded the petitioner's matter with certain directions contained in paragraph No.6 of the order dated 02.04.2021---Supreme Court, in the order under review, had dismissed the petitioner's civil petition, converted the civil petition filed by the Regional Police Officer and allowed the appeal, thereby setting aside the Tribunal's judgment, on the footing that the dismissal order dated 15.08.2013 had been affirmed up to the Supreme Court---Held, that this critical position was not adverted to---Original dismissal order lost its significance upon reinstatement by the department pursuant to the Tribunal's judgment dated 13.12.2018, though the petitioner was again dismissed on 05.10.2019, which fact perhaps escaped attention, and the original order of dismissal was heavily relied upon to nonsuit the petitioner---Earlier Civil Petition No.2043-L of 2015, which had been dismissed in a bunch relating to alleged fake appointments in the Punjab Police, involved allegations totally different from those against the petitioner---There was an error floating on the face of the record, and the review petitioner was nonsuited on the basis of an earlier dismissal letter from service which lost its efficacy on the reinstatement order passed by the department pursuant to the Tribunal judgment. (c) Review allowed----Petitions restored, converted into appeals and disposed of with directions---Order under review recalled---Civil Petition No.1309-L of 2021 and Civil Petition No.1590-L of 2021 restored to their original numbers and positions and, after hearing the parties on merits, both civil petitions converted into appeal and disposed of with directions to the department to proceed in accordance with the directions contained in paragraph No.6 of the impugned judgment of the Tribunal dated 02.04.2021 and pass appropriate order. Disposition: Order dated 01.11.2023 recalled; Civil Petition No.1309-L of 2021 and Civil Petition No.1590-L of 2021 restored, converted into appeal and disposed of with directions to the department to proceed in accordance with paragraph No.6 of the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal dated 02.04.2021 and pass appropriate order. (C.R.P. No.1226 of 2023 in C.A. No.1590-L of 2021 and C.R.P. No.1227 of 2023 in C.P.L.A. No.1309-L of 2021, Supreme Court of Pakistan, judgment of Muhammad Ali Mazhar, J., Islamabad, 9th June, 2026; Muhammad Ali Mazhar, Musarrat Hilali and Shahid Bilal Hassan, JJ. Approved for reporting.)

Summary: (a) Land Acquisition Act, 1894----Ss. 4, 41 & 43-A (Part VII, Ss. 38 to 44)---Constitution of Pakistan----Arts. 8(1), 23 & 24(2)---Land acquired for a specified public purpose for a company---Conversion to different purpose---Whether land acquired under S. 4 notification for specific public purpose can be converted or utilized for a purpose other than that for which acquired---Land measuring 1020 Kanals and 19 Marlas in Mohal Amangarh, Nowshera Khurd, Tehsil Nowshera was acquired for establishment of Board/Paper Mills, and an agreement dated 16.10.1954 was executed between the Provincial Government and the beneficiary company under S. 41, whereby the company covenanted to use the land exclusively for construction and operation of the Mills and not to use, transfer or deal with it for any purpose foreign to the object of acquisition without previous consent of the Provincial Government, failing which surplus or inconsistently used land was liable to resumption and restoration to original owners---Petitioner, who purchased assets of Adamjee Papers & Board Mills in court-supervised auction, developed a housing scheme on the land and was refused registration and attestation of sale deeds; High Court dismissed its constitutional petition---Held, land acquired for a specified public purpose cannot, as a matter of right, be converted, diverted or utilized for a purpose other than that for which the power of eminent domain was invoked, and remains impressed with and subservient to that public purpose---Legislative scheme of Part VII manifests intention that land procured for a company remains impressed with the public purpose and cannot be diverted or alienated in derogation of the terms of the statutory agreement---S. 41 gives statutory recognition to the agreement between Government and beneficiary company, and S. 43-A imposes an express and mandatory restraint on transfer, sale, mortgage, lease or other disposition without previous sanction of the Provincial Government, which is a substantive precondition governing legality of any subsequent transaction and not merely procedural or directory---Transfer, lease, mortgage or other disposition in contravention of S. 43-A is legally defective and voidable at the instance of the State, besides being amenable to injunctive or restorative relief to ensure reversion of land to its intended public purpose---Any change in user, even where otherwise permissible, remains subject to previous sanction of the Provincial Government and the terms of the S. 41 agreement; in the absence of such approval the land remains burdened with its original purpose and any attempt to divert it is without lawful authority and of no legal effect. (b) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts. 8(1), 23 & 24(2)---Eminent domain---Public purpose and compensation---Right to property---Held, right to property under Art. 23 is a fundamental right but not absolute and is qualified by public interest and public purpose; Art. 24(2) permits compulsory acquisition only for a public purpose and by authority of law providing for compensation---Public purpose declared in the acquisition notification is not a mere formality but the constitutional justification for overriding a citizen's fundamental property right; if the purpose is fictitious, abandoned or materially changed, the acquisition loses its constitutional foundation---Power of eminent domain is conditioned by two limitations, namely a genuine public purpose and payment of fair and lawful compensation---Once land is acquired for a specified object, it cannot ordinarily be diverted to another purpose at the whims of the beneficiary or its successor-in-interest; transfer of land acquired for a public object to private developer or for commercial purpose would amount to indirect expropriation in favour of private interests, which Art. 24 prohibits---Where acquired land is neither utilized for the purpose of acquisition nor retained in furtherance thereof, because the object has been fulfilled, abandoned, rendered impossible or has ceased to exist, the State's right to retain it becomes open to serious legal scrutiny and the doctrine of reversion assumes relevance, restoration to original owner or lawful successors being in accord with justice and rationale of eminent domain---Court also invoked, in support, considerations of equity, fairness and good conscience and principles of Islamic jurisprudence, including sanctity of private property, Hifz al-Mal (protection of property) as an objective of the Shariah, and the maxims "La darar wa la dirar" and "Al-darar yuzal", and the doctrine of Maslahah. (c) Land Acquisition Act, 1894----Ss. 41 & 43-A---Auction purchaser---Judicial sale of mills in execution of decree of Banking Court---Whether auction purchaser acquires unfettered right to change user of acquired land---Mills established in 1955 ceased operations around 1990 and were sold in public auction in execution of Banking Court decree---Held, auction purchaser acquired ownership of the Mills and their assets, but acquisition of title through court-sanctioned auction did not efface the statutory and contractual restrictions governing user and disposition of the acquired land---Purchaser merely stepped into the shoes of the original beneficiary and could acquire no higher or better title than the beneficiary; doctrine of nemo dat quod non habet attracted---Judicial sale affected only the identity of the beneficiary and not the legal incidents and limitations attaching to the land---Mere cessation of industrial activity, abandonment of the original undertaking or subsequent transfer of ownership does not extinguish obligations under the S. 41 agreement---Petitioner did not acquire any unfettered, absolute or indefeasible right to alter the nature of the land or convert the industrial undertaking into a housing scheme, which was inconsistent with the agreement and the statutory scheme and contrary to law, incapable of conferring legal right upon the petitioner---Statutory and contractual obligations attached to the land run with it and bind all claiming through the original beneficiary---Petitioner could not claim conversion into a housing scheme as a vested, absolute or indefeasible right---Provincial Government, if of opinion that whole or any part of the land has become surplus to the original purpose or is utilized inconsistently with the object of acquisition, shall be at liberty to exercise its powers in accordance with law and the terms of the agreement dated 16.10.1954. Disposition: Impugned judgment dated 11.09.2024 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in W.P. No. 4361-P/2021 found free from illegality, irregularity or jurisdictional infirmity, maintained and upheld; petition (C.P.L.A. No. 5182/2024) dismissed as bereft of merit; all pending miscellaneous applications disposed of in the same terms. Approved for Reporting.

Summary: Summary pending.