Summary: (a) When there is contradiction in the statements of eyewitnesses and site plan, the same are not safe for reliance for the purpose of conviction. (b) When cause of death of the deceased as per post mortem report is single shot firearm injury, possibility of false implication of two accused who are real brothers inter-se cannot be ruled out when motive is shown as previous hostilities. (c) Where crime empties recovered from the spot at the time of inspection by the Investigation Officer, are sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory after the arrest of the accused or together with the crime weapon recovered after a considerable delay without justifiable reason, the positive report of the said Laboratory loses its evidentiary value and the same cannot be relied upon for the purpose of conviction. (d) Where hostilities followed by litigations exist between the parties, the same may drive one of the parties to enmesh its rival in a false case or the latter to do away with the former, therefore, such a motive can be considered a double-edged weapon, hence, merely on the basis of such motive, an accused cannot be held responsible for commission of offence. (e) It is not essential that there should be many circumstances creating doubts, even a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case is sufficient to extend the benefit of doubt to the accused as it is the cardinal principle of criminal administration of justice that it is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer.

Summary: i. There is no denial to this fact that the tragic incident led to the tragic death of the deceased, where one was the husband and the other his wife, but there is no denial to this fact as well that mere heinousness of an offence would hardly be a circumstance for holding an accused responsible, rather under all circumstances the Courts of law must look for independent corroboration and the prosecution must bring on record trust-worthy and confidence-inspiring evidence. If on one hand the unfortunate spouses lost their lives, then on the other four (04) real brothers are charged, so to reach to a just conclusion extra care is needed, so that the liabilities could be fixed against those who are responsible. ii. The improvements are dishonest and we are confident in holding that the same has damaged the case of the prosecution. The witnesses failed to establish their presence on the spot. Had they been present and had they been fired upon, there was hardly an occasion for them to escape unhurt, as the accused were armed with deadly weapons. iii. On one hand the witnesses remained inconsistent on material aspects of the case, whereas on the other they failed to establish their presence on the spot at the time of occurrence, so this Court is inclined to hold that the incident went unwitnessed and the report was made after attendance of the complainant was procured.

Summary: (i) The driver having the charge of vehicle is supposed to have knowledge with regard to contents and articles being transported in it. (ii) Co-accused at the relevant time was found seated in the front seat of the vehicle and noting incriminating was recovered from the personal possession. (iii) Appellant filed appeal for the return of vehicle. Who is neither the registered owner of the vehicle nor its bonafide purchaser.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Civil Servants Act, 1973 – S. 2(1)(b); Constitution of Pakistan – Arts. 4, 25, 27, 34 & 35 – Status of Civil Servant – Female Government Officer’s Right to Change Domicile Respondent, a female civil servant originally appointed under KPK domicile, changed her domicile to Balochistan post-marriage and applied for direct recruitment to a post under Balochistan quota—Held, respondent remained a “civil servant” within the meaning of S. 2(1)(b) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 and was rightly subject to recruitment regulations applicable to civil servants—Mere success in competitive exam does not confer a vested right of appointment—FPSC acted within administrative capacity; locus standi to file appeal was upheld—Change of domicile after marriage is not automatic but a matter of legal choice, and constitutionally protected where permitted under policy. (b) Civil Service Regulations, Vol I – R. 310-A; Office Memoranda (O.M.) 1971 & 1975 – Change of Domicile During Service – Female Officer’s One-Time Right Held, under O.M. 1971, domicile declared at entry into service is frozen and immutable during service tenure to preserve provincial quotas and inter-federal equity—However, O.M. 1975 read with R. 310-A, CSR Vol. I, carves a gender-sensitive exception: married female civil servants may exercise a one-time option to adopt husband’s domicile for direct recruitment—Such change does not disrupt seniority or service structure if the recruitment involves a distinct post and fresh scale—Court affirmed the validity of respondent’s change of domicile under O.M. 1975 as a permissible and final legal exercise. (c) Interpretation of Service Law – “Direct Recruitment” vs. “Initial Recruitment” – Scope and Application Held, terms “direct recruitment” and “initial recruitment” are interchangeable in service jurisprudence—Both apply to appointments made otherwise than by promotion or transfer—Thus, in-service civil servants are eligible for “direct recruitment” to new posts if they meet criteria and obtain departmental NOC—O.M. 1975 applies equally to in-service female officers seeking fresh appointment on new posts, enabling one-time domicile adoption in line with spousal domicile. (d) Gender Equality – Article 25(3) of the Constitution – Women-Centric Constitutional Interpretation Court adopted purposive, gender-sensitive interpretation of O.M. 1975 in harmony with Art. 25(3), 34 and 35 of the Constitution—Held, law must be applied to recognize historical disadvantages faced by women—Affirmative action through lawful accommodation (e.g., permitting change of domicile for direct recruitment) is a constitutionally sanctioned tool to promote substantive gender equality—Respondent’s legal right to adopt her husband’s domicile for one-time use upheld as valid and non-discriminatory. (e) PMDC Regulations, 2018 – S. V(5), (6) & (9) – Validity of Experience Certificate – Jurisdiction of Certifying Authority Held, PMDC is the competent statutory authority to assess teaching experience in medical faculty appointments—PMDC’s unchallenged certification confirming respondent’s qualifying experience in BS-18 and BS-19 roles carries legal finality—Internal arrangements or terminology used by PIMS do not override PMDC’s certification—FPSC cannot disregard or override PMDC’s jurisdiction—Objections to experience certificate rejected as baseless. Disposition: Petition dismissed—Orders of FPSC dated 10.07.2024 and 02.10.2024 rejecting respondent’s candidature were set aside—FPSC directed to consider respondent for appointment to post of Associate Professor on Balochistan quota within 15 days—Court upheld respondent’s domicile change and experience as lawful. Cited Constitutional Provisions and Statutes: • Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 – Articles 4, 25(3), 27, 34, 35 • Civil Servants Act, 1973 – S. 2(1)(b) • Civil Service Regulations, Volume I – R. 310-A • Establishment Division O.M. Nos. F.8/5/75-WC (1975) & 1/14/71-TRV (1971) • Pakistan Medical and Dental Council Regulations, 2018 • Citizenship Rules, 1952 Notable Cases and Authorities Cited: • Muhammad Mubeen us Salam v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2006 SC 602 • Dr. Rashid Anwar v. Federation of Pakistan 1996 PLC (C.S.) 1073 • District Education Officer v. Sonia Begum 2023 SCMR 217 • Waqar Zafar v. Mazhar Hussain Shah PLD 2018 SC 81 • Hadayat Ullah v. Federation of Pakistan 2022 SCMR 1691 • Mohsin Ali Hasani v. Government of Pakistan 1990 SCMR 1685 • Yaqub Ali Khan v. FPSC 2019 SCMR 413 • Lord Denning’s dissent, and international references including CEDAW Articles 2, 5, 15 & 16

Summary: Under Section 7(f)(ii) of PEEDA, where charge of absence from duty for a period of more than one year is proved, the penalty of compulsory retirement, or removal or dismissal from service shall be imposed. However, if the absence from duty is not more than one year, the Authority has option to impose any one or more penalties mentioned under section 4 of PEEDA, however, such discretion must be reasoned, supported by cogent justification and in accordance with principles of proportionality and administrative fairness.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Intra Court Appeal --- Appointment on the recommendation of PPSC---Proven use of Malpractice, unfair means in the test, interview in inquiry conducted by Anti Corruption Establishment. --- PPSC withdrew its recommendation for appointment of alleged successful candidate on the said post--- On said recommendations concerned Department terminated their newly appointed employee during probation without any stigma--- As per the Regulation 26 and 63 of Regulations-2016, the Commission is competent to withdraw its earlier recommendations sent to the concerned department if a person has been found deficient in any conditionality regarding his / her eligibility as a candidate and if any error or omission in result or merit is found, even after dispatch of recommendation to the concerned department.--- The appointing authority has jurisdiction to terminate its newly appointed employee without assigning any reason or serving any show cause notice during the period of probation. --- Public Service Commission and Government were obliged to ensure complete transparency in the process of selection / appointment of civil servants and if an incompetent or the corrupt persons enter into the civil service at the unwarranted ouster of the eligible and competent candidate from public post / job opportunities such appointments which disregard the merit, undoubtedly perpetuate bad governance and would drained the public exchequer and such appointments also thwart the credibility of the Commission. High Court has no suo moto jurisdiction to take cognizance of the matter---- Intra Court Appeals allowed. Writ petition of the respondent stood dismissed.

Summary: Article 199 of Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 challenging therein the amendment in Rule 66 of the Punjab Mining Concessions Rules, 2002 and fixation of enhanced rate of Royalty--- Section 2 of the Regulation of Mines and Oilfields and Mineral Development (Government Control) Act of 1948 empowers the Government to make Rules--- Rule 66(1)(2) of Punjab Mining Concessions Rules, 2002 fixation of Rate of Royalty--- The Government has jurisdiction under Mineral Development (Government Control) Act, 1948 to amend the Punjab Mining Concessions Rules, 2002 and to fix or enhance the amount of royalty on Limestone & Argillaceous Clay. The Provincial Government is also empowered to frame Rules, describing the conditions for Mining Lease and royalties as well as to fix or enhance rate of royalty which (royalty) is not legally considered as a ?tax'. Further as a policy matter the fixing, modifying or enhancing the rate of royalty there is no need to hear the petitioners-companies and the same does not offend the principle of audi alteram partem. --- Writ Petitions dismissed.

Summary: Summary pending