Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Messrs AL AMIN CERA and others-Respondents Civil Appeals Nos. 225 to 546 of 2019. (Against the judgment dated 19.03.2018 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in S.C.R.A. No. 744 of 2016 and connected cases). Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 3656 of 2019 in Civil Appeal No. 225 of 2019. (Application for impleadment). Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 409 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 225 of 2019. (Stay application). Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 4607 of 2019 in Civil Appeal No. 546 of 2019. (a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)- -Ss.25A & 25D-Leave to appeal was granted to examine interpretation and implementation of provision of Sections 25A and 25D of Customs Act, 1969. (b) Anti-Dumping Duties Act (XIV of 2015)- -S.4-Customs Act (IV of 1969), S. 25-Dumping and under invoicing-Distinction-Under invoicing is different from dumping which is based on selling below-normal value-not just mis-declared customs values-Anti-dumping duty is not about under-invoicing in customs sense-it is about whether imported goods are being sold in Pakistan at-dumped-prices (i.e. below their ‘normal value’ in exporting country)-Such duties are meant to protect domestic industries from un-fairly low-priced imports-Under-invoicing is not required for anti-dumping duty to be imposed-Key distinction in basis of calculation of anti-dumping duty and customs valuation is that the former is calculated on the basis of margin of dumping (difference between export price and normal values of goods), whereas the latter is determined on the basis of price actually paid or payable (transaction value) or alternative methods of calculation envisaged by Section 25 of Customs Act, 1969-Anti-dumping duty, whether provisional or final, is imposed after investigation is carried out by National Tariff Commission whereas customs valuation is applied at the time of clearance of every consignment of goods imported into or exported out of Pakistan-Anti-dumping duty is a trade policy tool applied on top of normal customs duty when dumping is proved whereas customs valuation is a technical process to assess the value of goods for duty calculation applicable to all importers, regardless of whether dumping exists-Where issue is dumping, the remedy lies with National Tariff Commission under the provisions of Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015-Where issue is under-invoicing, the remedy lies in customs valuation under Section 25A of Customs Act, 1969-They are parallel but distinct remedies-Customs valuation under Section 25A of Customs Act, 1969 protects revenue and ensures fair valuation for duty / tax purposes-Anti-dumping duty protects domestic industry from injury caused by unfair trade practice-selling goods below their normal value-Both remedies can co-exist but they address different harms. (c) Customs Act (IV of 1969)- -Ss. 25A & 25D-Director General Customs Valuation-Revisional jurisdiction-Scope-Dispute was with regard to exercise of revisional jurisdiction by DG-CV who substituted his own determination for that of DCV or that of the Collector-Held: For purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of determination made either by Collector or Director Customs Valuation, the DG-CV under Section 25D of Customs Act, 1969 can exercise revisional powers-On a revision petition, DG-CV can revise determination made by Collector or DCV and such power has not been hedged or qualified by any condition or limitation-Provision of Section 25D of Customs Act, 1969 does not contain any controlling expression for restricting or circumscribing revisional power of DG-CV-Supreme Court declined to subscribe to the view taken by High Court as where revisional jurisdiction was conferred on a body without circumscribing the scope of jurisdiction and it could not be held that revisional jurisdiction inherently prohibited revisional forum from substituting its view that of the one under revision-Power of DG-CV under Section 25-D of Customs Act, 1969 encompassed the power not just to set-aside customs valuation by Collector or DCV but also to correct such valuation on the basis of the material that was presented before Collector or DCV, as the case may be-While exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 25D of Customs Act, 1969 the DG-CV was competent to set-aside determination made under Section 25A (1) of Customs Act, 1969 and thereafter could exercise discretion either to remand the matter to the Collector or DCV as the case was or to modify or substitute (which could include increase or decrease) the determination under revision-Supreme Court set aside judgment passed by High Court-Appeal was allowed. Government of N.-W.F.P. v. Muhammad Irshad PLD 1995 SC 281; Bank of Bahawalpur, Ltd. v. Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner PLD 1977 SC 164; Queen v. Rowlands (1882) 8 QBD 530; Duck v. Bates (1884) 12 QBD 79; Inamur Rehman v. Federation of Pakistan 1992 SCMR 563; Saadia Jabbar v. Federation of Pakistan 2018 PTD 1746; Kala v. Board of Revenue PLD 1985 SC 208; Black's Law Dictionary (9th Edition); Ramkanai Jamini Ranjanpat Pvt. Ltd. v. Member Board of Revenue and W. Bengal 1976 (3) SCC 369 = AIR 1976 SC 1545 ref. Nemo in other cases. Assisted by: Umar Farooq, Deputy Registrar/R.O., IHC and Mehboob Irshad, Law Clerk.

Summary: Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)- -O. XXVII, R.8-A, O.XXI, R.23-A, O.XLI, Rr. 5, 6 & S. 47-Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894), Ss.18, 30 & 31-Constitution of Pakistan, Art.185(3)-Respondents’ land acquired-Compensation enhanced in favour of land owners-Execution application filed-Government/ Acquiring agency (judgment debtor) filing objections-Objections filed without depositing the decretal amount or furnishing security-Effect and legality-Competency, consideration and maintainability of objections before the executing court-Scope-Facts in brevity were that the land belonging to the respondents (land owners) was acquired for defence purposes under an award, after which the reference court enhanced the compensation and subsequently High Court upheld the enhancement-During execution the executing court verified the relevant revenue record including goshwaras, naqsha-e-tajwizi, khana-e-malkiat, khana-e-kasht and acquaintance roll and upheld respondents’ entitlement and dismissed the department’s objections for non-compliance with Order XXI, Rule 23-A, C.P.C., which order was then affirmed by the High Court-The legal issue was-whether a government department, as judgment-debtor, could maintain objections in execution without depositing the decretal amount or furnishing security, and whether Order XXVII, Rule 8-A, C.P.C. provided any exemption from the mandatory precondition under Order XXI, Rule 23-A, C.P.C.-?-Held: Order XXI, Rule 23-A, C.P.C. squarely governed objections by a judgment-debtor in execution and stipulated a jurisdictional precondition that, in the case of a money decree, the judgment-debtor must either deposit the decretal amount in court or furnish security for its payment, and in the case of any other decree must furnish security for due performance-Unless that condition is met, the court could not consider the objection-The petitioner did not deposit the decretal amount nor did it furnish security-The executing court and the High Court were therefore correct to treat the objections as not maintainable-Order XXVII, Rule 8-A, C.P.C. concerned exemption from furnishing security in specified situations where Government or a public officer was a party and tied to stays in appellate proceedings under Order XLI, Rules 5 & 6, C.P.C. and it did not override, qualify or dilute the mandatory precondition in execution envisaged by Order XXI, Rule 23-A, C.P.C.-The High Court rightly rejected reliance on Order XXVII, Rule 8-A at the execution stage under section 47, C.P.C.-Execution questions arising between the parties as to discharge or satisfaction of the decree lay before the executing court under section 47, C.P.C.-Here, that court exercised its jurisdiction, tested ownership and entitlement on the revenue record, and rejected the objections-Those concurrent findings, affirmed by the High Court, disclosed no misreading or non-reading of material, no jurisdictional defect, and no perversity occasioning miscarriage of justice to warrant interference in leave jurisdiction under Article 185(3)- For completeness, while deposits in land acquisition matters were contemplated by section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in specified circumstances, the immediate bar to entertaining the petitioner’s objections flew from Order XXI, Rule 23-A, C.P.C.-Without deposit of the decretal amount or furnishing security, the objections could not be considered-No illegality was pointed out in the impugned judgment warranting interference by the Supreme Court-Leave was declined and the petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Najm Qureshi v. Chase Manhattan Bank (now MCB) 2015 SCMR 1461; Muhammad Sadiq v. WAPDA PLD 2003 SC 290; Happy Family Associates v. Pakistan International Trading Co. PLD 2006 SC 226 and Nadeem Akhtar Tabasum v. MCB 2014 SCMR 1371 rel. Respondents not represented. Assistance Muhammad Subhan Malik, (Judicial Law Clerk).

Summary: Civil Appeals Nos. 225 to 546 of 2019. (Against the judgment dated 19.03.2018 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in S.C.R.A. No. 744 of 2016 and connected cases). Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 3656 of 2019 in Civil Appeal No. 225 of 2019. (Application for impleadment). Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 409 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 225 of 2019. (Stay application). Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 4607 of 2019 in Civil Appeal No. 546 of 2019. (Application for impleadment). (a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)--- ----Ss.25A & 25D---Leave to appeal was granted to examine interpretation and implementation of provision of Sections 25A and 25D of Customs Act, 1969. (b) Anti-Dumping Duties Act (XIV of 2015)--- ----S.4---Customs Act (IV of 1969), S. 25---Dumping and under invoicing---Distinction---Under invoicing is different from dumping which is based on selling below “normal value”- not just mis-declared customs values---Anti-dumping duty is not about under-invoicing in customs sense- it is about whether imported goods are being sold in Pakistan at “dumped” prices (i.e. below their ‘normal value’ in exporting country)---Such duties are meant to protect domestic industries from un-fairly low-priced imports---Under-invoicing is not required for anti-dumping duty to be imposed---Key distinction in basis of calculation of anti-dumping duty and customs valuation is that the former is calculated on the basis of margin of dumping (difference between export price and normal values of goods), whereas the latter is determined on the basis of price actually paid or payable (transaction value) or alternative methods of calculation envisaged by Section 25 of Customs Act, 1969---Anti-dumping duty, whether provisional or final, is imposed after investigation is carried out by National Tariff Commission whereas customs valuation is applied at the time of clearance of every consignment of goods imported into or exported out of Pakistan---Anti-dumping duty is a trade policy tool applied on top of normal customs duty when dumping is proved whereas customs valuation is a technical process to assess the value of goods for duty calculation applicable to all importers, regardless of whether dumping exists---Where issue is dumping, the remedy lies with National Tariff Commission under the provisions of Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015---Where issue is under-invoicing, the remedy lies in customs valuation under Section 25A of Customs Act, 1969---They are parallel but distinct remedies---Customs valuation under Section 25A of Customs Act, 1969 protects revenue and ensures fair valuation for duty / tax purposes---Anti-dumping duty protects domestic industry from injury caused by unfair trade practice- selling goods below their normal value---Both remedies can co-exist but they address different harms. (c) Customs Act (IV of 1969)--- ----Ss. 25A & 25D---Director General Customs Valuation---Revisional jurisdiction---Scope---Dispute was with regard to exercise of revisional jurisdiction by DG-CV who substituted his own determination for that of DCV or that of the Collector---Held: For purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of determination made either by Collector or Director Customs Valuation, the DG-CV under Section 25D of Customs Act, 1969 can exercise revisional powers---On a revision petition, DG-CV can revise determination made by Collector or DCV and such power has not been hedged or qualified by any condition or limitation---Provision of Section 25D of Customs Act, 1969 does not contain any controlling expression for restricting or circumscribing revisional power of DG-CV---Supreme Court declined to subscribe to the view taken by High Court as where revisional jurisdiction was conferred on a body without circumscribing the scope of jurisdiction and it could not be held that revisional jurisdiction inherently prohibited revisional forum from substituting its view that of the one under revision---Power of DG-CV under Section 25-D of Customs Act, 1969 encompassed the power not just to set-aside customs valuation by Collector or DCV but also to correct such valuation on the basis of the material that was presented before Collector or DCV, as the case may be---While exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 25D of Customs Act, 1969 the DG-CV was competent to set-aside determination made under Section 25A (1) of Customs Act, 1969 and thereafter could exercise discretion either to remand the matter to the Collector or DCV as the case was or to modify or substitute (which could include increase or decrease) the determination under revision---Supreme Court set aside judgment passed by High Court---Appeal was allowed. Government of N.-W.F.P. v. Muhammad Irshad PLD 1995 SC 281; Bank of Bahawalpur, Ltd. v. Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner PLD 1977 SC 164; Queen v. Rowlands (1882) 8 QBD 530; Duck v. Bates (1884) 12 QBD 79; Inamur Rehman v. Federation of Pakistan 1992 SCMR 563; Saadia Jabbar v. Federation of Pakistan 2018 PTD 1746; Kala v. Board of Revenue PLD 1985 SC 208; Black's Law Dictionary (9th Edition); Ramkanai Jamini Ranjanpat Pvt. Ltd. v. Member Board of Revenue and W. Bengal 1976 (3) SCC 369 = AIR 1976 SC 1545 ref. Raja Muhammad Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court at Islamabad along with K.A. Wahab, Advocate-on-Record (via video link (Karachi)) for Appellants/Applicants/Petitioners (in C.As. Nos. 225 to 544 of 2019). Saeed Akram, Member, FBR, Ch. Muhammad Javed, Chief Legal, Muhammad Tahir, Director (Law), Customs, Ghulam Nabi Kambo, Additional Director, Valuation, Karachi, Dr. Muhammad Moen Wassi, Collector, Karachi, Pirzada Muhammad Omer Qasim, Additional Collector Customs, Lahore for Appellants/Applicants/Petitioners. Salman Akram Raja, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link (Lahore)) for Appellants/Applicants/Petitioners (in C.A. No. 545 of 2019). Nemo in C.A. No. 546 of 2019 (Adjournment application of Shehzad Ata Elahi, Advocate Supreme Court). Ghulam Haider Sheikh, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.As. Nos. 234, 263, 265 to 267, 349, 359, 367, 369, 381, 382, 386, 389, 391, 396, 405 to 407, 411, 413, 425, 428, 431, 434, 435, 438, 443, 455 to 459, 465, 466, 469, 479, 480, 482, 486, 488, 492, 493, 495, 496, 499, 504, 505, 507, 508, 512, 515, 517, 520, 523, 532 and 537 of 2019). Nemo in other cases. Assisted by: Umar Farooq, Deputy Registrar/R.O., IHC and Mehboob Irshad, Law Clerk. Date of hearing: 20th March, 2025. MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB, J.--- Through this judgment, we propose to decide Civil Appeals Nos. 225 to 546 of 2019, Civil Miscellaneous Applications Nos. 3656 of 2019 and 409 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 225 of 2019 and Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 4607 of 2019 in Civil Appeal No. 546 of 2019, since they entail common questions of law.

Summary: Civil Appeals Nos. 225 to 546 of 2019. (Against the judgment dated 19.03.2018 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in S.C.R.A. No. 744 of 2016 and connected cases). Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 3656 of 2019 in Civil Appeal No. 225 of 2019. (Application for impleadment). Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 409 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 225 of 2019. (Stay application). Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 4607 of 2019 in Civil Appeal No. 546 of 2019. (Application for impleadment). (a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)--- ----Ss.25A & 25D---Leave to appeal was granted to examine interpretation and implementation of provision of Sections 25A and 25D of Customs Act, 1969. (b) Anti-Dumping Duties Act (XIV of 2015)--- ----S.4---Customs Act (IV of 1969), S. 25---Dumping and under invoicing---Distinction---Under invoicing is different from dumping which is based on selling below “normal value”- not just mis-declared customs values---Anti-dumping duty is not about under-invoicing in customs sense- it is about whether imported goods are being sold in Pakistan at “dumped” prices (i.e. below their ‘normal value’ in exporting country)---Such duties are meant to protect domestic industries from un-fairly low-priced imports---Under-invoicing is not required for anti-dumping duty to be imposed---Key distinction in basis of calculation of anti-dumping duty and customs valuation is that the former is calculated on the basis of margin of dumping (difference between export price and normal values of goods), whereas the latter is determined on the basis of price actually paid or payable (transaction value) or alternative methods of calculation envisaged by Section 25 of Customs Act, 1969---Anti-dumping duty, whether provisional or final, is imposed after investigation is carried out by National Tariff Commission whereas customs valuation is applied at the time of clearance of every consignment of goods imported into or exported out of Pakistan---Anti-dumping duty is a trade policy tool applied on top of normal customs duty when dumping is proved whereas customs valuation is a technical process to assess the value of goods for duty calculation applicable to all importers, regardless of whether dumping exists---Where issue is dumping, the remedy lies with National Tariff Commission under the provisions of Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015---Where issue is under-invoicing, the remedy lies in customs valuation under Section 25A of Customs Act, 1969---They are parallel but distinct remedies---Customs valuation under Section 25A of Customs Act, 1969 protects revenue and ensures fair valuation for duty / tax purposes---Anti-dumping duty protects domestic industry from injury caused by unfair trade practice- selling goods below their normal value---Both remedies can co-exist but they address different harms. (c) Customs Act (IV of 1969)--- ----Ss. 25A & 25D---Director General Customs Valuation---Revisional jurisdiction---Scope---Dispute was with regard to exercise of revisional jurisdiction by DG-CV who substituted his own determination for that of DCV or that of the Collector---Held: For purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of determination made either by Collector or Director Customs Valuation, the DG-CV under Section 25D of Customs Act, 1969 can exercise revisional powers---On a revision petition, DG-CV can revise determination made by Collector or DCV and such power has not been hedged or qualified by any condition or limitation---Provision of Section 25D of Customs Act, 1969 does not contain any controlling expression for restricting or circumscribing revisional power of DG-CV---Supreme Court declined to subscribe to the view taken by High Court as where revisional jurisdiction was conferred on a body without circumscribing the scope of jurisdiction and it could not be held that revisional jurisdiction inherently prohibited revisional forum from substituting its view that of the one under revision---Power of DG-CV under Section 25-D of Customs Act, 1969 encompassed the power not just to set-aside customs valuation by Collector or DCV but also to correct such valuation on the basis of the material that was presented before Collector or DCV, as the case may be---While exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 25D of Customs Act, 1969 the DG-CV was competent to set-aside determination made under Section 25A (1) of Customs Act, 1969 and thereafter could exercise discretion either to remand the matter to the Collector or DCV as the case was or to modify or substitute (which could include increase or decrease) the determination under revision---Supreme Court set aside judgment passed by High Court---Appeal was allowed. Government of N.-W.F.P. v. Muhammad Irshad PLD 1995 SC 281; Bank of Bahawalpur, Ltd. v. Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner PLD 1977 SC 164; Queen v. Rowlands (1882) 8 QBD 530; Duck v. Bates (1884) 12 QBD 79; Inamur Rehman v. Federation of Pakistan 1992 SCMR 563; Saadia Jabbar v. Federation of Pakistan 2018 PTD 1746; Kala v. Board of Revenue PLD 1985 SC 208; Black's Law Dictionary (9th Edition); Ramkanai Jamini Ranjanpat Pvt. Ltd. v. Member Board of Revenue and W. Bengal 1976 (3) SCC 369 = AIR 1976 SC 1545 ref. Raja Muhammad Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court at Islamabad along with K.A. Wahab, Advocate-on-Record (via video link (Karachi)) for Appellants/Applicants/Petitioners (in C.As. Nos. 225 to 544 of 2019). Saeed Akram, Member, FBR, Ch. Muhammad Javed, Chief Legal, Muhammad Tahir, Director (Law), Customs, Ghulam Nabi Kambo, Additional Director, Valuation, Karachi, Dr. Muhammad Moen Wassi, Collector, Karachi, Pirzada Muhammad Omer Qasim, Additional Collector Customs, Lahore for Appellants/Applicants/Petitioners. Salman Akram Raja, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link (Lahore)) for Appellants/Applicants/Petitioners (in C.A. No. 545 of 2019). Nemo in C.A. No. 546 of 2019 (Adjournment application of Shehzad Ata Elahi, Advocate Supreme Court). Ghulam Haider Sheikh, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.As. Nos. 234, 263, 265 to 267, 349, 359, 367, 369, 381, 382, 386, 389, 391, 396, 405 to 407, 411, 413, 425, 428, 431, 434, 435, 438, 443, 455 to 459, 465, 466, 469, 479, 480, 482, 486, 488, 492, 493, 495, 496, 499, 504, 505, 507, 508, 512, 515, 517, 520, 523, 532 and 537 of 2019). Nemo in other cases. Assisted by: Umar Farooq, Deputy Registrar/R.O., IHC and Mehboob Irshad, Law Clerk. Date of hearing: 20th March, 2025. MIANGUL HASSAN AURANGZEB, J.--- Through this judgment, we propose to decide Civil Appeals Nos. 225 to 546 of 2019, Civil Miscellaneous Applications Nos. 3656 of 2019 and 409 of 2023 in Civil Appeal No. 225 of 2019 and Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 4607 of 2019 in Civil Appeal No. 546 of 2019, since they entail common questions of law.

Summary: Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. XXVII, R.8-A, O.XXI, R.23-A, O.XLI, Rr. 5, 6 & S. 47---Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894), Ss.18, 30 & 31---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.185(3)---Respondents’ land acquired---Compensation enhanced in favour of land owners---Execution application filed---Government/ Acquiring agency (judgment debtor) filing objections---Objections filed without depositing the decretal amount or furnishing security---Effect and legality---Competency, consideration and maintainability of objections before the executing court---Scope---Facts in brevity were that the land belonging to the respondents (land owners) was acquired for defence purposes under an award, after which the reference court enhanced the compensation and subsequently High Court upheld the enhancement---During execution the executing court verified the relevant revenue record including goshwaras, naqsha-e-tajwizi, khana-e-malkiat, khana-e-kasht and acquaintance roll and upheld respondents’ entitlement and dismissed the department’s objections for non-compliance with Order XXI, Rule 23-A, C.P.C., which order was then affirmed by the High Court---The legal issue was “whether a government department, as judgment-debtor, could maintain objections in execution without depositing the decretal amount or furnishing security, and whether Order XXVII, Rule 8-A, C.P.C. provided any exemption from the mandatory precondition under Order XXI, Rule 23-A, C.P.C.”?---Held: Order XXI, Rule 23-A, C.P.C. squarely governed objections by a judgment-debtor in execution and stipulated a jurisdictional precondition that, in the case of a money decree, the judgment-debtor must either deposit the decretal amount in court or furnish security for its payment, and in the case of any other decree must furnish security for due performance---Unless that condition is met, the court could not consider the objection---The petitioner did not deposit the decretal amount nor did it furnish security---The executing court and the High Court were therefore correct to treat the objections as not maintainable---Order XXVII, Rule 8-A, C.P.C. concerned exemption from furnishing security in specified situations where Government or a public officer was a party and tied to stays in appellate proceedings under Order XLI, Rules 5 & 6, C.P.C. and it did not override, qualify or dilute the mandatory precondition in execution envisaged by Order XXI, Rule 23-A, C.P.C.---The High Court rightly rejected reliance on Order XXVII, Rule 8-A at the execution stage under section 47, C.P.C.---Execution questions arising between the parties as to discharge or satisfaction of the decree lay before the executing court under section 47, C.P.C.---Here, that court exercised its jurisdiction, tested ownership and entitlement on the revenue record, and rejected the objections---Those concurrent findings, affirmed by the High Court, disclosed no misreading or non-reading of material, no jurisdictional defect, and no perversity occasioning miscarriage of justice to warrant interference in leave jurisdiction under Article 185(3)--- For completeness, while deposits in land acquisition matters were contemplated by section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in specified circumstances, the immediate bar to entertaining the petitioner’s objections flew from Order XXI, Rule 23-A, C.P.C.---Without deposit of the decretal amount or furnishing security, the objections could not be considered---No illegality was pointed out in the impugned judgment warranting interference by the Supreme Court---Leave was declined and the petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Najm Qureshi v. Chase Manhattan Bank (now MCB) 2015 SCMR 1461; Muhammad Sadiq v. WAPDA PLD 2003 SC 290; Happy Family Associates v. Pakistan International Trading Co. PLD 2006 SC 226 and Nadeem Akhtar Tabasum v. MCB 2014 SCMR 1371 rel. Imran Ahmed Malik, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (through video link from Lahore) Respondents not represented. Assistance Muhammad Subhan Malik, (Judicial Law Clerk). Date of hearing: 17th October, 2025.

Summary: Azad Jammu and Kashmir Family Courts Act, 1993 (XI of 1994) --- ----Ss.5, Sched., 7 & 14---Suit for recovery of dower, maintenance allowance, and return of dowry articles---Maintenance allowance---Entitlement and computation---Wife being ousted from matrimonial home ---Effect ---List of dowry articles not being signed by wife or her counsel, plea of---Burden of proof---Present appeals arose from a consolidated judgment passed by the family court, whereby suits filed by the plaintiff (wife) against the defendant (husband) for recovery of dower, maintenance allowance, and return of dowry articles were decided---Marriage was solemnized with agreed dower of Rs.5,00,000/-, and the plaintiff (wife) was ousted from the matrimonial home and divorce took place---The family court dismissed the suit for dowry articles, decreed dower partly in the form of a house valued at Rs.2,00,000/- and Rs.3,00,000/- in cash, and awarded maintenance at Rs.10,000/- per month from 03.02.2022 till divorce and for the iddat period---Held: The defendant though levelled the allegation of bad character against the plaintiff but he failed to prove the same rather such conduct of defendant was a proof of the fact that his behavior was cruel towards the plaintiff/wife so if wife left the house of husband due to allegations of bad character by the husband, her desertion could not be declared as willful, thus the court below rightly declared the plaintiff entitled to get the dower as well as maintenance allowance---Since the plaintiff herself pleaded in her plaint that after marriage she was re-settled with the defendant many times and lastly she was ousted from home on 03.02.2022, hence the court below rightly declared her entitled to get the maintenance form 03.02.2022---The quantum of maintenance fixed by court below was also justified because the parties agreed that in case of desertion the defendant was bound to pay maintenance of Rs.10,000/- per month---Plaintiff/wife was also entitled to receive the dowry articles mentioned in the list or their depreciation price since the marriage remained valid for four years and plaintiff failed to mention the price of every item separately---Moreover, plea from husband that list of dowry articles was not signed by wife or her counsel had no force---Documenting of dowry articles was not necessary to be proved in strictosensu---Appeal filed by wife was accepted and those filed by husband were dismissed, in circumstances. Saqib Ahmed Abbasi for Appellant (in Family Appeal No. 416 of 2024). Fazal Mehmood Baig for Plaintiff/Appellant (in Family Appeal No. 419 of 2024). Date of hearing: 14th October, 2025. Verdict: (i) the Appeals Nos. 416/2024, 417 2024 and 420/2024 are hereby dismissed. (ii) The Appeal No. 419/2024 is hereby accepted by declaring the plaintiff entitled to receive the dowry articles as per dowry list or its present price.

Summary: (a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) [Since repealed]--- ----Ss. 261(1) & 261(3)---Production of document / information required from company---Registrar, powers of---“Any document”---Scope---Contention of the Petitioner/Company was that the Registrar of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan exceeded their jurisdiction by demanding documents, such as the ECIB Report---Validity---Sections 261(1) & 261(3) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, empower the Registrar to require the production of any document or information necessary to satisfy itself regarding the accuracy or completeness of disclosures made by a Company; which allows the Registrar to examine “any document” relating to the company's affairs, which would include its liabilities, litigation, and representations made to the public through a prospectus---Therefore, Registrar's request was well within its statutory competence, particularly since it related directly to the veracity of the prospectus, a document inviting investment from the public, warranting the highest degree of transparency---Thus, the Respondents had acted within their lawful authority under S. 261 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984---Constitutional petition, being merit-less, was dismissed. (b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) [Since repealed]--- ----Ss. 261 & 265---Investigation of company’s affairs---Appointment of inspector ---Scope---Petitioner /Company assailed order of appointment of inspector into its affairs---Validity---At the stage of forming an opinion under S. 261 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 (‘the Ordinance 1984’), the Registrar is not required to possess conclusive or irrefutable evidence in order to send a report to the Commission---Similarly, for appointing inspector(s) under S. 265 of the Ordinance 1984 to carry out an investigation into the affairs of the company, the Commission needs to simply form an opinion--- The statutory scheme contemplates a preliminary and subjective satisfaction based on the existence of material that raises a legitimate concern about the correctness or propriety of a company's affairs---The expression “is of the opinion” in Ss. 261 & 265 of the Ordinance, 1984 means that the opinion must be founded on some tangible basis, but need not meet the evidentiary standard required for adjudication---The purpose at said stage is merely to enable the Commission to decide whether an in-depth investigation is warranted---A full-fledged inquiry in the form of a trial is not required before passing the order or for the appointment of Inspectors---The Commission has to only satisfy itself, prima facie, on the basis of material placed before it, that a case for investigation through Inspectors can be called for, and it is for the Inspectors to ascertain and determine the truth--- Hence, the role of the Commission is rather inquisitorial than adjudicatory, as it does not entail recording findings of guilt or liability---If, upon reviewing the documents and responses submitted by the Company, the Registrar or the Commission observes inconsistencies or unexplained discrepancies, such as conflicting financial disclosures or potential suppression of material facts in the prospectus, that alone would be sufficient to form an opinion calling for further probe---Thus, the appointment of an Inspector is neither punitive nor final, but merely facilitates the collection of evidence by an independent functionary---Constitutional petition, being merit-less, was dismissed. Mst. Haleema and others v. Executive Director, C&C Department Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan and others 2025 CLD 324; Brothers Steel Ltd. and others v. Mian Mirajuddin and 15 others PLD 1995 SC 320 and Messrs Future Vision Advertising (Private) Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2024 CLD 890 ref. (c) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) [Since repealed]--- ----Ss. 263 & 265---Investigation of company’s affairs---Affording opportunities to company---Appointment of inspector ---Scope---Petitioner /Company assailed order of appointment of inspector into its affairs---Validity---Record clearly demonstrated that the petitioner / Company was afforded ample opportunity to explain its position before any action was taken---Initially, vide two orders, the Company was directed to furnish specific information regarding its bank-wise liabilities, overdue loans and pending litigation---Upon its failure to provide satisfactory data, further time was granted on its own request, and a detailed response was duly considered by the Registrar---Thereafter, when discrepancies were observed, an SCN was issued under S. 265, affording the Company fourteen days to respond, along with the option of a personal hearing---Petitioner subsequently filed replies, which were duly examined by the Commission---A personal hearing was also provided, demonstrating full compliance with the principles of natural justice---Thus, the petitioner was neither denied an opportunity of defense nor subjected to unilateral proceedings, rather, the SECP proceeded cautiously and transparently before directing an investigation---In the present case, the discrepancies highlighted by the respondents clearly fell within the scope of illegality in the affairs of the company as envisaged under S. 265 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984---The mismatch between the liabilities disclosed in the Company's prospectus and the data later furnished to the SECP, particularly the unexplained difference of Rs. 277.87 million and the false declaration that no overdue loans existed, constituted material misstatements---Such discrepancies, by their very nature, struck at the core of transparency and business conduct and, therefore, justifiably prompted the Commission to form an opinion that the affairs of the Company were being conducted in a manner contrary to sound business principles---Hence, the initiation of investigation proceedings under Ss. 263 & 265 was neither arbitrary nor excessive, but a lawful exercise of regulatory oversight to verify potential illegality and protect shareholders and creditors---Thus, the respondents had acted within their lawful authority under Ss. 263 & 265 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984---The opinion formed was supported by relevant material and did not suffer from arbitrariness or mala fide intent---The Petitioner, instead of fully complying with the directions, provided inconsistent information, thereby inviting a legitimate inquiry---The appointment of an Inspector is neither punitive nor final, but merely facilitates the collection of evidence by an independent Functionary---Constitutional petition, being merit-less, was dismissed. Saif Power Limited v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Law, Civil Secretariat Islamabad and others 2023 SCMR 714 ref. (d) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) [since repealed]--- ----Ss. 263 & 265---Investigation of company’s affairs---Appointment of inspector ---Scope---Petitioner /Company assailed order of appointment of inspector into its affairs---Argument of the petitioner was that the Commission had already verified the prospectus previously and was, therefore, barred from reopening the matter after six years---Validity---The impugned actions, made after providing the Petitioner ample opportunity to respond, fell squarely within its regulatory authority and an investigation was a necessary and continuing step to ascertain whether the Company's affairs were being conducted in violation of sound commercial and statutory principles---Therefore, the argument of the petitioner was untenable---Provisions of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, confer a continuing supervisory power upon the SECP to form an opinion at any stage, if there is reason to believe that the company's affairs are being conducted in a manner prejudicial to the categories mentioned under S. 265 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984---Thus, formation of such an opinion is administrative and preparatory in nature, it does not amount to a finding of guilt or subjecting the company to civil consequences---The formation of opinion under S. 265 requires only the existence of credible material suggesting the need for further inquiry, hence, it does not demand conclusive proof of wrongdoing---The discrepancies noted in the Petitioner's disclosures provided such a material basis, justifying SECP's action---Thus, the Respondents had acted within their lawful authority under Ss. 263 & 265 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984---The opinion formed was supported by relevant material and did not suffer from arbitrariness or mala fide intent---The petitioner, instead of fully complying with the directions, provided inconsistent information, thereby inviting a legitimate inquiry---The appointment of an Inspector is neither punitive nor final, but merely facilitates the collection of evidence by an independent functionary---Constitutional petition, being merit-less, was dismissed. (e) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) [since repealed]--- ----Ss. 263 & 265---Investigation of company’s affairs---Affording opportunities to Company---Appointment of inspector---Scope---Petitioner/Company assailed order of appointment of appointment of inspector into its affairs---Argument of the petitioner/ Company was that such intrusive proceedings damaged the Petitioner's reputation---Validity---The appointment of an inspector does not tarnish the Company's reputation, which cannot be a ground to defeat the statutory scheme of investigation designed to ensure transparency in corporate affairs and the company itself should have no reluctance in joining the investigation, if it can explain and answer the questions raised by the SECP---Thus, the appointment of investigators likely to affect the reputation of the company can hardly be a ground for rendering redundant the provisions of S. 265 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984---Applying said reasoning in the present case, the petitioner / Company, having been confronted with material discrepancies in its disclosures, could not evade lawful investigation merely by alleging reputational harm or procedural impropriety---Thus, the respondents had acted within their lawful authority under Ss. 263 & 265 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984---The opinion formed was supported by relevant material and did not suffer from arbitrariness or mala fide intent---The petitioner, instead of fully complying with the directions, provided inconsistent information, thereby inviting a legitimate inquiry---The appointment of an Inspector is neither punitive nor final, but merely facilitates the collection of evidence by an independent functionary---Constitutional petition, being merit-less, was dismissed. Anique Salman Malik for Petitioner. Hafiz Sultan Mazhar Sher and Muhammad Waseem Ahmed Rana, SSP for Respondents. Date of hearing: 17th October, 2025.

Summary: (a) Civil procedure—Execution of decrees—Deposit or security prerequisite for objections by judgment-debtor ----Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXI, R. 23-A; O. XXVII, R. 8-A; O. XLI, Rr. 5 & 6; S. 47; Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3) Execution—Objections by judgment-debtor—Requirement of deposit—Petitioner department filed objections in execution without depositing decretal amount or furnishing security—Held, Order XXI, rule 23-A CPC imposes a mandatory jurisdictional condition for entertaining objections: judgment-debtor must either deposit the decretal amount or furnish security—Failure to comply renders objections non-maintainable—Government departments not exempt from this requirement—Order XXVII, rule 8-A CPC relates to exemption from furnishing security in appellate proceedings, not to execution stage—It does not override or qualify rule 23-A—Both Executing Court and High Court correctly dismissed objections as incompetent. (b) Land acquisition—Execution of compensation award—Verification of ownership and entitlement ----Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Ss. 18, 30 & 31; Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 47 Land acquired for defence purposes—Ownership and entitlement verified through goshwaras, naqsha-e-tajwizi, acquaintance roll, and revenue entries (khana-e-malkiat and khana-e-kasht)—Executing Court found deceased owner’s name duly recorded—Concurrent findings by Executing Court and High Court sustained—Held, such factual determinations raise no question of law or jurisdiction warranting interference under Art. 185(3) of the Constitution. (c) Judicial review in execution matters—Concurrent findings—Scope under Article 185(3) ----Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3); Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 47 Findings of Executing Court affirmed in appeal—No misreading or non-reading of material, no jurisdictional defect, and no perversity—Held, concurrent findings on questions of execution and satisfaction of decree are final—Supreme Court will not reappraise facts in leave jurisdiction—No illegality or miscarriage of justice shown. Cited Cases: • Najm Qureshi v. Chase Manhattan Bank (now MCB), 2015 SCMR 1461 • Muhammad Sadiq v. WAPDA, PLD 2003 SC 290 • Happy Family Associates v. Pakistan International Trading Co., PLD 2006 SC 226 • Nadeem Akhtar Tabasum v. MCB, 2014 SCMR 1371 Disposition: Leave to appeal declined; petition dismissed (17.10.2025).

Summary: (a) Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act (XIV of 1976)--- ----Ss.2(bb) & 33---Punjab Private Security Companies (Regulation and Control) Ordinance, (LXIX of 2002), S.13---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Employees’ Old-Age Benefit (EOB) contributions---Petitioner company engaging security services through independent third-party service provider---Issuance of show cause notice and demand notice, challenge to---Whether the security guards were employees of the beneficiary company or that of the third-party service provider---Whether the petitioner/beneficiary company was liable for ‘EOB’ contributions or the independent third-party service provider---Determination---Briefly, the petitioner company entered into security service agreements with various private security companies for deployment of security guards at its offices and sites---Upon correspondence, the Employees Old-Age Benefits Institution (EOBI) demanded employer and employee contributions in respect of the deployed guards and issued show-cause as well as demand notices, and initiated recovery proceedings, including sealing of the petitioner’s office, leading the petitioner to file a complaint under section 33 of the Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976, which was dismissed by the adjudicating authority---Appellate Authority also held the petitioner liable to pay contributions amounting to Rs. 238,960,800/- for the period July 2004 to June 2010---Issue requiring determination before the High Court “was whether the security guards deployed through independent security companies were to be treated as employees of the petitioner company for the purposes of EOB contributions, and whether the impugned orders and recovery proceedings were legally sustainable?”---Held: Security Companies engaged by the petitioner company were registered in different provinces where the provincial statutes govern the regulatory framework of security companies in their respective jurisdictions---For instance, S. 13 of the Punjab Private Security Companies (Regulation and Control) Ordinance, 2002 delineates a comprehensive regulatory framework governing the employment, supervision and welfare of personnel engaged by a licensed security company---This provision imposed upon the licensee a continuing obligation to ensure the integrity, discipline and lawful conduct of all individuals employed in connection with its operations---Under the existing framework across the provincial jurisdictions, security companies/third-party service providers assumed the unequivocal status of “employers” of their respective security personnel, possessing complete administrative and financial control over them, who were responsible for the employment, hiring, training and equipping of the security guards and provide uniforms, issue arms and ammunition, deploy personnel to various sites, manage work shifts and determine leave schedules---Under the contractual framework the security companies having complete discretion were responsible for hiring, dismissal, payment of wages, and all other benefits due towards the guards under the social security and labor laws and these agreements explicitly set out the responsibility of registration with the Social Security and Employees Old Age Benefits Institution on the Security Companies and established their liability to discharge all legal obligations towards the said guards---Impugned decision imposing the contributions liability upon the petitioner in respect of the security guards at its sites, without first adjudicating the clear and material question of who in fact employed and paid the guards, was legally unsustainable---Security companies, in their capacity as direct employers of the security guards, could not be overlooked in determining liability for Employees Old Age Benefits contributions---Impugned decisions were set aside---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. Messers Bolan Mining Enterprises v. Board of Trustees, EOBI and others 2010 SCMR 1573 rel. Nestle Milk Pak Ltd. v. Board of Trustees, EOBI, Karachi, 2005 PLC 19 ref. (b) Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act (XIV of 1976)--- ----S.2(bb)---Workers performing duties through a third-party service provider---Whether these workers to be regarded as employees of the beneficiary company or the third-party service provider---Scope of employment---Term ‘employee’ includes any person engaged for wages or otherwise, whether employed directly by the principal employer or through any other person acting on his behalf---Likewise, the expression “employer”, when used in relation to an industry or establishment, is sufficiently wide to encompass any person, who employs a person either directly or through an intermediary or contractor---When these definitions are harmoniously construed, it unequivocally follows that the workers performing duties through a contractor, agent, or any such intermediary, whose services are availed by any establishment, fall within the purview of the term “employee” for the purposes of statutory contribution. Hamza Siddiqui for Petitioner. Khurram Mahmood Qureshi for Respondents Nos.1 to 3. Assisted by Muhammad Yahya Khan Niazi. Date of hearing: 16th September, 2025.