Summary: ----S. 9, O. VII, R. 14 & O. XVI, Rr. 1, 2---Suit for recovery of damages---Fatal road accident---Negligence on the part of vehicle company alleged---Onus to prove---Expert evidence, relevance of---Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 'the thing speaks for itself', applicability of---Claim of vehicle being mechanically unfit resulting in the accident had to be proved through specific evidence---The appellants/plaintiffs filed a civil suit for damages against a transport company, following a serious road accident---Appellants/plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 (mother and daughter) were passengers on the bus, while the remaining appellants/ plaintiffs were immediate family members affected indirectly by the consequences of the accident---As a result of the accident, appellant/ plaintiff No. 1 was rendered permanently disabled, causing physical, emotional, and financial distress to the family---The primary claim was that the bus was mechanically unfit and unstable from the start of the journey, whereas, defendant company contended that the accident occurred due to a fault of another vehicle which suddenly changed lanes, forcing the bus driver to swerve, resulting in a rollover---The Trial Court partly decreed the suit, awarding Rs. 140,000 to plaintiff No. 1 and Rs. 40,000 to plaintiff No. 2---Dissatisfied from the Trial Court's decision, the appellants/plaintiffs filed the present appeal---Held: Considering that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 'the thing speaks for itself' only supplied an inference and not a conclusive presumption and since the defendants through their evidence were able to cast doubts by denying the claim of the appellants, the appellants/ plaintiffs were required to produce some expert evidence to bridge the gap but none was produced---The evidence brought by the defendants remained unchallenged---Since the appellants/plaintiffs had opted to take a specific position that occurrence was due to bus's mechanical and fitness failure, therefore, they had to prove it by producing some evidence but they failed to do so---It was clear that in the present case doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not attracted and normal rule of evidence prevailed, therefore, the onus of proving negligence on part of the defendant was on the appellants/plaintiffs, particularly when the defendant had unrooted the prima facie presumption by producing bus driver, bus hostess and workshop in-charge, since it was appellant/ plaintiffs' position that the accident occurred due to fault in the bus---Neither the appellants/plaintiffs sought to rely on the record of maintenance and fitness of the vehicle in issue nor they sought to produce any such record or evidence through process of the court in terms of O. VII, R. 14, read with O. XVI, Rr. 1 & 2 of the C.P.C.---Had the appellants/plaintiffs applied for expert [advice or evidence] for the inspection of the bus or sought appointment of any expert and the response the respondent/defendant company had opposed such prayer, there would have been some inference in favour of the appellants/ plaintiffs---Although it was proved that appellant/plaintiff No.1 had sustained injuries, she was bedridden for life and her family members might be facing trauma and emotional stress for life, however, it was not proved that those had occurred due to direct negligence by the respondent/defendant company---There was nothing on record which could have established that the bus carrying the appellants/plaintiffs had any mechanical fault, which fault was then instrumental for causing the accident---Appeal being without merit was dismissed, in circumstances. N K V Bros (Pvt.) Ltd. v. M Karumai Ammal AIR 1980 SC 1354 ref. (b) Damages--- ----Doctrine of 'Res ipsa loquitur' 'the thing speaks for itself'---Essential ingredients---Applicability and significance---'Res ipsa loquitur' is Latin for 'the thing speaks for itself'---This doctrine applies, when the things that inflicted the damage was under the sole management and control of the defendant; secondly, the occurrence was such that it would not have happened without negligence; and thirdly, there must be no evidence as to why or how the occurrence took place---In such circumstances the defendants have to persuade the court that the accident did not occur on account of their negligence---In simple words, res ipsa loquitur means an inference of negligence in civil proceedings; it permits an inference of a defendant's negligence from the happening of an event and thereby creates a prima facie case of negligence sufficient for submission to a Court---To warrant submission of the inference for the court's consideration, the plaintiff must establish: (i) the event must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (ii) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; (iii) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff---However, it is equally important to register that a defendant may rebut the inference of negligence with evidence that tends to cast doubt on the plaintiff's proof; and more importantly, the doctrine permits an inference of negligence to be drawn solely from the happening of the accident---The rule simply recognizes that some accidents by their very nature would ordinarily not happen without negligence---Res ipsa loquitur does not create a conclusive presumption in favor of the plaintiff but merely permits the inference of negligence to be drawn from the circumstances of the occurrence---Mere happening of an accident or injury will not give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to negligence on the defendant's part, even in a strict liability context---It is insufficient by itself to establish a prima facie case of negligence , or to prove negligence as a matter of law---Stated another way, proof of an accident does not equate with proof of negligence---In an action based on negligence, the maxim res ipsa loquitur is merely a rule of evidence effecting onus; it does not alter the general rule that the onus to prove negligence rests upon the claimant---The doctrine has been applied to situations where a motor vehicle mounted the footpath , where a vehicle struck a pedestrian who was walking alongside the highway , where it was shown that the brake pipe of the vehicle was beyond repair, and where a vehicle of unsound condition was being driven on a poor road on a dark night. Mst. Kamina and another v. Al-Amin Goods Transport Agency through L.R.s and 2 others 1992 SCMR 1715 and Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation Limited and another v. Malik Abdul Habib and another 1993 SCMR 848 rel. Dermatossian v. New York City Tr. Auth. 67 NY2d 219 [1986]; (E.g. James v Wormuth, 21 NY3d 540 [2013]; Morejon v Rais Constr. Co., 7 NY3d 203 [2006]; States v. Lourdes Hosp., 100 NY2d 208 [2003]; Abbott v. Page Airways (23 NY2d 502, 511 [1969]; Kambat (89 NY2d at 497) and States 100 NY2d at 212; Kambat v. St. Francis Hosp., 89 NY2d 489; Morejon v. Rais Const. Co., 7 NY3d at 209; States v. Lourdes Hosp. 100 NY2d at 214; Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Southport Corpn. [1956] AC 218; [1955] 3 All ER 864; Collvilles Ltd. v. Devine [1969] 2 All ER 53; Monforti v. K-Mart Inc. 690 Sol. 2d 631; Fla. Dist. Ct. App.5th Dist. 1997; Thompson v. Volles, (37 Del. 83); Transit Homes, Inc. v. Bellamy, 282 Ark. 453; Callvert v. Katy Taxi, Inc. [413 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1969); Brown v. Rolls Royce Ltd. [1960] 1 All ER 577; Ellor v. Selfridge & Co. Ltd. (1930) 46 TLR 236; Isaac Walton & Co. Ltd. v. Vanguard Motor Bus Co. Ltd. (1908) 25 TLR 13; 22 Bhagyawati Mittal v. Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corpn Lucknow AIR 1978 All. 356 and Gopibai Ghansbamdas Advani v. Food Corpn of India, Bombay AIR 1983 Bom. 137 ref. (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ----Arts. 72, 117 & 120---Tendering of document in the statement of counsel---Admissibility of such documentary evidence---Disputed documents tendered in evidence through counsel's statement cannot be considered because such procedure deprives the opposing party to test the authenticity of those documents by exercising its right of cross-examination. Rustam and others v. Jehangir (deceased) through L.R.s 2023 SCMR 730; Mst. Akhtar Sultana v. Major Retd. Muzaffar Khan Malik through his legal heirs and others PLD 2021 SC 715; Manzoor Hussain v. Misri Khan PLD 2020 SC 749 and Hameeda Begum v. Irshad Begum 2007 SCMR 996 rel. (d) Damages--- ----'General damages' and 'special damages'---Definitions---Distinction---Standards of proof---The "general damages" are implied or presumed to have accrued from the wrong complained of, for the reason that they are its immediate, direct or proximate result or such that thus necessarily result from the injury, or such that they did in fact result from the wrong, directly or proximately---The term "special damages" is defined as those which are actual, but not the necessary result of the injury complained of, and which in fact follow it as a natural and proximate consequence in a particular case i.e. by reason of special circumstances or conditions---Such special damages must be specifically pleaded and proved---In a suit for damages, the wrong done to the plaintiff must be proved to be immediate, direct or proximate result of the act, or acts of negligence. (e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.9---Suit for recovery of damages, filing of---Jurisdiction of Civil Court, invoking of---Ouster of Civil Court's jurisdiction in certain cases discussed--- Question as to what law governs the suit for recovery of damages---Held: Suit for recovery of damages is governed by S. 9 of C.P.C. as it would operate and vest jurisdiction in the Civil Court to adjudicate the suits for recovery of damages and the Civil Court is not robbed of its jurisdiction to try such kinds of suits as the said provision is all encompassing---This is based on well settled position of law that ouster of jurisdiction of Civil Court conferred upon it under S. 9 of C.P.C. cannot be readily inferred and an ouster by special law has to be specific, clear and unambiguous---Exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Court must be expressed, and ouster clause, ousting general law's jurisdiction, must be construed very strictly. Messrs Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited (SNGPL) v. Messrs Noor CNG Filling Station 2022 SCMR 1501; Keramat Ali and another v. Muhammad Yunus Haji and others PLD 1963 SC 191; Khulna and 4 others v. Abdul Jabbar and 9 others PLD 1968 SC 381 and Abbasia Cooperative Bank (Now Punjab Provincial Cooperative Bank Ltd.) through Manager and another v. Hakeem Rafiz Muhammad Ghaus and 5 others PLD 1997 SC 03 rel. (f) Tort--- ----Definition---"Tort" is an act or omission that gives rise to an injury either to person or property---A tortious breach is where one party (the tort-feasor) breaches the legally protected rights of another party (the claimant)---Torts tend to fall within four categories---They are: 1) torts of physical integrity; 2) torts of interests in property; 3) torts of use and enjoyment of land and; 4) torts of reputation. Pakistan Television Corporation v. Noor Sanat Shah 2023 SCMR 616 rel. (g) Jurisprudence--- ----Justice and morality---Standards and yardstick to be adopted by courts while deciding cases---Scope---Judicial decisions must rest on legal principles, not on compassion or emotions--- Justice or morality do not signify any concept of precision as morality may fluctuate from one community to another and from one country to the other---Courts are not required to enforce moral standards but as courts of law are merely concerned with the enforcement of law enacted by the legislature--- Courts of law are not mandated to rule on the basis of mere agony, unfortunate pain and helplessness---It is the duty of every court to implement the enforced laws and to decide the disputes in accordance therewith, rather than on the basis of compassion---Any relief granted on the touchstone of subjective standards of leniency and compassions, rather than the law, cannot be sustained. Sundas and others v. Khyber Medical University through V. C. Peshawar and others 2024 SCMR 46 and Superintendent of Police, Headquarters, Lahore and others v. Ijaz Aslam and others 2024 SCMR 1831 rel. POSCO International Corporation through Authorized Officer v. RIKANS International through Managing Partner/Director and 4 others PLD 2023 Lah. 116 ref. Mubashir Rehman Chaudhary for Appellants. Faisal Zaffar for Respondents. Date of hearing: 4th March, 2025.

Summary: ----Ss. 341, 465 & 466---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302(b), 376 & 201---Qatl-i-amd, rape, causing disappearance of evidence of an offence or giving false information to screen an offender---Appreciation of evidence---Deaf and dumb accused able to understand court proceedings---Scope---Accused were charged for committing murder of the daughter of complainant by firing---In the present case, Trial Court thought that the principal accused, though not insane, could not be made to understand the proceedings---Validity---Before referring to the reference, the Trial Court did not go through the record, as an enquiry was conducted on the application of principal accused for declaring him a lunatic under Ss. 465 & 466, Cr.P.C---Medical board unanimously opined that there was no active psychiatric morbidity at present and the Trial Court dismissed the application for declaring the accused a lunatic, and after that charge was framed against him---Trial Court observed that the said accused could not speak or listen---However, the Court did not note whether the accused could understand the gestures made to him---It was notable that a joint trial was conducted against the accused and his brother/co-accused---Said accused persons were represented and defended adequately by the advocate of their choice---Proper cross-examination of the witnesses was also carried out on behalf of defence---In such situation, the trial was conducted fairly and a sufficient opportunity to present the case was also afforded to the accused persons, including the principal accused---Trial Court was obliged to ascertain whether the accused could be made to understand the proceedings with the help of his relatives or friends or through technical assistance---If the Trial Court doubted the accused's physical and mental capacities, the procedure prescribed under S. 341, Cr.P.C., should be followed---If the trial proceeds in the ordinary way, the Court can pass a sentence if the accused is found guilty and convicted---However, if it is found that the accused cannot understand the proceedings and trial resulted in conviction, the Trial Court is required to forward the proceedings to the High Court, if the evidence warranted so, but it cannot pass a sentence against him---Trial Court must forward the proceedings to the High Court to pass such orders as the High Court think fit---Unless the accused is insane, the Trial Court can proceed with the trial even though the accused cannot understand the proceedings---Given the circumstances, the Trial Court submitted a reference without complying with the spirit provided under S. 341, Cr.P.C.---Therefore, the matter was remanded to the trial Court to proceed as per the law---Reference was answered in the negative. Muhammad Akhlaq, Deputy Prosecutor General and Shahzeb, D.S.P. for the State Rana Attiq-ur-Rehman for the Complainant. Muhammad Khalid Ch. for Accused. Date of hearing: 16th April, 2025.

Summary: (a) Punjab Transparency and Right to Information Act (XXV of 2013)--- ----Ss.3 & 13(1)(b)---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 9, 14 &19-A---Right to information---Scope and essence---Exception stated---Right to privacy of an individual---Brief facts of the matter were that the appellant, filed complaints under Art. 19-A of the Constitution read with S. 3 of the Punjab Transparency and Right to Information Act, 2013 (the "Act 2013") before the Punjab Information Commission (the "Commission"), seeking detailed information from the Excise and Taxation Department (the "Department"), regarding the Excise and Taxation officer, inspectors, zone numbers and names of property circles, etc.---The Commission directed the Department to disclose the information, however, the Department resisted, citing S. 13(1)(b) of the Act, 2013, which exempted disclosure of information violating individual privacy---The Department challenged the Commission's orders through Constitutional petition---The Single Judge-in-Chambers accepted the Constitutional petition while setting aside the Commission's orders, holding that the requested information fell within the domain of protected privacy---The appellant filed the present appeal (I.C.A) challenging the decision passed in the Constitutional petition---Moot point of the matter was as to "whether the scope of the fundamental right to access information, as enshrined under Art. 19-A of the Constitution, and the provisions of the Punjab Transparency and Right to Information Act, 2013, permitted the disclosure of personal information of taxpayer maintained by a public body, or whether such disclosure was lawfully barred under S. 13(1)(b) of the Act 2013 on the ground that it would cause harm to a legitimate privacy interest of individuals"---Held: The right to information was primarily intended to give access to the citizen to the information gathered and maintained by public authorities to ensure that government was functioning in a transparent manner and accountable to the people it served---By allowing individuals to have access to the information qua government activities, income, expenditure, policies, and decision-making, helps to prevent corruption, abuse of power, and promotes better governance---However, the Act 2013 ibid provides certain exception as under S. 13(1)(b) of the Act ibid any request to provide information which violates the privacy of an individual can validly be withheld---This was rooted in the idea that while the public has the right to know about the workings of government, the life of a private individual should be respected and protected---The privacy directly related to an individual's personal life, such as their name, address, phone number, family details, medical history, financial status, etc. which had validly been safeguarded in almost every law---Admittedly, the substantial information as permissible under the Act 2013 was already provided to the appellant by the respondent No.1/Department through the Commission/respondent No.2---The appellant made request for getting information qua disclosures of names of taxpayer and information regarding individual properties owned by different taxpayers but imparting of requisite information was subject to an unambiguous consent of said individual otherwise request could validly be regretted under S. 13(1)(b) of the Act ibid---The Commission in blatant excess of its jurisdiction passed the orders, whereby, the respondent No.1/ Department was directed to provide private information of the individuals to the appellant, thus the Single Judge in Chamber had rightly allowed the Constitutional petition of the respondent No.1/ Department and set aside the aforesaid orders of the Commission being violative to the above said provision of law and same was immune from any inference by the High Court through the present Intra Court Appeal---Intra Court Appeal being devoid of any merits was dismissed in limine. (b) Punjab Transparency and Right to Information Act (XXV of 2013)--- ----S.13(1)(b)---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts .9, 14 & 19-A---Right to information---Exception---Right to privacy of an individual---Scope---A public information officer may refuse an application for access to information where disclosure of the information shall or is likely to cause harm to a legitimate privacy interest, unless the person concerned has consented to disclosure of the information---Such provision gives the power to public information officer to refuse the application for access to information where such disclosure of information is likely to harm the legitimate privacy or interest of individual unless the person concerned has consented to disclosure of information---Right to information under Art. 19-A of the Constitution and the Punjab Transparency and Right to Information Act, 2013 does not extend to any 'legitimate privacy interest' of an individual guaranteed under Arts. 9 & 14 of the Constitution and protected under S. 13(1)(b) of the Act ibid. (c) Islamic jurisprudence--- ----Right to information---Right to privacy---Scope---The religion of Islam, undoubtedly is a complete and comprehensive code of life which provides full protection to privacy and confidentiality of every individual---It also emphasizes the importance as a mandatory injunction qua spying on others or unwarranted intrusion into their private personal affairs---In this regard, reference is made to Ayat No.12 of Surah Al-Hujurat. Ayat No.12 of Surah Al-Hujurat ref. (d) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 14--- Punjab Transparency and Right to Information Act (XXV of 2013), Ss. 3 & 13(1)(b)---Right to information---Right to privacy and home of an individual---Dignity of a man---Scope---The solemnity of privacy of a person has been guaranteed under Art. 14(1) of the Constitution---Expression 'privacy of home' used in Art. 14 of the Constitution is not restricted to the physical house of a person but it covers the entire treasure of his personal life, as the privacy attaches to the person, not to the place where it is associated---The right to privacy involves the protection of individuals from unwarranted intrusion into their personal lives. Muhammad Nawaz v. Additional District and Sessions Judge and others PLD 2023 SC 461 rel. Ghulam Mustafa v. Judge Family Court and another 2021 CLC 204 and M. D. Tahir, Advocate v. Director, State Bank of Pakistan, Lahore and 3 others 2004 CLD 1680 ref. (e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.35-B---Special cost, awarding of---Futile and frivolous litigation against a state institution---Where a state institution is dragged in futile and frivolous litigation, special cost can be awarded. Capital Development Authority, CDA through Chairman, CDA, Islamabad v. Ahmed Murtaza and another 2023 SCMR 61; Province of Punjab through the Deputy Commissioner, Collector District Gujranwala and others v. Zulfiqar Ali and another 2024 SCMR 22 and Javed Hameed and others v. Aman Ullah and others 2024 SCMR 89 rel. Nadeem Sarwar for Appellant. Rana Shamshad Khan, Additional Advocate General, on Court's call.

Summary: ----Ss. 365 & 376---Abduction, forcible intercourse/rape---Appreciation of evidence---Mentally impaired victim---Competency to testify---Alternative means to record testimony---Accused were charged for committing rape with the mentally impaired daughter of the complainant after her abduction---During the trial, Female Medical Officer testified that victim was deaf and dump and unable to speak; that she was mentally retarded and unable to tell about previous such incidents or give relevant gynecological history---Prosecution submitted an application before the Trial Court to determine whether victim was competent to testify---Consequently, the Court summoned victim, conducted a voir dire test and found her unable to testify---However, Trial Court failed to explore whether victim's testimony could have been recorded through alternative means, which declared her incompetent to testify under Arts. 3 & 17 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, without seeking the opinion of a qualified psychiatric or psychological expert---Absence of expert evaluation constituted a serious procedural lapse, as mental incapacity did not automatically preclude a witness from providing testimony---Law did not rigidly assume that persons with disabilities were wholly incapable of expressing themselves---In criminal cases involving victims with cognitive or intellectual disabilities, their testimony should not be rejected outright due to their condition---Instead, appropriate procedural accommodations must be made to facilitate their meaningful participation in the legal process---Trial Court should have summoned an expert to assess whether victim communicated her experiences through alternative means before declaring her incompetent to testify---Thus, matter was remanded to the Trial Court with the direction to summon a forensic psychologist or psychiatrist to assess victim's capacity to communicate and the feasibility of recording her testimony through alternative means---Appeal was disposed of in the above terms. Malik Farooq Haider for Appellant (in Crl. Appeal No.692 of 2022). Muhammad Sharif Bhatti for Appellant (in Crl. Appeal No.704 of 2022). Ch. Asghar Ali Gill, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State. Rab Nawaz Khan Baloch for the Complainant. Date of hearing: 28th January, 2025.

Summary: ----Jurisdiction of Court---Assumption/exercise of---Scope---Every Court prior to taking cognizance and adjudicating upon an issue should first resort to the question of assumption of jurisdiction of the Court and if it comes to the conclusion that jurisdiction can be assumed only then it can adjudicate upon the issue. Government of Sindh through Secretary Education and Literacy Department and others v. Nizakat Ali and others 2011 SCMR 592 and Fauji Foundation and another v. Shamimur Rehman PLD 1983 SC 457 ref. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199 --- Punjab Procurement Rules, 2014, R. 14--- Benches of the (Lahore) High Court ---T erritorial jurisdiction---Invoking constitutional jurisdiction of a Bench of the High Court---Determination, criteria of--- Petitioners/companies were aggrieved of their disqualification to tender their bids at pre-qualification stage of public procurement of livestock (Cow and Buffalo Heifers) to a scheme namely "Livestock Asset Transfer to Rural Women in South Punjab" ('the Scheme')---Petitioners had filed constitutional petitions before the Rawalpindi Bench of the Lahore High Court ('Rawalpindi Bench/Court')---Objection was raised regarding maintainability of constitutional petitions qua territorial jurisdiction of this (Rawalpindi) Bench/Court---Plea raised by the petitioners, against objection, was that the addresses of offices of the petitioners were located at Rawalpindi and Islamabad, thus cause of action had arisen at territorial jurisdiction of the Rawalpindi Bench/Court---Validity---Pertinently, all concerned official respondents (like the Director General, officers, members of grievance committee) relating to the Scheme belonged to concerned Department(s) of South Punjab (Bahawalpur), for the purpose to conduct proceedings under the Punjab Procurement Rules, 2014 ('the Rules 2014') i.e. issuing invitation of pre-qualification bids, entertaining grievances, conducting the procurement process of the Scheme and redressing the grievance of the bidders---It became apparent that neither the part of the cause of action had arisen in Rawalpindi nor the official respondents arrayed in present petition(s) against whom relief was sought, were situated in Rawalpindi, nor fell within the territorial jurisdiction of this (Rawalpindi Bench of) Lahore High Court and, thus, were not amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court---Constitutional petitions, falling beyond the territorial jurisdiction of this/Rawalpindi Bench of Lahore High Court, were dismissed, in circumstances. Messrs Mandviwalla Builders and Developers and another v. M. Awais Sheikh CEO Mangla View Resport and Mangla Garrison Housing (Pvt.) Limited and others 2023 CLD 885 ref. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199 --- Punjab Procurement Rules, 2014, R. 14--- Benches of the High Court ---T erritorial jurisdiction, assigning of---Writ, issuance of---Scope--- P rinciple of dominant jurisdiction ---Petitioners/companies were aggrieved of their disqualification to tender their bids at pre-qualification stage of public procurement of livestock (Cow and Buffalo Heifers) to a scheme namely "Livestock Asset Transfer to Rural Women in South Punjab" ('the Scheme')---Petitioners sought issuance of writ by the Rawalpindi Bench of the Lahore High Court ('Rawalpindi Bench/Court')---Held: Issuance of writ is an extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court and is invoked when stipulations in the Constitution for its issuance are met---Petitioners had failed to satisfy that this (Rawalpindi bench of) High Court could exercise jurisdiction to pass direction to all the respondents---Under principles of dominant jurisdiction, Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court is exercised under Art. 199 of the Constitution and not under any other instrument; the Lahore High Court is created by the Constitution of Pakistan, thus, it can only exercise powers which are conferred upon it by or under the Constitution---It was mandatory upon the Bench of High Court to confine itself to its territorial jurisdiction as provided in the Constitution---Constitutional petitions, falling beyond the territorial jurisdiction of this/Rawalpindi Bench of Lahore High Court, were dismissed, in circumstances. Karamat Ullah Khan Chaudhry v. The Federation of Pakistan and 2 others 2018 PLC (C.S.) 555; Mirza Luqman Masud v. Government of Pakistan and 14 others 2015 PLC (C.S.) 526; Azad Hafeez Ltd. v. Chairman, FBR and 5 others 2012 MLD 1684; Ibrahim Fibres Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan and 3 others PLD 2009 Kar. 154; Dr. Qaiser Rashid v. Federal Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad PLD 2006 Lah. 789; Inaam Elahi Nasir and others v. National Bank of Pakistan and others 2013 PLC (C.S.) 899; Danish Kaneria v. Pakistan and others 2012 CLC 389; Mrs. Rohi Chaudhry and 2 others v. Federation of Pakistan and 3 others 2010 PTD 1233; High Noon Textile Ltd. v. Saudi Pak Industrial and Agricultural Investment Co. (Pvt.) Ltd and 4 others 2010 CLD 567; Muhammad Maqsood Sabir Ansari v. District Returning Officer, Kasur and 3 others 2007 CLC 1113; Mst. Shahida Maqsood v. President of Pakistan and another 2004 CLC 565; Province of NWFP and another v. Abdur Rahman, Forest Contractor and others 1991 SCMR 1321 and Muhammad Naim v. State Cement Corporation of Pakistan and others 1989 CLC 1241 ref. (d) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 198 & 199---Lahore High Court (Establishment of Benches) Rules, 1981, R. 3--- Benches of the (Lahore) High Court ---T erritorial jurisdiction, assigning of---Invoking constitutional jurisdiction of a Bench of High Court---Determination, criteria of--- Petitioners/ companies were aggrieved of their disqualification to tender their bids at pre-qualification stage of public procurement of livestock (Cow and Buffalo Heifers) to a scheme namely "Livestock Asset Transfer to Rural Women in South Punjab" ('the Scheme')---Petitioners had filed constitutional petitions before the Rawalpindi Bench of the Lahore High Court ('Rawalpindi Bench/Court')---Objection was raised regarding maintainability of constitutional petitions qua territorial jurisdiction of this (Rawalpindi)Bench/Court---Validity---In terms of Art. 198(3) of the Constitution, the Bahawalpur, Multan and Rawalpindi Benches of the Lahore High Court are constitutionally constituted Benches with the area assigned to them under Art. 198(6) of the Constitution---Said exercise is undertaken in accordance with the R. 3 of the Lahore High Court (Establishment of Benches) Rules, 1981 ('the Rules 1981'), which regulates the distribution of matters to be filed and heard by each Bench within the area assigned to it respectively---Thus, the matter-in-hand could not be entertained at the Rawalpindi Bench of the Lahore High Court merely because the addresses of the petitioners were at Rawalpindi and Islamabad---Since the subject matter of the titled petitions related to the Scheme for South Punjab and all related ancillary activities in respect of procurement in question were also carried out by the Livestock Department of South Punjab hence these petitions could not be adjudicated at Rawalpindi Bench of Lahore High Court---Constitutional petitions, falling beyond the territorial jurisdiction of this/Rawalpindi Bench of Lahore High Court, were dismissed, in circumstances. Havaldar (Retd.) Chiragh Din Babar v. Muhammad Aslam and 3 others PLD 2009 Lah. 622 ref. (e) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199(1A) [as inserted/ introduced through the Constitution (Twenty-sixth Amendment) Act, 2024]--- Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court, invoking of--- Vague/ambiguous prayer---Effect---As mandated by Art. 199(1A) of the Constitution, introduced through 26th Amendment in the Constitution , the High Court cannot exercise jurisdiction or issue directives beyond the matters explicitly raised in the Constitutional petition---Therefore, the contents of petition must be clear and apt leading to actual grievance of the person---In the present constitutional petitions, the petitioners had made unclear, confused, and vague prayer---There must not only be a right but a justiciable right in existence to give jurisdiction to the High Court in the matter---Constitutional petitions with vague and ambiguous prayer, being non- maintainable, were dismissed, in circumstances. N.W.F.P. Public Service Commission and others v. Muhammad Arif and others 2011 SCMR 848; Asdullah Mangi v. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation 2005 SCMR 445; Owais Shams Durrani and others v. Vice-Chancellor, Bacha Khan University, Charsadda and another 2020 SCMR 1041 and Muhammad Riaz Bhatti v. Federation of Pakistan and another 2004 SCMR 1120 ref. (f) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court, invoking of---Public interest litigation---Scope and effect---Held, that in the garb of public interest litigation, matters are brought before the High Court which are neither of public importance nor relatable to enforcement of a fundamental right or public duty---Constitutional petitions, being non-maintainable, were dismissed, in circumstances. Dr. Akhtar Hassan Khan and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2012 SCMR 455 ref. Fahad Iqbal for Petitioner (in W.P. No. 3661 of 2024). Shoaib ur Rehman for Petitioner (in connected W.P. No. 3851 of 2024). Samar Khan for Petitioner (in connected W.P. No. 3852 of 2024). Khalid Ishaq, Advocate General Punjab along with Imran Shaukat Rao and Abid Aziz Rajori, Assistant Advocate Generals and Dr. Muhammad Ashraf, Director General Livestock Department, Punjab, Dr. Sohail Azmat, Deputy Secretary Technical and Muhammad Iqbal, Deputy Secretary (Admin), South Punjab Secretariat for Respondents. Barrister Bushra Saqib on behalf of Respondent Noor Traders. Abdus Salam, Senior Law Officer on behalf of Respondent/ Punjab Procurement Regulatory Authority. Mujtaba-ul-Hassan and Adil Sarwar Sial, Research Officers, Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench. Date of hearing: 4th February, 2025.

Summary: (a) Contract Act (IX of 1872)--- ----Ss. 188 & 214---Powers-of-Attorney Act (VII of 1882), S. 2---Principal-agent relationship---General power of attorney---Transfer of property by the attorney in favour of his sons---Holder of a general power of attorney must obtain special permission from the principal when alienating the principal's property, either in his own favor or in the name of his relatives---Attorney would require prior permission, approval and consent of the principal when he wants to transfer the property in the name of his close relatives. Maqsood Ahmad and others v. Salman Ali PLD 2003 SC 31 and Jamil Akhtar and others v. Las Baba and others PLD 2003 SC 494 ref. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 185---Appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court---Scope---Concurrent findings of Courts below---Normally, the Supreme Court does not interfere in the concurrent findings (of Courts below) unless those are perverse, arbitrary, fanciful or capricious. [p. 66] C Afrasiab Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners. Nemo for Respondents Nos. 1-2. Hafiz Zaheer Iqbal, Advocate High Court (with permission) for Respondents Nos.3-5. Date of hearing: 11th September, 2024.

Summary: (a) Contract Act (IX of 1872)--- ----Ss. 188 & 214---Powers-of-Attorney Act (VII of 1882), S. 2---Principal-agent relationship---General power of attorney---Transfer of property by the attorney in favour of his sons---Holder of a general power of attorney must obtain special permission from the principal when alienating the principal's property, either in his own favor or in the name of his relatives---Attorney would require prior permission, approval and consent of the principal when he wants to transfer the property in the name of his close relatives. Maqsood Ahmad and others v. Salman Ali PLD 2003 SC 31 and Jamil Akhtar and others v. Las Baba and others PLD 2003 SC 494 ref. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 185---Appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court---Scope---Concurrent findings of Courts below---Normally, the Supreme Court does not interfere in the concurrent findings (of Courts below) unless those are perverse, arbitrary, fanciful or capricious. [p. 66] C Afrasiab Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners. Nemo for Respondents Nos. 1-2. Hafiz Zaheer Iqbal, Advocate High Court (with permission) for Respondents Nos.3-5. Date of hearing: 11th September, 2024.

Summary: (a) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)--- ----S. 15-A---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched., Art. 181---Restoration of possession---Limitation---Principle of laches---Applicability---Grievance of appellant/tenant was that after seeking her ejectment from the premises on basis of personal need, the respondent/landlord did not utilize it for his bona fide personal need---Rent Controller allowed the application of appellant/tenant and ordered to restore possession to her but Lower Appellate Court and High Court declined to interfere in the ejectment order---Validity---Tenant cannot be given an unlimited period of time to apply under section 15-A of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979---Period of one year cannot be construed as a period of limitation for tenant to apply but such right cannot be extended indefinitely at the leisure of tenant---Such application should be preferred within a reasonable period of time and it is for Rent Controller to decide whether the application is hit by laches rather than applying limitation period as provided under residuary Article 181 of First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908---Supreme Court directed to restore possession of premises to appellant/tenant and set aside the orders passed by High Court and Lower Appellate Court---Appeal was allowed. Words and Phrases (West Publishing Co.) Vol. 18A, (Permanent Edition, Pages 84-85); Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, John S. James, (Volume 2, page 1172); Law Terms and Phrases (Judicially Interpreted, Sardar Muhammad Iqbal Khan Mokal) Page 416; Venkataramaiya's Law Lexicon and Legal Maxims [2nd Edition, Page 942 (1986)]; Oxford. Dictionary of Law [Elizabeth A. martin 2022 Ed.], Page 328; Merriam Webster. Merriam Webster. [https://www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/good%20faith]; Legal Information Institute [Cornell Law School] [https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/good faith]; Abdul Ghaffar and others v. Mst. Mumtaz PLD 1976 SC 572; Ali Muhammad and another v. Fazal Hussain and others 1983 SCMR 1239; Allah Dino v. Muhammad Shah 2001 SCMR 286; The Canara Bank Ltd. v. The Warden Insurance Co. Ltd. AIR 1935 Bombay 35; Ali Muhammad and another v. Fazal Hussain and others 1983 SCMR 1239; Collector of Customs (Appraisement) v. Messrs Saleem Adaya, Karachi PLD 1999 Karachi 76; Haji Muhammad Ashraf v. The State and 3 others 1999 MLD 330; Haji Hussain Haji Dawood through LRs and others v. M.Y. Kherati 2002 SCMR 343; Abdul Ghaffar v Mumtaz PLD 1982 SC 88; Muhammad Nazir v. Saeed Subhani 2002 SCMR 1540; Rahim Jan v. Securities Exchange Commission of Pakistan 2002 SCMR 1303; The Rule of Law. (2010 Edition); Dr. Mobashir Hassan and others v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2010 SC 265; Baz Muhammad Kakar v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2012 SC 923; Pakistan Burmah Shell Ltd. v. Mrs. Nasreen Irshad 85 others 1989 SCMR 1892 and Abdus Sattar Molla v. Crown PLD 1958 FC 145 ref. (b) Interpretation of statutes--- ----General and special law---Scope---Specific or detailed provisions of a legal instrument should prevail over more general or conflicting provisions---When provision of a general law and special law addresses same issue or matter, the general law is impliedly repealed to the extent that the special law applies---In determining whether a statute is special or general, the focal point of consideration should principally and fundamentally be the subject matter---In the exigency of deciphering the Legislative intent or in case of conflict, the rule of harmonious construction can be adopted to interpret both co-existing provisions in a manner that gives effect to both without rendering either ineffectual or out of order. (c) Maxim--- ----Fiat justitia ruat caelum---Meaning---Let justice be done though heavens fall. (d) Maxim--- ----Ex debito justitiae---Meaning---Doctrine of ex debito justitiae refers to remedies to which a person is entitled to as of right, as opposed to a remedy which is discretionary---Such maxim applies to remedies that a Court is bound to give when they are claimed, as distinct from those that it has discretion to grant, where it is the foremost duty of Court to do complete justice. (e) Administration of justice--- ----Continuing wrong, doctrine of---Scope---If law is violated, the wrongdoer is continuously liable for penalty envisioned under law---Quintessence of continuing wrong is an act which triggers a continuing source of injury but the Courts should not be fervent or zealous to hold continuing wrong or default unless the language of statute or its provision clearly expresses such intention of legislature, or the nature of such injury is considered continuing, or it is based on a recurring cause of action. (f) Maxim--- ----Expressio unius est exlusio alterius---Connotation---Expressio unius est exlusio alterius denotes that to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other or of the alternative, keeping in mind that if a law or contract explicitly mentions one thing it is assumed that other things are not included. (g) Maxim--- ----Ex visceribus actus----Connotation---Phrase ex visceribus actus deciphers the principle that every section/clause of a statute should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act, so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute or series of statutes relating to the subject matter. (h) Maxim--- ----Ut res magis valeat quam pereat---Connotation---Principle of giving effect to the matter rather than having it fail. Appellant in person. Badar Alam, Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Kashif Badar, Advocate for Respondents Nos. 1-3. Iftikhar Javed Qazi, Advocate Supreme Court Amicus Curiae. Date of hearing: 24th December, 2024.

Summary: ----Ss. 2(22A), 33, 35 & Schedule-I, Art. 47 (as amended by Punjab Finance Act, 2018)---West Pakistan Stamp Inspection and Audit Rules, 1949, R.3---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 138 & 199---Constitutional petition---Public office---Collection of stamp duty---Insurance policies-- -Petitioners/insurance companies were aggrieved of notices for audit of accounts issued by Chief Inspector of Stamps, Board of Revenue Punjab---Dispute was with regard to deposit of stamp duty on instruments of insurance executed by petitioners/insurance companies-- -Held: If public functions under Art. 138 of the Constitution belong to Provincial Government then such functions can only be delegated to public officers who are departmental officials---Provisions of Stamp Act, 1899 concern themselves with collection and impounding of duties of stamp which, in essence, are public functions meant to be performed by public officers---Private bodies and persons included in definition of public office in Stamp Act, 1899 may carry out functions which can be described as public but as commercial organizations they cannot be said to possess powers solely in order that they may use them for the public good---Private bodies do not have the same duty that a public body, which is not a commercial undertaking, has---Private body is entitled to look to the interest of its shareholders-- -This also means that private bodies and persons may become subject to judicial review since their source of power is a statute---Offices to which a reference has been made in Appendix II of Stamp Act, 1899 do not include the bodies in dispute and not at all the offices of petitioners/insurance companies---Petitioners/insurance companies are not comprised in the list of Courts and offices and other accounts which are subject to stamp audit by a stamp auditor under West Pakistan Stamp Inspection and Audit Rules, 1949---Notices issued to petitioners/insurance companies were ultra vires as West Pakistan Stamp Inspection and Audit Rules, 1949 did not empower stamp auditor to inspect books and records of petitioners/ insurance companies for audit---Notices for audit were without lawful authority and Chief Inspector of Stamps was denuded of powers to serve such notices on petitioners/insurance companies to compel them to undertake stamp audit by stamp auditor nominated by Collector---High Court declared that definition of public office contained in S. 2(22A) of Stamp Act, 1899, to the extent of bodies in dispute was unconstitutional and without lawful authority and were struck out from the definition---High Court gave directions to modify definition of public officer in S. 2(22B) of Stamp Act, 1899---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. Sui Southern Gas Company Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2018 SCMR 802; R (King) v. Secretary of State for Justice [2015] UKSC 54 and YL v. Birmingham City Council [2007] UK HL 27 ref. (b) Stamp Act (II of 1899)--- ----Ss. 33 & 35---Words "by any public officer" and "acted upon, registered or authenticated?. by any public officer"---Scope---Words "by any public officer" in section 35 of Stamp Act, 1899 are tied in with the forgoing words "acted upon, registered or authenticated?. by any public officer"---These are all public functions conferred by Provincial Government and there is no power in any private person to act upon, register or authenticate an instrument---Such power is inconceivable to vest in a private person nor can he be conferred such a power, for that would be unconstitutional and against the holding of Supreme Court in Mustafa Impex case reported as PLD 2016 SC 808---Functions contemplated by sections 33 and 35 of Stamp Act, 1899 are in essence public functions of a Constitutional nature and the wide scope of definition of 'public office' introduced by Stamp (Punjab Amendment) Act, 1973 would be in contradiction to such functions---Two potentially conflicting strands of the same term are hard to reconcile in the statutory setting of Stamp Act, 1899. Mustafa Impex v. Government of Pakistan PLD 2016 SC 808 rel. Imtiaz Rashid Siddiqui, Shahzad Ata Elahi, Gohar Mustafa Qureshi, Shahryar Kasuri, Khawaja Omer Ghias, Syed Kamal Ali Haider, Raza Imtiaz Siddiqui, Ali Umrao, Haider Aziz Sheikh, Muhammad Mohsin Malik, Asad Abbas Butt, Muhammad Asif, Ms. Ayesha Qazi, Awais Ahmed, Malik Muhammad Zarif, Ali Ahmad Toor and Syed Ali Ahmad Gillani for Petitioners. Abdul Muqtadir Khan for Respondent No.4-FBR. Mirza Nasar Ahmad, Addl. Attorney General, Asad Ali Bajwa, D.A.G., Jahanzeb Inam, Addl. Advocate General and Hassan Ijaz Cheema, A.A.G. for Respondents. Date of hearing: 26th February, 2025.

Summary: (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----Ss. 3 & 5---Appeal filed before the Supreme Court---Appeal time- barred by 22 days---Condonation of delay, application for---Wrongadvise/confusion of counsel not sufficient cause for condonation of delay---In the application seeking condonation of delay it was stated that initially the legal advice received was that a leave petition ought to be filed before the Supreme Court---In the said application in another paragrapgh it was stated that thereafter the legal advice was that an appeal lay as of right---It was this confusion or conflict in legal advice that led to the delay in the filing of the appeal---Wrong legal advice such as appeared to be involved in the present case did not constitute sufficient cause within the meaning of law---Since it was the appellant's own position that an appeal lay as of right with the present appeal being barred by time, the delay could not be condoned---Application seeking condonation of delay was dismissed, with the result that the appeal also stood dismissed. Khushi Muhammad through LRs and others v Mst. Fazal Bibi and others PLD 2016 SC 872 distinguished. (b) Precedent--- ----Any case, whether of the Supreme Court or of a High Court, that establishes binding precedent turns on facts proved or admitted. Sh. Zameer Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant. Sanaullah Zahid, Addl. A.G. Punjab for Respondents Nos. 1-3. Date of hearing: 15th November, 2024.