Summary: Ingredients of Section 405 PPC are not made out. Pre-Arrest Bail is Allowed

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: Background The petitioner, a private company engaged in importing and distributing drugs, challenged the denial of a concessionary sales tax rate under Entry 81 of the Eighth Schedule of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, for the import of sutures. This denial was based on SRO 526(I)/2021 issued under the DRAP Act, 2012, which reclassified sutures as "medical devices" instead of "drugs." Consequently, the petitioner was charged a statutory sales tax rate of 17% or 18%, instead of the concessionary rate of 1%. The petitioner argued that such reclassification and denial of the tax benefit were unlawful and inconsistent with the Drugs Act, 1976. ------ Issues: ------ 1) Whether SRO 526(I)/2021 issued under the DRAP Act, 2012, can override the provisions of the Drugs Act, 1976, and the Sales Tax Act, 1990. ------ 2) Whether rules and subordinate legislation can redefine the classification of sutures contrary to statutory provisions. ------ 3) Whether the petitioner is entitled to the concessionary tax rate under Entry 81 of the Eighth Schedule to the Sales Tax Act, 1990, based on the classification of sutures as drugs. ------ Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: ------ Holding: The Sindh High Court allowed the petition, declaring that the reclassification of sutures as "medical devices" through SRO 526(I)/2021 was inconsistent with the parent statutes, including the Drugs Act, 1976, and the Sales Tax Act, 1990. ------ Reasoning: Subordinate Legislation Cannot Override Parent Statutes: The court emphasized that rules and notifications, as subordinate legislation, cannot contradict or override the provisions of parent statutes. The Drugs Act, 1976, classified sutures as "drugs," and this statutory definition cannot be altered through subordinate legislation like SRO 526(I)/2021. ------ Scope of Rule-Making Power: The "removal of difficulties" clause under Section 36 of the DRAP Act, 2012, cannot be used to alter the substantive provisions of parent statutes. Such clauses are meant for procedural or implementation issues, not for reclassifying items already defined under the law. Conflict Between DRAP Act and Drugs Act: Section 32 of the DRAP Act explicitly states that its provisions are to be read in addition to, and not in derogation of, the Drugs Act, 1976. Therefore, the reclassification of sutures as medical devices through SRO 526(I)/2021 was beyond the scope of the DRAP Act. ------ Inconsistent Application: The petitioner provided evidence showing that other importers of sutures were granted the tax concession under Entry 81, highlighting discriminatory enforcement by the customs authorities. Outcome: The court ruled in favor of the petitioner, setting aside the denial of the concessionary tax rate and allowing the petitioner to clear its consignments under Entry 81 of the Eighth Schedule to the Sales Tax Act, 1990. ------ Citations/Precedents: PLD 2023 SC 609 (Government of Balochistan vs. Shah Muhammad) 2022 SCMR 1787 (Farrukh Raza Sheikh vs. The Appellate Tribunal, Inland Revenue, and others) PLD 2021 Sindh 492 (Abbu Hashmi vs. Federation of Pakistan and others) 2019 SCMR 282 (Messrs Pakistan Television Corporation Ltd. vs. Commissioner Inland Revenue) 2017 SCMR 1136 (Messrs Pakistan Television Corporation Ltd. vs. Commissioner Inland Revenue) PLD 1997 SC 582 (Elahi Cotton Ltd. vs. Federation of Pakistan) PLD 1990 Lahore 121 (Ittefaq Foundry vs. Federation of Pakistan and others) PLD 2014 SC 389 (Suo Motu Case) PLD 2011 SC 619 (Suo Motu Case)

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: Background: The petitioners sought pre-arrest bail in a case filed under FIR No. 238/2023, dated 17.05.2023, under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC). The complainant alleged that 5 to 6 years ago, the petitioners had obtained three cows and one he-buffalo worth Rs. 5,50,000/- under a share agreement but misappropriated the animals and failed to deliver the complainant's share. The petitioners argued that the allegations were mala fide and that no incriminating evidence linked them to the alleged crime. -----Issues: 1- Whether the delay in filing the FIR raises concerns about the veracity of the allegations against the petitioners. -----2- Whether the elements of criminal breach of trust under Section 406 PPC are fulfilled. -----3- Whether the petitioners' actions constitute a breach of contract rather than a criminal offense. -----4- Whether there is any mala fide or ulterior motive behind the complaint. ------Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court noted that the alleged crime occurred 5 to 6 years prior to the registration of the FIR, with no satisfactory explanation for the delay. This raised doubts about the false implication of the petitioners. The court found that Section 406 PPC was not applicable as the complainant admitted that the animals were given to the petitioners under a business agreement, not an entrustment of property. The petitioners' failure to return the complainant's share was deemed a breach of a business agreement rather than a criminal breach of trust. No Evidence of Criminal Entrustment: Based on the evidentiary material, the court concluded that the complainant's claims did not amount to criminal entrustment. Broken business promises do not qualify as criminal offenses under Section 406 PPC. While the petitioners failed to prove mala fide conclusively, the court inferred from the case's facts and circumstances that ulterior motives could not be ruled out. The petitioners, being non-convicts who had already joined the investigation, were granted confirmation of pre-arrest bail. The court found no justification for their imprisonment, as the offense under Section 406 PPC does not fall under the prohibitory clause of Section 497 Cr.P.C. The petition for pre-arrest bail was allowed, and the interim pre-arrest bail granted on 20.10.2023 was confirmed, subject to fresh bail bonds. ------Citations/Precedents: Shakeel Ahmad vs. The State and another (2012 MLD 1492) Tahir Hussain v. The State and other (2020 YLR 576) Khair Muhammad and another vs. The State through PG Punjab and another (2021 SCMR 130) Shahid Imran versus The State and others (2011 SCMR 1614) Shahzada Qaiser Arfat alias Qaiser vs. The State and another (PLD 2021 SC 708) Meeran Bux v. The State and another (PLD 1989 SC 347) Khair Muhammad and another Vs. The State through P.G.Punjab and another (2021 SCMR 130) Sajid Hussain alias Joji Vs. The State (PLD 2021 SC 898) -----Quote: ''Ingredients of Section 405 PPC are not made out. Pre-Arrest Bail is Allowed''

Summary: Sentence reduced --- Convict appealed his conviction and death sentence for the rape of a minor, on August 10, 2019. The trial court, via judgment dated November 12, 20210, convicted Rafique under Section 376(iii) PPC, sentencing him to death with a fine of Rs.1,00,000 and additional imprisonment in case of default. Rafique was also ordered to pay Rs.2,00,000 as compensation to the victim's family.--- The appellant challenged his conviction and death sentence on the grounds of false implication, disputing the evidence presented during the trial. ---- The court rejected the appellant's claims of false implication, citing consistent testimony from the complainant, Abdul Majeed, and an eyewitness, Muhammad Sadiq. Despite a negative DNA report, the court found sufficient evidence to uphold the conviction. However, considering mitigating factors such as the appellant's age and the negative DNA report, the death sentence was converted to life imprisonment. The appeal was dismissed, and the compensation and fine amounts imposed by the trial court were upheld. The Capital Sentence Reference for confirmation of the death sentence was also denied.Legal Principles/Precedents:The court applied the well-established principle that an accused is entitled to the benefit of the doubt as an extenuating circumstance while deciding the sentence.The court considered mitigating factors, such as the appellant's age and the negative DNA report, in determining the appropriate sentence. --- The appellant's appeal was dismissed, and the death sentence was converted to life imprisonment. The compensation and fine amounts imposed by the trial court were upheld, and the Capital Sentence Reference for confirmation of the death sentence was denied.