Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) [since repealed]--- ----Ss.39 & 40(1)---Companies Act (XIX of 2017), S.13(3)---Punjab Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967), S.42---Record of Rights---Change of name of 'person'---Effect---Petitioner company was aggrieved of order passed by revenue authorities refusing to incorporate change of its name and had treated the same as sale in favour of petitioner---Validity---Provision of S. 42 of Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967 reflects that the same is applicable on acquiring of any right as land owner or a tenant---Words "a person" in S. 42 of Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967 further clarifies that the Legislature has envisaged acquisition of any right or interest as land-owner or a tenant from one person to another---Dispute had arisen when request was made to revenue authorities to incorporate the change in name of the company from "National Sugar Industries Limited" to "Popular Sugar Mills Limited", which change had already been permitted by Registrar of the Companies, under Ss. 39 & 40 of Companies Ordinance, 1984---Mere change of name did not change legal status of petitioner company or its distinct personality and such change entailed no difference to rights or obligations---High Court set aside order passed by revenue authorities as application or request to incorporate change of name was not a sale---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. Asghar Ali v. P.K. Shahani and 2 others 1992 CLC 2282; Habib Safe Deposit Vault (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Province of Sindh through Secretary, Ministry of Revenue and 2 others 2015 PTD 1863; Bhoruka Engineering Inds. Ltd. v. The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (ITA No. 120 of 2011); Reckitt Benckiser (India) Private Limited v. State of H.P. and others (C.W.P. No. 1293 of 2019); Inox Air Products (Pvt.) Ltd. v. State of H.P. and others (C.W.P. No. 3166 of 2016); Bacha F. Guzdar v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay (Civil Appeal No.104 of 1953); Cyrus Cowasjee and 2 others v. Karachi Metropolitan Corporation through Administrator, Karachi PLD 2022 Sindh 106; Aron Salomon (Pauper) v. A. Salomon and Company Limited 1897 AC 22, HL; Lee v. Lee's Air Farming Ltd. 1960 3 All E.R = 1961 AC 12, PC; State of West Bengal and others v. Gopi Vallabh Solutions Private Limited and others (CAN 6652 of 2018 in MAT 869 of 2018); Hira Textile Mills Ltd. through Director v. Executive District Officer (Revenue), Kasur and 4 others 2009 CLD 839; Salfi Textile Mills Limited and another v. City District Government of Karachi through D.C.O. and another 2013 CLD 2120; Administrator, Thal Development through EACO Bhakkar and others v. Ali Muhammad 2012 SCMR 730; Ghulam Sarwar v. National Bank of Pakistan and others 2007 CLD 530; Collector of Customs, Lahore and others v. Universal Gateway Trading Corporation and another 2005 SCMR 37; Dr. Abdul Nabi, Professor, Department of Chemistry, University of Balochistan, Sariab Road, Quetta v. Executive Officer, Cantonment Board, Quetta 2023 SCMR 1267 and Haji Noorwar Jan v. Senior Member, Board of Revenue, N.W.F.P. Peshawar and 4 others PLD 1991 SC 531 ref. Dr. Muhammad Farogh Naseem, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Haq Nawaz Chattha, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner. Ms. Samia Khalid Additional Advocate General, Salman Asif Warraich, Assistant Advocate General with Ch. Rab Nawaz, Assistant Commissioner and Ijaz Ahmad, Tehsildar / Sub-Registrar Kot Momin for Respondents. Dates of hearing: 21st September, 19th and 24th October, 2023.

Summary: Punjab Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)--- ----S. 42--- Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) (since repealed), Ss.39 & 40(1)---Companies Act (XIX of 2017), S. 13 (3)---Record of Rights---Change of name of 'person'---Effect---Petitioner company was aggrieved of order passed by revenue authorities refusing to incorporate change of its name and had treated the same as sale in favour of petitioner---Validity---Provision of S. 42 of Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967 reflects that the same is applicable on acquiring of any right as land owner or a tenant---Words "a person" in S. 42 of Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967 further clarifies that the Legislature has envisaged acquisition of any right or interest as land-owner or a tenant from one person to another---Dispute had arisen when request was made to revenue authorities to incorporate the change in name of the company from "National Sugar Industries Limited" to "Popular Sugar Mills Limited", which change had already been permitted by Registrar of the Companies, under Ss. 39 and 40 of Companies Ordinance, 1984---Mere change of name did not change legal status of petitioner company or its distinct personality and such change entailed no difference to rights or obligations---High Court set aside order passed by revenue authorities as application or request to incorporate change of name was not a sale---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. Asghar Ali v. P.K. Shahani and 2 others 1992 CLC 2282; Habib Safe Deposit Vault (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Province of Sindh through Secretary, Ministry of Revenue and 2 others 2015 PTD 1863; Bhoruka Engineering Inds. Ltd. v. The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax I.T.A. No. 120 of 2011; Reckitt Benckiser (India) Private Limited v. State of H.P. and others C.W.P. No. 1293 of 2019; Inox Air Products Pvt. Ltd. v. State of H.P. and others C.W.P. No. 3166 of 2016; Bacha F. Guzdar v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay Civil Appeal No. 104 of 1953; Cyrus Cowasjee and 2 others v. Karachi Metropolitan Corporation through Administrator, Karachi PLD 2022 Sindh 106; Aron Salomon (Pauper) v. A. Salomon and Company Limited 1897 AC 22, HL; Lee v. Lee's Air Farming Ltd. 1960 3 All E.R = 1961 AC 12, PC; State of West Bengal and others V. Gopi Vallabh Solutions Private Limited and others CAN 6652 of 2018 in MAT 869 of 2018; Hira Textile Mills Ltd. through Director v. Executive District Officer (Revenue), Kasur and 4 others 2009 CLD 839; Salfi Textile Mills Limited and another v. City District Government of Karachi through D.C.O. and another 2013 CLD 2120; Administrator, Thal Development through EACO Bhakkar and others v. Ali Muhammad 2012 SCMR 730; Ghulam Sarwar v. National Bank of Pakistan and others 2007 CLD 530; Collector of Customs, Lahore and others v. Universal Gateway Trading Corporation and another 2005 SCMR 37; Dr. Abdul Nabi, Professor, Department of Chemistry, University of Balochistan, Sariab Road, Quetta v. Executive Officer, Cantonment Board, Quetta 2023 SCMR 1267 and Haji Noorwar Jan v. Senior Member, Board of Revenue, N.W.F.P. Peshawar and 4 others PLD 1991 SC 531 ref. Dr. Muhammad Farogh Naseem, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Haq Nawaz Chattha, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner. Ms. Samia Khalid, Additional Advocate General and Salman Asif Warraich, Assistant Advocate General with Ch. Rab Nawaz, Assistant Commissioner and Ijaz Ahmad, Tehsildar/Sub-Registrar Kot Momin for Respondents. Dates of hearing: 21st September, 19th and 24th October, 2023.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S. 12(2)---Fraud and misrepresentation---Applicant claiming no knowledge of decree being assailed---An application under S. 12(2), C.P.C., 1908, filed before the Appellate/District Court by a respondent (in decided appeal) was dismissed, against which dismissal revision was filed---Stance of the petitioner (applicant under S. 12(2) C.P.C.) was that he had no knowledge about the pendency of appeal as no notice/summon was served to him and neither he appeared before the Appellate/District Court nor appointed any counsel, hence, order and decree (passed in appeal) was result of fraud and mis-representation---Validity---Record contradicted said stance of the petitioner as his name was mentioned as respondent No.3 and his address was the same in (said decided)appeal as he had mentioned in his application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. and also in the present civil revision---Appellate/District Court issued notice to petitioner/applicant (being respondent) by adopting due process and even after publication of advertisement in newspaper but he did not appear before the Appellate / District Court and was ultimately proceeded against ex-parte and thereafter( on the basis of statements of the contesting parties), the appeal was accepted by modifying the judgment and decree of the Trial Court---All the parties to the suit and appeal were closely related to each other and close relatives of petitioner--- Hence, it could not be believed that petitioner was not aware of the proceedings in suit and appeal---Thus, the District Judge had rightly dismissed the application of the petitioner after properly discussing in detail the un-rebuttable facts of the case---No infirmity, legal or factual, had been pointed out in the impugned order---Revision was dismissed in limine, in circumstances. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S. 12(2)---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched., Art. 181---Application under S. 12(2) C.P.C., 1908, filing of---Limitation---An application under S. 12(2) C.P.C., 1908 filed before the District Court by a respondent (in decided appeal) was dismissed, against which dismissal revision was filed---Stance of the petitioner (applicant under S. 12(2) C.P.C.) was that he had no knowledge about the pendency of appeal as no notice/summon was served to him and neither he appeared before the Appellate/District Court nor appointed any counsel, hence, order and decree (passed in appeal) was result of fraud and mis-representation---Validity---Pertinently, against the judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court, one party (defendant) filed constitutional petition before the High Court wherein the petitioner was also impleaded as one of the respondents; notice was issued by the High Court which was personally served through process server to the petitioner after five months of passing of decree by District Court (notice-serving date) but the petitioner never appeared before the High/Court; said constitutional petition was later dismissed---Application under S. 12(2), C.P.C., was filed after five years of said notice-serving date to the petitioner which was dismissed being barred by limitation because period of limitation to file an application under S. 12(2), C.P .C. was three years from the date of knowledge of previous litigation, and the crucial starting point for the period of limitation would be when the right to apply accrued to the aggrieved applicant, which in case of an application under S. 12(2), of the C.P.C., would be the date when the impugned decision based on fraud and concealment was passed---In case the aggrieved person had, by means of fraud, been kept away from the knowledge of decision of the Court, he may then seek the extension of the commencing point of the period of limitation of three years from the date of decision under Art. 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908---Thus, the District Judge had rightly dismissed the application of the petitioner after properly discussing in detail the un-rebuttable facts of the case---No infirmity, legal or factual, had been pointed out in the impugned order---Revision was dismissed in limine, in circumstances. Bashir Ahmed through Legal Representative and others v. Muhammad Hussain and others PLD 2019 SC 504; Faizum alias Toor v. Nander Khan and others 2006 SCMR 1931 and Fida Hussain v. Ghulam Sarwar 2002 SCMR 1554 ref. (c) Limitation--- ----Principles---Law of limitation is considered to be preventive in nature which serves as a major deterrent against the factors and elements which can affect peace, tranquility and due order of State and society and bar of limitation in litigation also brings forth valuable rights in favour of other party---Law of limitation requires that a person must approach a court of law and take legal remedies with due care, diligence and within the time provided by the law. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S. 12(2)---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched., Art. 181---Application under S. 12(2) C.P.C., 1908, filing of---Limitation---Scope ---An application under S. 12(2) C.P.C., 1908 filed before the Appellate/District Court by a respondent (in decided appeal) was dismissed, against which dismissal revision was filed---Contention of the applicant/petitioner was that limitation was a mere technicality---Validity---Question of limitation cannot be termed to be a mere technicality and cannot be ignored while deciding cases---Thus, the District Judge had rightly dismissed the application of the petitioner after properly discussing in detail the un-rebuttable facts of the case---No infirmity, legal or factual, had been pointed out in the impugned order---Revision was dismissed in limine, in circumstances. Mst. Musarat Parveen v. Muhammad Yousaf and others 2023 SCMR 1665; Messrs Pak Suzuki Motors Company Limited through Manager v. Faisal Jameel Butt and another PLD 2023 SC 482; Muhammad Anwar (decd) through L.Rs. and others v. Essa and others PLD 2022 SC 716; Abdul Sattar v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2013 SCMR 911 and Muhammad Islam v. Inspector General of Police, Islamabad and others 2011 SCMR 8 ref. (e) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ----Art. 129(e)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 150---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 12(2)---Limitation Act ( IX of 1908), First Sched., Art. 181---Application under S. 12(2) C.P.C., 1908, filing of---Fraud and mis-representation---Judicial proceedings, authenticity of---An application under S. 12(2) C.P.C., 1908, filed before the District Court by a respondent (in decided appeal) was dismissed, against which dismissal revision was filed---Plea of the petitioner (applicant under S. 12(2) C.P.C.) was that he had no knowledge about the pendency of appeal as no notice/summon was served to him and neither he appeared before the Appellate/District Court nor appointed any counsel, hence, order and decree (passed in appeal) was result of fraud and mis-representation---Validity---Applicant/petitioner had alleged fraud and representation against the respondents without any solid proof---Mere allegation, not supported by any material, would not invariably warrant inquiry or investigation---Said facts negated the claim/ground as written in application for setting aside the impugned judgment---Therefore, any plea being raised by the petitioner/applicant at present/later stage had no force---Petitioner/applicant failed to satisfy the judicial conscious of the Court as presumption of truth was attached to the record of the Court under Art. 129(e) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 and Art. 150 of the Constitution---Authenticity of the judicial record cannot be doubted without any solid proof and only on the oral arguments of the counsel/applicant/party---Petitioner/applicant had not been able to point out any plausible ground due to which he was seeking to set aside the impugned order, hence, he was not entitled to any relief---Once the dispute is settled, the same cannot be allowed to be set at naught through a malafide act of the aggrieved party---Thus, the District Judge had rightly dismissed the application of the petitioner after properly discussing in detail the un-rebuttable facts of the case---No infirmity, legal or factual, had been pointed out in the impugned order---Revision was dismissed in limine, in circumstances. Sh. Naveed Shahryar for Petitioner.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan – Arts. 130(6), 199 & 240 – Executive Authority, Cabinet Responsibility, and Judicial Restraint in Policy Matters - Judicial interference with executive discretion—Scope—Held, High Court acted without jurisdiction in directing the provincial government to regularize 236 contractual employees and create provisioning from the supplementary grant—Court failed to appreciate that such regularization required prior approval of both the provincial cabinet and the finance department—Under Art.130(6), budgetary and policy decisions are the collective responsibility of the cabinet and cannot be exercised unilaterally or on the basis of recommendations by sub-committees—Regularization constitutes a policy matter lying exclusively within executive domain; judicial orders usurping this role violate the trichotomy of powers. (b) Punjab Government Rules of Business, 2011 – Rr. 15, 19 & 25 – Cabinet Approval and Financial Sanction as Prerequisites for Regularization - Lack of cabinet and finance department approval—Effect—Held, recommendations of the cabinet sub-committee regarding regularization were provisional and lacked legal effect absent formal ratification by the cabinet—Finance department’s non-concurrence further rendered the proposed creation of posts and budget allocation void—Rules 15 and 19 mandate consultation with finance department for any change affecting provincial finances—Rule 25 requires full cabinet ratification of sub-committee decisions—Non-compliance with these rules invalidates any purported approval for regularization. (c) Employment Law – Regularization of Contractual Employees – No Vested Right Without Statutory Framework - Regularization as a matter of right—Scope—Held, no vested right to regularization arises in absence of statutory support—Employees hired on contract basis cannot claim regularization merely on the basis of long service or administrative recommendations—Punjab Regularization of Service Act, 2018 and its amendment of 2019 found inapplicable—Posts in question not sanctioned and had no service rules governing them—Judicial precedents including Tanveer Ahmad, Jabran Ali Khan and Muhammad Shafiq reaffirmed that regularization requires sanctioned posts, fulfillment of codal formalities, and approval of competent authority—Courts cannot compel creation of posts or allocation of funds absent legal foundation. (d) Suo Motu Case re Zakat Department Employees – Scope and Relevance - Zakat paid staff—Regularization of services—Held, this Court in earlier suo motu proceedings observed that the peculiar nature of service in the Zakat and Ushr Department does not merit blanket regularization—Left the matter to the discretion of provincial governments—High Court failed to consider that the employees in question worked part-time and were not on sanctioned posts—No legal or constitutional right to regularization established on facts. (e) Judicial Review – Limits of Constitutional Jurisdiction under Art. 199 - Court directing executive to create posts and finance them—Legality—Held, High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by effectively acting as appointing authority—Such directions amount to encroachment upon policy-making function reserved for the executive—Judicial power does not extend to mandating fiscal decisions or institutional restructuring—Courts may only review executive action for legality, arbitrariness, or violation of fundamental rights—not substitute administrative judgment with judicial command. Disposition: Civil Petition converted into appeal and allowed. Impugned order of Lahore High Court set aside for being beyond jurisdiction and contrary to settled principles regarding regularization.

Summary: Summary pending