Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 31.03.2002 passed by the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad in Appeal No. 1250(P)CS of 2018). (a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunals Act (I of 1974)--- ----S.4---Promotion---Vacant post---Current charge---Administrative neglects---Civil servant was aggrieved of being assigned the post on current charge basis instead of being promoted n the said post being a vacant post---Validity---When the post in question fell vacant, the civil servant was the senior-most eligible officer at that time, who was entitled to be considered for promotion with effect from that date---Delay caused by authorities in convening DPC or in processing petitioner's case due to procedural irregularities such as issues with the author of his PERs could not be used to defeat his rightful claim---Competent authority was under a duty to act with a fine sense of judgment, which it had failed to do---The moment the post became vacant and civil servant met required qualifications, legitimate expectation arose in his favour that he would be considered for promotion in a fair and timely manner---Failure to fulfil such expectation, without lawful justification, amounted to arbitrariness and procedural unfairness---Such delay in promotion of civil servant stemmed not from personal shortcoming but from systemic inefficiencies and administrative neglect---Civil servant must not bear the consequences of internal procedural lapses---Supreme Court directed the authorities to promote the civil servant to post in question with effect from the date on which vacancy in his quota first became available---Supreme Court also directed the authorities that all consequential benefits, including seniority, arrears of pay and service entitlements would follow from backdated promotion---Supreme Court set aside judgment passed by Service Tribunal---Appeal was allowed. Secretary, Government of Punjab v. Khalid Hussain Hamdani 2013 SCMR 817; Brean v. Amalgamated Engineering Union (1971) 2 QB 175; Messrs Gadoon Textil Mills v. WAPDA 1997 SCMR 641; Province of Sindh v. Ghulam Shabbir 2023 SCMR 686; Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa v. Fazli Ghufran 2022 SCMR 1765; Dr. Yasmeen Zafar v. Dr. Shehla Sami 2019 SCMR 993; Khalid Mehmood v. Chief Secretary, Punjab 2013 SCMR 544; WAPDA v. Haji Abdul Aziz 2012 SCMR 965; Muhammad Siddique v. Director, Special Education 1998 SCMR 88; Narender Chadha v. Union of India AIR 1986 SC 638; A. Janardhana v. Union of India AIR 1983 SC 769; B.S Yadav v. State of Haryana AIR 1981 SC 561; Dr. Muhammad Amjad v. Dr. Israr Ahmed 2010 SCMR 1466; WAPDA v. Muhammad Nawaz Khan 1998 SCMR 640; S. Abu Saeed v. Government of N.W.F.P. 1990 SCMR 1623; Government of N.W.F.P. v. Buner Khan 1985 SCMR 1158; Federation of Pakistan v. Jahanzeb 2023 PLC (C.S.) 336; NADRA v. Jawad Khan 2023 SCMR 1381 and Bashir Ahmed Badini v. Hon'ble Chairman and Member of Administration Committee 2022 SCMR 448 rel. (b) Civil service--- ----Vacant post, filling of---Principle---Every sanctioned post within a government department or public institution exists to serve a defined functional need and must be filled promptly upon falling vacant---So long as the post continues to exist and has not been formally abolished or frozen pursuant to a lawful policy decision, such as due to budgetary constraints or other demonstrable administrative exigencies, it must be filled within a reasonable time---Unjustified delays in such regard not only disrupt efficient functioning of the institution but also weaken its service delivery capacity---Vacancies, when left unattended, often lead to informal arrangements and ad hoc delegations of authority that foster opacity, enable nepotism and corrode principles of merit and transparency. Ms. Shireen Imran, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner. Raja Muhammad Shafqat Abbasi, DAG, Riaz Hussain Azam, Advocate-on-Record along with Javed Iqbal, Additional Secretary, Finance and Fiaz Afridi, DAG, CGA Office and Abdullah A.A.O. for Respondents. Assisted by: Umer A. Ranjha, Judicial Law Clerk, Supreme Court of Pakistan. Date of hearing: 19th May, 2025.

Summary: (a) Civil service--- ----Considerable length of service---Appointment later found to have been procured through misrepresentation---Dismissal from service---Retrospective recovery of salary---Scope---Petitioner, after rendering services for fifteen years, was dismissed on account of defect in his initial appointment, and salaries received by him were also held recoverable---Validity---Though a public employment secured through misrepresentation or tampered credentials is void ab initio and confers no vested right upon the appointee, nonetheless, the issue of retrospective salary recovery for services rendered over a significant period engages broader principles of fairness, equity, and administrative accountability---In the present case, after fifteen years of continuous and uninterrupted service of petitioner, the Department initiated an inquiry into educational credentials of the petitioner---There is no material on record to show that the petitioner deliberately concealed or suppressed his academic record during this time or resisted verification---On the contrary, service of the petitioner was accepted, utilized, and remunerated without demur or objection---Petitioner had indeed discharged all assigned responsibilities without lapse---In such circumstances, the employer having accepted and benefited from fifteen years of unblemished service cannot now seek restitution of benefits already consumed---Principles of equity, good conscience, and public interest dictate that in the absence of fraud or dishonest conduct by the employee, retrospective recovery of wages is unjust---The recovery of salary for services lawfully and diligently performed is impermissible, notwithstanding defects in the initial appointment---Thus, the order for recovery in the present case is arbitrary, excessive, and in clear violation of equitable principles---Supreme Court set-aside the impugned judgment to the extent of recovery of salary from the petitioner, however, the petitioner's dismissal from service, on account of ineligibility at the time of appointment, would remain intact---Petition was converted into an appeal and was partially allowed accordingly. Shams ur Rehman v. Military Accountant General, Rawalpindi 2020 SCMR 188 and Engineer in Chief v. Jalaluddin PLD 1992 SC 207 ref. (b) Contract Act (IX of 1872)--- ----S. 70---Employment---Considerable length of service---Appointment later found to have been procured through misrepresentation---Dismissal from service---Retrospective recovery of salary---Scope---Doctrine of quantum meruit---Petitioner, after rendering services for fifteen years, was dismissed on account of defect in his initial appointment, and salaries received by him were also held recoverable---Validity---In the present case, the doctrine of quantum meruit finds clear and compelling application---This equitable principle permits reasonable compensation for services rendered where one party has knowingly accepted and benefited from the work of another, even in the absence of a valid or enforceable contract---For over fifteen years, the petitioner continuously performed duties that fulfilled institutional needs and was compensated accordingly---To retrospectively invalidate such remuneration despite the employer's full knowledge and acceptance of the services rendered would be contrary to the fundamental tenet that no person should unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of another---In the present case, it was the employer/ Department that stood to benefit unjustly---Said principle finds statutory recognition under Section 70 of the Contract Act, 1872---Therefore, even where an employment / appointment is found to be irregular, if the employee has continuously and faithfully discharged official functions and the employer has enjoyed the resulting benefit over a significant period, the doctrine of quantum meruit furnishes both a moral and legal basis to preclude retrospective recovery of salary---Labors that is not donated but knowingly accepted must be compensated regardless of technical infirmities in the appointment process---The recovery of salary for services lawfully and diligently performed is impermissible, notwithstanding defects in the initial appointment---Thus, the order for recovery in the present case was arbitrary, excessive, and in clear violation of equitable principles---Supreme Court set-aside the impugned judgment to the extent of recovery of salary from the petitioner, however, the petitioner's dismissal from service, on account of ineligibility at the time of appointment, would remain intact---Petition was converted into an appeal and was partially allowed accordingly. Craven-Ellis v. Cannons Ltd (1936) 2 KB 403 and Benedetti v. Sawiris [2013] UKSC 50 ref. (c) Employment--- ----Doctrine of quantum meruit---Scope---The doctrine of quantum meruit, literally meaning "as much as he has earned" or "as much as he deserves" and is a foundational principle of equity and restitution in both common law and civil law jurisdictions---Said principle enables a party to claim reasonable compensation for services rendered or work performed, even where a contract is void, unenforceable, or otherwise defective---The doctrine rests not merely on contractual notions, but on the broader equitable premise that a person who has received and retained a benefit should not be allowed to do so without paying reasonable compensation, particularly where the services were not intended to be gratuitous; which creates an implied obligation in law, akin to a quasi-contract, compelling restitution where unjust enrichment would otherwise result. State of West Bengal v. Messrs B.K. Mondal and Sons AIR 1962 SC 779 ref. (d) Civil service--- -----Doctrine of administrative acquiescence---Scope---Considerable length of service---Appointment later found to have been procured through misrepresentation---Dismissal from service---Retrospective recovery of salary---Scope---Petitioner, after rendering services for fifteen years, was dismissed on account of defect in his initial appointment, and salaries received by him were also held recoverable---Validity---The doctrine of administrative acquiescence rooted in principles of equity and fairness, which (doctrine) is based on the idea that if a person, observing another about to perform an act that might infringe upon their rights, remains silent in circumstances where an objection might have prevented the act, they may later be estopped from objecting---Transposed to public law, it implies that prolonged inaction or silence by a public authority, particularly where it had the duty and opportunity to act may amount to institutional acquiescence---In such cases, the authority's delay in enforcing its rights or correcting an irregularity can defeat retrospective punitive action, especially where the individual affected has acted in good faith and to the authority's benefit throughout---The prolonged inaction by the department, its failure to undertake any meaningful verification or scrutiny of the petitioner's appointment for fifteen years amounted to institutional negligence---Significantly, it was only after the passage of fifteen years that the department initiated an inquiry into the petitioner's appointment---Said belated action, without any intervening misconduct by the petitioner, underscored that the lapse lies entirely with the department---Administrative silence over such an extended period, particularly where it results in the receipt and acceptance of services, may amount to acquiescence and estop the department from seeking retrospective punitive measures---Petitioner could not be faulted for the department's own dereliction of its gatekeeping responsibilities---While the eventual termination of service due to irregular appointment may be legally sustainable, the direction for recovery of fifteen years' salary without any allegation or proof of fraud or mala fide intent on the part of the petitioner was manifestly disproportionate, inequitable, and legally untenable---The recovery of salary for services lawfully and diligently performed was impermissible, notwithstanding defects in the initial appointment---Thus, the order for recovery in the present case was arbitrary, excessive, and in clear violation of equitable principles---Supreme Court set-aside the impugned judgment to the extent of recovery of salary from the petitioner, however, the petitioner's dismissal from service, on account of ineligibility at the time of appointment, would remain intact---Petition was converted into an appeal and was partially allowed accordingly. Ramsden v. Dyson (1866) LR 1 HL 129; Sardar Ali Khan v. State Bank of Pakistan 2022 SCMR 1454 and Market Committee, Multan v. Additional Commissioner (Consolidation) Multan 2023 SCMR 1683 ref. Misbah Gulnar Sharif, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner. Imran Masood, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents. (Through V.L. Lahore Registry) Mian Ghulam Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court. Assisted by: Umer A. Ranjha, Judicial Law Clerk, Supreme Court of Pakistan Date of hearing: 19th May, 2025.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan—Arts. 4 & 25—Civil Servants Act, 1973—Promotion—Entitlement to backdated promotion—Principles of fairness, non-discrimination, and legitimate expectation—Performance Evaluation Reports (PERs)—Effect of non-adverse remarks— Where a civil servant is eligible, senior-most, and performing duties of a higher post on current charge basis, denial of promotion solely on the basis of non-adverse or suggestive comments in Performance Evaluation Reports (PERs) constitutes an arbitrary exercise of discretion. In the present case, the petitioner was eligible for promotion to BS-17 as Private Secretary from 06.08.2015 but was promoted belatedly in 2018. The remarks in his PERs (e.g., “needs to improve discipline and manners”) were held to be non-adverse and could not legally justify withholding promotion. Further, the PERs were not authored by the competent authority, raising procedural concerns. The delay in promotion due to internal mismanagement violated the petitioner’s legitimate expectation and right to fair treatment under Articles 4 and 25 of the Constitution. Cited Cases: Secretary, Govt. of Punjab v. Khalid Hussain Hamdani (2013 SCMR 817) Messrs Gadoon Textile Mills v. WAPDA (1997 SCMR 641) Federation of Pakistan v. Jahanzeb (2023 PLC (C.S.) 336) Province of Sindh v. Ghulam Shabbir (2023 SCMR 686) Govt. of KPK v. Fazli Ghufran (2022 SCMR 1765) Khalid Mehmood v. Chief Secretary Punjab (2013 SCMR 544) (b) Civil service—Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC)—Discretionary powers—Requirement to act reasonably and with objectivity—Improper deferral of promotion—Effect— The DPC’s repeated deferral of the petitioner’s promotion without affording an opportunity of hearing or rectification of alleged deficiencies violated principles of natural justice. The Supreme Court reiterated that discretion in promotion matters must be exercised in a structured, objective, and lawful manner—unguided discretion opens the door to favouritism, procedural unfairness, and administrative injustice. Mere procedural irregularities, such as the non-signing of PERs by the designated authority, cannot be used to delay or deny promotion. (c) Service law—Promotion with retrospective effect—Entitlement from date of vacancy—Administrative delay—Legitimate expectation— When a post becomes vacant and an eligible civil servant is available, he or she has a legitimate expectation to be considered fairly and promptly. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that promotions must be considered from the date a vacancy in the officer’s quota arises, and internal inefficiencies or lapses cannot defeat this right. Delay in convening DPC or flawed administrative processing cannot justify loss of seniority or arrears. Cited Cases: Dr. Muhammad Amjad v. Dr. Israr Ahmed (2010 SCMR 1466) WAPDA v. Muhammad Nawaz Khan (1998 SCMR 640) Dr. Yasmeen Zafar v. Dr. Shehla Sami (2019 SCMR 993) Narender Chadha v. Union of India (AIR 1986 SC 638) (d) Public administration—Sanctioned posts—Duty to fill vacancies promptly—Effect of delay— Every sanctioned post exists to serve a functional purpose and must be filled within a reasonable time. Unfilled vacancies cause inefficiency, encourage informal delegation of authority, and erode transparency. The Supreme Court stressed that public institutions are public trusts, and government officers are trustees of public duty, who must not delay filling vacancies absent cogent and lawful justification. Disposition: Appeal allowed. Impugned judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal set aside. Petitioner directed to be promoted to BS-17 with effect from 06.08.2015 (date of vacancy). All consequential benefits including seniority, arrears of pay, and revised pay fixation to follow. Compliance report to be submitted within 30 days.

Summary: (a) Contract Act, 1872 ----S. 70—Quantum meruit—Void appointment—Recovery of salary—Petitioner served for 15 years before appointment was found void for failure to meet minimum educational criteria—No allegation of fraud or concealment—Services rendered were accepted and remunerated without objection—Supreme Court held that doctrine of quantum meruit applied—Labor rendered in good faith and accepted by employer over extended period entitled to reasonable compensation—Retrospective recovery of salary impermissible in absence of fraudulent intent. References: Craven-Ellis v. Cannons Ltd (1936) 2 KB 403; Benedetti v. Sawiris [2013] UKSC 50; State of West Bengal v. M/s B.K. Mondal and Sons AIR 1962 SC 779. (b) Administrative Law ----Doctrine of acquiescence—Delayed departmental inquiry—Appointment made in 2003, scrutinized only after 15 years—No timely verification or oversight by department—Supreme Court held that institutional silence and prolonged acceptance of service created bar to retrospective recovery—Department estopped from invoking punitive financial measures for its own negligence—Termination for ineligibility upheld, but financial restitution disallowed. References: Ramsden v. Dyson (1866) LR 1 HL 129; Sardar Ali Khan v. State Bank of Pakistan 2022 SCMR 1454; Market Committee, Multan v. Additional Commissioner (Consolidation), Multan 2023 SCMR 1683. (c) Constitutional Law ----Equity and fairness in public service—Public authority benefiting from 15 years of continuous, satisfactory service cannot unjustly enrich itself by recovering past salary—Employee not shown to have committed fraud or willful misconduct—Supreme Court held that retrospective recovery was disproportionate, inequitable, and legally untenable—Order for recovery set aside, though dismissal for ineligibility remained intact. (d) Service Law ----Irregular appointment—Termination justified—Recovery not justified—Where appointment is found to be void due to non-fulfillment of eligibility criteria, termination of service is legally sustainable—However, Supreme Court clarified that in absence of deceit or malpractice, recovery of salary already paid for duties actually performed violates settled principles of law and equity. References: Shams ur Rehman v. Military Accountant General, Rawalpindi 2020 SCMR 188; Engineer-in-Chief v. Jalaluddin PLD 1992 SC 207. Disposition: Petition converted into appeal and partially allowed—Impugned judgment set aside to the extent of salary recovery—Dismissal from service maintained.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan – Art. 212(3); Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 (PEEDA) – Ss. 13(1) to 13(6) – Disciplinary Proceedings – Procedural Fairness and Natural Justice Petitioner, a civil servant, was subjected to disciplinary action under PEEDA, 2006 on charges of fraud and inefficiency in wheat procurement—Inquiry Officer exonerated petitioner of all major charges but recommended minor penalty for negligence—Competent Authority, without first expressing disagreement under S.13(2), issued a defective notice under S.13(4), failed to record reasons for dissent, and imposed a major penalty under S.13(5)—Held, PEEDA mandates a structured process for review of inquiry reports: any disagreement by Competent Authority must be communicated clearly and in writing at show-cause stage—Failure to do so undermines due process—Final order passed with post hoc justification cannot cure initial procedural flaws. (b) PEEDA Act, 2006 – S. 13 – Role of Competent Authority – Limits of Discretion and Judicial Scrutiny Held, Competent Authority under PEEDA is not exercising appellate jurisdiction over Inquiry Officer but acts within the same continuum of proceedings—Nonetheless, it must strictly adhere to procedural safeguards—Authority must first assess legality of inquiry (S.13(1)), determine whether charges are proved (S.13(2)), and issue a reasoned show-cause notice under S.13(4) if penalties are contemplated—Issuing pre-decided penalty notices or vague summons without adequate time or justification is a violation of fair trial—Final orders based on new reasoning cannot substitute procedural compliance—Disciplinary power must operate within the bounds of law, not authoritarian convenience. (c) Administrative Law – Show-Cause Notice – Defects and Consequences Held, notice issued under S.13(4) must (i) clearly state whether Authority agrees or disagrees with inquiry findings; (ii) explain basis of disagreement; and (iii) specify proposed penalties—Notice that merely states proposed penalty without inviting proper explanation and grants inadequate time violates principles of natural justice—Petitioner was deprived of opportunity to respond effectively, leading to substantial prejudice—Such defects invalidate entire proceedings. (d) Disciplinary Jurisprudence – Principles of Reasoned Decision-Making Held, requirement to record reasons is not merely a formality—Reasons ensure transparency, allow judicial review, reflect due consideration of accused’s case, and prevent arbitrariness—Where disagreement with Inquiry Officer is proposed, grounds must be disclosed before imposing penalty—Post-decisional justification in final order cannot retrospectively cure lack of reasons in show-cause stage—Judicial discipline demands decisions rooted in legality, not ex post rationalizations. (e) Constitutional Law – Right to Fair Trial – Art. 10A (read with Art. 4) – Civil Servants and Procedural Safeguards Court reaffirmed that disciplinary proceedings must conform to Art. 10A guaranteeing fair trial—Any exercise of disciplinary discretion must be bounded by reason, law, and procedural propriety—Arbitrary or procedurally defective actions violate civil servant’s constitutional rights—Courts must intervene to annul such proceedings where procedural safeguards are subverted. Disposition: Petition converted to appeal and allowed—Order of punishment dated 12 July 2013, Appellate Authority’s order dated 10 December 2013, and Punjab Service Tribunal’s judgment dated 15 February 2016 were set aside—Matter remanded to Competent Authority to recommence proceedings from the stage of receipt of inquiry report and proceed strictly in accordance with law. Cited Statutory Provisions: • Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 – Articles 4, 10A, 212(3) • Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 – Sections 10, 13(1) to 13(6) • Government of the Punjab Notification No. SORI (S&GAD) I-30/2003(P-II) dated 17.08.2015 (Guidebook for Inquiries)

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Employment---Transfer of departmental codes and human resource---Non-transfer of a government servant amidst inter-departmental restructuring, challenge to---Claim for implementation of administrative summary---Whether such claim was amenable to constitutional jurisdiction---The petitioner was serving as Assistant Director at the Rehabilitation Center for Physically Handicapped Children (RCPHC) since 05.08.2016---After the 18th Constitutional amendment, the Sindh Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2018 was enacted, under which rehabilitation centers and their related assets, codes, and human resources were to be transferred from the social welfare department to the newly established ‘department for empowerment of persons with disabilities’ (DEPD)---In 2020, a summary proposing transfer of various codes, including the petitioner’s cost center SY450, to DEPD was approved---A transfer order listed two individuals from the petitioner’s center as transferred, while the petitioner’s name did not appear---The petitioner claimed administrative correspondence continued between officials regarding the implementation of the approved summary, and thereafter he filed the present constitutional petition seeking implementation of the summary and protection of his service position---Held: No writ was maintainable for the enforcement of administrative proposals, internal summaries, or inter-departmental communications that had not culminated in a final, notified decision---The Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under was limited to enforcement of vested legal rights and could not be invoked to compel the implementation of incomplete or discretionary administrative process---Mere movement or internal approval of a summary did not by itself confer any justiciable right capable of enforcement through constitutional remedies---Moreover, matters relating to the posting and transfer of government servants from one department to another fell within the exclusive domain of the executive and are governed by administrative policy and discretion---Unless such action was shown to be discriminatory, mala fide, or in violation of statutory rules, the same could not be made subject to judicial review---In the present case, the petitioner had not demonstrated any legal entitlement to be transferred, nor had he pointed to any rule or notification creating a vested right in his favour---The Court could not substitute its judgment for that of the competent authority in such matters, particularly when no final order or notification had been issued---Constitutional petition, being devoid of any enforceable legal right and involving disputed questions was not amenable to writ jurisdiction and same was not maintainable under Art. 199 of the Constitution---Accordingly, the petition stood dismissed. Ali Gul Abbasi for Petitioner. Zulfiqar Ali Naich, A.A.G. for Respondents. Date of hearing: 15th May, 2025 (b) To restrain the respondents not to take any adverse action/order against the petitioner with regard to his service, till final decision of the instant petition.

Summary: The question before this Court is whether the date of regularization of the petitioners should be considered as 10.11.2010?the date of the notification. Held: While placing reliance on the dicta laid down in case reported as Province of Punjab through Secretary Livestock and Dairy Development Department, Government of the Punjab, Lahore and others v. Dr. Javed Iqbal and others (2021 SCMR 767), both regular and contractual employees are governed by two separate and distinct Legal Frameworks?Contractual appointments are governed by specific terms and conditions distinct from those applicable to the regular civil servants. Therefore, allowing the contract employees to claim seniority from the date of notification would infringe upon the rights of existing regular civil servants, disrupting established hierarchies and entitlements. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the date of the regularization cannot be the date of the regularization policy envisaged under the notification (i.e., 10.11.2010) as any such step would negate the purpose and significance of the Contract Appointment Policy and will leave no distinction between a contractual and a regular employee as held in the case of Dr. Javed Iqbal supra and direction cannot be issued to the respondents to decide the applications of the petitioners against the settled legal position. 466Jail Appeal 27397/22 Muhammad Adnan Chanda Vs The State Mr. Justice Farooq Haider 15- 05- 2025 2025 LHC 3207 PLJ 2025 Cr.C 554 (DB) (Lahore High Court, Lahore), 2025 YLR 2049 (Lahore)

Summary: (a) Civil service- -Back benefits, concept of-Meaning-Back benefits-, as discussed in present case, were confined to arrears of pay and other emoluments denied due to wrongful dismissal or removal. Bryan A Garner (ed), Black's Law Dictionary (10th edn, Thomson Reuters 2014) 166; Ibid and Aguinaga v. United Food and Commercial Workers Int'l Union 993 F.2d 1463, 1473; Muhammad Sharif v. Inspector General of Police, Punjab 2021 SCMR 962 and Smith v. West 1999 US App Vet Claims LOXIS 475, 6 rel. (b) Civil service- -Reinstatement-Meaning and Scope. Muhammad Sharif v. Inspector General of Police, Punjab 2021 SCMR 962; Chairman State Life v. Siddiq Akbar 2013 SCMR 752; Umer Said v. District Education Officer (Female) 2007 SCMR 296; Inspector General of Police, Punjab v. Tariq Mahmood 2015 SCMR 77; Muhammad Bashir v. Government of the Punjab 1994 SCMR 1801 and Pakistan v. Mrs. A.V. Issacs PLD 1970 SC 415 rel. (c) Civil service- -Period spent by the civil servant due to wrongful removal or dismissal from service-Regularization of intervening period by-leave without pay-or-leave of kind due-Purpose and meaning. National Bank of Pakistan v. Zahoor Ahmed Mengal 2021 SCMR 144; NAB v. Muhammad Shafique 2020 SCMR 425; Federation of Pakistan v. Mamoon Ahmed Malik 2020 SCMR 1154 and Muhammad Sharif v. Inspector General of Police, Punjab 2021 SCMR 962 rel. (d) Punjab Civil Servants Act (VIII of 1974)- -S. 16, second proviso-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 4, 10A, 14 & 25-Fundamental Rules, R. 54-Civil Service Rules (Punjab), R. 7.3- -Reinstatement in service after setting aside order of compulsory retirement, removal or dismissal from service-Back benefits, entitlement to-Scope and principles-Doctrine of Constructive Continuity-and-Vanishing Dismissal-Introduction and applicability in service jurisprudence-This is the first time such a doctrine is being formally articulated in service jurisprudence-Adopting the language and structure of constructive continuity provides coherence, consistency, and clarity to future cases where civil servants are reinstated following wrongful termination-In the absence of a codified rule or settled precedent using this terminology, this formulation will serve as a valuable guidepost for courts, tribunals and administrative authorities and will enhance the transparency and reasoning behind reliefs granted in reinstatement cases-When the foundational order is without lawful authority, superstructure built upon it collapses-Civil servant must be placed in the position they would have occupied had the unlawful action not occurred-Concept of constructive continuity, as articulated here, reinforces this consequence and gives expression to the broader principles of legal restoration and administrative fairness that underpin service jurisprudence-Such doctrine, while coined for the first time, is rooted in the constitutional promise of fairness, restitution and institutional integrity-It ensures that a wrongfully removed public servant is treated, for all legal and financial purposes, as having continued in service, thereby entitling them to the salary, benefits, and emoluments that would have accrued but for the wrongful termination- -Constructive continuity is, therefore, not only an administrative doctrine; it draws strength from constitutional protections-Denying back benefits to a reinstated civil servant who has suffered procedural or substantive injustice infringes upon these constitutional guarantees-It amounts to continued punishment despite legal vindication-Such imaginative reconstruction, grounded in equity and justice, constitutes a legitimate and necessary doctrinal development in service jurisprudence-Constructive continuity functions as a constitutional bridge-It ensures that reinstatement is not an empty gesture but a restorative act, fully aligned with Articles 9, 10A, 14, and 25 of the Constitution-It prevents wrongful state action from leaving lasting scars on an individual’s career and livelihood-To reinstate a civil servant without restoring their status, entitlements and dignity is to offer a remedy that fails to remedy and justice that falls short of being just-Petitioners were held entitled to back benefits subject to the effect of the modified penalties, effective from the date of the original punishments-Denial of back benefits by the Punjab Service Tribunal was held to be unsustainable and judgments were modified accordingly-Civil petitions were converted into appeals and were partially allowed, in circumstances. Marangakis v. Icelands Food Limited [2022] EAT 161; Folkestone Nursing Home v. Patel [2018] EWCA Civ 1843; Roberts v. West Coast Trains Ltd. [2004] IRLR 789; Superintendent of Police v. Ijaz Aslam 2024 SCMR 1831; Vice Chancellor Agriculture University v. Muhammad Shafiq 2024 SCMR 527; Pakistan Peoples Party Parliamentarians v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2022 SC 574; Aatika Hina Mushtaq v. Secretary Special Education, Government of Punjab 2025 SCP 158; Divisional Superintendent v. Umar Daraz 2023 SCMR 761; Province of Punjab v. Kanwal Rashid 2021 SCMR 730; Pir Imran Sajid v. Managing Director 2015 SCMR 1257; Abdul Wahab v. HBL 2013 SCMR 1383; Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation AIR 1986 SC 180; Naveed Asghar v. The State PLD 2021 SC 600; Altaf Ibrahim Qureshi v. Aam Logue Ittehad PLD 2019 SC 745; Mubarik Ali Babar v. Punjab Public Service Commission 2023 SCMR 518; Uzma Naveed Chaudhary v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2022 SC 783; Malik Ubaidullah v. Government of Punjab 2021 PLC (C. S.) 65; Muhammad Yasin v. D.G. Pakistan Post Office 2023 SCMR 394; National Commission on Status of Women v. Government of Punjab PLD 2019 SC 218; Inspector General of Police, Punjab v. Tariq Mahmood 2015 SCMR 77; Sohail Ahmed Usmani v. DG CAA 2014 SCMR 1843; Chairman State Life v. Siddiq Akbar 2013 SCMR 752; Muhammad Hussain v. E.D.O. (Education) 2007 SCMR 855; Umer Said v. District Education Officer (Female) 2007 SCMR 296; General Manager v. Mehmood Ahmed Butt 2002 SCMR 1064; Secretary, Government of Punjab v. Khalid Hussain Hamdani 2013 SCMR 817; Brean v. Amalgamated Engineering Union (1971) 2 QB 175 and Muhammad Sharif v. Inspector General of Police, Punjab 2021 SCMR 962 rel. (e) Civil service- -Reinstatement after passing of substituted/modified/reduced penalties on the ground of disproportionality-Effect and scope stated. Assisted by: Umer A. Ranjha, Judicial Law Clerk, Supreme Court of Pakistan.

Summary: (a) Civil service--- ----Back benefits, concept of---Meaning---“Back benefits”, as discussed in present case, were confined to arrears of pay and other emoluments denied due to wrongful dismissal or removal. Bryan A Garner (ed), Black's Law Dictionary (10th edn, Thomson Reuters 2014) 166; Ibid and Aguinaga v. United Food and Commercial Workers Int'l Union 993 F.2d 1463, 1473; Muhammad Sharif v. Inspector General of Police, Punjab 2021 SCMR 962 and Smith v. West 1999 US App Vet Claims LOXIS 475, 6 rel. (b) Civil service--- ----Reinstatement---Meaning and Scope. Muhammad Sharif v. Inspector General of Police, Punjab 2021 SCMR 962; Chairman State Life v. Siddiq Akbar 2013 SCMR 752; Umer Said v. District Education Officer (Female) 2007 SCMR 296; Inspector General of Police, Punjab v. Tariq Mahmood 2015 SCMR 77; Muhammad Bashir v. Government of the Punjab 1994 SCMR 1801 and Pakistan v. Mrs. A.V. Issacs PLD 1970 SC 415 rel. (c) Civil service--- ----Period spent by the civil servant due to wrongful removal or dismissal from service---Regularization of intervening period by “leave without pay” or “leave of kind due”---Purpose and meaning. National Bank of Pakistan v. Zahoor Ahmed Mengal 2021 SCMR 144; NAB v. Muhammad Shafique 2020 SCMR 425; Federation of Pakistan v. Mamoon Ahmed Malik 2020 SCMR 1154 and Muhammad Sharif v. Inspector General of Police, Punjab 2021 SCMR 962 rel. ( d) Punjab Civil Servants Act (VIII of 1974)--- ----S. 16, second proviso---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 4, 10A, 14 & 25---Fundamental Rules, R. 54---Civil Service Rules (Punjab), R. 7.3-- -Reinstatement in service after setting aside order of compulsory retirement, removal or dismissal from service---Back benefits, entitlement to---Scope and principles---“Doctrine of Constructive Continuity” and “Vanishing Dismissal”---Introduction and applicability in service jurisprudence--- This is the first time such a doctrine is being formally articulated in service jurisprudence---Adopting the language and structure of constructive continuity provides coherence, consistency, and clarity to future cases where civil servants are reinstated following wrongful termination---In the absence of a codified rule or settled precedent using this terminology, this formulation will serve as a valuable guidepost for courts, tribunals and administrative authorities and will enhance the transparency and reasoning behind reliefs granted in reinstatement cases---When the foundational order is without lawful authority, superstructure built upon it collapses---Civil servant must be placed in the position they would have occupied had the unlawful action not occurred---Concept of constructive continuity, as articulated here, reinforces this consequence and gives expression to the broader principles of legal restoration and administrative fairness that underpin service jurisprudence---Such doctrine, while coined for the first time, is rooted in the constitutional promise of fairness, restitution and institutional integrity---It ensures that a wrongfully removed public servant is treated, for all legal and financial purposes, as having continued in service, thereby entitling them to the salary, benefits, and emoluments that would have accrued but for the wrongful termination-- -Constructive continuity is, therefore, not only an administrative doctrine; it draws strength from constitutional protections---Denying back benefits to a reinstated civil servant who has suffered procedural or substantive injustice infringes upon these constitutional guarantees---It amounts to continued punishment despite legal vindication---Such imaginative reconstruction, grounded in equity and justice, constitutes a legitimate and necessary doctrinal development in service jurisprudence---Constructive continuity functions as a constitutional bridge---It ensures that reinstatement is not an empty gesture but a restorative act, fully aligned with Articles 9, 10A, 14, and 25 of the Constitution---It prevents wrongful state action from leaving lasting scars on an individual’s career and livelihood---To reinstate a civil servant without restoring their status, entitlements and dignity is to offer a remedy that fails to remedy and justice that falls short of being just---Petitioners were held entitled to back benefits subject to the effect of the modified penalties, effective from the date of the original punishments---Denial of back benefits by the Punjab Service Tribunal was held to be unsustainable and judgments were modified accordingly---Civil petitions were converted into appeals and were partially allowed, in circumstances. Marangakis v. Icelands Food Limited [2022] EAT 161; Folkestone Nursing Home v. Patel [2018] EWCA Civ 1843; Roberts v. West Coast Trains Ltd. [2004] IRLR 789; Superintendent of Police v. Ijaz Aslam 2024 SCMR 1831; Vice Chancellor Agriculture University v. Muhammad Shafiq 2024 SCMR 527; Pakistan Peoples Party Parliamentarians v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2022 SC 574; Aatika Hina Mushtaq v. Secretary Special Education, Government of Punjab 2025 SCP 158; Divisional Superintendent v. Umar Daraz 2023 SCMR 761; Province of Punjab v. Kanwal Rashid 2021 SCMR 730; Pir Imran Sajid v. Managing Director 2015 SCMR 1257; Abdul Wahab v. HBL 2013 SCMR 1383; Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation AIR 1986 SC 180; Naveed Asghar v. The State PLD 2021 SC 600; Altaf Ibrahim Qureshi v. Aam Logue Ittehad PLD 2019 SC 745; Mubarik Ali Babar v. Punjab Public Service Commission 2023 SCMR 518; Uzma Naveed Chaudhary v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2022 SC 783; Malik Ubaidullah v. Government of Punjab 2021 PLC (C. S.) 65; Muhammad Yasin v. D.G. Pakistan Post Office 2023 SCMR 394; National Commission on Status of Women v. Government of Punjab PLD 2019 SC 218; Inspector General of Police, Punjab v. Tariq Mahmood 2015 SCMR 77; Sohail Ahmed Usmani v. DG CAA 2014 SCMR 1843; Chairman State Life v. Siddiq Akbar 2013 SCMR 752; Muhammad Hussain v. E.D.O. (Education) 2007 SCMR 855; Umer Said v. District Education Officer (Female) 2007 SCMR 296; General Manager v. Mehmood Ahmed Butt 2002 SCMR 1064; Secretary, Government of Punjab v. Khalid Hussain Hamdani 2013 SCMR 817; Brean v. Amalgamated Engineering Union (1971) 2 QB 175 and Muhammad Sharif v. Inspector General of Police, Punjab 2021 SCMR 962 rel. (e) Civil service--- ----Reinstatement after passing of substituted/modified/reduced penalties on the ground of disproportionality---Effect and scope stated. Muhammad Usman Arif, Advocate Supreme Court along with Rana Iqbal, Advocate High Court for Petitioners (in C.P.L.A. No. 3453-L of 2019). Malik Saleem Iqbal Awan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (in C.P.L.A. No. 23-L of 2022). Khalid Masood Ghani, A.A.G., Punjab and Kashif Murtaza, Inspector (Legal) for Respondents. Assisted by: Umer A. Ranjha, Judicial Law Clerk, Supreme Court of Pakistan. Date of hearing: 14th May, 2025.