Summary: (a) Punjab Emergency Service Act (III of 2006)---- ----Ss. 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21 & 27---Punjab Emergency Service---Legal character after Punjab Emergency Service (Amendment) Act, 2021---Independent administrative department of Government---Effect on statutory framework---Emergency Service was originally established as a body corporate with perpetual succession and power to sue and be sued---By virtue of 2021 Amendment, S.4(2) was amended and Emergency Service was described as an independent administrative department of Government---Supreme Court held that 2021 Amendment merely changed legal form of Emergency Service from body corporate to an independent statutory department of Government and did not alter its statutory framework for administration, management or regulation of employees---Emergency Service continued to operate under Act of 2006, 2007 Rules and 2022 Regulations with its own organizational and service structure---Employees remained public servants under S.21 of Act of 2006, which provision was not changed by 2021 Amendment---Change in legal status of institution did not by itself convert its employees into civil servants. (b) Punjab Government Rules of Business, 2011---- ----Rules 2(b), 2(c) & 2(j)---Attached Department, Autonomous Body and Department---Punjab Emergency Service---Independent administrative department---Status under Rules of Business---Supreme Court observed that Rules of Business regulate allocation and transaction of business of Government of Punjab and provide for Attached Departments, Autonomous Bodies, Departments and Special Institutions---There was no concept in Rules of Business of an “independent administrative department of Government” placed under any existing secretariat---After 2021 Amendment, Emergency Service was omitted from First Schedule and Second Schedule of Rules of Business and was no longer shown as an autonomous body under Home Department---Consequently, Emergency Service operated as a statutory department of Government functioning independently outside ordinary departmental structure of governance under Rules of Business---Such structure was best described as a legislatively created department of Government, independent in functioning yet to some extent controlled by Government, and as an instrumentality of Government created by statute to perform specialized public functions. (c) Punjab Emergency Service Act (III of 2006)---- ----Emergency Service---Specialized public function---Operational autonomy and government accountability---Emergency Service performed rescue services across Punjab including ambulance, fire, motorbike, water, flood, height and animal rescue services through emergency helpline 1122, besides disaster preparedness, community safety, building safety, awareness and training programs---Supreme Court held that unique independent statutory department framework emerged from specialized functions of Emergency Service involving public safety, protection of life and property during emergencies and disasters---Such framework allowed operational autonomy and institutional continuity while permitting Government to retain some element of control and accountability over emergency and disaster response, which forms part of Government’s obligation to safeguard life and public safety---Larger constitutional issue whether legislature could create a department of Government, being within domain of executive under Rules of Business, was not before Court and was therefore not decided. (d) Punjab Civil Servants Act (VIII of 1974)---- ----S. 2(b)---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 240 & 260---Civil servant and public servant---Distinction---Supreme Court held that a civil servant is a person who is member of civil service of Province or holds a civil post in connection with affairs of Province and whose appointment and terms and conditions are governed by civil service legal framework---Public servant, on the other hand, is a broader concept, including persons performing public duties or exercising public authority under law, particularly within meaning of S.21, P.P.C. for purposes of criminal liability and public accountability---All civil servants may be members of service of Pakistan, but all persons performing functions in connection with affairs of Federation or Province are not necessarily civil servants---Statutory declaration that employees are public servants recognizes public character of their functions and ensures accountability under law, but does not confer civil servant status upon them. Cited Cases: • Sindh Irrigation and Drainage Authority v. Government of Sindh 2022 SCMR 595 • Salahuddin v. Frontier Sugar Mills & Distillery Ltd. PLD 1975 SC 244 • Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2006 SC 602 • Executive Council Allama Iqbal Open University v. M. Tufail Hashmi 2010 SCMR 1484 • Muhammad Naeem v. Federation of Pakistan 2023 SCMR 301 (e) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts. 240 & 260---Service of Pakistan---Civil servant---Employees of statutory bodies and instrumentalities of Government---Test for determining civil servant status---Supreme Court held that terms “service of Pakistan” and “civil servant” are not synonymous---Status of civil servant depends on whether employee holds a civil post and whether appointment and terms and conditions of service are regulated under relevant civil servants law and rules framed thereunder---Mere fact that a body is created by statute, funded by Government, performs public functions, or is subject to some administrative supervision does not make its employees civil servants---Employees of statutory corporations, autonomous bodies, universities, banks or public institutions are not civil servants unless their service is governed by civil service legal framework---Applicable test remains whether employee’s appointment and service conditions are governed by Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 and rules made thereunder, or by a separate statutory/service framework. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2006 SC 602 • Executive Council Allama Iqbal Open University v. M. Tufail Hashmi 2010 SCMR 1484 • Muhammad Naeem v. Federation of Pakistan 2023 SCMR 301 (f) Punjab Emergency Service Act (III of 2006)---- ----S. 21---Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 21---Punjab Civil Servants Act (VIII of 1974), S. 2(b)---Employees of Punjab Emergency Service---Public servants, not civil servants---Punjab Emergency Service employees were governed by Punjab Emergency Service Leave, Efficiency and Discipline Rules, 2007 and Punjab Emergency Service (Appointment & Conditions of Service) Regulations, 2022---Their appointment, discipline, performance, leave, retirement and other service matters were regulated by separate statutory framework under Act of 2006 and not by Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 or rules framed thereunder---Act of 2006 expressly declared members of Emergency Service to be public servants within meaning of S.21, P.P.C., and such declaration remained unchanged after 2021 Amendment---Supreme Court held that employees of Emergency Service could not be treated as civil servants and therefore did not fall within jurisdiction of Punjab Service Tribunal. (g) Punjab Service Tribunals Act (IX of 1974)---- ----Jurisdiction of Punjab Service Tribunal---Jurisdiction confined to civil servants---Employees of Punjab Emergency Service---Service Tribunal had no jurisdiction---Respondent, a rescue driver, challenged disciplinary proceedings before Punjab Service Tribunal, which partially allowed appeal and directed regular inquiry---Supreme Court held that Tribunal failed to correctly examine jurisdiction in light of statutory framework governing Emergency Service and settled principles laid down by Supreme Court---Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974 confers jurisdiction in respect of civil servants and appeal before Tribunal lies by a civil servant---Employee of Emergency Service, being governed by separate statutory framework and declared public servant under Act of 2006, was not civil servant merely because Emergency Service was made an independent administrative department by 2021 Amendment---Proceedings before Tribunal were without lawful basis. (h) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. VII, R. 11---Interim orders on jurisdiction---Merger into final judgment---Service Tribunal earlier passed interim orders on application under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C. and question of jurisdiction was allegedly decided in favour of respondent---Tribunal later held that such interim orders had attained finality as they were not challenged---Supreme Court held that finding was erroneous because interim orders merged into final judgment wherein Tribunal once again addressed question of jurisdiction by holding that, due to 2021 Amendment, Emergency Service had status of independent department and Tribunal had jurisdiction---Jurisdiction being foundational issue had to be examined with care and circumspection before assuming authority over matter. Disposition: Civil Petition was converted into appeal and allowed; Supreme Court held that employees of Punjab Emergency Service are not civil servants and Punjab Service Tribunal has no jurisdiction in matters relating to their terms and conditions of service; impugned order dated 07.06.2023 passed by Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore was set aside.

Summary: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Initial Appointment to Civil Posts (Relaxation of Upper Age Limit) Rules, 2008--- ----Rr. 3(i), Table, Serial No.(ii) & (iii) & 4, proviso---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 175F(1)(c)---Initial appointment---Upper age limit---Relaxation---Backward area---Petitioner / authority was aggrieved of judgment passed by High Court declaring respondent / candidate as entitled to relaxation of upper age limit for her appointment to post in question---Validity---Only hurdle/objection in appointment of respondent / candidate was that she was over age---Respondent / candidate hailed from District Buner, and as per Serial No.xiv of Appendix to Rule 3(ii) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Initial Appointment to Civil Posts (Relaxation of Upper Age Limit) Rules, 2008, the area was in the category of “backward areas”---Besides three years automatic relaxation under category (ii) specified in Rule 3(i) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Initial Appointment to Civil Posts (Relaxation of Upper Age Limit) Rules, 2008, respondent / candidate was also entitled to relaxation in upper age limit upto two years by appointing authority under Serial No.iii of Table of Rule 3(i) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Initial Appointment to Civil Posts (Relaxation of Upper Age Limit) Rules, 2008---Case of respondent / candidate was also covered under the category of “general candidates”, as stipulated in proviso to Rule 4 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Initial Appointment to Civil Posts (Relaxation of Upper Age Limit) Rules, 2008---Federal Constitutional Court declined to interfere in judgment passed by High Court as there was no illegality, irregularity or infirmity and respondent / candidate was entitled to relaxation in upper age limit---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. Muzammil Khan, Additional Advocate General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for Petitioners. Mushtaq Ahmad Khan Alizai, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent. Date of hearing: 25th February, 2026.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Doctrine of res judicata serves a dual purpose: it safeguards the parties from multiplicity of proceedings and at the same time conserves the valuable judicial time, a public resource enabling the Court to devote its attention to other deserving litigations awaiting adjudication.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Held: Pakistan Penal Code —Section 302/34- Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act, 2013-Section 15AA- Delay in lodging of report-effects of-- The deficiency in the sequence of events, therefore, remains a circumstance which cannot be lightly brushed aside. The place of occurrence is situated at a distance of approximately 20/22 kilometers from the hospital. The time of occurrence is stated to be 10:00 a.m., whereas the time of report is recorded as 2:30 p.m., indicating a delay of about four and a half hours. This delay, significantly, has neither been satisfactorily explained by the complainant, nor by the Investigating Officer. In cases involving homicidal death, prompt reporting of the occurrence lends assurance to the prosecution version, whereas unexplained delay often gives rise to the possibility of deliberation, consultation, or embellishment. If, as suggested, the scribe received information and could reach the hospital within thirty minutes, it becomes difficult to comprehend how the shifting of the dead body from the place of occurrence to the hospital consumed such an inordinate period. The transportation of a body over a distance of 20/22 kilometers would not ordinarily require four and a half hours, particularly in circumstances of urgency. Two plausible inferences, therefore, emerge: either the dead body was first collected and shifted to the hospital by persons from the locality and the presence of complainant was procured thereafter to formalize the report, or the complainant himself reached the house of the deceased after a considerable lapse of time and only then arranged for the shifting of the body and the lodging of the report. Both scenarios introduce an element of doubt in the prosecution story as initially planned. When this unexplained delay is examined in juxtaposition with the contradictory statement of the scribe (examined as PW-06), it constitutes a material infirmity. These inconsistencies are not minor or trivial discrepancies attributable to lapse of memory; rather, they pertain to the very genesis of the case and the promptness of its reporting. In Criminal Law jurisprudence, where the liberty of a person is at stake, such contradictions assume significance. Accordingly, these deficiencies in the prosecution evidence, particularly regarding the timing of information, arrival, and lodging of the report, are circumstances which this Court cannot overlook. They cumulatively diminish the certainty required for sustaining a conviction and must, therefore, be considered carefully in favour of the accused, when assessing whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving its case beyond reasonable doubt. Pakistan Penal Code —Section 302/34- Burden of proof- The prosecution carries the burden of establishing not only that the deceased met a homicidal death, but also that it was the accused who committed the offence. Mere assertion by the complainant that he saw the accused standing armed near the body, without independent corroboration and without satisfactorily establishing his own presence and prompt arrival, would hardly constitute a complete chain of circumstantial evidence. The law is well-settled that in cases resting upon circumstantial evidence, the circumstances proved must be consistent only with the suggestion of guilt and must exclude every other reasonable suggestion. In the present case, where the complainant is admittedly not an eyewitness of the occurrence and where vital links, particularly the role and conduct of the husband remain unexplained, his solitary testimony, unsupported by independent and convincing corroboration, would hardly serve to sustain the conviction of the appellant. Accordingly, these essential aspects must ponder with this Court while determining whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving its case beyond reasonable doubt or whether the benefit of doubt must, as a matter of right, be given to the accused. (Criminal Law Appeal is Allowed)

Summary: Held: Pakistan Penal Code —Section 302/324/114- Testimony of single witness- appreciation of- The Court is duty bound to examine whether the findings of the trial Court are supported by the evidence on record; whether the evidence was appreciated in its correct legal perspective; and whether the prosecution proved its case through reliable and trustworthy material. The role of this Court is not simply to agree or disagree with the trial Court, but to ensure that the conviction is based on solid and reliable evidence, and not on assumptions. It is admitted that the prosecution case mainly depends upon the statement of a single eye-witness. However, it is a settled principle of law that conviction can be based on the testimony of a single witness, even in a murder case, if that witness is found to be truthful and trustworthy. The law does not require a large number of witnesses; rather, it requires that the evidence be credible and convincing. If the sole witness appears natural, consistent, and remains firm during cross-examination, his testimony can be sufficient for conviction. However, where the death penalty has been awarded, the evidence must be examined with great care. The appellate Court must carefully re-evaluate the entire record to ensure that no reasonable doubt has been overlooked. Since human life is involved, the evidence must be weighed very carefully, and the conclusions must be clear and free from uncertainty therefore, to properly decide whether the trial Court was justified in convicting the appellant and awarding the death sentence, this Court finds it necessary to re-examine the statements of the witnesses and review the entire evidence again so that no miscarriage of justice has occurred. Pakistan Penal Code —Section 302/324/114- Testimony of single witness- appreciation of- The argument that the injured could speak, he should have lodged the report himself instead of the complainant, however, this argument is not convincing as the medical evidence clearly shows that the injured was not mentally fit to give a proper statement. Furthermore, if the complainant had actually been the attacker, as claimed by the defence, it would be unnatural for the injured, while still conscious, to remain silent and not name the real culprit. The fact that he did not make any such accusation against the complainant seriously damage the defence version. The circumstances also show that it was the complainant who immediately took the injured to the hospital and reported the matter. If he had been the assailant, it would be highly unlikely for him to take the injured to public hospital and expose himself to immediate suspicion, especially when, according to the defence, other persons were present and aware of the incident therefore, the prompt reporting of the crime, the medical evidence regarding the condition of the injured, and the consistent statement of the complainant together support his testimony. No major contradiction or improvement has been pointed out to make his evidence unreliable. It is true that the complainant is related to the deceased, but mere relationship is not a reason to reject a witness. The correct approach is to examine such evidence carefully. If, after careful scrutiny, the testimony appears natural, consistent, and trustworthy, it can form the basis of conviction even in a murder case. The learned trial Court carefully evaluated the evidence of the complainant and found him to be truthful and reliable. After independently reviewing the record, we find no strong reason to disagree with that conclusion. Pakistan Penal Code —Section 302/324/114- Natural witness- appreciation of- The argument that although firing was allegedly directed at both the deceased and the complainant, and the complainant remained unharmed. However, the mere fact that he was not injured does not make his testimony false. It cannot be assumed that every person present at the scene must suffer injuries. Although the motive suggested by the prosecution may not be fully clear, but it cannot be said that the complainant was necessarily the main target therefore, his survival does not weaken the prosecution case or reduce the credibility of his eyewitness account. Reliance Muhammad Ijaz vs The State (2023 SCMR 1375). Pakistan Penal Code —Section 302/324/114- Medical evidence- appreciation of The defence argued that, considering the distance between the parties, there should have been no charring marks on the body. However, the presence of charring on one injury shows that at least one shot was fired from close range, while the other may have been fired from a slightly longer distance. This difference does not contradict the prosecution story. Instead, it fits naturally with what can happen during a sudden firing incident, where shots may be fired from different distances within a short time. It is a settled principle that medical evidence mainly serves to confirm or support the direct evidence. When there is a reliable and confidence-inspiring eyewitness account, medical evidence is considered corroborative. In this case, the medical evidence is consistent with the eyewitness version and further strengthen its truthfulness. Reference Aqil Versus The State (2023 SCMR 831). Pakistan Penal Code —Section 302/324/114- Medical evidence- appreciation of It is true that the prosecution has not presented very strong or convincing evidence explaining the exact reason behind the crime. The motive suggested is somewhat weak however, it is settled that when there is clear and reliable direct evidence, the absence or weakness of motive alone is not enough to acquit an accused in a murder case. Human behavior is complex, and sometimes crimes are committed due to personal grudges or emotions that are not fully known to others. The issue of motive can become important at the stage of sentencing. Even if it does not affect the finding of guilt, it may help the Court decide whether the death penalty is appropriate or whether lesser punishment would meet the ends of justice therefore, the key question before this Court is whether the sentence awarded by the trial Court is in accordance with law and whether the reasons given justify imposing the death penalty. There is no dispute that the deceased suffered firearm injuries and later died because of them. The eyewitness and medical evidence clearly prove that the appellant committed the offence however, the matter does not end with conviction; the correctness of the sentence must also be examined. It has come on record that the deceased and the appellant knew each other and were on friendly terms. According to the complainant, they used to sit together and smoke. The motive suggested was that the complainant objected the frequent visit of the appellant to the deceased, which allegedly led to tension and finally to the incident. If this is accepted, it appears that any grievance was mainly between the complainant and the appellant, not directly with the deceased. The exact cause of the dispute and what immediately led to the firing are not fully clear. In this sense, the motive remains uncertain. It is well established that where motive is weak or not clearly proved, and where the incident does not appear to be the result of clear pre-planning, such factors may not change the conviction but can be considered while deciding the sentence. The evidence justifies maintaining the conviction under Section 302 PPC, the important question is whether this case deserves the death penalty. Considering all the circumstances, the relationship between the parties, the lack of a strong and clear motive, and the surrounding facts of the case, this Court is of the view that the death sentence awarded by the trial Court appears somewhat harsh. In our opinion, the case does not fall within the category of the “rarest of rare” cases that require the extreme penalty. Although the sentence cannot be called completely unjustified, it does not fully align with the overall circumstances of the case. The trial Court did not properly consider the exact nature of the dispute and the surrounding factors while awarding the death sentence. Accordingly, the instant criminal appeal is partially allowed and, while maintaining the conviction of the appellant under section 302(b) PPC, his sentence of death is reduced to imprisonment for life whereas, the remaining portion of the judgment shall remain intact. (Criminal Appeal is Dismissed)

Summary: (a) It is settled law that a conviction recorded upon a voluntary plea of guilt is legally sustainable, provided the Court satisfies itself that the plea is conscious, voluntary, and unequivocal, and that the accused fully understands the nature and consequences of such admission. (b) Criminal Law jurisprudence has progressively evolved from a purely retributive framework to one that incorporates reformative and restorative dimensions. The acceptance of a plea of guilt in minor offences is a recognized procedural mechanism aimed at the expeditious disposal of cases, reduction of docket congestion, and ensuring a proportionate response to less serious infractions. Such a mechanism advances the mandate contained in clause (d) of Article 37 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, which obligates the State to secure inexpensive and expeditious justice. The ever-increasing pendency of Criminal Law cases has stretched judicial capacity to its limits. In these circumstances, courts must adopt pragmatic and innovative approaches to ensure that valuable judicial time is reserved for serious and contested matters. The summary disposal of petty offences upon a voluntary plea is one such pragmatic measure serving systemic efficiency and judicial economy. In several common law jurisdictions, notably the United States, the plea of nolo contendere—literally meaning “I do not wish to contend”—permits an accused person to accept the imposition of sentence without formally admitting guilt. Though not technically a guilty plea, it authorizes the court to proceed to sentencing as if guilt had been admitted. Historically derived from English common law and influenced by ecclesiastical legal traditions, the plea represents a procedural accommodation that balances judicial economy with the mitigation of collateral consequences. Under such a plea, the accused refrains from contesting the charge without expressly acknowledging culpability. Its functional essence lies in the recognition that not every procedural acceptance of penalty must carry identical collateral stigma.