Summary: A claim of maintenance by dependent parents against their sons, being a family dispute rooted in familial obligations, squarely falls within the domain of "family affairs" and is therefore well within the jurisdiction of the Family Court. To read Entry No.3 as confined only to wife and child would be to read into the statute a restriction that the legislature consciously omitted.

Summary: A claim of maintenance by dependent parents against their sons, being a family dispute rooted in familial obligations, squarely falls within the domain of "family affairs" and is therefore well within the jurisdiction of the Family Court. To read Entry No.3 as confined only to wife and child would be to read into the statute a restriction that the legislature consciously omitted. 176C.O. (Commercial) 78664/24 Fatima Fertilizer Company Limited & 1 other Vs . . Mr. Justice Ch. Sultan Mahmood 24- 10- 2025 2025 LHC 7187

Summary: (a) Family law ----Nikahnama---Dower (Haq Mehr)---Column No.16---Property specified as dower---Dower payable on demand (andal talab)---Once immovable property is entered in nikahnama as dower, husband is under legal obligation to keep such property reserved for transfer to wife upon demand---Subsequent alienations made by husband or through close relatives behind wife’s back cannot defeat wife’s vested dower rights---Transfers effected within short span to defeat dower claim held of no legal consequence. (b) Transfer of Property---Bona fide purchaser---Knowledge of encumbrance---Petitioner claimed to be bona fide purchaser of dowered land---Record showed petitioner had knowledge of entry of dowered land in nikahnama at least by date of filing application for impleadment---Despite such knowledge, petitioner purchased substantial portion of dowered land through registered sale deed---Claim of bona fide purchaser without notice found untenable---Purchaser with notice cannot claim protection against wife’s dower rights. (c) Family Courts Act, 1964 ----Recovery of dower---Impleadment of subsequent transferees---Where dowered property has been transferred to third parties, such transferees can be impleaded and suit can proceed against them---Decree for dower enforceable against property notwithstanding intervening mutations and sale deeds. (d) Evidence ----Nikahnama---Proof of execution---Secretary Union Council and Nikah Registrar produced---Execution and contents of nikahnama duly proved through official witnesses---Allegation of forged or fictitious nikahnama rejected in absence of any challenge to its validity despite knowledge---Concurrent findings upheld. (e) Civil procedure ----Concurrent findings of fact---Scope of interference---Family Court, Appellate Court and High Court returned concurrent findings on facts and law---No perversity, misreading or non-reading of evidence pointed out---Supreme Court declined to interfere in exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Article 185(3) of the Constitution. Cited cases: Nil cited in judgment. Disposition: Leave to appeal declined; petition dismissed; concurrent judgments of Family Court, Appellate Court and High Court upholding respondent-wife’s entitlement to dowered land affirmed.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)----S.302(b)----Conviction on circumstantial evidence alone----Standard and completeness of chain of circumstances---Jail petition directed against conviction under S.302(b), PPC, where prosecution case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence without any ocular account---Held, in a case founded solely on circumstantial evidence, every link in the chain must be proved and the proved circumstances must be incompatible with any reasonable hypothesis of the accused’s innocence; if any link breaks, the entire chain collapses---Prosecution was required to establish (i) an unbroken chain of incriminating circumstances, and (ii) that such circumstances pointed only to the guilt of the accused and to no other reasonable conclusion---In the present case, CCTV footage was equivocal and unauthenticated, “last-seen” evidence was weak and neutral, alleged recoveries conflicted with medical evidence, and motive remained unproved; thus the chain was incomplete and could not sustain a conviction---Benefit of doubt was accordingly extended and conviction set aside. Cited cases: Ch. Barkat Ali v. Major Karam Elahi Zia and another 1992 SCMR 1047; Altaf Hussain v. Fakhar Hussain and another 2008 SCMR 1103; Siraj v. The Crown PLD 1956 FC 123. (b) Criminal trial----Electronic / CCTV evidence----Requirements of reliability, chain-of-custody and forensic authentication----Effect of deficiencies----Prosecution relied on CCTV/USB footage allegedly showing the accused carrying the cinderblock used to assault the deceased in the madrassah room---Held, CCTV material did not meet the minimum threshold of reliability: no site plan aligned the cameras’ field of view with the locus in quo; there was no proof of continuous recording, clock synchronization, or that the footage was free from editing; no forensic report authenticated the footage; resolution, angles and lighting did not permit positive identification; footage did not capture the actus reus or weapon and, at best, suggested presence in a shared space already occupied by many students---Further, it was on record that whenever the USB was played, the court computer flagged it as virus-infected---Such unsealed, unauthenticated and equivocal electronic material could not be treated as dependable incriminating evidence and remained at best a neutral circumstance insufficient to support conviction. (c) Criminal trial----“Last-seen together” evidence in a shared accommodation----Scope and probative value----Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.302(b)---Deceased and accused were students sharing Room No.4 of the madrassah with about 25 others; prosecution attempted to rely on “last-seen” theory based on the accused’s presence in the room and hostel premises---Held, for “last-seen” evidence to carry weight, prosecution must prove with clarity (i) the specific time when the deceased was last seen alive in the company of the accused, and (ii) a narrow temporal gap between such last sighting and discovery of the dead body, so as to reasonably exclude intervention of others---Neither requirement was satisfied; PW-8 only stated that around 12:30 a.m. he saw the accused alone in the washroom and later apparently asleep in his bed, while the body was discovered much later in a room accessible to many students---In a multi-occupancy setting, such evidence was inherently weak, did not exclude hypothesis of others’ involvement, and remained a neutral circumstance incapable of sustaining conviction on its own. (d) Evidence----Recovery of weapon and inconsistency with medical evidence----Effect----Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.302(b)---A blood-stained knife was allegedly recovered from under the accused’s pillow and its chemical examination was positive for human blood; however, post-mortem and medical evidence recorded no incised or stab wounds and attributed cause of death solely to head injuries from a heavy blunt object (cement block)---Held, where medical evidence excludes the use of the allegedly recovered weapon, such recovery loses probative force and becomes a source of doubt rather than corroboration---The mismatch between the purported weapon (knife) and the nature of injuries (blunt trauma from cinderblock) created a serious inconsistency, undermining the prosecution’s narrative and further weakening its case. (e) Criminal trial----Motive----Failure to prove motive, effect in circumstantial case----Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.302(b)---Prosecution alleged that the accused had teased or quarreled with the deceased earlier, using this as motive; however, no independent evidence was produced to prove any prior teasing or quarrel and none of the students deposed to any past altercation---On the contrary, PW-5 Jameel-ur-Rehman stated that “the deceased and the accused were close friends” as disclosed to him by other students---Held, where prosecution sets up a specific motive but leads no convincing evidence to establish it and, instead, evidence indicates cordial relations, the alleged motive is disproved---In a purely circumstantial case, failure to establish motive, when other links in the chain are already weak or doubtful, further erodes the prosecution case and strengthens the presumption of innocence. (f) Criminal trial----Standard of proof and benefit of doubt----Circumstantial evidence; multiple doubts in prosecution case----Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.302(b)---Prosecution case was marred by (i) unauthenticated and equivocal CCTV/USB footage; (ii) weak “last-seen” evidence in a room shared by numerous students; (iii) recovery of a knife inconsistent with medical evidence which attributed death to blunt-force trauma from a cinderblock; (iv) non-proof of motive and evidence of friendly relations between deceased and accused; and (v) other investigative deficiencies---Held, prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and cannot rest on suspicion, however strong; where material doubts arise from the record, they must be resolved in favour of the accused as a matter of right, especially in a capital charge based solely on circumstantial evidence---Present case being riddled with doubts, conviction could not be sustained; jail petition was converted into appeal and allowed, resulting in the accused’s acquittal and direction for release if not required in any other case. (g) Criminal procedure----Effect of acquittal in main jail petition on connected criminal petition----Code of Criminal Procedure (V of 1898)---In view of the acquittal of the accused in Jail Petition No.217/2021 by extending benefit of doubt and setting aside the judgments of the Trial Court and High Court (dated 08.11.2019 and 05.04.2021 respectively), the connected Criminal Petition No.372/2022 was rendered infructuous and was accordingly dismissed.

Summary: (a) Customs Act (IV of 1969) ---- ----Ss. 17, 168, 171, 179 & 180---Import Policy Order, 2013, paras. 5(vii), 9(ii)(1) & (5)---Detention and seizure of imported prime movers---Jurisdiction of customs authorities---Legality---Construction companies imported prime movers (Hino vehicles) claiming entitlement under para 9(ii)(5) of the Import Policy Order, 2013 (IPO, 2013)---Vehicles were later found displayed for sale in petitioners’ showrooms instead of being used in their construction projects---Held, that import under para 9(ii)(5) was restricted to the importer’s own operational use and not for commercial resale---Customs authorities were, therefore, justified in detaining and seizing the vehicles for violation of the IPO, 2013---Interpretation of the High Court on this point having been maintained earlier by the Supreme Court had attained finality and could not be reopened in a subsequent adjudication---Tribunal’s contrary findings were unsustainable in law. (b) Doctrine of election --- ----Remedies and forum---Once a party has elected to pursue one of the available legal remedies and obtained a final adjudication thereon, it cannot subsequently invoke another parallel remedy on the same cause of action---Petitioners, having contested detention and seizure proceedings up to the Supreme Court, were barred from reopening the same issues in adjudicatory or appellate proceedings before the Tribunal---Doctrine of election and principle of past and closed transactions applied. (c) Import Policy Order, 2013 ---- ----Restriction on import of prime movers---Interpretation---Under para 5(vii) read with Appendix-C of the IPO, 2013, vehicles falling under PCT heading 8701.2040 were not freely importable and were subject to prohibitions except in limited circumstances enumerated in para 9(ii)---Such permission was confined to certain industries, including construction and petroleum sectors, and was meant for their own operational use---Commercial exploitation by way of resale defeated the intent of the legislation and was rightly disallowed by customs authorities. (d) Administration of justice --- ----Finality of litigation---Lower forums are bound by the interpretation rendered by the Supreme Court on a question of law---Tribunal acted in excess of jurisdiction by disregarding the binding interpretation of IPO, 2013 earlier affirmed by the Supreme Court---Reopening concluded issues constituted abuse of process. Held, that the Tribunal’s order allowing the appeals of petitioners was contrary to law and rightly set aside by the High Court. Civil petitions converted into appeals and dismissed. Cited Case: • Muhammad Raqeeb v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (2023 SCMR 992).

Summary: (a) Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 ---- ----S. 13—Talb-i-Muwathibat—Immediacy and substance of declaration—Form not prescribed but intent must be unequivocal—Plaintiff claimed that upon receiving information of the sale at 07:00 a.m. on 07-06-2001 he made Talb-i-Muwathibat; informer (PW-3) stated he learnt of the sale at his uncle’s dera with 15–20 houses between that dera and plaintiff’s, indicating lapse of time before any intimation—Further, the plaintiff’s utterance, as proved (“… بس خواہش ظاہر کی …”), reflected only a desire to pre-empt, not a clear, immediate assertion of the right—Held, requirements of S. 13 were not met; mere expression of desire is insufficient and the immediacy stood compromised. (b) Pre-emption—Proof of talbs—Standard—Where evidence creates doubt about whether Talb-i-Muwathibat was promptly and properly made, the doubt enures to the benefit of the vendee—Plaintiff failed to discharge the onus to prove a valid and immediate Talb-i-Muwathibat on the facts. (c) Civil procedure—Concurrent findings—Interference—Where courts below misapplied S. 13 or relied on doubtful proof of the foundational talb, interference is warranted—Concurrent decrees for pre-emption set aside. Held, that the plaintiff did not prove a valid Talb-i-Muwathibat; benefit of doubt goes to the vendees. Petition converted into appeal and allowed; judgments and decrees of the courts below set aside; pre-emption suit dismissed, no order as to costs.

Summary: (Against order dated 08.11.2022 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in C.P. No. D-5641 of /2022). (a) Customs Act ( IV of 1969)--- ----S. 27A---Customs Rules, 2001, R.592---Mutilation of consignment (goods)---Type/Kind of imported goods (“rollers”) not identified in relevant list---Scope and effect---Request moved by the importer for mutilation of consignment (goods) was turned down vide Order-in-Original on the ground that the consignment of “rollers” does not qualify for mutilation under Section 27A of the Customs Act, 1969 (‘the Act 1969’) for not being identified in list given under Rule 592 of the Customs Rules, 2001(‘the Rules, 2001’); however, the High Court allowed said request---Validity---Section 27A of the Act 1969 allows mutilation or scrapping of goods as are notified by the Federal Board of Revenue (Board) and in the manner as prescribed by the Rules 2001; only such goods which are found in consonance with the said requirement shall be subjected to duty on such rates as may be applicable to the goods as if they had been imported in the mutilated form or as scrapped---The list available under Rule 592 of the Rules 2001 is restricted and not inclusive of “any other item ” except those identified therein---Rule 592 was subjected to few amendments and omissions, however, the “rollers” were never identified by the said Rule in any form (serviceable/unserviceable)---Rule 592 of the Customs Rules, 2001 appears to suggest that it is restricted and not inclusive of other items---Supreme Court set-aside the impugned order passed by the High Court; consequently the order of rejection for mutilation, stood restored---Petition for leave to appeal, filed by Collectorate, was converted into appeal and allowed accordingly. (b) Customs Act ( IV of 1969)--- ----S. 27A---Customs Rules, 2001, R. 592---Mutilation of consignment (goods)---Form of goods (i.e. serviceable or unserviceable)---Request moved by the importer for mutilation of consignment (goods) was turned down vide Order-in-Original; however, the High Court allowed said request observing that the goods (the rollers) were imported in unserviceable conditions---Validity---Observation of the High Court was misconceived for the reason that it was never the case of the respondent/importer that the goods were imported in unserviceable condition---The outright request for the mutilation by the importer itself suggested that those goods were serviceable goods and hence ought to follow the procedure prescribed under Section 27A of the Customs Act, 1969, read with Rule 592 of the Customs Rules, 2001---Rule 592 provides that the “identified goods” (old and new items) if imported in serviceable conditions along-with scrap consignment or imported separately as scrap and found serviceable, may be mutilated and scrapped as the case may be within the meaning of Section 27A of the Customs Act, 1969; said Rule is then followed by short list identifying the categories of good; the rollers admittedly were not included---As for as impugned order was concerned that the mutilation rule was not applicable, was totally contrary to the facts of the case---Supreme Court set-aside the impugned order passed by the High Court; consequently the order of rejection for mutilation, stood restored---Petition for leave to appeal , filed by Collectorate, was converted into appeal and allowed accordingly. (c) Customs Act ( IV of 1969)--- ----S. 27A---Customs Rules ,2001, R. 592---S.R.O.450(I)/2001 dated 18.06.2001---Mutilation of consignment (goods)---Type/Kind of imported goods (“rollers”) not identified in relevant list---Scope and effect---Request moved by the importer for mutilation of consignment (goods) was turned down vide Order-in-Original on the ground that the consignment of “rollers” did not qualify for mutilation under Section 27A of the Customs Act, 1969 (‘the Act 1969’) for not being identified in list given under Rule 592 of the Customs Rules, 2001 (‘the Rules, 2001’); however, the High Court allowed said request observing that “decades old rule which includes the list of 9 items is beyond comprehension not to re-use thousands of other unserviceable items which could be imported for re-use of the material, which could be an important step towards achieving better and green environment, which aspect could not be ruled out”---Validity---The Rules, 2001, specially Rule 592 has undergone many changes and it cannot be said that the Legislature and/or FBR were not conscious about the list and its contents---Had it been the intention of Legislature, as opined by the High Court, there was no wisdom in providing list of “goods” with the Rule 592 of the Rules 2001---Rule 592 of the Rules 2001was amended from time to time such as on 27.06.2011, 08.08.2017 and it was lastly amended through S.R.O. 1540(I)/2018 dated 21.12. 2018 which shows the consciousness---Supreme Court set-aside the impugned order passed by the High Court; consequently the order of rejection for mutilation, stood restored---Petition for leave to appeal, filed by Collectorate, was converted into appeal and allowed accordingly. Muhammad Khalil Dogar, Advocate Supreme Court, K.A. Wahab, Advocate-on-Record, Saad Atta Rabbani, Additional Collector and Farhad Ullah, Deputy Collector for Petitioner [through video-link from Karachi]. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 24th October, 2025.

Summary: (Against judgment/order dated 08.05.2023 and 06.05.2024 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in Income Tax Cases Nos. 633 to 638 of 2001 and Income Tax Reference Application No. 220 of 2008, respectively). (a) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979) [since repealed]--- ----Second Sched., Pt.1, Cl. 93---Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001), Second Sched., Pt.1, Cl. 59---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.185(3)---Income tax exemptions---Scope and preconditions---Essential elements and components---Charitable purpose---Meaning, extent and application---Pakistan Stock Exchange Limited filed seven connected civil petitions arising from income tax assessments for tax years 1993-94 to 1998-99 under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, and tax year 2003 under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, in which the appellate tribunal had earlier allowed exemption on income from ‘house property’ under clause (93) of the Second Schedule (1979 Ordinance) and clause (59) (2001 Ordinance), but the High Court later reversed those findings---Core issue befor e the Supreme Court was “whether the petitioner was legally entitled to income-tax exemption by establishing that its income was derived from house property held under legal obligation for charitable purposes and was actually applied or finally set apart for such charitable application”?---Held: Insofar as the first “element” for exemption from tax was concerned, it appeared to be clear that the income in question was derived from “house property”---Therefore it was appropriate to move on to the second “element”, which had been the principal point of dispute between the parties---This itself could be regarded as having two “sub-components”: (i) the income must be held under trust or “other legal obligations”, which must (ii) be “wholly, or in part only, for … charitable purposes” (it being common ground that no “religious” purposes were involved in the case)---It was not enough for the petitioner simply to show that the sub-clause was a “charitable purpose” as the exemption clause required that the sources of income or the income be held under some “legal obligation”, either wholly or in part, for a “charitable purpose”---Sub-clause (2) could be regarded as a “charitable purpose” within the meaning of the definition clause---Therefore, while disagreeing with the High Court, Supreme Court concluded that the petitioner’s situation, in the facts and circumstances of the case, came within the definition clause---An examination of the order of the tribunal showed that there was no affirmative and actual finding of fact that the income in question was either actually applied or “finally” set aside for purposes of achieving the objects set out in sub-clause (2)---The entire discussion related to a matter of law, i.e., whether the sub-clause in question could be regarded as a “charitable purpose”---A finding in favor of the petitioner was recorded in this regard, but that was not enough---The tribunal also had to apply its mind as to whether the third “element” of the exemption clause existed during the periods in question and absent any such finding the benefit of the exemption clause could not be extended to the petitioner---In our view, while the finding of the tribunal might have sufficed for purposes of the second “element” of the exemption clause, it was wholly deficient for the third “element”---The reasoning appeared simply to amount to this: that because the second “element” was found to exist therefore the third was equally found to (or must) exist---But, the tribunal failed to appreciate that while the determination of the second “element” was a question of law (or perhaps a mixed question of law and fact) the third “element” was a separate requirement, which was only a question of fact---The existence of the one could not, and did not, inevitably, as seemed to have been concluded by the tribunal, lead to the other---To conclude that the one existed did not show or mean that the other did as well---The positive obligation that lay on the petitioner in this regard was not discharged---And since the tribunal was the last finder of fact the exercise in relation to the third “element” could not be carried out by either the High Court (which in any case decided against the petitioner) or the Supreme Court---This deficiency was fatal for the petitioner’s case---Even when the exemption clause was viewed in its totality the last portion thereof had to be clearly established, at the latest, by or before the final forum designated to determine questions of fact---This was patently not the situation at hand---Petitioner had failed to make out a case for entitlement to the exemption clause---Leave to appeal was refused and the petitions were dismissed, in circumstances. Cotman v. Brougham [1918] AC 514, [1918-19] All ER Rep 265, [1918] UKHL 358; Re Introductions Ltd. [1968] 2 All ER 1221; [1969] 1 All ER 887; Anglo Overseas Agencies Ltd. v. Green and another [1960] 3 All ER 244 and Commissioner of Income Tax v. Merchant Navy Club 2004 PTD 1304 ref. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Muhammad Abdur Rauf Khan PLD 1963 SC 209; Hamdard Dawakhana v. Commissioner of Income Tax PLD 1980 SC 84 and Fauji Foundation v. Shamimur Rehman PLD 1983 SC 457 rel. (b) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Fiscal statute---Exemption clause---Application and interpretation---Firstly, the onus lies on the taxpayer to show that his case comes within the exemption---Secondly, if two reasonable interpretations are possible the one against the taxpayer will be adopted---But, thirdly, if the taxpayer’s case comes fairly within the scope of the exemption then he cannot be denied the benefit of the same on the basis of any supposed intention to the contrary of the legislature or authority granting it. Oxford University Press v. Commissioner of Income Tax 2019 SCMR 235 rel. (c) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979) [since repealed]--- ----Second Sched. Pt.1, Cl.93---Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001), Second Sched., Pt.1, Cl.59---Income tax---Exemption---Essential elements / components---The exemption clause can be said to contain three “elements”---The income for which exemption is sought (i) must be from “investments in securities of the Federal Government and house property”; (ii) either the said sources of income or the income itself must be “held under trust or other legal obligations wholly, or in part only, for religious or charitable purposes”; and (iii) the income must be “actually applied or finally set apart for application thereto”. Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner (in all cases via video-link, Karachi). Munawar Ali Memon, Advocate Supreme Court, Mrs. Abida Parveen Channar, Advocate-on-Record, M. Masood, Additional Commissioner, (via video-link, Karachi) and Dr. Ishtiaq, D.G. (Law) for Respondents. Date of hearing: 21st April, 2025.

Summary: (Against judgment/order dated 08.05.2023 and 06.05.2024 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in Income Tax Cases Nos. 633 to 638 of 2001 and Income Tax Reference Application No. 220 of 2008, respectively). (a) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979) [since repealed]--- ----Second Sched., Pt.1, Cl. 93---Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001), Second Sched., Pt.1, Cl. 59---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.185(3)---Income tax exemptions---Scope and preconditions---Essential elements and components---Charitable purpose---Meaning, extent and application---Pakistan Stock Exchange Limited filed seven connected civil petitions arising from income tax assessments for tax years 1993-94 to 1998-99 under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, and tax year 2003 under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, in which the appellate tribunal had earlier allowed exemption on income from ‘house property’ under clause (93) of the Second Schedule (1979 Ordinance) and clause (59) (2001 Ordinance), but the High Court later reversed those findings---Core issue befor e the Supreme Court was “whether the petitioner was legally entitled to income-tax exemption by establishing that its income was derived from house property held under legal obligation for charitable purposes and was actually applied or finally set apart for such charitable application”?---Held: Insofar as the first “element” for exemption from tax was concerned, it appeared to be clear that the income in question was derived from “house property”---Therefore it was appropriate to move on to the second “element”, which had been the principal point of dispute between the parties---This itself could be regarded as having two “sub-components”: (i) the income must be held under trust or “other legal obligations”, which must (ii) be “wholly, or in part only, for … charitable purposes” (it being common ground that no “religious” purposes were involved in the case)---It was not enough for the petitioner simply to show that the sub-clause was a “charitable purpose” as the exemption clause required that the sources of income or the income be held under some “legal obligation”, either wholly or in part, for a “charitable purpose”---Sub-clause (2) could be regarded as a “charitable purpose” within the meaning of the definition clause---Therefore, while disagreeing with the High Court, Supreme Court concluded that the petitioner’s situation, in the facts and circumstances of the case, came within the definition clause---An examination of the order of the tribunal showed that there was no affirmative and actual finding of fact that the income in question was either actually applied or “finally” set aside for purposes of achieving the objects set out in sub-clause (2)---The entire discussion related to a matter of law, i.e., whether the sub-clause in question could be regarded as a “charitable purpose”---A finding in favor of the petitioner was recorded in this regard, but that was not enough---The tribunal also had to apply its mind as to whether the third “element” of the exemption clause existed during the periods in question and absent any such finding the benefit of the exemption clause could not be extended to the petitioner---In our view, while the finding of the tribunal might have sufficed for purposes of the second “element” of the exemption clause, it was wholly deficient for the third “element”---The reasoning appeared simply to amount to this: that because the second “element” was found to exist therefore the third was equally found to (or must) exist---But, the tribunal failed to appreciate that while the determination of the second “element” was a question of law (or perhaps a mixed question of law and fact) the third “element” was a separate requirement, which was only a question of fact---The existence of the one could not, and did not, inevitably, as seemed to have been concluded by the tribunal, lead to the other---To conclude that the one existed did not show or mean that the other did as well---The positive obligation that lay on the petitioner in this regard was not discharged---And since the tribunal was the last finder of fact the exercise in relation to the third “element” could not be carried out by either the High Court (which in any case decided against the petitioner) or the Supreme Court---This deficiency was fatal for the petitioner’s case---Even when the exemption clause was viewed in its totality the last portion thereof had to be clearly established, at the latest, by or before the final forum designated to determine questions of fact---This was patently not the situation at hand---Petitioner had failed to make out a case for entitlement to the exemption clause---Leave to appeal was refused and the petitions were dismissed, in circumstances. Cotman v. Brougham [1918] AC 514, [1918-19] All ER Rep 265, [1918] UKHL 358; Re Introductions Ltd. [1968] 2 All ER 1221; [1969] 1 All ER 887; Anglo Overseas Agencies Ltd. v. Green and another [1960] 3 All ER 244 and Commissioner of Income Tax v. Merchant Navy Club 2004 PTD 1304 ref. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Muhammad Abdur Rauf Khan PLD 1963 SC 209; Hamdard Dawakhana v. Commissioner of Income Tax PLD 1980 SC 84 and Fauji Foundation v. Shamimur Rehman PLD 1983 SC 457 rel. (b) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Fiscal statute---Exemption clause---Application and interpretation---Firstly, the onus lies on the taxpayer to show that his case comes within the exemption---Secondly, if two reasonable interpretations are possible the one against the taxpayer will be adopted---But, thirdly, if the taxpayer’s case comes fairly within the scope of the exemption then he cannot be denied the benefit of the same on the basis of any supposed intention to the contrary of the legislature or authority granting it. Oxford University Press v. Commissioner of Income Tax 2019 SCMR 235 rel. (c) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979) [since repealed]--- ----Second Sched. Pt.1, Cl.93---Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001), Second Sched., Pt.1, Cl.59---Income tax---Exemption---Essential elements / components---The exemption clause can be said to contain three “elements”---The income for which exemption is sought (i) must be from “investments in securities of the Federal Government and house property”; (ii) either the said sources of income or the income itself must be “held under trust or other legal obligations wholly, or in part only, for religious or charitable purposes”; and (iii) the income must be “actually applied or finally set apart for application thereto”. Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner (in all cases via video-link, Karachi). Munawar Ali Memon, Advocate Supreme Court, Mrs. Abida Parveen Channar, Advocate-on-Record, M. Masood, Additional Commissioner, (via video-link, Karachi) and Dr. Ishtiaq, D.G. (Law) for Respondents. Date of hearing: 21st April, 2025.

Summary: Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----Ss.114(6), 120(1), 122(3), 122(4), 122(5A) & 133(1)---Amendment of assessment---Further amendment sought by department with reference to earlier deemed assessment---Legality---Subsequent amendment---Scope---Whether original deemed assessment survives after amendment---Briefly, for the tax year 2009, the respondent taxpayer filed a return of income which was treated as a deemed assessment under S. 120(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001; subsequently, the assessment was amended by the tax authorities under S. 122 of the Ordinance---Thereafter, the department sought to carry out a further amendment by referring back to the earlier deemed assessment instead of the amended assessment---The appellate tribunal inland revenue held that once an assessment stood amended, any further amendment could not be made in the amended assessment order---Aggrieved of the said order, the commissioner inland revenue filed the present income tax reference before High Court under S.133(1) of the Ordinance---The issue before the High Court was “whether, in law, the commissioner was entitled to further amend the original deemed assessment under S. 120(1) despite the existence of an amended assessment, in view of S. 122(4) of the Ordinance, or whether the amended assessment alone remained operative and amenable to further amendment?”---Held: A collective reading of subsection (6) of S. 114, read with S. 120 and subsection (3) of S. 122 of the Ordinance led to an ineluctable conclusion that once amended, the deemed assessment order merged into the amended order and as a natural corollary, the only assessment which remained in field was the amended assessment---If the commissioner intended to further amend the assessment order, the only available assessment was the revised/amended assessment as the return already filed under S. 120(1) of the Ordinance lost its efficacy and became irrelevant to the extent of the omission/wrong statement---The amended assessment order was only available assessment, which could be subjected to any further amendment in terms of subsection (5A) of S. 122 of the Ordinance---There was no substance in the question sought to be raised through the present reference application, as such, same was dismissed. Dr. Abdul Nabi, Professor, Department of Chemistry, University of Balochistan, Sariab Road, Quetta v. Executive Officer, Cantonment Board, Quetta 2023 SCMR 1267; All Pakistan Newspaper Society and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2012 SC 01; M/s. Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan and 6 others PLD 1997 SC 582 and Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Ch. Muhammad Akram 2013 PTD 1578 rel. Liaquat Ali Ch. for Applicant. Barrister Usman Khalil for Respondent (in ITR No.293 of 2016) Shahbaz Butt for Respondent (in I.T.R. No.284 of 2016). Date of hearing: 24th October, 2025.