Summary: (a) General Clauses Act (X of 1897) --- ----S. 3(8ab)---"Federal Government"---Concept of the term 'Federal Government" in relation to five different phases before and after creation of Pakistan stated. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 99---Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act (X of 2010), S.31---Conduct of business of Federal Government--- Scope---Changes made in Art.99 of the Constitution through the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010 elaborated. Two important changes which have been made in Article 99 of the Constitution by the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010 were that; (i) the power of delegation to officers and subordinate authorities had been taken away, and (ii) the making of rules had been made mandatory. Two significant inferences followed from such changes. (i) The executive power of the Federal Government had now been channelized and the exercise thereof was to be through the mandatory modality of Rules of Business. These Rules were therefore binding on the Government and a violation of the terms thereof could be fatal to the exercise of executive power. (ii) Whereas originally the Federal Government had the power to delegate any of its functions to officers or authorities i.e. it would have been possible to delegate functions pertaining to fiscal matters to the Finance Ministry; this was no longer possible. (c) Rules of Business, 1973 --- ----R. 16---Cases to be brought before Cabinet---Discretionary power of the Prime Minister---Scope---In terms of R.16 of the Rules of Business, 1973, the Prime Minister had been given discretionary power in the matter of cases brought before the Cabinet, however exercise thereof was circumscribed by certain conditions; first, that there must be a conscious application of mind by the Prime Minister to the existing circumstances justifying the need for such departure through passing of a reasoned and formal order prior to the action taken, and, second, determining whether the constitutional provisions justified such a departure. (d) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 91---Rules of Business, 1973, Rr. 16, 17, 18, 20---Decision making by the Prime minister---Consultation with the Cabinet---Cabinet being the supreme body of the Executive, with a high constitutional status, could not and ought not to be treated as a mere rubber stamp for decision making by the Prime Minister---Constitution envisaged a parliamentary form of Government which was based on decision making by the Cabinet---To turn the Cabinet into a rubber stamp in pursuit of decision making by the Prime Minister to the exclusion of his Cabinet would violate the letter and spirit of the Constitution, as it would reduce a cabinet form of government into a prime ministerial one which was a concept alien to the Constitution. (e) Rules of Business, 1973 --- ----Rr. 2 & 27 & Part E---Concept of "business of Government"---Scope---'Executive' and 'legislative' matters---Word "business" was defined in terms of R.2 of the Rules of Business, 1973 to mean all work done by the Federal Government--- Concept of 'business of Government' included not merely executive matters but also those which pertained to legislation. (f) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 99(3)---Rules of Business, 1973---Nature of---Mandatory and binding on the Government---Authority to frame rules was normally conferred by an Act of Parliament---In the case of the Rules of Business, 1973 such authority flowed from the Constitution itself [Article 99(3)]---Federal Government did not have the discretion to not follow the provisions of the Rules of Business, 1973---Following the Rules of Business, 1973 was mandatory and binding on the Government and a failure to follow them would lead to an order lacking any legal validity---Framer of rules was as much bound by the content thereof as anyone else was subject thereto---Constitutionally mandated rules (such as the Rules of Business, 1973) were closely intertwined with the concept of good governance for and in the public interest---Allowing a departure therefrom would be detrimental to open and transparent forms of governance---To allow the Executive to depart from the language of the Rules of Business, 1973 in its discretion, would be to permit, and legitimize, unconstitutional executive actions. Ahmad Nawaz Shah, Senior Intelligence Officer, Director General, Intelligence and Investigation (Customs and Excise), Islamabad v. Chairman, Central Board of Revenue, Islamabad and 10 others 2002 SCMR 560 ref. (g) Rules under a statute--- ----Mandatory and binding in nature---Rules were framed to achieve a certain objective and to achieve this within the channels relating to the devolution and flow of statutory authority---In the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary all rules were, and should be considered to be mandatory and binding---Burden of proof laid on anyone asserting that the rules in question were directory and not mandatory---Such persons must establish that there was a sound and powerful reason why the rules should not be considered mandatory and binding---Said principle applied with redoubled force, for and in relation to two sets of rules; firstly, constitutionally mandated rules e.g the Rules of Business, 1973 and secondly, rules framed under fiscal enactments. (h) Rules under a statute--- ----Mandatory and binding in nature---Government department violating explicit provisions of certain rules (framed under a statute)---Condonation of such violation---Scope---In each and every case the presumption of law would be that the rules were mandatory and should be observed and followed---Only if a compelling public interest was established as a reason for non-compliance with the rules i.e. other than inadvertence, or negligence, or incompetence then, and only then, could the court consider whether or not to condone the breach in the observance of the rules. (i) Constitution of Pakistan --- ----Arts. 41, 48 & 90---"Federal Government"---Concept and scope---President was not part of Federal Government; he was the Head of the State---Federal Government consisted of the Prime Minister and the Federal Ministers (i.e. the Cabinet) and not the President. (j) Rules of Business, 1973--- ----Rr. 2 & 27---Concept of "business of Government"---'Executive' and 'legislative' matters---Separation of powers between the "Executive" and "Legislature"---Scope---Concept of 'business of Government' included not merely executive matters but also those which pertained to legislation---Rule 27 of the Rules of Business, 1973 stipulated that the Division concerned shall be responsible for determining the contents of the proposed legislation and for consultation with other Divisions---All this was part of the legislative business which was governed by the Rules of Business, 1973, however, once the proposed legislation was finalized and then placed before the House (Parliament), the powers of the Executive, as such, came to an end; the legislature took over---Although the Rules of Business, 1973 covered legislative work, but said Rules did not confer power on the Executive to enact legislative measures---All statutory rules, including those of a fiscal nature, were subordinate legislation---Power to enact subordinate legislation had to be conferred by substantive law; the Rules of Business, 1973 which merely regulated procedural modalities, could not conceivably do so. (k) Rules of Business, 1973 --- ----R. 7(2) & Sched. IV---Power of Secretary of a Division to authenticate by signature all orders and other instruments made, or executed, in the name of President---Such power was a purely formal power---Exercise of such power established the genuineness of the document, it did not confer the statutory power to issue such a document. (l) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 97---Extent of executive authority of the Federation---Scope---Use of the phrase "subject to the constitution" in Art.97 of the Constitution---Connotation---Said phrase indicated that the executive authority of the Federation, as exercised by the Federal Government, was subordinated to the constitutional schema in relation to the conferment of constitutional powers and responsibility on the three organs of the State. (m) Constitution of Pakistan --- ----Art. 98---Parliament conferring functions on subordinate authorities on the recommendation of the Federal Government-- -Scope---Designated functions could only be conferred on officers or authorities who were subordinate to the Federal Government; they could not be conferred on private entities or companies. (n) Legislation--- ----Subordinate legislation---Fiscal notifications---Regulation and issuance of fiscal notifications was in the nature of subordinate legislation (o) Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-Organization) Act (XVII of 1996)--- ---- S. 2 (fa)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 90---Definition of "Federal Government" as given under S.2(fa) of the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-Organization) Act, 1996---Vires---In terms of Article 90 of the Constitution "Federal Government" meant the Prime Minister and the Ministers---Whereas S.2(fa) of the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-Organization) Act, 1996 defined the "Federal Government" as being the Ministry of Information Technology and Telecommunication for purposes of the said Act---Constitutionality---Statutory definition must yield before the provisions of the Constitution--- Statutory definition of "Federal Government" provided under the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-Organization) Act, 1996 was, thus, clearly violative of Art.90 of the Constitution and, therefore, was ultra vires and a nullity. (p) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 89 --- Power of the President to promulgate Ordinance --- Nature of such power was legislative, since it contemplated a change, or alteration, in the corpus of laws in the country; it was not quasi-legislative power. (q) Words and phrases--- ----"Government"---Connotation---Word "government", in its normal connotation, was equivalent to the term "Executive". (r) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 91---"Cabinet"---Scope---Cabinet was a composite concept and its components were the Prime Minister and the Federal Ministers. (s) Rules of Business, 1973 --- ----R. 16(2)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 91---Power of Prime Minister to by-pass the Cabinet---Vires of---Prime Minister could not exercise the powers of the Cabinet by himself---Prime Minister executed policy decisions, he did not take them by himself---Rule 16(2) of the Rules of Business, 1973 which enabled the Prime Minister to dispose of matters by by-passing the Cabinet was, thus, ultra vires (the Constitution). Prime Minster was the head of the Cabinet. He was the single most important person in the Cabinet, but he did not stand in the position of the Cabinet. He was neither a substitute nor a surrogate for the Cabinet. He could not exercise its powers by himself. The reason that he could not stand in the position of the Cabinet was because the Cabinet was, in fact, the Federal Government. Treating the office of the Prime Minister as being equivalent to that of the Cabinet,would mean that the Prime Minister, by himself, as a single individual, would become the Federal Government. This was simply inconceivable. Function of the Chief Executive (Prime Minister) was to execute and implement the policy decisions taken by Cabinet i.e. the Federal Government. Chief Executive executed policy decisions; he did not take them by himself. The Prime Minister could not take decisions by himself, or by supplanting or ignoring the Cabinet because the power to take decisions was vested with the Federal Government i.e. the Cabinet, and unilateral decisions taken by him would be a usurpation of power. Decisions of the Federal Government were the decisions of the Cabinet and not of the Prime Minister. Any decisions taken by the Prime Minister on his own initiative lacked the authority of the law or the Constitution. Rule 16(2) which enabled the Prime Minister to dispose of matters by by-passing the Cabinet was, thus, ultra vires (the Constitution). (t) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 82(3), 83, 84, 86 & 91---Prime Minister---Discretionary governmental spending/expenditure---Authorization by Cabinet --- Any discretionary spending at the initiative of the Prime Minister alone was manifestly unconstitutional and contrary to law---Prime Minister could not make fiscal changes on his own and nor could he engage in discretionary spending by himself---In all such cases the prior decision of the Cabinet was required, since it was unambigiously that body alone which was the Federal Government---Ex post facto approval (of expenditure) by the Cabinet would not suffice since money once spent could not be unspent---All discretionary spending without the prior approval of the Cabinet was contrary to law and would make the Prime Minister personally responsible for such action. Action against distribution of development funds by Ex-Prime Minister Raja Pervaiz Ashraf (PLD 2014 SC 131) ref. (u) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 89 & 91---Power of President to promulgate Ordinance---Scope---Prior approval of the Cabinet---Ordinance making power could only be exercised after a prior consideration by the Cabinet---Ordinance issued without the prior approval of the Cabinet was not valid. (v) Constitution of Pakistan --- ----Arts. 70 & 91---Introduction of Bill in Parliament---Approval by Cabinet---No bill could be moved in Parliament on behalf of the Federal Government without having been approved in advance by the Cabinet---Cabinet had to be given a reasonable opportunity to consider, deliberate on and take decisions in relation to all proposed legislation, including a Finance Bill or an Ordinance or an Act---Actions by the Prime Minister on his own, in such regard, were not valid and would be ultra vires the Constitution. (w) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 77, 90 & 98---Rules of Business, 1973, Rr.3(3), 4(2), 16 & 27---Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990), Ss. 3(2)(b), 3(6), 4(c), 8(1)(b), 13(2)(a) & 71---Exemption from sales tax, withdrawal/modification of---Notifications issued on the basis of the approval of the Secretary and the Advisor of the relevant Division---Constitutionality---Secretary or Advisor did not have any power to make subordinate or delegated legislation---Such power had been conferred solely and exclusively on the Federal Government in terms of S.3 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990---Neither the constitutional provisions, nor the Rules of Business, 1973 conferred power on a Secretary or head of a Division, to be treated as the Federal Government---Secretary of the Revenue Division was not empowered under R.4(2) read with R.3(3) of the Rules of Business, 1973 to issue notifications pertaining to modifications of tax merely because the subject fell within the scope of his responsibilities--- Although the Rules of Business, 1973 covered legislative work, but said Rules did not confer power on the Executive to enact legislative measures---Rules of Business, 1973 neither conferred a power to make fiscal changes, nor could they, on any meaningful interpretation of the Constitution, conceivably confer such a power---Parliament could confer functions on subordinate authorities on the recommendation of the Federal Government, in terms of Art.98 of the Constitution, however said provision did not contemplate the transfer of legislative powers of any nature whatsoever to subordinate officials--- Levy of tax was the function of Parliament---Giving such function/power to the Executive per se, would amount to a negation of the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy and the doctrine of separation of powers---Breach of R.16 of the Rules of Business, 1973 by the Government in issuing the notifications for withdrawal/modification of exemption from sales tax was fatal to the case of the Government---Consequently the impugned notifications were declared ultra vires and were struck down---Appeal was allowed accordingly. Article 77 of the Constitution only enabled the levy of tax under law. Levy of a tax inevitably implied a restriction of a citizen's right to property. Payments of tax amounted to a corresponding deprivation of property and, since the right to property was a fundamental right, this could only be done by means of strict compliance with the law. Breach of Rule 16 of the Rules of Business, 1973 by the Government in issuing the notifications for withdrawal/modification of exemption from sales tax was fatal to the case of the Government. Concept of 'business of Government' included not merely executive matters but also those which pertained to legislation. Rule 27 of the Rules of Business, 1973 stipulated that the Division concerned shall be responsible for determining the contents of the proposed legislation and for consultation with other Divisions. All this was part of the legislative business which was governed by the Rules of Business, 1973, however, once the proposed legislation was finalized and then placed before the House (Parliament), the powers of the Executive, as such, came to an end; the legislature took over. Although the Rules of Business, 1973 covered legislative work, but said Rules did not confer power on the Executive to enact legislative measures. All statutory rules, including those of a fiscal nature, were subordinate legislation. Power to enact subordinate legislation had to be conferred by substantive law; the Rules of Business, 1973 which merely regulated procedural modalities, could not conceivably do so. Chairman, Federal Board of Revenue (FBR), who was the ex officio Secretary of the Revenue Division was not empowered under Rule 4(2) read with Rule 3(3) of the Rules of Business, 1973 to issue notifications pertaining to modifications of tax merely because the subject fell within the scope of his responsibilities. Mere fact that a certain Division was going to deal with a specified subject in terms of the Rule of Business, 1973, did not confer any extra, or additional, constitutional or statutory powers on the said Division. The conferment of power, the exercise of power and the formal notification of the exercise of power were all independent (albeit interlinked) concepts. Chairman FBR, in his capacity as Secretary to the Revenue Division could no doubt make proposals pertaining to modification of tax policy. He could either directly, or through his subordinate officials, process proposals. However, the Chairman's power did not extend any further. The power to make fiscal changes was a substantive power, and moreover, one of great constitutional importance. The Rules of Business, 1973 neither conferred such a power, and nor could they, on any meaningful interpretation of the Constitution, conceivably confer such a power. If the Rules of Business, 1973 were to be amended to purportedly confer such a power, the amendment would be clearly ultra vires. Neither the Secretary, nor the Advisor, had any power to make subordinate or delegated legislation. This power had been conferred solely and exclusively on the Federal Government in terms of section 3 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. Indeed it could not have been conferred on any other subordinate authority, or body, without violating the Constitution. Certain powers had been conferred on the Federal Government under the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The conferment of such a power on any other authority would be clearly unconstitutional. It was up to the Federal Government to allocate, through the modality of the Rules of Business, 1973 which of the different Divisions was to deal with the matter. But this did not mean that the Revenue Division had been transformed into the Federal Government. Secretary of the Revenue Division had full power and authority to process a case relating to fiscal matters. Once he had processed it, he then had to forward it, in accordance with the normal constitutional channels, to the Federal Government, for decision. In other words, the decision would then be taken by the Cabinet comprising of the Prime Minister and the Ministers. The mere fact that the Secretary of the Revenue Division had processed the case did not elevate his status to that of the Federal Government. Neither the constitutional provisions, nor the Rules of Business, 1973 conferred power on a Secretary or head of a Division, to be treated as the Federal Government. Article 98 of the Constitution provided that the Parliament could confer functions on subordinate authorities on the recommendation of the Federal Government, however said provision did not contemplate the transfer of legislative powers of any nature whatsoever to subordinate officials. All it permitted was the discharge of certain functions by designated officials. The transfer of legislative powers would be a clear cut violation of the structure of the Constitution and the concept of separation of powers. Levy of tax was the function of Parliament under Article 77 of the Constitution. Such powers, if given to the Executive per se, would amount to a negation of the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy and the doctrine of separation of powers. Secretary, a Minister or the Prime Minister were not the Federal Government and the exercise, or purported exercise, of a statutory power exercisable by the Federal Government by any of them, especially, in relation to fiscal matters, was constitutionally invalid and a nullity in the eyes of the law. Fiscal notifications enhancing the levy of tax issued by the Secretary, Revenue Division, or the Minister, were ultra vires. Consequently the impugned notifications were declared ultra vires and were struck down. Appeal was allowed accordingly.

Summary: Judgment recognizes the right to read as fundamental right as it is, intrinsically linked to life under Article 9, embedded in our constitutional principles and necessary for the preservation of our societal values. However, it is subject to lawful regulation; restrictions imposed through foreign policy on import and export of books are thus permissible, and the High Court cannot invoke suo motu jurisdiction in such matters. --- (a) Constitution of Pakistan---Arts.2A, 9, 19, 25-A & 37---Fundamental rights---Right to read---Derivation from right to life---Scope---Catalogue of fundamental rights expressly enumerated in the Constitution was exhaustive and courts could not invent new fundamental rights---Courts could, however, derive rights which, though not expressly mentioned, were intrinsically embedded in the text, structure, values and underlying purpose of an enumerated constitutional right---Constitution was a developing constitutional order capable of adaptation while remaining anchored to its text---Any unenumerated right sought to be derived from Art.9 was required to bear an intrinsic nexus with life, remain rooted in constitutional principles and be necessary for preservation of societal values---Right to read satisfied such requirements and formed part of the meaningful enjoyment of life under Art.9. Cited Cases: Khurshid Soap and Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Limited v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2020 SC 641 Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization 597 U.S. 215 (b) Constitution of Pakistan---Art.9---Right to life---Meaning---Life not confined to physical or animal existence---Article 9 protected more than bare survival and extended to a life of dignity, purpose and worth---Acquisition of knowledge, education, critical thought and intellectual development bore a direct nexus with meaningful human existence---Reading enabled individuals to understand history, law, rights and obligations, engage with diverse ideas and participate as informed citizens---Obstructing access to readable material imperilled education, intellectual growth, informed citizenship and the rule of law---Right to read was, therefore, embedded in and protected by the constitutional right to life. Cited Cases: Shehla Zia v. WAPDA PLD 1994 SC 693 Employees of Pakistan Law Commission, Islamabad v. Ministry of Works 1994 SCMR 1548 Metropolitan Corporation v. Imtiaz Hussain PLD 1996 Lahore 499 Sajida Bibi v. Incharge Chowki PLD 1997 SC 666 Nizar Ali Fazwani v. Federation of Pakistan 2025 CLC 1607 (c) Constitution of Pakistan---Arts.2A, 9 & 37---Objectives Resolution---Freedom of thought, social justice and education---Right to read---Constitutional history demonstrated an unbroken commitment, through the Constitutions of 1956, 1962 and 1973, to promotion of education and meaningful participation of citizens in national life---Objectives Resolution guaranteed freedom of thought and required observance of social justice---Freedom of thought could meaningfully exist only where individuals had access to books, written material and knowledge---Right to read was a natural and necessary companion of freedom of thought and the constitutional commitment to education and social justice. (d) Constitution of Pakistan---Arts.9 & 25-A---Right to read---Formal education distinguished from general acquisition of knowledge---Article 25-A imposed an obligation upon the State to provide free and compulsory formal education to children between five and sixteen years of age---Provision was directed towards education imparted through schools and educational institutions within the prescribed age group---A generalized right to read, extending to books, journals, articles, treatises and other written material for persons generally, could not be derived from Art.25-A---Such broader right arose from Art.9 and its expansive protection of meaningful life, knowledge and intellectual development. Cited Cases: Headmaster v. Chairman 1996 CLC 1785 Ahmad Abdullah v. Government of Punjab PLD 2003 Lahore 752 Dr. Laiba Khan v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa W.P. No.1300-A of 2021 Imdad Hussain v. Province of Sindh PLD 2007 Karachi 116 Mehboob Ali Rind v. Secretary Education, Balochistan 2023 PLC (C.S.) 1526 (e) Constitution of Pakistan---Arts.9 & 19---Right to read---Access to law books---Scope---Law books were not confined to use by members of the Bar and Bench but were consulted by citizens seeking to understand their legal rights, obligations and pending or contemplated litigation---Importing the same books from countries other than India substantially increased their price and imposed a financial burden upon readers---Making access to books difficult, including through measures increasing their practical unaffordability, impaired the fundamental right to read---Right extended to books, journals, articles and other written or recorded material contributing to knowledge and education. (f) Constitution of Pakistan---Arts.90, 97 & 142 read with Federal Legislative List, Fourth Schedule, Entries 1 & 3---Foreign policy, national security and international trade---Executive authority---Judicial review---Federal Government possessed executive authority in matters falling within Parliament’s legislative competence, including national security, external affairs and foreign policy---Determination of the countries with which Pakistan would maintain trade relations was the exclusive prerogative of the Executive---Courts were institutionally unsuited to formulate or review such policy and could not direct the Government to trade with one country rather than another---Judicial interference in such matters would transgress separation of powers and encroach upon the constitutional domain of the Executive. Cited Case: Muhammad Shoaib Razzaq v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2019 Islamabad 339 (g) Constitution of Pakistan---Art.9---Right to read---Qualified right---Restrictions imposed by law and foreign policy---Right to read was not absolute---Article 9 itself permitted deprivation or restriction in accordance with law---Federal Government had lawfully exercised its executive authority by prohibiting import of goods originating from or imported through India and Israel under the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950 and the applicable Import Policy Order---Where restriction upon reading material resulted from a lawful foreign-policy and trade measure, Court could not substitute its own policy judgment---Affected persons could approach the Federal Government for reconsideration, but review of foreign policy remained the sole prerogative of the Executive. (h) Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950---S.3---Import Policy Order, 2020, para.5---Prohibition upon goods of Indian or Israeli origin---Law books---Constitutional validity---Restriction upon import of law books engaged the fundamental right to read, but such engagement did not by itself render the prohibition unconstitutional---Impugned measure had been issued within the lawful domain of the Federal Government on foreign-policy and trade considerations---Right to read being qualified and subject to law, the prohibition remained intra vires the Constitution. (i) Constitution of Pakistan---Arts.4(2)(c) & 199(1)(a)(i)---Writ of mandamus---Existence of legal duty---High Court directing appointment of officer to hear grievances and review import policy---Legality---Mandamus could issue only where an existing legal obligation required a public authority to perform a particular act---Article 4(2)(c) prohibited compelling any person to do that which law did not require---No statutory provision required the Federal Government to appoint an officer, devise a review mechanism or entertain private grievances concerning the import prohibition---Court could not create a new administrative duty, power or procedure by judicial command---Directions requiring appointment of an officer and creation of a review mechanism were without lawful foundation. Cited Case: Vice Chancellor, Shaheed Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto Medical University v. Altaf Hussain Somroo F.C.P.L.A. No.14 of 2025 (j) Constitution of Pakistan---Art.199---High Court---Suo motu exercise of constitutional jurisdiction---Relief not prayed for---Certiorari converted into mandamus---Petitioners before High Court had sought declaration that the impugned SRO and Import Policy Order were unconstitutional, void ab initio and ultra vires---Relief sought was essentially in the nature of certiorari requiring the Court to determine whether the impugned instruments were legally valid---After holding the measures intra vires, High Court nevertheless directed the Federal Government to appoint an officer, hear grievances and establish a review procedure---By granting mandamus not claimed by the parties, High Court effectively acted suo motu---High Courts possessed no authority to invoke constitutional jurisdiction on their own motion and could grant relief only within the framework of the pleadings, prayers and powers conferred by law. Cited Cases: Khalid Mehmood v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Finance PLD 2026 FCC 1 M/s Sadiq Poultry v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa PLD 2023 SC 236 Akhtar Abbas v. Nayyar Hussain 1982 SCMR 549 (k) Constitution of Pakistan---Art.9---Right to read and right to write---Concurring opinion---Reading and writing constituted mutually dependent and inseparable components of literacy---Reading enabled acquisition and comprehension of knowledge, rights and duties, while writing enabled articulation of thought, assertion of legal claims, recording of transactions and participation in civic, democratic and judicial processes---Right to think and express oneself necessarily involved both the receipt and communication of ideas---Right to life, purposively construed, therefore included an integrated “right to read and write” essential for dignity, intellectual autonomy, moral agency and meaningful participation in society. (l) Constitution of Pakistan---Arts.9, 17, 19 & 25-A---Right to write---Freedom of expression, association and literacy---Concurring opinion---Written communication was one of the most enduring and structured forms of expression protected under Art.19---Elementary literacy contemplated by Art.25-A necessarily included the ability to read and write---Reading, analysis and written criticism influenced public opinion, facilitated informed decision-making and contributed to exercise of freedom of association under Art.17---Arbitrary or structural deprivation of the capacity to receive and impart ideas in written form would impair the dignity protected by the right to life---Right to read and write, however, remained subject to lawful constitutional restrictions and did not create an unrestricted entitlement to publish or disseminate prohibited material. (m) Constitution of Pakistan---Arts.9, 90 & 97---Import of Indian law books---Availability through digital sources---Concurring opinion---Professional material could increasingly be accessed through electronic and online sources, making an absolute physical-import prohibition capable of circumvention---Government was required to exercise care and caution when invoking patriotism and national security to restrict intellectual material so that development of an informed and intellectually competent society was not unnecessarily impeded---Nevertheless, foreign policy remained within the exclusive constitutional domain of the Executive and could not be judicially reviewed or reformulated by the Court. Disposition---Leave to appeal was granted and petitions were converted into appeals---Right to read was declared to form part of the right to life under Art.9 of the Constitution, but was held to be qualified and subject to restrictions imposed in accordance with law, including lawful foreign-policy considerations---Import prohibition was not struck down---Private respondents were permitted to approach the Federal Government for reconsideration of the policy---Directions of the Lahore High Court requiring appointment of an officer, hearing of grievances and establishment of a review mechanism were set aside---Concurring opinion further declared that the right to life included the integrated right to read and write.