Summary: (a) Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973--- ----Rr. 2, 3 & 9---Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act (IV of 2010), Ss. 3, 4 & Preamble---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Misconduct---Disciplinary proceedings---Harassment at workplace---Proceedings---Object, purpose and scope---Petitioner / civil servant was aggrieved of show cause notice issued to him regarding departmental inquiry on the allegation of sexual harassment of a female employee---Validity---Proceedings initiated under provisions of Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 are a matter between Federal Government in its capacity as an employer and a civil servant in his/her capacity as an employee---Purpose of such proceedings is to ensure that an employee is abiding by the terms and conditions of service prescribed for purposes of his/her conduct in discharge of his/her duties---Object and scope of Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 is altogether different as the rationale for enactment of such law, as explained in its Preamble, is to provide for protection of women from harassment at workplace---Set of facts on the basis of which a complaint was founded against accused under provisions of Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 needed to be inquired into, which if proved, consequences and penalties prescribed under Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 were to flow toward petitioner / civil servant---Proceedings under Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 are adversarial in nature, where a complainant makes allegations against an accused and the same have to be proved on the basis of cogent evidence---Penalties prescribed in terms of S. 4 of Protection Against Harassment of Women At the Workplace Act, 2010 may be similar to, or overlap with, the penalties prescribed in terms of R. 4 of Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, and the same has no bearing on the object, purpose and effect of the proceedings under Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 on one hand and Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, on the other---High Court declined to interfere in show cause notice issued to petitioner / civil servant--- Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances. Nadia Naz v. The President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan PLD 2023 SC 588; Raja Tanveer Safdar v. Mrs. Tehmina Yasmeen and others PLD 2024 SC 795; Faraz Naveed v. District Police Officer Gujrat 2022 SCMR 1770; Imran Amir v. Mst. Ismat Bibi and another 2023 CLC 1059; Dr. Sohail Hassan Khan v. Director General (Research), Livestock and Dairy Development Department, Punjab 2020 SCMR 1708; Asif Mehmood Butt v. Regional CEO, NBP 2011 PLC (C.S.) 1462; Falak Sher v. Inspector General Police, Lahore 2005 SCMR 1020; DIG of Police v. Anees ur Rehman Khan PLD 1985 SC 134; Syed Muhammad Iqbal Jafri v. Registrar, Lahore High Court 2004 PLC (C.S.) 809; Saifur Rahman v Chairman, National Accountability Bureau PLD 2022 SC 409; Muhammad Ashraf v. The State 1995 SCMR 626; The State v. Jehangir Akhtar 2018 SCMR 733; I.A. Sherwani v. Government of Pakistan 1991 SCMR 1041; Pir Muhammad v. Government of Balochistan 2007 SCMR 54 and Muhammad Hassan Ullah v. Chief Secretary Government of Balochistan 2025 SCMR 134 ref. (b) Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973--- ----R.3---Disciplinary proceedings---Scope---Proceedings under Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 are not necessarily adversarial in nature---Such proceedings are meant to confirm and ensure that terms and conditions of service prescribed for purposes of Civil Servants Act, 1973 including requirements as to conduct and efficiency of an employee, are being complied with. Muhammad Shoaib Shaheen, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner. Raja Muhammad Jawad Arsalan, Assistant Attorney General for Respondents. Muhammad Ahmad Pansota, Barrister Scheherzaday Shehryar and Guzel Mobeen for Respondent No.4. Sher Alam Khan and Zeeshan Raza Zaidi, SOs, Establishment Division for Respondents. Ms. Zaib Tayyab, Director SS(A) and Ghulam Mustafa, APS, MOFA for Respondents. Date of hearing: 26th August, 2025.

Summary: (a) Service matters ---- Civil servants in Pakistan Railways ---- Advance increments for higher qualification ---- Scope of departmental and general incentive schemes---- Respondent, serving as Accounts Officer in Audit Department of Pakistan Railways, obtained LLB degree (1992) and claimed two advance increments under (i) “Incentive Scheme for Railways Officers and Subordinates” dated 22.01.1966, and (ii) Office Memorandum dated 08.07.1996 regarding “Grant of Advance Increments to Employees Drawing Pay in BPS-16” (General Scheme, 1996)----Department rejected claim on ground that Scheme, 1966 stood abolished w.e.f. 01.12.2001; Federal Service Tribunal, however, granted benefit under Scheme, 1966----Held, per record, Scheme, 1966 did not extend to officers of the Audit Department at all and no benefit thereunder had been notified for that cadre; Tribunal thus erred in importing Audit Department into the scheme and in granting increments to respondent----Benefit under Scheme, 1966 set aside. (b) Service matters ---- Advance increments for additional qualification ---- General Scheme, 1996 requiring M.A. / M.Sc. ---- LLB degree not covered---- General Scheme, 1996 specifically provided two advance increments for employees in BPS-16 on acquiring M.A. or M.Sc. qualification----Respondent, holding LLB degree, sought to invoke the scheme by arguing that LLB was equivalent to M.A.----Held, scheme neither mentioned LLB nor contained any facilitation clause for treating “equivalent” degrees as falling within its ambit; no judicial warrant existed to expand language of scheme so as to include LLB within M.A./M.Sc. category----Respondent therefore did not qualify for advance increments under General Scheme, 1996. (c) Service matters ---- Remand to Tribunal or lower forum ---- Nature, limits and proper use of remand power---- High Court / appellate forum noticed that the Tribunal had not addressed respondent’s alternate claim under General Scheme, 1996----Held, “remand” is not an automatic or default judicial reflex; it is a corrective tool to be deployed only where material facts remain undetermined, essential evidence is lacking, or procedural fairness has been impaired so that the appellate court cannot itself do complete justice----Where factual matrix is complete, issues are purely legal, or record enables final adjudication, appellate court ought to decide matter itself rather than remand, in line with principle of judicial economy and constitutional command of expeditious justice under Art. 37(d) of the Constitution----In present case, record was complete and question purely legal; Court therefore declined to remand and decided respondent’s entitlement on merits. (d) Constitutional law ---- Institutional autonomy and judicial restraint in policy domain ---- Service incentive schemes and allowances ---- Question arose whether Court could “read in” LLB as equivalent to M.A. for purposes of General Scheme, 1996, though scheme itself contained no such provision----Held, institutional autonomy is a vital facet of constitutional governance; policy choices in framing incentive schemes and determining eligible qualifications fall within executive/administrative domain (e.g. Pakistan Railways, Finance Division)----Courts must interpret schemes as framed, ensuring legality and rationality, but cannot recast, extend or re-engineer them to confer benefits not contemplated by the competent authority----To judicially import equivalence where scheme is silent would amount to judicial legislation and undermine institutional autonomy----Unless a constitutional or statutory command is violated, Court cannot compel grant of a benefit not provided in the governing framework. (e) Service matters ---- Equivalence of LLB with Master’s degree for pay / incentive purposes ---- Consistency with prior case-law---- Respondent’s counsel argued that LLB should be treated as equivalent to M.A. and thus brought within General Scheme, 1996----Held, Supreme Court has already held that LLB is not equivalent to a Master’s degree for such service/financial benefits; reference made to order dated 17.02.2022 in CPLA No.262 of 2018 (Government through Secretary Finance, Finance Division (Regulation Wing), Islamabad v. Manzoor Qadir, Assistant Director (Mails) and others) and order dated 13.03.2018 in CPLA No.65 of 2017 (The Secretary Finance Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad v. Hakim Ali Soomro and others)----Present Bench followed the said view and declined to treat LLB as equivalent to M.A. for purposes of advance increments. (f) Service matters ---- Wrongly granted monetary benefits ---- Recovery and departmental magnanimity ---- Effect on precedent---- Following Tribunal’s impugned judgment, respondent had already received advance increments aggregating to Rs.75,000/- ---- Supreme Court held respondent not entitled to such increments under either Scheme, 1966 or General Scheme, 1996, yet Additional Secretary, Pakistan Railways stated that Department, in the circumstances of this particular case, did not intend to recover said amount----Held, such waiver reflected departmental grace and magnanimity but could not be treated or cited as precedent in any other matter----Petitions were converted into appeals, allowed, impugned judgment of Tribunal set aside, and respondent’s claim to advance increments finally dismissed.

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 199 & 212---Civil service---Disciplinary proceeding against civil servant, challenging of--- Invoking const itutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Mala fide alleged by civil servant---Effect---Petitioner (Officer Inland Revenue) challenged the Fact Finding Inquiry Report recommending disciplinary proceeding alleging that ongoing disciplinary proceeding was tainted with mala fide---Arguments of the petitioner, invoking constitutional jurisdiction of High Court, was that no final order was passed, hence, no department remedy was available---Validity---As per the Fact Finding Inquiry Report disciplinary action against the petitioner had been recommended together with other officials of the respondents-FBR, including Commissioners and Additional Commissioners ; which (the second set of proceeding) initiated by respondents-FBR eventually was under challenge before the concerned forum---Constitutional bar under Art.212 of the constitution will exclude judicial review jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 199 of the Constitution, if the issue was about the terms and conditions of service of any civil servant---Argument of the petitioner (that no final order was passed, hence, no department remedy was available) was also not tenable, because, disciplinary proceeding being sub judice had not been concluded---No justification to interfere in the ongoing disciplinary proceeding was made out, however, competent authority shall conclude the disciplinary proceeding expeditiously, and should take into account the factors raised---Petition was disposed of. Ahmad Ullah and others v. District Education Officer (Male), Buner and others 2024 SCMR 2004 ref. M.A. Rahman v. Federation of Pakistan and others 1988 SCMR 691 and Syed Muhammad Abbas Rizvi and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Establishment Division, Islamabad and others 2014 PLC (C.S.) 1363 distinguished. Zamir Hussain Ghumro and Faizan Hussain Memon for Petitioner. Muhammad Akbar Khan, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan for Respondent No.1. Mukesh Kumar Khatri for Respondent No.4. Date of hearing: 16th October, 2025.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Employee of District judiciary---Disciplinary proceedings---Show-cause notice, assailing of---Constitutional petition--Maintainability---Petitioner was alleged to have secured employment on the basis of forged documents---Petitioner assailed final show-cause notice issued to him by authorities during departmental disciplinary proceedings---Validity---Show-cause notice, whether initial or final, was not amenable to Constitutional jurisdiction unless it was shown to be a nullity in law---Issuance of show-cause notice was a procedural step intended to afford the employee an opportunity to explain his conduct and did not by itself constitute adverse determination of rights---Constitutional Courts do not sit as appellate forums over departmental inquiries---Petitioner was to exhaust remedies available under service rules, including right to reply, personal hearing and appeal, when the adverse order was passed---Premature judicial intervention undermined disciplinary framework and set a deleterious precedent for circumventing lawful accountability---Mere show-cause notice filed at a stage when no final determination had been made, failed to meet threshold of maintainability under Art. 199 of the Constitution---High Court declined to interfere in the matter as it was premature, misconceived, legally deficient and factually unsubstantiated---High Court directed the competent authority to proceed with the disciplinary inquiry strictly in accordance with the law, ensuring due process and affording petitioner a fair defence opportunity---Constitutional petition was dismissed accordingly. (b) General Clauses Act (X of 1897)--- ----S.21---Locus poenitentiae, principle of---Scope---Provision of S. 21 of General Clauses Act, 1897, provides a statutory basis for revisiting prior administrative orders---Power to issue orders includes power to amend, vary, or rescind them, provided such exercise is undertaken in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as the original order---Provision of S. 21 General Clauses Act, 1897 empowers competent authority to reopen a matter where new and credible evidence emerges, especially in fraud or misrepresentation cases. Muhammad Ali Pirzado for Petitioner. Liaquat Ali Shar, Additional Advocate, General for Respondents. Date of hearing: 27th October, 2025.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan- -Arts.4, 9, 10A, 25 & 212(3)-Abscondence in criminal proceedings- -Person’s status as a proclaimed offender-Effect upon his right to pursue civil or service remedies-Its legal consequences would be confined to the criminal sphere only-Criminal fugitivity and civil adjudication of rights-Highlighted as two distinct legal domains-Brief facts of the matter were that the petitioners were appointed as ‘junior vernacular teachers’ nearly twenty-five years ago, but their appointments were later declared bogus by the education department resulting in stoppage of their salaries, though no formal removal order had yet been passed and their service appeal seeking release of salaries was dismissed by the Punjab Service Tribunal solely on the ground that they were absconders in a separate criminal case-Pivotal issue requiring determination before the Supreme Court was as to-whether the status of an absconder or fugitive in a criminal case, by itself, barred or disentitled a person from pursuing civil or service law remedies before a competent forum?-Held: Principle that a fugitive or absconder could not invoke courts appellate jurisdiction in a criminal matter was strictly confined to criminal proceedings and its extension into civil, family, or service-law contexts found no support in either doctrine or policy-Civil and service adjudications determined rights over property, employment, or entitlements that were enforceable irrespective of the claimant’s physical custody, and the litigant’s absence seldom frustrated the process or its execution-Unless a statute expressly provided otherwise or the fugitivity demonstrably obstructed adjudication, abscondence in a criminal matter could not extinguish or suspend independent civil or service rights-Any disadvantage arising from the status of a proclaimed offender ordinarily attached only to the very case in which the proclamation was issued and did not extend to other matters lacking nexus to that proceeding-Accordingly, a proclaimed offender could not, merely by virtue of that status, be barred from instituting or defending a civil suit or prosecuting an appeal concerning his civil rights and obligations-To dismiss the petitioners solely based on their alleged abscondence was, therefore, a clear misapplication of law, as it conflated two distinct jurisdictions and deprived the petitioners of adjudication on issues squarely within their civil and service rights-Impugned judgment was set aside-Present petitions were converted into appeal and allowed, in circumstances. Malik Ahmad Usman Nawaz v. The Appellate Tribunal (Elections Act, 2017) 2024 SCMR 1202; Umar Farooq v. Sajjad Ahmad Qamar and others PLD 2024 SC 688 and Tahir Sadiq v. Faisal Ali and others 2024 SCMR 775 rel. (b) Administration of justice- -Whether a person’s status as an absconder in a criminal case can operate as a bar to the pursuit of civil or service-law remedies-Legality-The right of access to justice cannot be curtailed merely because a person stands accused, or has absconded, in another domain of law.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts.4, 9, 10A, 25 & 212(3)---Abscondence in criminal proceedings- --Person’s status as a proclaimed offender---Effect upon his right to pursue civil or service remedies---Its legal consequences would be confined to the criminal sphere only---Criminal fugitivity and civil adjudication of rights---Highlighted as two distinct legal domains---Brief facts of the matter were that the petitioners were appointed as ‘junior vernacular teachers’ nearly twenty-five years ago, but their appointments were later declared bogus by the education department resulting in stoppage of their salaries, though no formal removal order had yet been passed and their service appeal seeking release of salaries was dismissed by the Punjab Service Tribunal solely on the ground that they were absconders in a separate criminal case---Pivotal issue requiring determination before the Supreme Court was as to “whether the status of an absconder or fugitive in a criminal case, by itself, barred or disentitled a person from pursuing civil or service law remedies before a competent forum?”---Held: Principle that a fugitive or absconder could not invoke courts appellate jurisdiction in a criminal matter was strictly confined to criminal proceedings and its extension into civil, family, or service-law contexts found no support in either doctrine or policy---Civil and service adjudications determined rights over property, employment, or entitlements that were enforceable irrespective of the claimant’s physical custody, and the litigant’s absence seldom frustrated the process or its execution---Unless a statute expressly provided otherwise or the fugitivity demonstrably obstructed adjudication, abscondence in a criminal matter could not extinguish or suspend independent civil or service rights---Any disadvantage arising from the status of a proclaimed offender ordinarily attached only to the very case in which the proclamation was issued and did not extend to other matters lacking nexus to that proceeding---Accordingly, a proclaimed offender could not, merely by virtue of that status, be barred from instituting or defending a civil suit or prosecuting an appeal concerning his civil rights and obligations---To dismiss the petitioners solely based on their alleged abscondence was, therefore, a clear misapplication of law, as it conflated two distinct jurisdictions and deprived the petitioners of adjudication on issues squarely within their civil and service rights---Impugned judgment was set aside---Present petitions were converted into appeal and allowed, in circumstances. Malik Ahmad Usman Nawaz v. The Appellate Tribunal (Elections Act, 2017) 2024 SCMR 1202; Umar Farooq v. Sajjad Ahmad Qamar and others PLD 2024 SC 688 and Tahir Sadiq v. Faisal Ali and others 2024 SCMR 775 rel. (b) Administration of justice--- ----Whether a person’s status as an absconder in a criminal case can operate as a bar to the pursuit of civil or service-law remedies---Legality---The right of access to justice cannot be curtailed merely because a person stands accused, or has absconded, in another domain of law. Manzoor Ahmed Rahmani, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in both cases/via video link from Branch Registry Quetta). Muhammad Ayaz Swati, A.A.G. Balochistan for Respondents (in both cases). Date of hearing: 24th October, 2025.

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 30.01.2018 of the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore in Appeal No.3989 of 2016). (a) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts.4, 9, 10A, 25 & 212(3)---Abscondence in criminal proceedings- --Person’s status as a proclaimed offender---Effect upon his right to pursue civil or service remedies---Its legal consequences would be confined to the criminal sphere only---Criminal fugitivity and civil adjudication of rights---Highlighted as two distinct legal domains---Brief facts of the matter were that the petitioners were appointed as ‘junior vernacular teachers’ nearly twenty-five years ago, but their appointments were later declared bogus by the education department resulting in stoppage of their salaries, though no formal removal order had yet been passed and their service appeal seeking release of salaries was dismissed by the Punjab Service Tribunal solely on the ground that they were absconders in a separate criminal case---Pivotal issue requiring determination before the Supreme Court was as to “whether the status of an absconder or fugitive in a criminal case, by itself, barred or disentitled a person from pursuing civil or service law remedies before a competent forum?”---Held: Principle that a fugitive or absconder could not invoke courts appellate jurisdiction in a criminal matter was strictly confined to criminal proceedings and its extension into civil, family, or service-law contexts found no support in either doctrine or policy---Civil and service adjudications determined rights over property, employment, or entitlements that were enforceable irrespective of the claimant’s physical custody, and the litigant’s absence seldom frustrated the process or its execution---Unless a statute expressly provided otherwise or the fugitivity demonstrably obstructed adjudication, abscondence in a criminal matter could not extinguish or suspend independent civil or service rights---Any disadvantage arising from the status of a proclaimed offender ordinarily attached only to the very case in which the proclamation was issued and did not extend to other matters lacking nexus to that proceeding---Accordingly, a proclaimed offender could not, merely by virtue of that status, be barred from instituting or defending a civil suit or prosecuting an appeal concerning his civil rights and obligations---To dismiss the petitioners solely based on their alleged abscondence was, therefore, a clear misapplication of law, as it conflated two distinct jurisdictions and deprived the petitioners of adjudication on issues squarely within their civil and service rights---Impugned judgment was set aside---Present petitions were converted into appeal and allowed, in circumstances. Malik Ahmad Usman Nawaz v. The Appellate Tribunal (Elections Act, 2017) 2024 SCMR 1202; Umar Farooq v. Sajjad Ahmad Qamar and others PLD 2024 SC 688 and Tahir Sadiq v. Faisal Ali and others 2024 SCMR 775 rel. (b) Administration of justice--- ----Whether a person’s status as an absconder in a criminal case can operate as a bar to the pursuit of civil or service-law remedies---Legality---The right of access to justice cannot be curtailed merely because a person stands accused, or has absconded, in another domain of law. Manzoor Ahmed Rahmani, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in both cases/via video link from Branch Registry Quetta). Muhammad Ayaz Swati, A.A.G. Balochistan for Respondents (in both cases). Date of hearing: 24th October, 2025.

Summary: (a) Administration of justice----Absconder/fugitive from law in criminal case----Whether bars pursuit of civil or service remedies----Scope. The central question was whether a person declared an absconder or fugitive in a criminal matter is, by that status alone, precluded from pursuing civil or service-law remedies. The Court held that the fugitive disentitlement principle—rooted historically in criminal appellate procedure and premised on enforceability of judgments and prevention of evasion—applies strictly and exclusively to criminal proceedings. Its rationale does not extend to civil, family, or service adjudication, where rights concerning employment, property or entitlements remain enforceable irrespective of the claimant’s physical custody. Mere abscondence in a criminal case does not bar access to civil or service forums unless a statute expressly imposes such a disability or the fugitivity itself demonstrably obstructs adjudication. (b) Criminal law----Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine----Origin, rationale and limits---Inapplicability beyond criminal jurisdiction. The doctrine evolved in the United States as an equitable rule of criminal procedure, endorsed on the basis that a court should not pronounce unenforceable judgments, that flight frustrates appellate process, and that denial of hearing deters evasion. Similar consequences exist in the United Kingdom under the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 and in Pakistani criminal procedure, where appellate courts refuse to hear criminal appeals of fugitives until surrender. These consequences, however, are confined to criminal proceedings. Attempts in other jurisdictions to extend the doctrine into civil matters have been rejected as disproportionate and inconsistent with due process guarantees. (c) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts.4, 9, 10-A & 25----Right of access to justice----Civil, service, and proprietary rights not extinguished by criminal abscondence----Due process implications. Under Articles 4, 9, 10-A and 25 of the Constitution, every person is entitled to fair treatment, meaningful access to justice, equality before law, and due process. Abscondence or being a proclaimed offender in a criminal case cannot, by implication, foreclose rights relating to employment, livelihood, pension, property, or contractual obligations. Reading such a bar into service jurisprudence without clear legislative mandate would offend constitutional guarantees, deny access to justice, distort judicial function, and convert service adjudication into an oppressive mechanism contrary to rule of law and fair administration of justice. (d) Service law----Proclaimed offender----Effect confined to criminal proceedings—No automatic civil/service disability except where statute expressly so provides. This Court has earlier held that disadvantages arising from the status of proclaimed offender ordinarily attach only within the criminal proceedings in which such proclamation is issued and do not extend to unrelated civil matters. A proclaimed offender is not barred from instituting or defending civil proceedings or pursuing appeals regarding civil or service rights. Unless a service statute clearly prescribes that criminal abscondence disables pursuit of service remedies, no such disqualification can be imported by implication. Cited Cases: • Tahir Sadiq v. Faisal Ali and others 2024 SCMR 775 • Malik Ahmad Usman Nawaz v. The Appellate Tribunal (Elections Act, 2017) 2024 SCMR 1202 • Umar Farooq v. Sajjad Ahmad Qamar and others PLD 2024 SC 688 (e) Administration of justice----Misapplication of criminal status to service proceedings----Illegality. The dispute concerned allegations of fake or irregular appointments, legality of disciplinary proceedings, and withholding of salaries despite absence of removal orders—issues exclusively within service and administrative law. These had no nexus to the petitioners’ criminal status. The Service Tribunal’s dismissal of their appeal solely on the ground that they were fugitives was a misapplication of law, conflating two unrelated jurisdictions and depriving petitioners of adjudication on their service rights. (f) Civil procedure----Right to be heard----Prohibition against tactical use of criminal labels to defeat civil remedies. Importing the fugitive disentitlement doctrine into civil/service matters would create twofold injustice: first, by denying citizens access to statutory remedies in matters affecting livelihood and civil entitlements, thereby undermining due process; and second, by enabling opportunistic litigants to weaponize criminal accusations to block judicial scrutiny of their actions. Such misuse would subvert rule of law and cannot be permitted. Disposition: Impugned judgment set aside; petitions converted into appeal and allowed; matter deemed pending before the Punjab Service Tribunal, which shall decide on merits within three months from receipt of order.

Summary: The ACTING SECTOR COMMANDER NHMP, SHAHI BAG KALAT QUETTA and others-Respondents (Against the judgment dated 03.03.2025 of the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad in Appeal No. 03(Q)CS of 2024). National Highways and Motorway Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 2016- -R. 8(2)-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10-A-Right to cross-examination-Scope-Departmental proceedings-Penalty of dismissal from service-Fair trial-Waiver of right of cross-examination-Scope-Inquiry Officer dispensing with the right to cross-examination without recording reasons-Validity-Where an accused does not specifically refer to his right to cross-examination in a reply to a show-cause notice, that right is not somehow waived-Such right remains intact and it is upon the Inquiry Officer to ensure that such right is told to the accused, properly afforded and if the accused does not wish to proceed with cross-examination, Inquiry Officer is to record the reasons and put that into writing-It is incumbent upon the inquiry officer to ensure that the right is not treated so casually and dispensed away with especially without any reasons recorded in writing-Right remains intact, guaranteed under Art. 10-A of the Constitution even where the accused does not make a request to cross-examine any witness at any point during the investigation process-Right to a proper defence-and, by necessary implication, the right to cross-examine-is a vested and inalienable right of the accused-Article 10-A of the Constitution casts a constitutional canopy over all proceedings, shielding the accused from being left exposed to the harsh glare of arbitrary or one-sided departmental action, as it ensures that no person is condemned unheard and that fairness permeates every stage of the disciplinary process-Order of dismissal from service and judgment of the Tribunal were set aside with a direction to conduct de novo inquiry strictly in accordance with Art. 10-A of the Constitution-Civil petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, in circumstances. Federation of Pakistan through Chairman FBR v. Zahid Malik 2023 SCMR 603; Lyons v. Longford and Westmeath Education and Training Board [2017] IEHC 272; Tariq Khan v. Additional DG, FIA 2025 PLC (C.S.) 467; Ghulam Murtaza Shiekh v. The Chief Minister, Sindh 2024 SCMR 1757; Federation of Pakistan through Chairman FBR v. Zahid Malik 2023 SCMR 603 and Usman Ghani v. Chief Post Master, GPO Karachi 2022 SCMR 745 rel.

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 03.03.2025 of the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad in Appeal No. 03(Q)CS of 2024). National Highways and Motorway Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 2016--- ----R. 8(2)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10-A---Right to cross-examination---Scope---Departmental proceedings---Penalty of dismissal from service---Fair trial---Waiver of right of cross-examination---Scope---Inquiry Officer dispensing with the right to cross-examination without recording reasons---Validity---Where an accused does not specifically refer to his right to cross-examination in a reply to a show-cause notice, that right is not somehow waived---Such right remains intact and it is upon the Inquiry Officer to ensure that such right is told to the accused, properly afforded and if the accused does not wish to proceed with cross-examination, Inquiry Officer is to record the reasons and put that into writing---It is incumbent upon the inquiry officer to ensure that the right is not treated so casually and dispensed away with especially without any reasons recorded in writing---Right remains intact, guaranteed under Art. 10-A of the Constitution even where the accused does not make a request to cross-examine any witness at any point during the investigation process---Right to a proper defence-and, by necessary implication, the right to cross-examine-is a vested and inalienable right of the accused---Article 10-A of the Constitution casts a constitutional canopy over all proceedings, shielding the accused from being left exposed to the harsh glare of arbitrary or one-sided departmental action, as it ensures that no person is condemned unheard and that fairness permeates every stage of the disciplinary process---Order of dismissal from service and judgment of the Tribunal were set aside with a direction to conduct de novo inquiry strictly in accordance with Art. 10-A of the Constitution---Civil petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, in circumstances. Federation of Pakistan through Chairman FBR v. Zahid Malik 2023 SCMR 603; Lyons v. Longford and Westmeath Education and Training Board [2017] IEHC 272; Tariq Khan v. Additional DG, FIA 2025 PLC (C.S.) 467; Ghulam Murtaza Shiekh v. The Chief Minister, Sindh 2024 SCMR 1757; Federation of Pakistan through Chairman FBR v. Zahid Malik 2023 SCMR 603 and Usman Ghani v. Chief Post Master, GPO Karachi 2022 SCMR 745 rel. Muhammad Umar Ijaz Gilani, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner. Raja Shafaqat Khan Abbasi, Deputy Advocate General Pakistan along with Muhammad Asad, DSP, NHMP for Respondents. Date of hearing: 23rd October, 2025.