Summary: (a) Sales Tax Act, 1990----Ss.38 & 40---Access and inspection versus search under warrant---Distinction---Section 38 authorized duly empowered Inland Revenue officer to obtain free access to business premises, inspect stocks, records, accounts and data, seek explanations and take relevant material into custody against signed receipt for purposes of inquiry or investigation---Section 40 dealt with a distinct and more intrusive power of compelled search where officer had reason to believe relevant documents or things were kept at a place and prior magisterial warrant was required---Both provisions were complementary and operated independently within separate statutory fields. (b) Sales Tax Act, 1990----Ss.38 & 40---“Free access” and “search”---Legal meaning---Free access meant regulatory entry for examination of material openly available, voluntarily produced or maintained in ordinary course of business---Search involved coercive intrusion directed at discovering concealed or withheld material, including forced entry, opening hidden spaces or repositories and compulsory recovery---Free access was to inspect what was available, while search was to discover what was concealed---Every departmental visit, stock verification or demand for cooperation could not be re-characterized as a search merely because taxpayer found it inconvenient. Cited Case: • Khursheed & Sons v. Federation of Pakistan 2026 PTD 185 (c) Sales Tax Act, 1990----S.38---Physical stock-taking---Lawfulness of inspection---Authorized departmental team visited registered premises for stock verification, where petitioner’s representative informed it in writing that entire stock had already been sold, after which officials departed---No contemporaneous material established forced entry, breaking of locks, opening of concealed compartments, rummaging through private repositories, overpowering of occupants or compulsory recovery of hidden material---Visit therefore remained within scope of lawful inspection under S.38 and did not constitute search requiring warrant under S.40. (d) Sales Tax Act, 1990----S.38---Inspection and taking custody of records---Safeguards---Although S.38 conferred broad powers, it did not authorize forcible production of concealed documents or coercive seizure of property under guise of inspection---Material voluntarily produced or found in plain sight could be examined and taken into custody according to statute, but compelled discovery of hidden material fell within field of S.40---Substance of official action rather than terminology used by either party determined whether exercise was inspection or search. (e) Sales Tax Act, 1990----Ss.25 & 38---Audit and inquiry/inspection---Distinct statutory mechanisms---Section 25 governed formal audit of sales tax affairs of a registered person based upon reasons recorded in writing, notice, communication of reasons, production of records, hearing and possible consequential assessment---Section 38 conferred immediate powers of access, inspection, inquiry and factual verification over a wider class, including registered persons, persons liable to registration and persons connected with suspected tax fraud---Separate headings, triggering conditions, procedures, covered persons and consequences demonstrated that both provisions were independent and parallel enforcement tools. (f) Sales Tax Act, 1990----Ss.25 & 38---Prior audit as prerequisite---No express or implied requirement existed that formal audit under S.25 must precede inquiry or inspection under S.38---Importing such condition would add words omitted by Legislature and amount to judicial legislation---Requiring audit before physical verification could permit stocks to disappear, records to be altered or evidence to be dissipated and would defeat preventive purpose of S.38. (g) Sales Tax Act, 1990----Ss.25 & 38---Nature and temporal operation---Section 25 was primarily document-centric, assessment-oriented and retrospective, examining declared liabilities and past compliance---Section 38 was field-oriented, preventive and immediate, enabling present-time verification of stocks, business activity, records, funding sources and suspicious circumstances---Section 38 created investigative foundation upon which subsequent proceedings could be initiated but was not itself an assessment provision. (h) Sales Tax Act, 1990----Ss.25, 26 & 38---Scrutiny of declarations---Scrutiny distinguished from audit---Scrutiny was preliminary desk-based administrative examination of returns, declarations, profiles and data already filed by taxpayer to identify anomalies, inconsistencies and risk indicators---It was not a formal proceeding and did not necessarily require prior notice---Every audit involved scrutiny, but every scrutiny did not mature into an audit---Department possessed incidental authority to analyze material which statute required taxpayer to file. (i) Sales Tax Act, 1990----Ss.26 & 38---Scrutiny revealing disproportionate inventories---Inquiry and physical verification---Declarations indicated retention of substantial inventories apparently disproportionate to assets and equity reflected in profile and income tax returns---Such anomaly lawfully justified next statutory step of inquiry and physical stock-taking under S.38---Use of word “scrutiny” in notice did not amount to admission that formal audit under S.25 had commenced without notice. (j) Sales Tax Act, 1990----Scrutiny, audit, inquiry, inspection and search---Conceptual distinction---Scrutiny was analytical review of filed data; audit was structured statutory verification under S.25; inquiry was broader fact-finding into suspicious transactions, inventory mismatches or possible tax fraud; inspection was physical or documentary verification of premises, stocks and records; and search was intrusive coercive discovery of concealed material subject to heightened safeguards---Maintaining these distinctions was necessary to preserve separate operation of Ss.25, 38 and 40. (k) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Tax inquiry and show-cause notices---Premature constitutional petition---Writ jurisdiction was extraordinary, supervisory and remedial, ordinarily available where action suffered from patent illegality, jurisdictional excess, mala fide, violation of fundamental rights or substantial breach of due process---It was not intended to arrest every inquiry, verification or interlocutory step merely because taxpayer apprehended an adverse result. (l) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Show-cause notice---No crystallized civil consequence---Impugned notices merely authorized inquiry, sought explanation and afforded hearing before any action under S.21(2) of Sales Tax Act, 1990---No final assessment, penalty, cancellation, confiscation or irreversible civil consequence had arisen---Initiation of inquiry was not synonymous with determination of liability and did not by itself furnish cause for constitutional interference. Cited Case: • Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Jahangir Khan Tareen and others 2022 SCMR 92 (m) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Fiscal proceedings---Normal rule of judicial restraint---Tax administration proceeded through scrutiny, inquiry, verification, hearing, determination, assessment and statutory appeal---At show-cause or inquiry stage, taxpayer was ordinarily required to submit reply, produce material and raise jurisdictional as well as factual objections before competent authority---Courts were to refrain from pre-empting statutory process unless notice was wholly without jurisdiction, ex facie mala fide or legally impossible to sustain. Cited Cases: • Messrs Chaudhri Wire Rope Industries Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer, Special Circle-I, Lahore 1988 SCMR 1934 • Ocean Pakistan Ltd. v. Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad and others 2012 PTD 1374 • Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax/Wealth Tax, Faisalabad and others v. Messrs Punjab Beverage Company (Pvt.) Ltd. 2008 SCMR 308 • Messrs Amin Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax and others 2000 SCMR 201 • Al-Ahram Builders (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal 1993 SCMR 29 • Shagufta Begum v. Income-Tax Officer, Circle-XI, Zone-B, Lahore PLD 1989 SC 360 (n) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Mala fide and abuse of authority---Burden---Mala fide was a serious allegation and could not be presumed from mere initiation of tax inquiry or repeat verification exercise---It required credible material showing personal animus, collateral purpose, harassment, retaliation or colourable exercise of power---No such material was produced to justify interdiction of inquiry at threshold. (o) Constitutional jurisdiction---Public revenue and regulatory enforcement---Courts were required to preserve protection against abuse of statutory power while ensuring that constitutional process did not become shield against lawful scrutiny---Revenue authorities were entitled to reasonable operational space to investigate suspicious declarations, possible fake input claims and tax fraud---Supervisory jurisdiction ensured legality of process but did not extinguish lawful process before completion. Disposition---Writ petition dismissed as premature and not maintainable along with pending applications---Petitioner left at liberty to submit reply, produce relevant record and raise all factual and legal objections before respondents---Respondents directed to consider such objections strictly in accordance with law and uninfluenced by tentative observations in notices---No order as to costs. M/s Maris International (Private) Limited v. Commissioner Inland Revenue (Zone-III), CTO and another, Writ Petition No.320 of 2025, Islamabad High Court, heard on 28.04.2026 and announced on 17.06.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: (a) Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997----S.9(1), category 3(c)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.497(2)---Post-arrest bail---Further inquiry---Alleged recovery of 2,000 grams charas from personal possession of accused---Record showed that habeas corpus petition alleging accused’s illegal detention since 17.12.2025 had been filed before High Court before noon on 19.12.2025, whereas narcotics FIR was subsequently registered at 3:20 p.m. on same date---Close chronology between institution of habeas corpus proceedings and registration of recovery case constituted exceptional factual anomaly, created noticeable dent in prosecution story, compromised transparency of alleged recovery and placed case under serious doubt---Matter consequently called for further inquiry. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S.497(2)---Bail---Mala fides and ulterior motive---Accused had already been granted post-arrest bail in an earlier murder case---Plea that subsequent narcotics case had been engineered through connivance of police and rival complainant party could not be brushed aside at bail stage---Friction between local police and accused’s family, prior criminal litigation and immediate filing of habeas corpus petition constituted material indicating possible mala fides and ulterior motive---Question of false implication required appraisal of evidence at trial and rendered case one of further inquiry. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S.497(2)---Further inquiry---Rule of bail---Where material available at tentative stage created reasonable doubt regarding genuineness of recovery and suggested possible mala fide implication, concession of bail was to be extended as a rule---Detailed examination of defence plea or final determination of credibility of prosecution evidence was not permissible at bail stage. Cited Cases: • Tariq Bashir and 5 others v. The State PLD 1995 SC 34 • Ehsan Ullah v. The State 2012 SCMR 1137 • Salman Mushtaq and others v. The State through P.G. Punjab and another 2024 SCMR 14 (d) Bail---Tentative assessment---Observations not to prejudice trial---Findings recorded while granting bail were provisional and confined to determining whether case required further inquiry---Trial Court was to decide prosecution case independently on evidence without being influenced by observations made in bail order. Disposition---Petition converted into appeal and allowed---Petitioner granted post-arrest bail in FIR No.2518 of 2025, Police Station Noshehra Virkan, District Gujranwala, subject to furnishing bail bond of Rs.100,000 with one surety in like amount to satisfaction of Trial Court. Mst. Robina Bibi alias Rubina Kausar v. The State and another, Criminal Petition No.731 of 2026, Supreme Court of Pakistan, decided on 16.06.2026, not approved for reporting.

Summary: Leave to contest was granted to the tenant by holding that the Ejectment Petition of the landlord was not maintainable in the absence of particulars of oral tenancy which established that relationship of landlord and tenant did not exist between them which is pre-requisite for the Rent Tribunal to exercise jurisdiction under the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009. Further, the Ejectment Petition was dismissed, accordingly without providing an opportunity to record evidence as the Rent Tribunal is divested of jurisdiction upon such determination.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Customs Act, 1969----S.13---Private bonded warehouse---Diplomatic bonded warehouse---Nature and effect of licence---Section 13 expressly authorized licensing of private warehouses for deposit of dutiable goods without immediate payment of customs duty and prescribed complete procedure for suspension or cancellation upon breach of licence conditions or violation of law---Petitioner held valid diplomatic bonded warehouse licence subsisting until 31.07.2027 and no proceedings for its suspension or cancellation had been initiated---So long as licence remained valid, legal existence of warehouse and entitlement to operate under special statutory framework could not be neutralized indirectly through refusal of import authorization. (b) Customs Rules, 2001----R.333(a)---Import and transshipment of spirits---Diplomatic bonded warehouses and diplomatic missions---Rule generally prohibited transshipment of spirits but expressly created exception for spirits imported by diplomatic bonded warehouses and diplomatic missions after obtaining authorization from Ministry of Commerce---Specific exception constituted statutory acknowledgment that import of spirits by such entities was legally permissible subject to authorization---Had law intended absolute prohibition, no express exception would have been created. (c) Customs Act, 1969----S.13---Customs Rules, 2001, R.333(a)---Customs General Order No.12 of 2002---Ministry of Commerce Office Memorandum dated 23.09.1992---Diplomatic bonded warehouses---Special statutory regime---Combined framework regulated licensing, importation, warehousing, supervision, documentation, payments and restricted sales to diplomatic missions, diplomats and other privileged persons---Diplomatic bonded warehouses constituted a distinct class recognized by law and could not be equated with ordinary commercial importers. (d) Ministry of Commerce Office Memorandum dated 23.09.1992---Import of liquor by diplomatic bonded warehouses---Continued operation---Memorandum authorized bonded warehouses to import liquor on behalf of foreign diplomatic missions, diplomats and privileged foreign persons subject to prescribed safeguards---No notification, statutory instrument or executive order expressly withdrawing, rescinding or superseding said memorandum was produced---Mere promulgation of later Import Policy Order did not establish implied repeal of special administrative framework. (e) Customs General Order No.12 of 2002----Cls.21 & 22(b)---Diplomatic bonded warehouses---Sales to entitled persons---General Order recognized diplomatic bonded warehouses established under S.13 of Customs Act, prescribed foreign-currency payment arrangements and permitted entitled expatriates and foreign nationals to purchase alcohol and specified goods from such warehouses---Condition that import remained subject to Import Policy Order regulated process but did not abolish warehouse regime, invalidate licences or repeal special exception under R.333(a). (f) Diplomatic and Consular Privileges Act, 1972---Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961---Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963---Diplomatic bonded warehouses---International obligations---Ministry of Foreign Affairs had acknowledged bonded warehouses as recognized mechanism through which foreign missions and their members obtained relief from duties and taxes on hard drinks, tobacco, fragrances and other commodities through exemption certificates---Warehouse regime implemented Pakistan’s diplomatic obligations and was not an ordinary commercial trade arrangement. (g) Customs Act, 1969----Ss.83, 84 & 104---Bonded goods---In-bonding and ex-bonding---Distinction---Goods deposited in bonded warehouse remained under customs custody, supervision and control and were not integrated into domestic commerce merely upon physical arrival or in-bonding---Importation for home consumption and application of commercial trade restrictions attained legal significance at stage of ex-bonding under S.104---Warehousing under customs control was a deferred-duty storage mechanism distinct from clearance for home consumption. Cited Case: • Collector of Customs v. M/s A.R. and Company 2022 PTD 1408 (h) Import Policy Order, 2022----Appendix-A, Serial No.14---Alcoholic beverages and spirits---Diplomatic bonded warehouse---Goods stored under customs custody and cleared only against diplomatic exemption certificates did not enter unrestricted local market---Where supply remained confined to foreign missions, diplomats and privileged persons under comprehensive customs supervision, physical entry into bonded warehouse did not amount to prohibited commercial import for home consumption---No material showed diversion, misuse, breach of licence or circulation in local market. (i) Statutory interpretation---Generalia specialibus non derogant---General law and special law---Import Policy Order, 2022 constituted general framework governing ordinary commercial imports, whereas S.13 of Customs Act, R.333(a) of Customs Rules and Customs General Order No.12 of 2002 formed specialized regime for diplomatic bonded warehouses---General prohibition on alcoholic beverages could not override or defeat specific statutory pathway created for licensed diplomatic bonded warehouses. Cited Cases: • Gulistan Textile Mills Ltd. v. Soneri Bank Limited PLD 2018 SC 322 • Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Ltd., Islamabad v. S.K. (Pvt.) Limited 2025 SCMR 570 (j) Statutory interpretation---Expressio unius est exclusio alterius---Rule 333(a) expressly mentioned diplomatic bonded warehouses and diplomatic missions as exceptions to general prohibition on transshipment of spirits---Deliberate inclusion demonstrated legislative intent to treat them as separate and permissible category and exclude them from restrictions applicable to ordinary importers. (k) Statutory interpretation---Ut res magis valeat quam pereat---Harmonious construction---Interpretation rendering R.333(a), Office Memorandum dated 23.09.1992 and Customs General Order No.12 of 2002 redundant or meaningless was impermissible---Import Policy Order and customs framework were to be read harmoniously so that general ban remained applicable to ordinary commercial imports while special diplomatic bonded warehouse regime continued to operate. Cited Case: • Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, Large Taxpayers Unit, Lahore v. Coca Cola Export Corporation 2026 PTD 318 (l) Import Policy Order, 2022----Para.5(1)(b) read with Appendix-A, Serial No.14---Diplomatic exception---Although alcoholic beverages were ordinarily banned, para.5(1)(b) expressly exempted goods imported by foreign diplomatic missions enjoying customs-duty exemption under Diplomatic and Consular Privileges Act, 1972---Said exception, read with R.333(a), Office Memorandum of 1992, Customs General Order No.12 of 2002 and Ministry of Foreign Affairs communication dated 20.09.2022, preserved lawful import mechanism through diplomatic bonded warehouses---Minister erred by reading prohibition in isolation and ignoring express exception. (m) Administrative law---Locus poenitentiae---Accrued and vested rights---Petitioner had operated for years under valid licence, invested capital, maintained staff, entered international supply arrangements and imported consignment in reliance upon subsisting statutory and regulatory framework---Administrative authority could reconsider its decision before rights crystallized, but once lawful order or representation had been acted upon and valuable rights created, it could not be withdrawn to detriment of beneficiary without lawful basis---Sudden refusal of authorization, absent change in primary legislation or statutory rules, unlawfully impaired accrued rights. Cited Case: • Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance v. Muhammad Himayatullah Farukhi PLD 1969 SC 407 (n) Rules of Business, 1973----Rr.8 & 13---Inter-divisional consultation---Diplomatic bonded warehouse regime concerned Commerce Division, Federal Board of Revenue and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and affected implementation of international diplomatic privileges---Prior meaningful consultation with Ministry of Foreign Affairs was mandatory before Commerce Division could declare 1992 framework repealed or dismantle diplomatic supply mechanism---Unilateral decision taken without such consultation suffered from procedural illegality. Cited Case: • Mustafa Impex, Karachi v. Government of Pakistan PLD 2016 SC 808 (o) Administrative law---Speaking order---Requirement of reasons---A valid speaking order was required to demonstrate application of mind, consideration of relevant statutory provisions and rational nexus between facts and conclusion---Impugned order merely assumed implied repeal of 1992 Memorandum and applied general prohibition without addressing S.13 of Customs Act, R.333(a), diplomatic exception in para.5(1)(b), Customs General Order No.12 of 2002, Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ position or distinction between in-bonding and home consumption---Order therefore lacked essential ingredients of lawful reasoned decision. Cited Cases: • Secretary, Ministry of Health, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and others v. Dr. Rehana Hameed and others 2010 SCMR 511 • Fasih-ud-Din Khan and others v. Government of Punjab and others 2010 SCMR 1778 • Messrs United Woolen Mills Ltd. Workers’ Union v. Messrs United Woolen Mills Ltd. 2010 SCMR 1475 • Government of Sindh through Land Acquisition Officer and others v. Muhammad Juman and another 2009 SCMR 1407 (p) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Judicial review of import policy decision---Policy discretion---Although trade and import policy ordinarily fell within executive domain, constitutional interference was warranted where decision misconstrued governing law, ignored special statutory regime, disregarded relevant material, violated Rules of Business and deprived valid licence of practical effect without lawful suspension or cancellation---Impugned speaking order was arbitrary, based upon misdirection in law and issued without lawful authority. Disposition---Writ petition allowed---Speaking Order dated 30.10.2025 passed by Minister-in-Charge, Commerce Division, set aside and declared without lawful authority and of no legal effect---Ministry of Commerce directed to issue forthwith requisite import authorization for petitioner’s consignment of 812 cases of alcoholic beverages imported under Invoice No.DIPL-010 and Bill of Lading No.SOCJEAKHI2400323 and intimate Deputy Registrar (Judicial) of High Court. M/s Diplomats Duty Free (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan and others, Writ Petition No.525 of 2026, Islamabad High Court, heard on 16.06.2026.

Summary: Remedy of appeal in terms of Section 14 of the Family Court Act, 1964 being available against dismissal of application under Section 476 Cr.P.C. by the Family Court, which was not available, hence, constitution petition was premature and not maintainable.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Justice Ayesha Malik's note: (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.188---Supreme Court Rules, 1980, O.XXVI, R.1---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XLVII, R.1---Review jurisdiction---Scope---Review was neither substitute for appeal nor disguised rehearing of matter already adjudicated---Court could not revisit a conscious determination merely because another view was possible---Jurisdiction was confined to discovery of new and important matter, mistake or error apparent on face of record or other sufficient reason---Error had to be patent, self-evident and capable of being noticed without elaborate reasoning---Review was nevertheless available where judgment proceeded on erroneous assumption of material fact, overlooked a fundamental legal question or ignored a pivotal aspect of record having direct bearing upon result. Cited Cases: • Inter Quest Informatics Service v. Commissioner Income Tax 2025 SCMR 257 • Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2024 SC 1199 • Haji Musharraf Mahmood Khan v. Sardar Zada Zafar Abbas PLD 2023 SC 588 • Oil & Gas Regulatory Authority v. Gas & Oil Pakistan Ltd. PLD 2025 SC 351 • District Education Officer v. Sonia Begum PLD 2025 SC 720 • Commissioner Inland Revenue, Karachi v. MSC Switzerland Geneva 2023 SCMR 1011 (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XI, R.21---Failure to answer interrogatories or comply with discovery order---Striking out defence---Nature of provision---Rule was penal in character and its invocation could result in dismissal of suit or complete deprivation of defendant’s right to defend---Being strictissimi juris, provision was to be construed strictly and exercised with utmost judicial caution---Two foundational requirements were existence of a specific order directing answers, discovery or inspection and a failure to comply with such order---Penal consequence was not automatic and could be imposed only where default was proved to be wilful, deliberate, intentional, obstinate or contumacious. Cited Cases: • Messrs United Bank Limited v. Yousuf Haji Noor Muhammad Dhadhi PLJ 1987 SC 636 • Messrs Babar Sewing Machine Company v. Tirlok Nath Mahajan AIR 1978 SC 1436 (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XI, R.21---Wilful default---Test---Wilfulness was to be assessed with reference to circumstances attending non-compliance with particular order on relevant date rather than retrospectively inferred merely from earlier adjournments or past procedural conduct---Default caused by accident, incapacity, force majeure or circumstances beyond party’s control could not be characterized as contumacious disobedience---Provision was intended to discipline recalcitrant litigant, not punish one physically incapable of compliance. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XI, R.21---Defendant injured in widely reported shooting incident and hospitalized---Failure to submit answers to interrogatories---Trial Court had accepted hospitalization and inability to contact defendant as sufficient grounds on 08.11.2022 and 17.11.2022 but struck out defence on 24.11.2022 while same incapacity continued---Once Court accepted factual inability to comply, element of wilfulness stood negated---Failure to sign affidavit, consult counsel or finalize answers while hospitalized with gunshot injuries was physical impossibility, not deliberate defiance---Law did not compel performance of an impossible act: lex non cogit ad impossibilia. (e) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.10-A---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XI, R.21---Fair trial and right of defence---Striking out defence was an exceptional and drastic measure, described as death knell of party’s defence---Court contemplating deprivation of substantive right to defend was required to exercise maximum restraint, consider all relevant circumstances and prefer adjudication on merits over technical knockout---Expeditious disposal, though important, did not authorize summary injustice. (f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XI, R.21---Judicial discretion---Proportionality and alternative sanctions---Rule vested discretion in Court and did not oblige it to strike out defence in every case of default---Before imposing ultimate penalty, Court was required to assess explanation, duration and nature of default, prejudice to opposite party and overall conduct, and consider lesser measures including realistic peremptory directions and compensatory or deterrent costs---Power could appropriately be exercised where party persistently absented itself or caused prolonged, inordinate and inexcusable delay resulting in substantial prejudice---Mechanical invocation without recorded finding of wilful disobedience was impermissible. Cited Cases: • Asha Rani Gupta v. Vineet Kumar 2022 SCC OnLine SC 829 • Miss Santosh Mehta v. Om Prakash and others (1980) 3 SCC 610 • Bimal Chand Jain v. Sri Gopal Agarwal (1981) 3 SCC 486 • Qazi Naveed-ul-Islam v. District Judge 2023 SCP 32 (g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XI, R.21---Past history of adjournments---Effect---Earlier delay and repeated adjournments could inform case management but could not retrospectively convert a presently justified and involuntary default into wilful disobedience---Trial Court had routinely granted numerous adjournments for years without imposing costs or recording deliberate obstruction, yet abruptly resorted to most severe sanction less than a month after defendant’s shooting and hospitalization---Such disproportionate shift ignored immediate circumstances and constituted mechanical exercise of discretion. (h) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XI, R.21---Application by interrogating party---Jurisdictional prerequisite---Statutory sequence required: a specific discovery or interrogatory order; non-compliance attracting potential penal consequence; and an application by party interrogating or seeking discovery or inspection for an order to that effect---Phrase “may apply to the Court” vested initiative in aggrieved party and kept penal jurisdiction dormant until formally invoked---Unlike provisions expressly authorizing Court to act on its own motion, O.XI, R.21 did not confer suo motu power to strike out defence. (i) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XI, R.21---Formal written application---Requirement---For grave penal action depriving a party of defence, informal opposition to adjournment or presumed oral request was legally insufficient---Record showed respondent had sought imposition of costs but had not filed an application seeking striking out of defence---Formal, written and documented application was mandatory statutory trigger---Trial Court acted without jurisdiction by invoking R.21 suo motu, and majority judgment under review committed patent error by treating repeated opposition to adjournments as equivalent to an oral application. Cited Cases: • Mrs. Namita Dhar v. Dr. Amalendu Sen AIR 1977 Calcutta 187 • Ranipet Chemicals & Engineering Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Swastik Stainless Steel Stores AIR 1986 Calcutta 76 (j) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.188---Error apparent on face of record---Review of majority judgment---Original majority validated striking out of defence by relying upon petitioner’s historical conduct while overlooking immediate medical incapacity and also assumed suo motu jurisdiction under O.XI, R.21 despite absence of formal application---Both errors were patent, went to root of penal jurisdiction and resulted in manifest miscarriage of justice---Review was therefore maintainable and necessary to prevent finality of judgment from becoming shield for injustice. (k) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XI, R.21---Case management---Duty of Trial Court---Courts were responsible for timely progression of litigation and could discourage adjournments through diligent case management, costs and lawful procedural sanctions---Nonetheless, balance between expedition and fair trial had to be maintained---Public shooting, surgery and hospitalization furnished legitimate cause for reasonable adjournment, and right to defence prevailed over mechanical insistence upon immediate compliance. (l) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.188---Review jurisdiction---Dissenting opinion---One learned Judge found no error apparent, considered record to demonstrate persistent delay including filing of written statement after approximately four years and repeated failure to answer interrogatories, and would have dismissed review petitions---By majority of two to one, however, review concerning order striking out defence was allowed. Disposition---Civil Review Petition No.1-L of 2023 dismissed---Civil Review Petition No.2-L of 2023 allowed by majority of two to one---Majority judgment dated 29.12.2022, along with judgments of Lahore High Court and Trial Court striking out petitioner’s defence, set aside---Matter remanded to Trial Court to provide reasonable opportunity to petitioner to file answers to interrogatories in compliance with order dated 20.10.2022 and thereafter proceed with suit in accordance with law. Imran Ahmad Khan Niazi v. Mian Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif, Civil Review Petitions Nos.1-L and 2-L of 2023, Supreme Court of Pakistan, heard on 08.04.2026 and announced on 11.06.2026, approved for reporting.