Summary: Summary pending

Summary: The legal question put for opinion of this Court is whether ICA is maintainable if part of the original order is not amenable to appeal, revision or review under the applicable law. Held that the ICA is not maintainable, even if the appellant confines the challenge to the part of the original order, against which the right of appeal, revision, or review is not explicitly available under the applicable law. 49Service 22253/25 Mazhar Hayat Vs Govt. of the Punjab etc. Mr. Justice Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi 13-01- 2026 2026 LHC 58

Summary: 48I.C.A-ICA (Writ)-ICA Local Government 365-25 M/S SHAN FLOUR & GENERAL MILLS VS POP ETC Mr. Justice Anwaar Hussain 13-01- 2026 2026 LHC 84

Summary: For Revision to be maintainable, the impugned order should have finality attached to the same otherwise if the said order is only a discretionary procedural interlocutory order, the same would not be a 'case decided' amenable to Revisional jurisdiction.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: An admission made before the Regional Verification Board cannot be deemed sufficient for the purpose of surrender of CNIC when further steps had not been taken and the competent authority had not passed an order regarding cancellation or approval of surrender of CNIC. Said fact cannot be equated with renunciation of citizenship under section 14 of the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951.

Summary: Section 115 CPC Power of the Court: 1. The controversy essentially pertains to the fate of the decree in Suit No. 32/1-A, which was contingent upon a decree that has since been nullified and whose reversal has attained finality. This Court is vested with revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC in two distinct capacities: first, upon invocation by an aggrieved party, which is subject to the limitation of ninety days as provided in the second proviso to Section 115(1); and second, in the exercise of suo motu revisional powers, which are supervisory and not circumscribed by any prescribed limitation period. The scope of such powers has been elaborately discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in Province of Punjab through District Officer, Revenue, Rawalpindi and others v. Muhammad Sarwar (2014 SCMR 1358), wherein it was held that Section 115(1) CPC confers two distinct jurisdictions: one exercised upon an application by an aggrieved party and the other exercised suo motu by the Court. The limitation of ninety days applies only to revisions filed by an aggrieved party and does not fetter the Court’s inherent supervisory jurisdiction to rectify jurisdictional errors or material irregularities committed by subordinate Courts. The apex Court further reiterated that where the revisional jurisdiction is invoked by a party, the statutory limitation must be strictly adhered to; however, when the Court itself acts to correct a manifest illegality or jurisdictional defect, such power is not constrained by limitation. In the present case, where the decree in Suit No. 32/1-A is demonstrably contingent upon a decree that has been set aside with finality, and where material facts were not brought to the notice of the Court at the relevant time, this Court is competent—either upon application under Section 12(2) CPC or in exercise of its revisional and supervisory jurisdiction—to examine the legality and sustainability of the impugned decree. 2. Once this Court arrives at the conclusion that the decree passed in Suit No. 32/1-A was wholly founded upon the ultimate outcome of Civil Law Suit No. 381/1—and that the said foundational decree is no longer in the field—the legal position becomes self-evident. Notwithstanding the fact that the decree in Suit No. 32/1-A was not independently challenged at an earlier stage, the foregoing discussion prima facie discloses elements of fraud, concealment, and misrepresentation of material facts which go to the very root of the matter. In such circumstances, there exists no legal impediment or procedural bar to the acceptance and adjudication of the present and connected applications. It is a settled principle that where a decree is alleged to have been procured through fraud or suppression of material facts, the Court is empowered to examine the matter in order to prevent abuse of the process of law. It is equally well established that framing of issues and recording of evidence is not a sine qua non in every case, particularly where the material available on record is sufficient to determine the controversy or where the impugned decree is demonstrably void or without lawful foundation. 3. It is a settled principle of law that, ordinarily, upon the acceptance of an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Law Procedure, 1908, the impugned judgment, decree or order is set aside and the lis is restored to its original position, resulting in revival of the suit or appeal for decision on merits. However, this general rule is not without exception. Where the very institution of the suit, culminating in the impugned judgment, decree or order, was inherently defective, collusive, devoid of lawful cause of action, or otherwise not maintainable in the eyes of law, the Court, while allowing the application under Section 12(2) CPC, is not bound to order revival of such proceedings. In such circumstances, revival would amount to perpetuating an abuse of the process of Court. Instead, the suit may be dismissed outright upon acceptance of the application, as the foundational defect strikes at the root of the jurisdiction and maintainability of the proceedings. In the case at hand, the institution of Suit No. 32/1-A was manifestly collusive and inherently defective, particularly in view of the fact that the appeal arising out of Suit No. 38/1 had already been allowed and the said suit stood dismissed. Consequently, the subsequent suit lacked lawful substratum and independent cause of action. Therefore, the dismissal of the suit upon acceptance of the application under Section 12(2) CPC constitutes a legally sustainable exception to the general rule of revival of proceedings.

Summary: 1. Amendments to written statements should be liberally allowed to ensure complete adjudication of disputes. 2. Alternative pleas consistent with existing pleadings are permissible, even at later stages. 3. Procedural technicalities should not override substantive justice. 4. Courts have inherent power to allow amendments post-framing of issues if required for just decision.

Summary: 2(c) West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959,—Landlord and landowner distinguished- The term "landlord"" as defined in Section 2(c) is not synonymous with ""owner

Summary: i. If the assailants had arrived with firearms, motivated by blood feud, to eliminate the victim, there appears to have been no impediment to accomplish that objective. In such circumstances, it is highly doubtful that only one firearm injury would strike the neck of the victim, while the remaining shots would miss, particularly when the appellant is alleged to have been armed with a Kalashnikov. ii. When the plea of alibi is proved on record and the defence witnesses inspire confidence, it inevitably casts serious doubt on the credibility of the complainant. In such circumstances, this Court is inclined to hold that the complainant distorted and exaggerated the facts. iii. It is true that the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not an absolute rule and does not mechanically apply in Criminal Law jurisprudence. Courts may, in appropriate cases, sift the grain from the chaff.