Summary: Both an arbitrator and a referee can be appointed only with the consent of the parties; however, an arbitrator exercises jurisdiction under the Arbitration Act, 1940, whereas a referee operates under Article 33 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. The statement of a referee constitutes an admission of the parties themselves and, once recorded on consent, cannot be challenged in appeal or revision.

Summary: In terms of rule 6 of Family Court Rules, 1965 as a suit for dissolution of marriage or for dower can be filed at the place where the wife ordinarily resides, and in view thereof a composite suit including other reliefs alongwith any one of the afore-mentioned relief can also be filed at the said place despite the fact that cause of action had neither wholly or in part arisen at the said place and parties had not resided together at the said place.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Thus, in view of the foregoing discussion, it is concluded that: i. The employer–employee relationship shall be determined from the real nature of control, supervision and integration, and not from contractual labels. ii. Where a licensed private security company recruits, trains, deploys, pays and disciplines security guards, it shall ordinarily be deemed to be their employer. iii. An establishment obtaining security Service Laws through such licensed company is, in the ordinary course, a recipient of Service Laws and not the employer of the deployed guards. iv. The statutory duties imposed upon a security company under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Private Security Companies Ordinance, 2002 are strong indicators of such company’s control and responsibility over the guards. v. The true employment relationship shall be determined by applying recognised tests, including the control test, integration test and overall economic reality. vi. A licensed security company performs an independent, statutory-regulated role under the Ordinance of 2002; such role is distinct from the client’s industrial/establishment affairs, and is not to be treated as a mere intermediary or contractor. vii. All security guard companies shall revise their contracts with their clients in light of this judgment so that the responsibility for contribution is clearly rationalized and aligned with the law. viii. The practice of concealing security guards, whether by the security company or by those to whom they are assigned, shall be stopped forthwith. ix. The EOB Act being a beneficial statute, its obligations cannot be avoided through contractual arrangements designed to defeat its purpose.

Summary: i. This exaggeration in the number of accused appears to have adversely affected the credibility of the prosecution case and has raised a serious question in the judicial mind of this Court as to whether the occurrence could be attributed to a single individual, rather than multiple accused as alleged. ii. When the physical circumstances of the case do not fully align with the narrative of the complainant and when the medical and forensic evidence points towards exaggeration in the prosecution story, this Court is constrained to apply extra caution while assessing the culpability of the accused solely on the strength of the dying declaration, which itself requires careful scrutiny to determine its reliability and evidentiary worth. iii. We do not deny that conviction can be based solely upon a dying declaration and that, if such a statement inspires confidence, it may, by itself, suffice to sustain conviction. However, we cannot ignore the fact that, with the passage of time, the evidentiary value of such declarations has undergone significant scrutiny. In earlier times, society was considered morally upright, and it could reasonably be assumed that a dying person would not speak falsehood. Yet, with the gradual erosion of moral values and changing social circumstances, it has become imperative that conviction cannot rest solely upon a dying declaration, rather corroboration through independent and reliable evidence is now essential. iv. During cross-examination, the doctor admitted that he had not recorded the Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) of the deceased at the time of examination. He also noted that there was a corresponding exit wound at the midline of the thyroid with active bleeding. Given these circumstances, several questions arise. Can a declaration attributed to the deceased be relied upon as the sole basis for conviction when the medical officer, though noting consciousness and orientation, did not record formal GCS findings? What weight should be attached to the opinion regarding the injuries, their severity, and their impact on the capacity of the deceased to comprehend and narrate events accurately? v. The sanctity attached to a dying declaration arises not merely from the solemnity of approaching death, but from the presumption that the declarant was capable of understanding the questions posed, responding coherently, and narrating the facts accurately, where this important requirement is damaged, the evidentiary value of the statement stands materially diluted. vi. In cases involving serious injuries, particularly those affecting the airway and neck region, an objective neurological assessment becomes indispensable. A bare endorsement that the patient was “conscious” without supporting clinical parameters renders the certification subjective and unverifiable. vii. This Court is constrained to observe that the primary medical priority in airway compromise is stabilization of respiration, not recording of statements. Proceeding to record a dying declaration without first ensuring adequate oxygenation casts serious doubt on the mental fitness of the declarant at the relevant time. viii. When such is the state of affairs, then this court finds that the Mental fitness was not objectively assessed, oxygenation status was not documented, speech capacity was medically compromised, and the certification of fitness was mechanical in nature, such circumstances mandate strict judicial caution.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Both an arbitrator and a referee can be appointed only with the consent of the parties; however, an arbitrator exercises jurisdiction under the Arbitration Act, 1940, whereas a referee operates under Article 33 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. The statement of a referee constitutes an admission of the parties themselves and, once recorded on consent, cannot be challenged in appeal or revision. 36C.O. (Commercial) CM/1/48681/26 Qatar Lubricants Company W.L.L through Ashfaq Ahmed Jalal & 1 Other Vs Atif Naeem Rana & 4 Others Mr. Justice Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi 22- 01- 2026 2026 LHC 79

Summary: Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act (XLII of 2012)--- ----Ss. 24, 56, 60 & 62---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Proceedings by Punjab Revenue Authority, assailing of---Alternative remedy for service provider, availability of---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court, invoking of---Scope---Petitioners (engaged in the business relating to selling of food items) filed constitutional petition being aggrieved of the proceedings conducted by the Punjab Revenue (authority/respondent) under S. 56 of the Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012 (‘the Act, 2012’)---Validity---Section 56 of the Act, 2012 bestows power upon the officers authorized by the authority to have access to premises, stocks, accounts and records of a registered person or a person liable for registration or whose business activities are covered under the Act, 2012 to ascertain the correct quantum of Punjab Sales Tax payable by the petitioners; Show-Cause Notices under S. 24 of the Act, 2012 were also issued to the petitioners---Section 60 of the Act, 2012 provides the power of adjudication in respect of certain cases of contravention or violation including tax fraud under the Act, 2012 or the Rules---Furthermore, S. 62 vests power of revision upon the authority---Therefore, the petitioners had alternate and efficacious remedies provided under the Act, 2012 ; in presence thereof invoking the constitutional jurisdiction would amount to stifling the normal course of law---Jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court under Art.199 of the Constitution is neither unbridled nor unrestricted, instead it is an extraordinary jurisdiction to be exercised in rare and exceptional circumstances---Wherever an efficacious and adequate remedy is available to a person invoking Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court, it exercises restraint unless some compelling circumstances exist for invocation of such jurisdiction---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Syed Masood Ali v. Mst. Feroza Begum and another PLD 2025 SC 339; Muhammad Safeer and others v. Muhammad Azam and others PLD 2024 SC 838; Special Secretary-II (Law and Order), Home and Tribal Affairs Department. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar and others v. Fayyaz Dawar 2023 SCMR 1442 and Mian Azam Waheed and 2 others v. The Collector of Customs 2023 SCMR 1247 ref. Hafiz Muhammad Idrees and Hassan Askari Kazmi for Petitioner.