Summary: (On appeal against the judgment dated 18.03.2025 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, in W.P. No. 1954 of 2019). (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched. & S.10(5)---Suit for dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula---High Court directing return of entire prompt dower, challenge to---Marriage remaining unconsummated---Effect---Wife’s liability confined to surrender up to 25% of admitted prompt dower---Statutory limit in Punjab---Scope---Briefly, after the parties’ nikah was solemnized, prompt dower was admitted as 15 tolas of gold; however, rukhsati did not take place and marriage remained unconsummated; wife filed a suit for dissolution through khula; she did not plead that the admitted prompt dower was unpaid; Family Court decreed khula subject to surrender of 25% of the admitted prompt dower; Appellate Court upheld that decree, whereas, High Court set aside the concurrent judgments and directed return of the entire prompt dower of 15 tolas on the ground of non-consummation---Question requiring determination before the Supreme Court was as to “whether, in a khula case in Punjab governed by Section 10(5) of the Family Courts Act, 1964, the wife could be directed to return the entire prompt dower due to non-consummation, or her liability was statutorily limited to surrender up to 25% of the admitted prompt dower?”---Held: Section 10(5) of the Act, 1964 (specifically in the province of Punjab) empowered the Family Court, in cases of khula, to direct the wife to surrender up to twenty five percent of her admitted prompt dower to the husband and it did not make any distinction between consummated and unconsummated marriages---In the present case the admitted prompt dower being 15 tolas of gold, the maximum liability of the petitioner under Section 10(5) of the Act, 1964 could not exceed twenty-five percent i.e. 3.75 tolas of gold --- Impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside---Present petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, in circumstances. (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched.& 10(5)---Husband claiming recovery of various items given to wife relating to wedding functions---Permissibility---Law draws a clear distinction between dower, dowry, bridal gifts and presents---Items given by a husband or his family in connection with marriage fall within the category of bridal gifts or presents and, as such, vest absolutely in the bride---Such items cannot be reclaimed by the husband, as they do not constitute dower nor are they recoverable as personal property of the husband. Amicus Curiae: Barrister Umar Aslam, Advocate Supreme Court and Ms. Maliha Zia, Advocate. Iftikhar Ahmed Awan, Advocate Supreme Court along with the Petitioner in person. Atif Nisar Abbasi, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent. Date of hearing: 24th September, 2025.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002), S.3---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 14 & 19---Suit for recovery of damages under the Defamation Ordinance, 2002---Limited interim injunction, grant of---Principles---Preventing irreparable harm during pendency of suit---Allegations of sexual harassment were made by petitioner (lady) against the respondent---Suit for damages was filed by respondent against the petitioner claiming substantial reputational harm arising from sexual harassment allegations---Interim injunction was granted by Trial Court restraining the petitioner from making any statement regarding the subject matter of the alleged defamation until the disposal of the suit---Legality---At present preliminary stage, the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations could not be determined without recording of evidence---Repetition or continuous propagation of such allegations, while the matter was sub judice, would amount to conducting a parallel media trial, which was neither permissible nor desirable in the interest of justice and fair adjudication---Respondent had successfully established a prima facie case in his favour; the allegations levelled against him, if found to be untrue, were of such a nature that they directly struck at his dignity, honour and professional credibility---Material available on record prima facie showed that the suit raised serious triable issues requiring evidence, and therefore, the respondent could not be left remediless during pendency of the proceedings---Balance of convenience also tilted heavily in favour of respondent---If the injunction was not maintained, respondent would continue to suffer damage to his reputation on a daily basis---On the contrary, the petitioner would not suffer any irreparable prejudice by being restrained from making statements relevant to the controversy till the matter was decided on merits---Restraint imposed was temporary in nature and subject to the final outcome of the suit---Trial Court had rightly exercised its discretion by imposing a limited and reasonable restriction, instead of a blanket prohibition, thereby ensuring that the petitioner's right to speech was not completely curtailed---Impugned order, by restraining only such statements which were directly related to the matter in controversy, achieved a constitutional balance between two competing rights i.e. freedom of speech (Article 19) and inviolability of the dignity of man (Article 14) and did not amount to an unlawful curtailment of freedom of expression---Impugned order was a well-reasoned order based on sound legal principles and did not warrant interference by this Court---Constitutional petition was dismissed. Bonnard v. Perryman (1891) 2 Ch 269 and K.V. Ramaniah v. Special Public Prosecutor AIR 1961 Andh Pra 190 ref. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002), S.3---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 14 & 19---Public figure---Suit for recovery of damages under the Defamation Ordinance, 2002---Limited interim injunction, grant of---Principles---Prevent of irreparable harm during pendency of suit---Although, Courts exercise restraint while granting injunctions restraining speech, however, there is no absolute bar in law against grant of such relief where circumstances so warrant---Where a person of established reputation claims that false allegations are being repeatedly propagated, the court is empowered to protect such reputation from irreparable harm till final adjudication---Reputation, once damaged, cannot be restored merely through monetary compensation---For a public figure whose career and livelihood depend upon public perception and trust, continuous circulation of unproven allegations would cause harm which cannot be quantified in terms of money---If the reputation of a responsible citizen can be measured in terms of money, then, it will amount to issuing a license against a citizen and asking him to take money as compensation for the injury---In such circumstances, denial of interim protection would render the final relief, if granted, meaningless. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Interim injunction, grant/refusal of---Interference by High Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction---Scope---Discretionary orders passed by a competent court, particularly those relating to grant or refusal of interim injunction, should not be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction unless the same are shown to be arbitrary, perverse or suffering from jurisdictional defect. Muhammad Saqib Jillani for Petitioner. Umar Tariq Gill for Respondent No. 2. Date of hearing: 23rd January, 2026.

Summary: Interim injunction in a suit for recovery of damages under the Defamation Ordinance, 2002--- In defamation matters involving serious and unproven allegations, courts are empowered to grant limited interim injunctions to prevent irreparable harm. ----- Freedom of speech is a cherished constitutional right, it is not absolute and must be balanced against the inviolable dignity and reputation of an individual. ----- judicial restraint, emphasizing protection of reputation during pendency of trial without foreclosing final adjudication on merits.

Summary: In the framework of our jurisprudence, a “Special Court” is a tribunal of limited and exclusive jurisdiction, established by a specific statutory enactment to adjudicate distinct categories of cases that lie outside the general domain of ordinary Civil Law courts. While the term is not explicitly defined in a single statute, its nature is inferred from Article 175 of the Constitution as a forum “established by law,” functioning not through inherent powers but strictly within the “four corners of the jurisdiction” conferred by its enabling statute [Ref: Ghulam Shabbir v. Punjab Special Court 1992 PCr.LJ 1932 Lahore]. Crucially, the creation of such a Special Court acts as an implied bar under Section 9 of CPC, effectively “eclipsing” general Civil Law jurisdiction; as noted by the Apex Court in State Life Insurance v. Sardar Begum [2017 SCMR 999], where a special law provides a separate remedy, general provisions “stand eclipsed.” These courts possess the attributes of a judicial forum—presided over by qualified judges often acting as persona designata rather than in their original capacity [See Ministry of Interior v. Special Court PLD 2020 Islamabad 82—and operate under the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant, meaning their specific procedural mandates prevail over general Civil Law procedure [Ref: M/s Frontier Foundry Steel v. NEPRA 2025 MLD 26 Islamabad]. Thus, a Special Court is an exclusive adjudicatory body where the “ouster of jurisdiction” of general courts is a necessary consequence of its establishment to deal with rights and liabilities unknown to the common law. It is settled law that a Special Court, being a creature of statute, cannot ordinarily extend its jurisdiction beyond the scope of the law creating it. As held in Inayat Ali v. The State [1992 PCr.LJ 1485 Lahore], it is a court of “limited jurisdiction,” and any attempt to exercise powers not expressly conferred would be ultra vires. However, the insertion of Section 12A introduces a novel legal paradigm. By employing the fiction of law through the “deeming clause” in sub-section (3), the Legislature has essentially superimposed the general jurisdiction of a District Judge onto the limited framework of a Special Court for the transferred cases. This creates a unique hybridization: a forum that is structurally a “Special Court” but functionally, for the purposes of the transferred case, deemed to be a “Court of original jurisdiction” with all attendant powers. The “ouster of jurisdiction” that typically defines a Special Court is here conversely met with a “conferment of jurisdiction” by the general Civil Law law (the Ordinance of 1962), effectively piercing the veil of exclusivity that usually surrounds special tribunals.

Summary: Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----S. 175---Power to enter and search premises---Scope and conditions for exercise---Pending proceedings, necessity of---Interpretation of taxing statute--- Petitioner challenged validity of raid conducted by tax authorities under S.175 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, contending that said provision could only be invoked where some proceedings were already pending against taxpayer and that prior notice issued under S.176 of the Ordinance could not by itself justify raid---Federal Constitutional Court examined plain language of S.175 and held that provision expressly authorized Commissioner, or officer authorized by him in writing, to enter and search premises, without prior notice, in order to enforce any provision of the Ordinance, including for purpose of audit of taxpayer or survey of persons liable to tax---Court held that no requirement of pre-existing or pending proceedings could be read into statute when legislature had not imposed any such limitation in express terms---Interpretation adopted in Agha Steels Industries v. Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation (2019 PTD 2119), to effect that there must be pending proceedings and search was measure of last resort, was respectfully disagreed with as such gloss was unsupported by statutory text and amounted to diluting clear legislative command---However, Court further clarified that power under S.175 was not unlimited or unfettered, but conditional in nature, since term “enforce” necessarily postulated breach or occasion for enforcement, and there must therefore be clear written statement identifying provision of Ordinance sought to be enforced and reasons for invoking coercive power so as to guard against abuse---In present case, impugned judgment of High Court upholding raid did not suffer from legal infirmity warranting interference---Leave to appeal was refused and petition was dismissed. Agha Steels Industries v. Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation (2019 PTD 2119); K.K. Oil and Ghee Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. FBR (2016 PTD 441); Khurram Shahzad v. Federation of Pakistan (2019 PTD 1124); Edwards v. Edwards (1876) 2 Ch.D. 291 rel. (a) Interpretation of statute---Plain meaning rule---Application--- Where words of statute are clear, plain and unambiguous, Court must give effect to their ordinary meaning and cannot import into provision restrictions, qualifications or conditions not chosen by legislature---Primary duty of Court is to ascertain intention of legislature from language actually employed in enactment. (b) Section 175, Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Pending proceedings---Whether prerequisite--- Section 175 authorizes Commissioner or duly authorized officer, without prior notice, to have access to premises, accounts, documents and computers in order to enforce any provision of the Ordinance, including for audit or survey---Nothing in text of provision makes pendency of proceedings against taxpayer a condition precedent for exercise of such power---Such requirement cannot be judicially engrafted into statute. (c) Search and raid under S.175---Whether last resort--- View that search under S.175 may be resorted to only as last measure where there is obstruction in pending proceedings was not borne out by statutory language---Courts are not competent to dilute or rewrite a clear taxing provision on ground of perceived severity, such matter being within legislative domain. (d) Section 175---Nature of power---Conditional, not unfettered--- Although existence of pending proceedings is not necessary, power under S.175 is nevertheless not absolute---Use of expression “in order to enforce any provision of this Ordinance” signifies that power is linked with enforcement of law and therefore presupposes some breach or legally cognizable occasion requiring enforcement---Authorities must clearly identify, in writing, provision of Ordinance sought to be enforced and reasons for such action, failing which power may be open to abuse. (e) Notice under S.176---Effect on power under S.175--- Mere fact that information or documents had earlier been sought under S.176 did not, by itself, negate or exclude subsequent exercise of power under S.175, where competent authority considered enforcement action necessary within meaning of statute. (f) High Court judgment---Interference in leave jurisdiction---Scope--- Where impugned judgment did not suffer from any legal infirmity in light of proper construction of S.175 and surrounding facts, no case for interference in leave jurisdiction was made out. Leave refused; petition dismissed.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (1) Reckless and irresponsible conduct of CDA (2) Responsibilities of Public Authorities in contesting court matters (3) Sufficient cause in terms of Order 9 Rule 13 of the CPC read with Article 164 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act

Summary: Interim injunction in a suit for recovery of damages under the Defamation Ordinance, 2002--- In defamation matters involving serious and unproven allegations, courts are empowered to grant limited interim injunctions to prevent irreparable harm. ----- Freedom of speech is a cherished constitutional right, it is not absolute and must be balanced against the inviolable dignity and reputation of an individual. ----- judicial restraint, emphasizing protection of reputation during pendency of trial without foreclosing final adjudication on merits. 34Writ Petition- Family- Dowry Articles 836-26 MUHAMMAD AHMAD TARIQ VS JFC ETC Mr. Justice Muzamil Akhtar Shabir 22- 01- 2026 2026 LHC 1286

Summary: (Against judgment dated 14.10.2022 passed in C.R. No. 1281-P of 2019 by Peshawar High Court, Peshawar). (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.152 & O.XX, R.3---Wrong mentioning of property owner’s name in the judgement, grievance of---Clerical mistake in the judgment, correction of---Amendment in judgment---Scope---Brief facts were that the respondents instituted a suit for declaration and partition against the petitioners, which was dismissed by the Trial Court and the Appellate Court, but upon remand by the High Court, the Appellate Court allowed the appeal; in that judgment, the Appellate Court inadvertently mentioned “BK” instead of “AK” as owner of the disputed property, whereupon the error was corrected under Section 152, C.P.C.; the petitioners’/defendants’ challenge to that correction failed before the Revisional Court and the High Court, leading to the filing of the present petition---The issue requiring determination was “whether substitution of the correct name in the judgment was a permissible clerical correction under Section 152, C.P.C. or an impermissible alteration of the judgment?”---Held: It was not disputed that while recording findings on certain issues, the Appellate Court in advertently mentioned the name of the father of the party instead of the party himself, despite the pleadings, evidence, and the rest of the judgment consistently identifying the correct person “AK” as the owner of the disputed property---The correction made by the Appellate Court did not introduce any new relief, alter the substantive findings, or re-open the merits of the case---It merely brought the judgment in conformity with the manifest intention of the Court as discernible from the record as a whole---Such a correction squarely fell within the ambit of an “error arising from accidental slip or omission” as contemplated by Section 152, C.P.C.---No illegality, irregularity, jurisdictional defect, or misreading of law was found in the impugned judgment of the High Court---Leave was refused and petition was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.152 & O.XX, R.3---Clerical or arithmetical mistake in judgment, amendment of---Correction of accidental slip---Scope---A combined reading of Section 152, C.P.C. and Order XX, Rule 3, C.P.C. makes it manifest that although a judgment, once signed, attains finality, the legislature itself has carved out a specific exception enabling correction of clerical or arithmetical mistakes or errors arising from accidental slips or omissions---The scope of Section 152, C.P.C. are no longer res integra---The power conferred under Section 152 may be exercised “at any time” and even suo motu---However, such power, though wide, is discretionary and must be exercised having regard to the circumstances of each case, particularly where third-party rights may not be affected. Mst. Farosha v. Fazal Gul and others PLD 1983 SC 220 and Baqar v. Muhammad Rafique and others 2003 SCMR 1401 rel. Vinod Kumar Singh v. Banaras Hindu University and others 1989 MLD 3215 ref. Shah Khawar, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners. Muhammad Taif Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 11 and 12. Date of hearing: 22nd January, 2026.

Summary: Summary pending