Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: A dispute relating to dowry, its possession or recovery between spouses falls within the jurisdiction of the Family Court and cannot, by mere use of the expression "amanat", be converted into an offence of criminal breach of trust under Section 406 PPC.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)----Ss. 34, 109, 409, 420, 468 & 471---Prevention of Corruption Act----S. 5(2)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S. 497(2)---Post-arrest bail---FIA corporate crime case---Rule of consistency / parity with co-accused---Further inquiry as to sole decisive authority versus subordinate role---Held, where co-accused holding identical or more definitive hierarchical positions already on bail, denying same treatment to petitioner unjustified---Whether petitioner possessed sole decisive authority or acted as mere subordinate following administrative routines is a matter for trial evidence and attracts further inquiry under S. 497(2) Cr.P.C. Disposition: Petition converted into appeal and allowed; appellant granted post-arrest bail subject to bail bonds of Rs. 500,000/- with one surety in like amount to satisfaction of Trial Court; observations tentative. Short order dated 12.05.2026. Approved for Reporting.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)----Ss. 337-F(v), 337-F(vi), 337-A(iii), 109 & 34---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----Ss. 497(2) & 498---Pre-arrest bail---Counter-versions / cross-cases---Local enmity and mala fides---Further inquiry---Held, where counter-cases and deep-seated rivalry create ambiguity as to aggression, number/severity of injuries on either side carries no decisive weight at bail stage---Such ambiguity attracts further inquiry under S. 497(2) Cr.P.C.---Pre-arrest bail protects against abuse of process driven by ulterior motives; history of litigation/rivalry heightens risk of false implication. Cited Cases: • Khizer Hayat v. The State and others 2024 SCMR 1605 Disposition: To extent of petitioner No.1 (Taimoor Khizar Hayat) petition became infructuous on arrest—liberty to avail post-arrest remedy; to extent of petitioners Nos.2 and 3 (Hamayun Sikandar Hayat and Muhammad Javed) petition converted into appeal and allowed; pre-arrest bail granted subject to bail bonds of Rs. 100,000/- each with one surety each in like amount to satisfaction of Trial Court; observations tentative. Short order dated 12.05.2026. Approved for Reporting.

Summary: (a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)----S. 10(4)---Application for leave to defend---Mandatory disclosure of material facts and plausible defence---Substantial question of law or fact---Banking Court dismissed a joint leave application of the directors of the borrower company and decreed Suit No.74 of 1998; High Court dismissed the regular first appeal under S. 22 of the Ordinance---Appellant No.1 pressed a solitary ground that he did not sign the personal guarantees as he was not in Pakistan when they were allegedly executed---Held, that S. 10(4) obliged the borrower company, along with its directors, to specifically disclose all material facts and set out a plausible defence---Leave application was conspicuously silent with regard to those mandatory pre-requisites and did not meet the threshold required for grant of leave to defend---Appellants had not denied that they were directors when finances were extended, had not denied sanctioning or disbursement of facilities, and had not denied that title documents of the subject property remained in custody of the Bank---Plea that appellant No.1 had not signed the guarantees remained unsubstantiated, and alleged absence from Pakistan was not established through any tangible or cogent evidence---Non-fulfilment of the mandatory requirements of S. 10(4) entailed legal consequences, and in the absence of such disclosure leave to defend could not be granted---Only a substantial question of law or fact could entitle the defendants to contest the suit, which was conspicuously absent, as found by the Banking Court and the High Court. (b) Transfer of Property---Equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds---Personal guarantees---Appellants conceded that original title documents of the mortgaged property were, and had long remained, in custody of the Bank, which prima facie constituted an equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds---No satisfactory explanation was furnished as to how title documents of property belonging to appellant No.1 came into possession of the Bank in the ordinary course of business---In the presence of an equitable mortgage, the argument that the appellants had not signed the guarantees lost its significance---Appellants could not dislodge the presumption arising from admitted custody of title documents with the Bank. (c) Administration of justice---Approbate and reprobate---Inconsistent pleas---Joint leave application---Joint application for leave to defend filed on behalf of all directors contained no allegation of impersonation, forgery or misuse of signatures---Once a joint application is filed seeking leave to defend, any subsequent attempt to attribute execution of documents to a co-defendant amounts to a clear conflict of interest, which cannot be countenanced in law nor pressed through a common pleading---Subsequent reliance upon an application by a co-guarantor seeking benefit under a State Bank of Pakistan circular amounted to an admission that finance facilities were availed by the company and that the property stood mortgaged with the Bank---Appellants could not be permitted to approbate and reprobate simultaneously, nor to take inconsistent positions at different stages of the proceedings. Disposition: Civil appeal dismissed; concurrent findings of the Banking Court and of the Lahore High Court in judgment dated 04.06.2010 in R.F.A. No.609 of 2002 left undisturbed. (C.A. No.630-L of 2013, Supreme Court of Pakistan, judgment dated 12.05.2026, by Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, J.; Approved for Reporting)

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ---- S. 376(iii) --- Qanun-e-Shahadat Order (X of 1984) ---- Arts. 3 & 117 --- Rape of a child --- Competence and reliability of child victim as witness --- Presumption of innocence --- Independent reappraisal in a capital case --- Petitioner, a sweeper serving at a Government Girls High School, was convicted by the Gender-Based Violence Court under S. 376(iii), P.P.C., and sentenced to death with fine of Rs.300,000 (default simple imprisonment for six months) and compensation of Rs.100,000 to the victim under S. 17 of the Anti-Rape (Investigation and Trial) Act, 2021, for rape of a girl of about ten years (referred to as M), alleged to have been committed on 08.10.2021 in a secluded part of the school premises; conviction and sentence were maintained by the High Court --- Held, that every criminal case begins with the presumption of innocence, which is not lessened by gravity of the charge or youth of the victim, and is displaced only by lawful evidence proving the charge beyond reasonable doubt --- Under Art. 117 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, that burden lies upon the prosecution throughout --- Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond every imaginable possibility; a doubt is reasonable only if it arises from the evidence or from a material gap in it --- Concurrent findings command respect, but in a death sentence case the duty of independent reappraisal is at its highest and the life of a citizen cannot rest upon deference --- Competence of a child witness is governed by Art. 3 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984: every person is competent to testify unless the Court finds that tender years prevent understanding of questions or giving of rational answers; competence is the rule, and the test is capacity to understand and answer, not maturity equal to an adult's --- Trial Court having held a voir dire and recorded that M understood questions and answered rationally, the proper inquiry was made --- Competence only admits the evidence; weight depends upon substance, manner of testing, and surrounding support --- Testimony of M identified the petitioner, placed the occurrence in the school, and stated that he took her to the washroom, removed her clothes, slapped her when she resisted, threatened her and committed the act; on identity, place, force, resistance, threat and nature of the assault her account was not shaken --- A child who has suffered sexual violence may not repeat graphic detail in open court, and the law does not require her to do so as the price of belief --- Confidence-inspiring testimony of a victim of sexual assault may by itself sustain a conviction, corroboration being a rule of prudence and not of law --- Variance between description of the place as a room and as a washroom was a variance of description of a secluded place within the same school premises, not as to school, time, accused, character of the act, or the child, and was not fatal --- Absence of an independent eye-witness was no anomaly, such offences being committed away from view --- Medical picture consisting of breast abrasions, vaginal redness and swelling, hymenal rupture, a child account of force, and examination within a period consistent with the reported timeline, had probative value in constellation --- Theoretical medical possibilities (hymenal rupture from play or exercise; redness from an article other than the penis) do not mature into reasonable doubt unless connected to facts on the record --- Allegation that the medical report was procured through collusion was unsupported --- Conviction under S. 376(iii), P.P.C., held, lawful and safe. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ---- S. 376(iii) --- Forensic evidence --- Absence of seminal material on vaginal and anal swabs --- Effect --- Punjab Forensic Science Agency report recorded absence of seminal material --- Held, that the offence of rape does not require proof of ejaculation, nor is detection of semen a condition precedent to conviction --- Biological recovery is time-sensitive and may be affected by interval between occurrence and examination, nature of the act, non-ejaculation, condom use, preservation, cleaning and other variables --- Absence of semen is a limitation upon biological recovery, not proof that the assault did not occur --- While a DNA report is regarded as a gold standard for establishment of identity and a strong corroborative piece of evidence, it cannot be treated as primary evidence and may be relied upon only for corroboration --- Negative reports do not necessarily destroy the prosecution case where the victim account and other convincing evidence establish the offence --- In the totality of a non-immediate examination, negative semen report, otherwise present medical observations, and a direct and credible child account, the negative semen result did not create reasonable doubt. (c) First Information Report --- Delay in registration in a child rape case --- Statement under S. 164, Cr.P.C. --- Occurrence alleged on 08.10.2021 at about 07:00 a.m.; F.I.R. registered on 11.10.2021 --- Held, that delay is not an abstract formula; its legal effect depends upon nature of the offence, identity and age of the victim, social setting, conduct of the informant, and the explanation emerging from the record --- Even if the statement under S. 164, Cr.P.C., and parts of cross-examination were read at their highest as suggesting that the child had told about the occurrence to the principal, her mother and another teacher on the same day, they did not show that a complete, legally actionable and uninhibited disclosure was made on 08.10.2021 and then deliberately suppressed --- Record disclosed institutional silence after the matter had come to the notice of school personnel and after a drip had been administered within the school premises; a child victim and her mother cannot be prejudiced by such institutional reticence --- In sexual offences, particularly involving children, silence and delay can be produced by fear, shame, confusion, dependence, family pressure, apprehension of stigma, and inability of a child to articulate the wrong --- Delay in rape cases must be considered in its social context; it is not fatal when satisfactorily explained by circumstances appearing from the record --- Once disclosure was made to the mother, she approached the police --- Delay, held, did not create reasonable doubt. (d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ---- S. 376(iii) --- Plea of false implication --- Defence of quarrel at school gate --- Petitioner neither proved the quarrel, nor examined any witness, nor appeared under S. 340(2), Cr.P.C., nor showed that the plea formed part of his first version before the investigating officer --- Held, that a motive for adults, even if assumed, is not automatically a motive for a child victim; the bridge must be built by evidence --- A bare plea of false implication, not put to the victim in cross-examination and not advanced through a statement on oath under S. 340(2), Cr.P.C. or through evidence in defence, does not dislodge a trustworthy and corroborated prosecution case --- Minor variations are natural where the principal witness is a child and the occurrence is traumatic; the law separates contradictions which strike at the root from discrepancies of memory, language and time. (e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ---- S. 376(iii) --- Sentence --- Death or imprisonment for life --- Statutory alternatives --- Proportionality --- Aggravating factors were grave: victim about ten years of age; petitioner an adult connected with the school premises; offence occurring where the child was entitled to safety; betrayal of institutional trust --- Held, that existence of statutory alternatives means that death is not automatic and sentencing discretion must be exercised judicially, not by anger, rhetoric or formula --- Record did not show previous conviction, proven history of similar offences, permanent physical disability of the child, or any additional proven aggravating circumstance beyond those inherent in the conviction --- Imprisonment for life is one of the gravest punishments known to law --- Where the statute permits life imprisonment and the record does not demonstrate that death alone is indispensable, the Court must choose the punishment which is severe, lawful and proportionate, while avoiding irreversible excess --- Conviction answers whether the accused committed the offence; sentencing answers what the law, proportionately and justly, must do in response --- Conviction maintained; sentence of death altered to imprisonment for life; fine, default sentence and compensation maintained; benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C. allowed; confirmation of death in the capital sentence reference set aside to that extent --- Name and identifying particulars of M not to be disclosed in any report, publication or broadcast. (f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ---- S. 509 --- Constitution of Pakistan ---- Arts. 9, 14, 25 & 25-A --- Safety of girls in educational institutions --- Preventive policing --- Medico-legal service --- Facts revealing that a girl of ten years was not safe even within a school compelled the Court to address the wider question of safety of girls in educational institutions and on their daily commute --- S. 509, P.P.C. criminalizes conduct intended to insult the modesty of a woman, invade her privacy, or subject her to harassment, and casts a corresponding obligation upon law-enforcement agencies to respond promptly --- If a child is not secure in an educational institution, or while travelling to and from it, the constitutional promise of education, dignity, equality and personal security becomes illusory --- All Provincial Inspectors General of Police and the Inspector General, Islamabad Capital Territory Police, directed to devise and implement effective mechanisms for protection of girls attending schools, colleges and universities, with particular attention to complaints of harassment under S. 509, P.P.C., stalking and other precursor offences, visible patrolling around educational institutions and routes used by female students, and preventive policing as the governing principle --- Federal Government and Provincial Governments may take benefit of the Sindh Medico Legal Act, 2023 as a legislative model in constituting a dedicated medico-legal cadre --- Attorney General for Pakistan, Advocate Generals of the Provinces, concerned Health Departments and Police authorities directed to take note for appropriate action and implementation in accordance with law. Cited Cases: • The State through Advocate General, Sindh, Karachi v. Farman Hussain PLD 1995 SC 1 • Raja Khurram Ali Khan v. The State PLD 2020 SC 146 • Atif Zareef v. The State PLD 2021 SC 550 • Shakeel v. The State PLD 2010 SC 47 • Muhammad Akram v. The State PLD 1989 SC 742 • Shahzad alias Shaddu v. The State 2002 SCMR 1009 • The State v. Abdul Khaliq PLD 2011 SC 554 • Abdul Chann v. The State 2022 SCMR 544 • Salman Akram Raja v. Government of Punjab 2013 SCMR 203 • Ali Haider alias Papu v. Jameel Hussain PLD 2021 SC 362 • Atta ul Mustafa v. The State 2023 SCMR 1698 • Mehboob Ahmad v. The State 1999 SCMR 1102 • Zahid v. The State 2020 SCMR 590 • Zahid v. The State 2022 SCMR 50 • Habib Ullah v. The State 2011 SCMR 1665 • Hamid Khan v. The State 1981 SCMR 448 • Muhammad Imran v. The State PLD 2025 SC 662 Disposition: Criminal petition converted into appeal and partly allowed; conviction of Younas Masih under S. 376(iii), P.P.C. maintained; sentence of death altered to imprisonment for life; fine of Rs.300,000 or, in default, simple imprisonment for six months, maintained; compensation of Rs.100,000 payable to M under S. 17 of the Anti-Rape (Investigation and Trial) Act, 2021, recoverable as arrears of land revenue, maintained; benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C. allowed; confirmation of death sentence in Capital Sentence Reference No.08-ARA-2022, as maintained by the High Court, set aside to the extent indicated; anonymity of M directed. (Crl.P.L.A. No.1042 of 2025, Supreme Court of Pakistan, judgment by Salahuddin Panhwar, J. (Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ. on the Bench), Islamabad, 12.05.2026; Approved for reporting.)

Summary: (a) Succession---Family pension, gratuity and post-retirement benefits of employee of public sector corporation---Whether part of tirka (estate)---Muslim Personal Law of inheritance---Brothers and sisters of deceased employee---Widow as statutory beneficiary---Appellants/petitioners, siblings of Ghulam Muhammad (deceased), instituted a succession application seeking a succession certificate in respect of the estate left by the deceased, who had served as Superintendent Revenue in PESCO and died on 28.03.2007, leaving service benefits including pension and gratuity payable by WAPDA---Respondent, the widow, contested the claim---Trial Court dismissed the succession application; Appellate Court allowed the appeal; High Court accepted the widow's revision and dismissed that of the siblings---Held, that under the pension regime applicable to employees of corporations and public sector entities such as PESCO, benefits including pension, gratuity, benevolent grant and other retirement dues are governed primarily by the relevant service and pension rules---Such benefits are not treated as part of the deceased employee's tirka devolving through inheritance under Muslim Personal Law---Their distribution is determined by the statutory framework that creates and regulates the entitlement---A family pension does not constitute an inheritable asset of the deceased employee; it is a statutory benefit or concession created by the relevant rules for the benefit of the employee's widow and other eligible dependents---Gratuity and other retirement benefits are ordinarily payable to the nominee or such persons as may be recognised under the applicable service or pension rules---Where those rules confer priority upon the widow or dependent family members, the statutory scheme prevails---Brothers and sisters of a deceased employee do not acquire any right to family pension merely because the employee died issueless---Where an employee dies after retirement, leaving behind a widow but no children, the widow, being the recognised dependent and, where applicable, the valid nominee, is entitled to receive family pension, pension arrears, gratuity, benevolent dues and such other retirement benefits as may be admissible under the governing statutory framework. (b) Succession---Amounts accrued during lifetime distinguished from family pension payable after death---Succession certificate---Held, that a crucial distinction must be maintained between amounts that had accrued to and were vested in the deceased during his lifetime, and the family pension that becomes payable only after his death---The former, having become the property of the deceased during his lifetime, may form part of his tirka and devolve upon his legal heirs in accordance with the applicable law of inheritance---Family pension stands on an entirely different footing: the right thereto arises only upon death and is payable exclusively in terms of the governing pension rules---Family pension constitutes a personal statutory right created in favour of the widow and other eligible dependents specified under the relevant rules---Such entitlement does not pass through the law of succession and cannot be claimed by collateral relatives, including brothers and sisters, unless they are expressly recognized as beneficiaries within the definition of "family" or "dependents" under the applicable statutory framework---Issuance of a succession certificate, by itself, does not confer any entitlement to family pension upon the legal heirs where such entitlement is inconsistent with the governing pension rules---A succession certificate may facilitate realization of assets forming part of the deceased's estate, but it cannot override or enlarge rights created and regulated by a statutory pension scheme---An ongoing family pension cannot be treated as part of the deceased employee's tirka and is not subject to distribution under the law of inheritance. Disposition: Civil Appeal and Civil Petition dismissed; leave declined; impugned judgment dated 13.08.2015 of the Peshawar High Court, Bannu Bench, in Civil Revisions No.44-B and 70-B of 2011 upheld; no order as to costs. (Civil Appeal No.208-P of 2015 and C.P.L.A. No.637-P of 2015, Haji Painda Khan and others v. Mst. Gul Indana Bibi and others, Supreme Court of Pakistan, Islamabad, 12.05.2026, Shakeel Ahmad, J. (Yahya Afridi, CJ on the Bench); Approved for reporting)

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts. 185(3), 184(3) & 187---Appellate jurisdiction---Scope of judicial inquiry and directions---Expansion of narrowly framed lis---Petition for leave to appeal against order of High Court of Sindh dated 02.11.2016 in C.P. No. D-789/2016 concerned the legality of construction over Plot No. LY-10/82, Mussa Lane, Lyari Quarters, Karachi, alleged to have been unlawfully erected on evacuee property, whose demolition the High Court had directed---Supreme Court, from 2018 onwards, in the same proceedings directed submission of a list of all buildings constructed in Lyari Town without approved building plans, directed action against SBCA officials for illegal constructions "all over Karachi" including recovery of relocation costs from officials' emoluments and properties (order dated 21.12.2018), and imposed a complete ban on change in use of land in Karachi with directions for demolition of commercial activities in Jam Sadiq Ali Park and other buildings (order dated 22.01.2019), resulting in extensive enforcement action across Karachi, in the nature of "continuous mandamus"---Held, a court seized of a matter must remain confined to the issue at hand and ought not to undertake any inquiry unnecessary for adjudication of the lis; queries and directions may travel beyond the pleadings only where their answers are "necessary to resolve a controversy pending before the Court"---Test is deliberately restrictive and requires a close and rational nexus between the relief claimed and the direction issued; emphasis is on necessity, not convenience, policy preference or broader regulatory concern---Courts have no duty to enter upon academic exercises or pronounce upon hypothetical questions; judicial function is to adjudicate a real and present controversy formally raised before it---Expansion of relief from a single identified structure in Lyari to all illegal constructions in Karachi could not be justified; the tangent on which the Court proceeded was not correct, and the broader directions did not satisfy the requirement of being necessary for resolving the controversy actually pending---Even assuming Art. 184(3) had been invoked, appellate jurisdiction could not be converted into original jurisdiction without satisfying the constitutional requirements and limitations of that provision, nor could directions be justified under Art. 187 (complete justice) merely because complete justice was required in relation to the matter pending before the Court---Lis before the Court was confined to alleged illegal construction of a single building. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Hanif Abbasi v. Imran Khan Niazi PLD 2018 SC 189 • Asma Jillani v. Government of Punjab PLD 1972 SC 139 (b) Building laws---Enforcement of building laws---Domain of provincial government and not judiciary---Due process---Demolition of dwellings---Held, the Court did not by its order seek to legalise illegality or confer lawful cover on unauthorised constructions in Karachi; a comprehensive legal framework, supported by rules and designated regulatory authorities, already exists, and Government of Sindh and other relevant departments are under a corresponding constitutional and statutory duty to supervise and regulate such matters---Enforcement of building laws remains primarily within the domain of the provincial government and not the judiciary---Court cannot, on the basis of some reports submitted by SBCA alone, direct demolition of dwellings without adherence to the requirements of due process, which is guaranteed to every individual under the law---Law must take its due course and all actions must be undertaken strictly within the framework of lawful authority and procedural safeguards---Main lis in C.P.L.A. No. 815/K of 2016 was informed to be no longer a live issue and was disposed of, with law enforcement agencies required to proceed in accordance with law. (c) Practice and procedure---Adjournment---Application for adjournment filed in Tariq Bin Naseer v. M/s Saima Builders (C.M.A. No. 60-K of 2020)---Held, grant of adjournment being a discretion of the Court, adjournment was denied as the Court intended to dispose of the main matter. Cited Cases: • Abbas Ali Shah v. Misha Zeb Khan C.P. No. 245 of 2026 (d) Constitution of Pakistan---Fundamental rights---Public amenities and civic facilities---Additional note of Syed Arshad Hussain Shah, J.---Protection and preservation of fundamental rights of citizens of Karachi must remain paramount; citizens are entitled to public amenities such as parks, playgrounds, green belts, recreational spaces, libraries, community centres, footpaths, walkways, public beaches, open spaces, sports facilities and healthcare and educational institutions, which form an integral part of the right to life and human dignity and must be safeguarded from unlawful encroachment, arbitrary conversion, misuse or deprivation---No person or authority, under the guise of any policy, executive instruction or administrative order, may curtail rights already existing and approved in master plans except in accordance with the Constitution and the law. Disposition: Orders of the Supreme Court passed in C.P.L.A. No. 815/K of 2016 dated 21.12.2018 and 22.01.2019 recalled; all directions issued, and all consequential reports, proceedings and actions taken or awaiting implementation pursuant thereto, recalled; all concerned authorities ordered to proceed in accordance with law; C.P.L.A. No. 815/K of 2016 and all pending applications disposed of. Not Approved for Reporting.