Summary: A photocopy of the judgment without any stamp or mark of copying agency upon the same showing the source from which the same was obtained or copied does not have presumption of genuineness or authenticity attached to it.

Summary: After examining the discrepancies forming basis of the show cause notice issued by the Commissioner while exercising jurisdiction under sub-sections (5A) and (9) of section 122 of the Ordinance, we are of the considered view that in the circumstances, Commissioner was precluded to exercise his powers under sub-section (5A) of section 122 of the Ordinance. The Commissioner, at the most, should have resorted to sub-section (5) of section 122 of the Ordinance, if he intended to amend the assessment order of the Assessing Officer.

Summary: The presence of rigor mortis and seminal discharge are recognised post-mortem phenomena - fully explained.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (Civil Law Revision under Section 115 of CPC) Civil Law PROCEDURE CODE (V OF 1908), S. 115, O. IX, R. 13 & O. XXXVII --- Recovery suit --- Ex-parte decree, setting aside of --- Conduct of petitioner --- Indolent litigant --- Petitioner failed to file surety bond despite conditional leave to defend and repeatedly defaulted in appearance --- Successive applications for restoration filed and withdrawn --- Held: Law favors adjudication on merits but assists only the vigilant --- Discretion cannot be exercised in favor of a party whose persistent negligence causes prejudice to the opponent --- Technicalities become material when conduct amounts to waiver of remedy. LIMITATION ACT (IX OF 1908), ART. 164 & 181 — Civil Law PROCEDURE CODE (V OF 1908), O. IX, R. 13 — SETTING ASIDE EX-PARTE DECREE — LIMITATION PERIOD — Application for restoration of petition to set aside ex-parte decree — Defendant appeared and obtained leave to defend but later absented himself — Ex-parte decree passed — Application to set aside decree filed after 10 months without application for condonation of delay — Contention: Applicability of residuary Article 181 (3 years) — Held: Where a defendant has knowledge of the pendency of the suit or has previously appeared, Article 164 applies, providing a 30-day limitation period — Article 181 is not applicable where a specific article (Art. 164) exists — Restoration would be a futile exercise as the underlying application was time-barred. (Civil Law Revision was dismissed.)

Summary: Article 212-Constitution of Pakistan- Under Article 212(2), a Tribunal established under Provincial laws may exercise jurisdiction over matters assigned to it by statute; however, for such jurisdiction to be “exclusive,” thereby barring all other courts from taking cognizance, specific Constitutional Law requirements must be met. In the absence of such requirements, the matters falling within the Tribunal’s purview can still be agitated before a Civil Law Court (being a court of ultimate Civil Law jurisdiction), the High Court under its Constitutional Law jurisdiction, or any other forum recognized by law. Consequently, the jurisdiction enjoyed by such a Tribunal is not exclusive, and other courts may legally exercise jurisdiction over these matters unless the power of exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly conferred by Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) through an Act passed pursuant to a resolution by the concerned Provincial Assembly or by strict adherence to the legislative competence required to invoke the ouster clause of Article 212(2). In the absence of such legislative cover extending the strict application of Article 212(2) to the Tribunal, its jurisdiction over the subject matters enshrined in its enabling statute cannot be deemed exclusive so as to oust the plenary jurisdiction of the Civil Law Courts. Ref: Syed Asghar Ali Shah & another v. Kaleem Arshad & others 2024 SCMR 563. Section 9 CPC- It is pertinent to note that the jurisdiction of the Civil Law Court under Section 9 CPC, is the rule, while the exclusion of its jurisdiction is an exception. Section 9 confers upon Civil Law Courts a plenary jurisdiction to adjudicate all suits of a Civil Law nature, unless cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred by a special statute. This provision is governed by the fundamental legal maxim ubi jus ibi remedium—where there is a right, there must be a remedy. In cases involving purely contractual obligations between a statutory body and a private individual, the nature of the dispute is Civil Law and commercial, distinct from administrative or Service Law matters. This distinction stems from the understanding that when the State or its instrumentalities or autonomous bodies descend into the arena of commerce and enter into private contracts with citizens, the law strips them of their sovereign immunity in matters of contractual obligations, treating them pari passu with any other private litigant. In this context, a special statute, such as the MTI Act, which establishes a Tribunal with specific, limited jurisdiction over employees and internal management, cannot be interpreted to impliedly oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Law Court regarding third-party commercial disputes where the Tribunal lacks statutory competence to grant the relief sought. To hold otherwise would render the appellant remediless, creating a legal vacuum repugnant to the administration of justice. Therefore, in the absence of an effective alternative forum capable of adjudicating the specific dispute and granting the requisite relief, the Civil Law Court retains its inherent jurisdiction to entertain the suit and determine the rights and liabilities of the parties in accordance with the law. Consequently, the impugned order is legally untenable and calls for interference by this court.

Summary: The right of appeal, no doubt, is a vested and substantive right which accrues to a litigant on the date of institution of the lis and cannot be taken away except by express words or by necessary implication. However, the forum through which such right is to be exercised is a matter of procedure; therefore, the right of appeal and the forum of appeal are two distinct and separate concepts. A litigant has a vested right of appeal, but no vested right to have that appeal heard by a particular forum, number of judges, or under a specific procedural arrangement. It is a settled principle of law that statutes relating to procedure, including those effecting a change of forum, operate retrospectively and apply to pending proceedings, unless such change prejudicially affects a substantive or vested right, causes injustice, or the legislature expressly provides otherwise. A mere change of forum does not amount to prejudice, nor does it extinguish or curtail the right of appeal; rather, it regulates the mode and machinery through which that right is exercised. Where legislation alters jurisdiction or transfers appellate authority from one forum to another without abolishing the right of appeal itself, such change is procedural in nature and does not offend Constitutional Law guarantees of due process or fair trial. However, where a statutory amendment results in the complete denial of an appellate remedy, creates a forum vacuum, or leaves the vested right of appeal without an express or effective forum, such interpretation must be avoided, as it would violate Articles 4 and 10-A of the Constitution. (ii) the omission of Section 33 under the Amended Act, 2024, constitutes a procedural amendment, altering the forum of appeal, and does not repeal any substantive law or create a right previously vested. Consequently, Section 6 cannot be invoked to revive the old appellate path through a larger Bench of the High Court. Similarly, Article 264 of the Constitution provides that the repeal of a law shall not affect rights, privileges, obligations, or liabilities that have already accrued under that law, nor shall it revive a law that was previously in force. In other words, when a law is repealed under the Constitution, the repeal does not undo past actions unless the Constitution explicitly provides otherwise. It does not revive any law, right, or situation that had already ceased to exist before the repeal, nor does it disturb or invalidate anything that was lawfully done, decided, or suffered while the repealed law was in force. The past operation of the law remains protected even though the law no longer applies for the future. (iii) the outcome of legislation or changes in law that pertain solely to the procedures or legal remedies indicates that if legislation is enacted with the primary intent to alter or modify procedural aspects without prejudicing the rights of the litigants, then no doubt, it will apply to all pending and future actions and individuals do not possess a vested right in any particular course of procedure, so for all intents and purposes, the change in the law of procedure operates retrospectively. However, laws affecting, curtailing or prejudicing vested rights shall be applied prospectively.

Summary: i. As previously observed, the parties bore no previous ill-will, grudge, or blood feud. In such circumstances, the contention of defense that the charge against the appellant, who is the real nephew of both the deceased and the complainant, was manufactured, or that the real culprits were shielded while the innocent accused was substituted, cannot be sustained. ii. It is true that a recovery report, in isolation, cannot establish the guilt of an accused, yet when the account of the accused is found to be biased, the recovery is duly proved, and the recovered weapon is safely transmitted to the firearms expert for examination, such evidence assumes substantial probative value. iii. Where the asserted cause of the killing is not established, the case of the appellant must be considered in isolation. The prosecution's case had suggested that the appellant, who had resided in the house of his maternal uncle for a prolonged period of two years, was motivated by lust arising from this alleged illicit relationship. It was on the basis of this purported motive that the trial court concluded and imposed the death sentence; however, in the absence of proof of such a relationship, the case of prosecution stands bereft of a concrete motive. Accordingly, this court must consider whether the complainant was able to demonstrate the real cause which led the appellant to commit the killing. iv. When viewed in this light, the sentence imposed by the trial court cannot be said to be commensurate with the circumstances of the case. Furthermore, in considering the age of the appellant and the absence of any definite motive, it becomes apparent that the imposition of the extreme penalty of death was disproportionate.

Summary: A reference filed u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for determination of compensation of the acquired land cannot be held as non-maintainable solely for absence of protest at the time of receipt of compensation rather filing of reference, itself, signifies non-acceptance of the award and in such circumstances, withdrawal of compensation under protest as envisaged by the first proviso to Section 31(2) of the Act is not mandatory

Summary: Summary pending