Summary: Review Petitions (Sunni Ittehad Council/Reserved Seats Case), decided on 06 May 2025 with dissenting Note by Justice Ayesha Malik. ---- Majority Judgment (Amin-ud-Din Khan, J. – For Seven Judges) (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 17(2), 51, 106, 184(3), 187, 188 & 225–––Election Commission of Pakistan–––Reserved seats for women and non-Muslims–––Nature, purpose and constitutional scheme–––Interpretation–––Scope of review jurisdiction. Held, that reserved seats under Arts. 51 and 106 are an integral component of representative democracy, meant to ensure inclusiveness of marginalized groups; however, their allocation remains party-based and contingent on valid participation through submission of party lists before elections. The Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC) had not submitted valid lists within statutory time; nevertheless, the earlier judgment (2024 PLD SC ___) incorrectly excluded the claim of seats solely because PTI candidates joined SIC post-poll. Such exclusion distorted proportional representation and denied voters’ constitutional right to representation. Court, exercising review jurisdiction under Art.188, revisited manifest error in interpreting Articles 51 & 106 and restored the legal position settled by the Peshawar High Court. (b) Election Act, 2017 (XXXIII of 2017) ----Ss. 60, 66, 104, 209 & Fourth Schedule–––Party lists for reserved seats–––Submission and substitution–––Consequences of omission–––ECP’s jurisdiction. Under s.104(1), party lists must be filed before the Commission within prescribed period; however, law does not bar consideration of subsequent lawful affiliation where a political party retains electoral identity through its symbol or allied group. ECP’s decision to treat SIC as ineligible was beyond jurisdiction and contrary to the spirit of participatory democracy. Held, that ECP’s action violated Articles 17(2) and 218(3) of the Constitution; hence, Peshawar High Court rightly set aside the Commission’s order. (c) Constitutional Jurisdiction & Review under Art. 188 ----Maintainability of review–––Grounds–––Error apparent on face of record–––Scope of “complete justice” under Art. 187. Held, that earlier three-member majority judgment committed an error apparent on face of record by granting relief to an entity (PTI) not party before the Court and by substituting statutory scheme with judicial innovation. Such exercise exceeded jurisdiction under Art.184(3). In review, the Court may correct its own constitutional error to uphold supremacy of Constitution; principle of functus officio does not bar review to correct manifest illegality. Jurisdiction under Art.188 read with Order XXVI, r.6 of Supreme Court Rules permits reconsideration of constitutional misinterpretation. (d) Principles of Interpretation –– Mandatory Timeframes and Jurisdictional Bars Held, that statutory requirements for filing party lists are directory in so far as they ensure procedural order, not substantive disenfranchisement. Technical lapses cannot defeat constitutional rights of representation. ECP’s insistence on procedural rigidity without constitutional foundation amounted to mal-exercise of authority. (e) Separation of Powers –– Election Disputes –– Art. 225 Held, that Art.225 restricts election disputes to election tribunals; however, questions of constitutional interpretation relating to representational rights fall within the Supreme Court’s review jurisdiction. The 2024 judgment exceeded the limits of “complete justice” under Art.187 by re-distributing seats contrary to electoral law; hence, liable to recall. (f) Fundamental Rights –– Freedom of Association & Political Representation ----Art.17(2)–––Right to form or be member of political party–––Proportional representation through reserved seats as extension of fundamental right–––Denial of representation unconstitutional. Held, that exclusion of voters represented by PTI-backed independents from allocation of reserved seats offended Art.17(2). Fundamental right to political participation cannot be curtailed by administrative interpretation or judicial construction inconsistent with the text and spirit of Constitution. (g) Precedents Relied Upon • Workers’ Party Pakistan v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2012 SC 681 • Muhammad Saeed v. ECP PLD 2023 SC 70 • Benazir Bhutto v. Federation PLD 1988 SC 416 • Lahore High Court judgment in E.T.R. No.01/05 etc., restored Disposition (Majority): Review Petitions Allowed –– Impugned Judgment dated 13.03.2024 set aside –– Peshawar High Court judgment restored –– Orders of ECP annulled –– Reserved seats allocated to Sunni Ittehad Council as per law. Dissenting Note (Ayesha A. Malik, J.) (h) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 187, 188 & 184(3)–––Scope of review jurisdiction–––Distinction between appeal and review–––Finality of Supreme Court judgments. Held, that review is not a rehearing of the case; its scope is confined to correcting an error apparent on the face of the record. The petitioners failed to identify any such error. The review petitions sought re-appraisal of factual and legal conclusions already determined; therefore, were misconceived and incompetent. (i) Art. 187 –– “Complete Justice” –– Limits of power The power of “complete justice” cannot be used to subvert finality of judicial decisions or to alter outcomes reached after full hearing. The majority, by reopening concluded findings, exceeded the permissible scope of Art.188 and Order XXVI of the Supreme Court Rules. (j) Constitutional Discipline –– Finality of Judgments Reiterated, that finality of judgments is a constitutional imperative ensuring legal certainty and public confidence. Allowing review as a second appeal undermines judicial stability and erodes institutional credibility. (k) Result Held, that review petitions ought to have been dismissed; original judgment of 13.03.2024 contained no patent error; majority’s decision amounts to re-hearing rather than review. Disposition (Dissent): Review Petitions Dismissed. Final Outcome: By Majority (7 to 2): Review petitions allowed; judgment of 13 March 2024 recalled; Peshawar High Court judgment restored; dissenting note by Ayesha A. Malik, J.

Summary: [Dissenting Note by Shakeel Ahmad, J.—Supplementing Afghan J, (Minority Opinion] Majority Opinion Citation is 2025 SCP 233 ----- (a) Constitution of Pakistan — Arts. 200, 175-A — Transfer of High Court Judges — Scope and Nature of Power — Constitutional Limitations. Held, the President’s power under Article 200 to transfer a High Court Judge is not unfettered; it is conditional upon consent of the judge concerned and meaningful consultation with the Chief Justice of Pakistan and the Chief Justices of both High Courts. Such consultation must be effective and informed, not perfunctory or based on incomplete information. The phrase “during the period” in all successive Constitutions (1956, 1962, 1973) denotes a temporary and time-bound transfer, not a permanent one. A permanent transfer would effectively circumvent Article 175-A (procedure for appointments) and undermine judicial independence. (b) Judicial Independence — Purpose of Safeguards — Prohibition on Executive Influence. The Constitution embeds multiple bulwarks to ensure judicial independence under Arts. 2-A, 175, 178, 195 and the Third Schedule. Any Executive power enabling removal or displacement of judges by “permanent transfer” would strike at the core of this independence. Judges are not civil servants; their transfer cannot be equated with administrative posting. High Courts are distinct constitutional entities, each with its own Chief Justice and seniority list; permanent inter-court transfers blur those constitutional boundaries. (c) Meaningful Consultation — Obligation of Disclosure — Violation by Omission. The summary initiating the impugned transfers failed to disclose crucial facts—seniority positions, requirement of fresh oath, and justification of public interest—thereby rendering the consultation process constitutionally defective. Such concealment amounted to mala fide exercise of power and violated the constitutional duty of fairness. Reliance placed on Messrs Airport Support Services v. Airport Manager (1998 SCMR 2268), Ikram Bus Service (PLD 1963 SC 564), and Doody ([1993] 3 All ER 92). (d) Public Interest — Requirement and Limits. Article 200 permits transfer only where public interest so demands, such as balancing judicial strength, national integration, or specialized need. No such public interest was demonstrated in the impugned notification. Transfers initiated for administrative or political reasons are ultra vires. (e) Locus Standi — Public Interest Litigation under Article 184(3). Advocates and Bar Associations possess standing to challenge measures that endanger judicial independence. Rule 165 of the Pakistan Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Rules (1976) obligates lawyers to resist politicization of judicial appointments. Relying on Benazir Bhutto v. Federation (PLD 1988 SC 416), Multilines Associates (PLD 1995 SC 423), and Wukla Mahaz (PLD 1998 SC 1263), the learned Judge reaffirmed that strict standing rules yield to public-interest concerns affecting the independence of the judiciary. (f) Constitutional Interpretation — Historical Evolution of Article 200. A review of Articles 172 (1956), 99 (1962) and 200 (1973) shows continuity of the words “consent and consultation” and “during the period”, evidencing legislative intent for temporary transfers only. The omission of the proviso by the 18th Amendment restored the full force of these safeguards. (g) Alleged Selectivity and Mala Fides. The transfers were completed within five days; the selection of relatively junior judges from Lahore, Sindh and Balochistan High Courts without consideration of seniority, and the absence of disclosure of fresh-oath implications, indicated selective and mala fide conduct. Such actions were inconsistent with transparency and fair-play principles. (h) Role of Armed Forces — Articles 244 & 245 — Non-Interference. The learned Judge noted that intelligence agencies have no constitutional role in judicial appointments or transfers. Members of the Armed Forces are bound by oath under Article 244 to remain apolitical; any interference would be unconstitutional. (i) Religious and Ethical Foundations of Judicial Independence. Verses from Surahs Al-Nisa (4:135 & 4:105), Al-Maida (5:8 & 5:44), and Sad (38:26) emphasize justice without fear or favour. Citing Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, the Judge reminded that “independence of judiciary is neither genuflexion nor opposition but fearless fidelity to law.” (j) Precedents Considered. Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation (PLD 1996 SC 324); Sharaf Faridi v. Federation (PLD 1989 Kar 404); Govt. of Balochistan v. Aziz Ullah Memon (PLD 1993 SC 341); Zafar Ali Shah v. Pervez Musharraf (PLD 2000 SC 869); and Liyanage v. The Queen ([1967] AC 259). (k) Dissenting Conclusion. Held (Dissenting), that permanent transfer of High Court Judges, as effected by Notification No. F.1(2)/2024-A.II dated 1 February 2025, is contrary to Article 200 of the Constitution; the process lacked genuine consultation and public interest justification. Such transfers undermine judicial independence and institutional autonomy. Questions concerning seniority and fresh oath were left open for future determination.

Summary: Section 26-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The rationale behind this legislation was to cut short the litigation. However, before invoking the penal provision, the conduct of the defendant must be carefully scrutinized. If the record reveals that the defendant had acted with bona fide intent, made efforts to comply with procedural requirements, or was prevented from timely filing the written statement due to genuine and unavoidable circumstances, then strict penal action may not be warranted. 233Crl. Appeal- Against Conviction- PPC 358-23 MUHAMMAD SULTAN VS STATE Mr. Justice Sadiq Mahmud Khurram 29- 09- 2025 2025 LHC 8239

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 185(3), 199(1)(b)(ii) & (5), 184(3) & 187—Quo warranto against Judges of Superior Courts—Scope; interim restraint—Maintainability to the extent of seeking information/examination of personal qualification to hold office distinguished from challenge to judicial acts—Held, while a proceeding in the nature of quo warranto may lie to examine a Superior Court Judge’s qualifications, a High Court cannot—in such proceedings under Art. 199—pass an interim order restraining the Judge from performing judicial functions, in view of Art. 199(5) and the settled law in PLD 1998 SC 161—Power to so restrain, if at all, lies only with the Supreme Court in exceptional circumstances in proceedings under Art. 184(3), aided by Art. 187. (b) High Courts—Practice & Procedure ----Interim order restraining a sitting Judge from “holding Court” during pendency of quo warranto petition—Illegality—Order set aside—Respondent No.1 (writ-petitioner) himself did not defend the restraint upon appreciating PLD 1998 SC 161; Attorney-General also supported the settled position—Impugned restraining portion held unsustainable. (c) High Court Office Objections / Registry Process ----Lahore High Court Rules & Orders, Vol. V, Ch. 1-A (as adopted by IHC)—Rules 9 & 9-A—Office objections must be decided first, through a speaking administrative order; only thereafter does the matter mature onto the judicial side—Bench directed that the Division Bench of the IHC shall first decide office objections and then proceed in accordance with law. (d) Administrative law—Reasoned orders ----S. 24-A, General Clauses Act, 1897—All administrative orders must be in writing and supported by reasons—“Verbal” or unreasoned directions lack legal sanctity—Principle reaffirmed. (e) Notice to Law Officers ----Order XXVII-A, C.P.C.—Matters involving interpretation of constitutional provisions—Notice to Attorney-General/Advocate-General—Compliance emphasized. (f) Additional note (concurring) by Shahid Bilal Hassan, J. ----Registry objections: nature and consequence—Proceedings on office objections are administrative; court must record reasons when overruling/sustaining them; ministerial staff cannot determine fate of petitions—Cited case law reiterating (i) written, reasoned administrative orders (S. 24-A GCA), and (ii) that deficient filings be placed before a Judge per Rules 9 & 9-A for appropriate orders (overrule; grant time; or dismiss, as the case may be). While concurring with the result, his Lordship underscores that bypassing the objection mechanism renders such orders legally infirm and the proper course is to restore status quo ante and decide objections first. (Concurring note; not a separate disposition.) Held: (i) High Court’s interim restraint preventing a sitting Judge from performing judicial functions in a quo warranto petition is without lawful authority and is set aside in light of PLD 1998 SC 161 and Art. 199(5); (ii) Division Bench of the Islamabad High Court shall first decide office objections by a speaking order and then proceed in accordance with law. Cited Cases: • Malik Asad Ali and others v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1998 SC 161 (paras 77, 84) • Zahid Hussain v. The State, 1998 SCMR 611 • CDA v. Shaheen Farooq, 2007 SCMR 1328 • Farman Ali v. Muhammad Ishaq, PLD 2013 SC 392 • Muhammad Boota v. Basharat Ali, PLD 2014 Lahore 1; 2014 CLD 64 (Lahore) • Rana Naveed Ahmad Khan v. Province of Punjab, PLD 2014 Lahore 436 • Pakistan Lawyers Forum v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2005 Lahore 107 • Tahira Naseem v. Arshad Mehmood, 2021 PCr.LJ 682 Disposition: Petition converted into appeal and allowed to the extent indicated—Impugned IHC order set aside insofar as it restrains the petitioner-Judge from holding Court; Division Bench of IHC directed to decide office objections first by a speaking order and thereafter proceed according to law.

Summary: The prayer seeking the application of the Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979 to OTT platforms and the alternate prayer for deemed certification of unrestrained content, are not maintainable on legal and practical grounds. 240Crl. Misc. 27723/25 Ghulam Abbas Vs Muhammad Ijaz Mr. Justice Muhammad Jawad Zafar 24- 09- 2025 2025 LHC 7088

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 185(3)---- Petition for leave to appeal—scope—principles governing interference with remand orders. Petition filed under Art. 185(3) of the Constitution requires demonstration of a substantial question of law of public importance. Jurisprudence establishes that leave may only be granted where a prima facie question of law arises, inconsistencies exist in evidence, or non-grant of leave would result in miscarriage of justice. A remand order, by its very nature, is not a final determination of rights but merely directs re-examination of issues by the subordinate forum. The Supreme Court, therefore, ordinarily refrains from interference unless the remand order is perverse, suffers from jurisdictional error, or where the matter could have been finally decided on the available record. (b) Civil Procedure—Remand Order ----Nature and effect—when interference justified. Remand order passed by the High Court directing the appellate court to re-decide the matter was examined. The High Court had noted that the first appellate court had recorded findings of superimposed thumb impressions and disbelieved certain documents (Exh.D-1 to D-3) without factual inquiry or evidence. Such findings could not stand without proper investigation; hence remand was justified. The contention that the High Court ought to have decided the case itself was found untenable, since the matter required factual determination. The remand did not suffer from illegality, jurisdictional error, or misreading of evidence. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----Remand jurisdiction—principles reaffirmed. It was reiterated that remand is appropriate when factual issues remain unexamined or evidence is incomplete; higher courts should not substitute themselves for the fact-finding forum. Only where the lower court’s remand is manifestly perverse or unnecessary on the face of record would intervention be warranted. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Shamin Ali v. Mst. Asma Begum 2011 SCMR 1238 • Abdul Rehman v. Rabon 2000 SCMR 1344 • Ghulam Rasool v. Government of Balochistan PLD 2002 SC 381 • Anab Din v. Member (SST) PLD 1986 Quetta 130 Disposition: Petition dismissed. Leave to appeal refused.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 191A, 202A, 204 & 209—Contempt of Court—Whether Judges of the Supreme Court can be proceeded against by their fellow Judges for contempt—Scope and limitation Held, contempt proceedings cannot be initiated by a Judge or Bench of the Supreme Court against another sitting Judge of the same Court; constitutional immunity under Art.199(5) bars intra-Court proceedings of such nature—A Judge of the Supreme Court or a High Court is not a “person” within the meaning of Art.204(2)—Judicial immunity preserves independence of judiciary and prevents internal interference—Misconduct of a Judge, if any, is cognizable only by the Supreme Judicial Council under Art.209, and contempt proceedings under Art.204(2) cannot run parallel thereto—To permit such intra-Court contempt proceedings would violate esprit de corps and erode judicial discipline and public trust. Cited Cases: • Jurist Foundation v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2020 SC 1 • Muhammad Ikram Chaudhry PLD 1998 SC 103 • Parkash Chand AIR 1998 SC 1344 (India) • Mujibur Rahman Shami PLD 1973 Lahore 778 • Mian Jamal Shah PLD 1966 SC 1 (b) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art.191A (inserted by 26th Constitutional Amendment, 2024)—Transfer of jurisdiction to Constitutional Benches—Effect on pending petitions After 26th Constitutional Amendment, all petitions concerning constitutional interpretation or fundamental constitutional questions stood transferred forthwith by operation of law to newly constituted “Constitutional Benches” under Art.191A(5)—Any regular Bench of the Supreme Court became functus officio in relation thereto—Regular Bench had no jurisdiction to proceed or issue directions in such cases, including contempt proceedings against Court officials—Placement of files before that Bench did not confer jurisdiction—Any order passed by such Bench contrary to Art.191A(3) & (5) was without constitutional sanction and void. Cited Case: • Dewan Motors (Pvt.) Ltd. PLD 2025 SC 394 (c) Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003 ----S. 19—Withdrawal of appeal—Effect Appellant (Additional Registrar, Judicial) sought withdrawal of appeal under S.19 of the Ordinance challenging a show-cause notice in contempt—Since the original Bench had discharged the notice, partial withdrawal allowed to the extent of the appellant—However, Court retained jurisdiction to determine constitutional issues arising from the regular Bench’s subsequent order initiating contempt proceedings against members of Committees under the Supreme Court (Practice & Procedure) Act, 2023 and Art.191A(4) of the Constitution. (d) Judicial discipline and esprit de corps ----Judicial independence—Internal comity—Administrative and adjudicative boundaries Superior Court Judges stand on equal constitutional footing; no one Judge is superior or subordinate to another within the same Court—Judicial propriety demands maintenance of esprit de corps and restraint from initiating intra-Court contempt processes—Disagreements over administrative or roster matters must be resolved institutionally, not through reciprocal judicial action—Any internal contempt process would generate anarchy and destroy institutional harmony. (e) Administrative jurisdiction—Part-heard matters—Transfer and fixation Part-heard matters cannot be transferred or fixed before another Bench through administrative orders except as authorized by Constitution, law, or rules—Once jurisdiction shifts (as under Art.191A), regular Benches lose authority to act further—Judges are bound by their Oath, the Code of Conduct, and constitutional command to obey the Constitution and law (Art.5(2)); failure to do so undermines discipline and public confidence. (f) Judicial immunity—Distinction from misconduct Judicial immunity covers acts performed in judicial and administrative capacity but does not extend to personal misconduct—However, inquiry into misconduct of a Judge of the Supreme Court or High Court lies exclusively before the Supreme Judicial Council under Art.209(7)—No other forum, including the Supreme Court itself, can inquire into or punish such conduct under Art.204. (g) Precedent distinguished ----Justice (R) Iftikhar Hussain Ch. & others PLD 2011 SC 197—Distinguished That case involved Judges who had ceased to hold office upon taking oath under the Provisional Constitution Order (PCO) of 2007; they were no longer constitutionally sitting Judges, hence could be proceeded under Art.204—Present case differs as the Committee members remain sitting Judges, constitutionally protected under Art.209. Disposition: Appeal partly allowed to the extent of appellant’s personal withdrawal; to the extent of observations against members of both Committees, proceedings continued and examined—Court held that contempt process against members of Committees (sitting Judges) was not maintainable and quashed—Orders of the regular Bench dated 21.01.2025 to 27.01.2025 set aside and ceased to hold the field—Appeal disposed of accordingly. (Order dated 27.01.2025; released 23.09.2025; Approved for Reporting)

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 200, 175(2), 175A, 192, 199, 1(2), 2A—Transfer of High Court Judges to Islamabad High Court—Consent and consultations—Scope and validity Transfer of a Judge from a Provincial High Court to the Islamabad High Court under Art.200(1) is constitutionally valid where (i) the Judge consents and (ii) the President consults the Chief Justice of Pakistan and the Chief Justices of both the transferring and receiving High Courts—Art.200 is a self-contained provision; no additional conditions may be read into it—Record reflecting meaningful consultations and consent satisfies constitutional safeguards against arbitrariness—Transfers made in public interest and in conformity with Art.200 do not offend judicial independence protected by Arts. 2A & 175(2)—Court declined to expand Art.200 beyond its text. (b) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 200(1) & (3)—Temporary increase vs. transfer—Distinct schemes—No inherent temporariness in Art.200(1) transfers Art.200(3) expressly provides a temporary attendance mechanism; by contrast, Art.200(1) contains no temporal limitation—Difference in language is deliberate; a transfer under Art.200(1) is not confined to a fixed period—Petitioners’ attempt to import the “temporary” qualifier from Art.200(3) into Art.200(1) rejected. (c) Constitutional structure; federal character of the judiciary ----Arts. 1(2), 175, 192, 199, 25 & 27; Islamabad High Court Act, 2010, S.3; Judicial Commission of Pakistan (Appointment of Judges) Rules, 2024, R.6—Representational diversity and institutional legitimacy Islamabad High Court, as the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory frequently dealing with matters of national import, ought to reflect the federation’s regional and linguistic diversity—Transfers of Judges from Provinces to IHC advance federal inclusion, strengthen public confidence, and enrich deliberation—This aligns with S.3 of the Islamabad High Court Act, 2010 (appointments “from the provinces and other territories of Pakistan”) and JCP Rules, 2024, R.6 (ensuring diversity in gender, region, religion)—Participation of Provincial Chief Justices in the appointment architecture (Art.175A) evidences a constitutional design favouring federal representativeness. (d) Constitutional interpretation—Harmonious reading; functionalism disciplined by text ----Approach and principles Constitution must be read holistically; no provision (absent express command) overrides another—Functionalism, when anchored in text and structure, permits the Constitution to operate as a “living” instrument while preserving judicial discipline—Applied here to reconcile judicial independence (Arts. 2A, 175) with the transfer power (Art.200) and federal representativeness. (e) Judicial review; limits ----Ultra vires control vs. textual clarity Judicial review corrects jurisdictional excess and legal misdirection; however, where constitutional text is clear (Art.200’s consent + consultation scheme), courts may not superadd conditions—Transfers satisfying the constitutional minima and public interest standard withstand review. (f) Oath of office ----Arts. 194, 175A & 200—Whether re-administration of oath is required on transfer A transfer under Art.200 is a lateral reassignment within the same constitutional office; it is not a fresh appointment—The oath under Art.194 attaches to office of High Court Judge, not to a particular territorial seat—No re-oath is constitutionally required upon transfer. (g) Comparative perspective (India) ----Art. 222 (India)—Public-interest constraint; Pakistani scheme stronger on safeguards Indian law permits transfers on consultation with the Chief Justice of India and without the Judge’s consent, subject to public-interest review—Pakistan’s Art.200 regime affords greater safeguards (consent + tripartite consultations); Pakistani transfers promoting national integration and judicial independence are consistent with comparative constitutional practice. (h) Administrative reform—Policy direction (seniority) ----Unified National Seniority List—Transfers to IHC To promote transparency and consistency in federal-forum transfers, a Unified National Seniority List of all High Court Judges be prepared, maintained, and annually notified by the Office of the President in consultation with the Chief Justice of Pakistan, to operate for transfers to the Islamabad High Court and applied subject to the diversity principle. Cited Cases: • Lahore Development Authority v. Imrana Tiwana 2015 SCMR 1739 • Hamza Rasheed Khan v. EAT, LHC PLD 2024 SC 1028 • State v. Zia-ur-Rehman PLD 1973 SC 49 • Qazi Hussain Ahmad v. General Pervez Musharraf PLD 2002 SC 853 • Fauji Foundation v. Shamimur Rehman PLD 1983 SC 457 • Shahid Nabi Malik v. Chief Election Commissioner PLD 1997 SC 32 • Registrar, Supreme Court v. Wali Muhammad 1997 SCMR 141 • Al-Raham Travels v. MoRA 2011 SCMR 1621 • Province of Sindh v. MQM PLD 2014 SC 531 • Muhammad Aslam Awan v. Federation 2014 SCMR 1289 • SNGPL v. S.K. (Pvt.) Ltd. 2025 SCMR 570 • Naseem Khan v. Govt. of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 2024 SCMR 1341 • Sharaf Faridi v. Federation PLD 1994 SC 105 • Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation PLD 1996 SC 324 • Malik Asad Ali v. Federation PLD 1998 SC 161 • (India) Supreme Court AOR Assoc. v. Union of India (1993) 4 SCC 441; Madras Bar Assoc. v. Union of India AIR 2015 SC 1571 Disposition: (i) Transfers of Judges from Provincial High Courts to the Islamabad High Court under Art.200 held constitutionally valid where consent and consultations are fulfilled and public interest is served. (ii) Such transfers reinforce the federal character of the judiciary by ensuring regional/linguistic diversity; consistent with the Islamabad High Court Act, 2010 and JCP Rules, 2024. (iii) Transfer under Art.200 is not a fresh appointment; no re-oath under Art.194 required. (iv) Policy direction: Unified National Seniority List to guide transfers to IHC, applied with a diversity principle.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 175A & 200---- Scope and validity of transfer of High Court Judges—Distinction between appointment and transfer—Interpretation of constitutional provisions. The Court (majority 3–2) held that Article 200 is a self-contained and independent constitutional provision enabling the President to transfer a Judge of one High Court to another, either permanently or temporarily, subject to the Judge’s consent and consultation with the Chief Justice of Pakistan and both Chief Justices concerned. Such transfer does not constitute a “fresh appointment” under Article 175A, nor does it attract the Judicial Commission of Pakistan’s jurisdiction. The framers intentionally retained Article 200 after the Eighteenth Amendment; to treat every transfer as a new appointment would render Article 200 redundant and defeat its object. Harmonious and purposive interpretation requires both provisions to operate in separate spheres—Article 175A governing appointments, and Article 200 governing transfers of serving Judges. const.p._22_2025_25092025 (1) (b) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 200—Consent and consultation—Meaning and scope. The power of transfer is fenced with safeguards of consent and consultation. These must be real, substantive, and purposive, not formalities. Record showed that each transferee Judge voluntarily consented, and the Chief Justice of Pakistan and Chief Justices of donor and recipient High Courts were duly consulted. No evidence of coercion or mala fide was established. The constitutional requirements were thus satisfied in letter and spirit. (c) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 200; High Court Judges (Leave, Pension and Privileges) Order 1997, Art. 25—Permanent vs. temporary transfer. Article 200 does not fix any duration; transfers may be temporary or permanent, depending on exigency and specification in the notification. Allowances and privileges mentioned in sub-article (2) apply only to temporary transfers. Permanent transfers create a vacancy in the parent High Court, which the Judicial Commission may subsequently fill. The President must, however, clearly specify the nature of transfer in each notification to avoid ambiguity regarding tenure and seniority. (d) Islamabad High Court Act 2010 (Act XVII of 2010) ----S. 3—Composition and diversity—Whether violated by transfers. Section 3, prescribing representation of all provinces in the Islamabad High Court, does not forbid filling vacancies through transfer. The inclusion of Judges from Punjab, Sindh, and Balochistan in the impugned notification ensured inter-provincial diversity and did not offend the statute. (e) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 175(3), 200 & Preamble—Judicial independence and public interest. Transfers effected under Article 200, with consent and consultation, do not undermine judicial independence. Allegations of executive interference, ulterior motive, or “court-packing” remained unsubstantiated. Independence of the judiciary is safeguarded by the constitutional checks built into Article 200 itself. The “letter of six Judges” complaining of interference, while significant, could not by itself invalidate a constitutionally compliant transfer order. (f) Disposition By a majority of 3 to 2, the constitutional petitions were disposed of. The impugned Notification No. F.10 (2)/2024-A.II dated 1 February 2025 was not struck down. The matter was remanded to the President of Pakistan to determine the nature (permanent / temporary) and seniority of the transferee Judges. Pending such determination, Justice Sardar Muhammad Sarfraz Dogar was to continue as Acting Chief Justice of the Islamabad High Court. The minority (Naeem Akhter Afghan & Shakeel Ahmad, JJ.) allowed the petitions and declared the Notification unconstitutional. (h) Cited Cases Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1996 SC 324) President’s Reference No. 2 of 1996 (PLD 1997 SC 84) Malik Asad Ali v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1998 SC 161) Sharaf Faridi v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1989 SC 404) Muhammad Aslam Awan v. Federation of Pakistan (2014 SCMR 1289) Mustafa Impex v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 2016 SC 808) Hamza Rasheed Khan v. Election Appellate Tribunal, Lahore (PLD 2024 SC 1028) Reference No. 1 of 2020 (PLD 2021 SC 825)

Summary: On the Scope of Rule 17 of Order VI of the CPC. 265Tax (Writ) 26984/25 Commissioner Inland Revenue Vs Ms Al-Qadir Seed Corporation (Pvt) Ltd through Imran Akram Mr. Justice Abid Aziz Sheikh 17- 09- 2025 2025 LHC 5602