Summary: (Against the judgment dated 28.07.2025 of the High Court of Sindh at Karachi passed in C.P. No. S-2602 of 2018). (a) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)--- ----S.16 (1)---Arrears of rent---Failure to deposit---Effect---If order under Section 16(1) of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 is not complied with, defense of tenant is struck off, as a mandatory requirement of law. Ashiq Ali and another v. Mehar Elahi and 13 others 2001 SCMR 130 and Bashir Ahmed v. Messrs Roots School Network through Administrator/owner and others 2011 SCMR 290 rel. (b) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)--- ----Ss. 15 & 16(1)---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 12, 42 & 54---Ejectment of tenant---Striking off defence---Declaration to title or specific performance of agreement to sell---Defence of petitioners / tenants was struck off due to failure on their part to deposit arrears of rent---Petitioners / tenants claimed to be owners in possession of premises on the basis of agreement to sell executed by respondent / landlord and suit for specific performance of that agreement to sell was pending adjudication---Validity---Ownership of the property was claimed and civil suits were pending---Only course available to petitioners / tenants was to pursue the civil suits and they had to vacate the premises in question---In case of any favourable judgment, petitioners / tenants could claim possession of the property afterwards but could not be allowed to continue possession of property---Respondent / landlord was successful in establishing relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and that there was a default in complying with tentative rent order---Supreme Court declined to interfere in eviction order passed by all three Courts below, who were justified in striking off the defence of petitioners / tenants and directing them to vacate the premises and hand over peaceful possession to respondent / landlord---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. Umar Gul v. Dr. Hafiza Akhtar and others 2025 SCMR 544; Syed Asghar Hussain v. Muhammad Owais and others 2018 SCMR 1720; Ashiq Ali and another v. Mehar Elahi and 13 others 2001 SCMR 130; Muhammad Iqbal Haider v. 1st ADJ, Karachi Central and others PLD 2018 SC 35; Bashir Ahmed v. Messrs Roots School Network through Administrator/owner and others 2011 SCMR 290; Mst. Mussarrat Shaheen v. Mst. Verbeena Khan Afroz and others 2024 SCMR 1796; Abdul Rasheed v. Maqbool Ahmed and others 2011 SCMR 320 and Muhammad Nisar v. Izhar Ahmed Shaikh and others PLD 2014 SC 347 ref. Raja Qasit Nawaz Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 1st September, 2025.

Summary: (Against the order dated 21.11.2022 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in I.T.R. No. 71408 of 2022). (a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----S. 129(1)(a) [as amended by Finance Act, 2005]---Assessment order, setting aside of---Powers of Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals)---Remanding of matter---Scope---Authorities were aggrieved of remanding of matter by Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) in exercise of powers under Section 129(1)(a) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Validity---Following the Finance Act, 2005, powers of Commissioner Appeals under section 129 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 were confined to confirming, modifying, or annulling an assessment, with the express remand power deleted---Commissioner Appeals, under Section 129 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 post year-2005, lacked jurisdiction to remand for a fresh assessment and was bound to decide the matters---Supreme Court remanded the matter to Commissioner Appeals who was under an obligation to decide the case within the frame of Section 129(1)(a) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 as it then was---Powers to make further enquiries were available, instead of remanding the matter---Appeal was allowed. (b) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Fiscal statutes---Reading in, principle of---Scope---Intention of Legislature must be discovered from the words used---If words used are capable of one construction only, then it would not be open to Courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction---If words of a statute or its any provision are readily understood without any ambiguity, then it is not for Court to raise any doubt as to what they mean for any contrary view, rather than implementing the same without any hesitation---Statute or any enacting provision must be so construed as to make it effectual and operational---Literal approach is to be adopted while interpreting fiscal or taxing statutes and Court cannot read into or impute something when provisions of a taxing statute are clear. Islamabad Electric Supply Company Limited (IESCO) v. The Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (H.Q), Islamabad 2023 SCMR 1516 and Allied Bank Limited v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Lahore 2023 SCMR 1166 rel. Ahmed Pervaiz, Advocate Supreme Court (Via Video-link from Lahore) and Arfat Rasool, Secretary Legal, FBR for Petitioner. Nemo for the Respondent. Date of hearing: 1st September, 2025. (b) in any other case, make such order as the Commissioner (Appeals) thinks fit. (a) in the case of an appeal against an assessment order – (i) make an order to set aside the assessment order and direct the Commissioner to make a new assessment order in accordance with any directions or recommendations of the Commissioner (Appeals); or (i) He could set aside the assessment order and direct the Commissioner to make a new assessment order in accordance with his directions/recommendations. (i) Alternatively, he could confirm, modify, or annul the assessment order.

Summary: (a) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979— —Ss. 15, 16(1) & 16(2)—Tenant disputing ownership—Effect—Non-compliance with tentative rent order—Striking off defence— Respondent purchased property from attorney of former owner through registered sale deed and filed rent case under Ss.15 & 16(1) SRPO—Trial Court ordered tenant (deceased predecessor of petitioners) to deposit arrears of rent from 2001 and continue paying future rent—Tenant failed to comply—Defence struck off under S.16(2) and eviction ordered—Appellate Court and High Court upheld eviction—Supreme Court held that once relationship of landlord and tenant is established, denial of landlord’s ownership does not absolve tenant from complying with tentative rent order—Ownership dispute must be agitated separately in civil suits—Failure to deposit tentative rent, whether willful or otherwise, justifies striking off defence under S.16(2)—Syed Asghar Hussain v. Muhammad Owais (2018 SCMR 1720), Ashiq Ali v. Mehar Elahi (2001 SCMR 130), Muhammad Iqbal Haider v. Ist ADJ Karachi Central (PLD 2018 SC 35) and Bashir Ahmed v. Roots School Network (2011 SCMR 290) relied upon. (b) Landlord and Tenant— —Denial of ownership by tenant—Requirement to vacate— Tenant admitted initial tenancy but later claimed ownership on basis of sale agreement—Such plea cannot be raised to resist eviction—Well-settled principle that tenant disputing landlord’s ownership must first vacate premises and then pursue claim of title through competent civil court—Possession cannot be prolonged on plea of ownership—Mst. Mussarrat Shaheen v. Mst. Verbeena Khan Afroz (2024 SCMR 1796), Rehmatullah v. Ali Muhammad (1983 SCMR 1064), Muhammad Nisar v. Izhar Ahmed Shaikh (PLD 2014 SC 347), and Nasir Khan v. Nadia Ali Butt (2024 SCMR 452) reaffirmed. (c) Jurisdiction— —Rent Controller—Scope—Title disputes not to be adjudicated— Rent Controller’s jurisdiction is confined to determining existence of landlord–tenant relationship and arrears of rent—Title and ownership disputes lie within domain of civil courts—Concurrent findings of three courts below that landlord–tenant relationship existed could not be interfered with in leave to appeal—Abdul Rasheed v. Maqbool Ahmed (2011 SCMR 320), Shameem Akhtar v. Muhammad Rashid (PLD 1989 SC 575), Mst. Azeemun Nisar Begum v. Mst. Rabia Bibi (PLD 1991 SC 242) and Muhammad Rafique v. Habib Bank Ltd. (1994 SCMR 1012) followed. Cited Cases Umar Gul v. Dr. Hafiza Akhtar 2025 SCMR 544 Syed Asghar Hussain v. Muhammad Owais 2018 SCMR 1720 Ashiq Ali v. Mehar Elahi 2001 SCMR 130 Muhammad Iqbal Haider v. Ist ADJ Karachi Central PLD 2018 SC 35 Bashir Ahmed v. Roots School Network 2011 SCMR 290 Mst. Mussarrat Shaheen v. Mst. Verbeena Khan Afroz 2024 SCMR 1796 Rehmatullah v. Ali Muhammad 1983 SCMR 1064 Muhammad Nisar v. Izhar Ahmed Shaikh PLD 2014 SC 347 Nasir Khan v. Nadia Ali Butt 2024 SCMR 452 Abdul Rasheed v. Maqbool Ahmed 2011 SCMR 320 Shameem Akhtar v. Muhammad Rashid PLD 1989 SC 575 Mst. Azeemun Nisar Begum v. Mst. Rabia Bibi PLD 1991 SC 242 Muhammad Rafique v. Habib Bank Ltd. 1994 SCMR 1012 Mst. Bor Bibi v. Abdul Qadir 1996 SCMR 877 Disposition Petition dismissed—Leave to Appeal refused.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)- -S. 5, Sched.-Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.5-Dower-Dispute arising from a post-marital agreement between husband and wife relating to dower-Subsequent enhancement and fixation of dower-Scope-Jurisdiction of family court to take cognizance of dower matter arising out of a post-marital agreement between husband and wife-The petitioner/husband and respondent No.2/wife entered into a valid marriage, with a dower of Rs.200,000 fixed at the time of Nikah-Later, an agreement was executed between the parties, wherein the petitioner/husband undertook to provide monthly maintenance, separate accommodation, and other financial commitments-However, their relationship subsequently deteriorated due to alleged maltreatment and non-fulfilment of obligations, following which respondent No.2/wife filed a suit for recovery of dower, gold, and maintenance before the family court, which decreed the suit-The petitioner's appeal before the district court was dismissed as time-barred, leading to the filing of the present Constitutional petitions challenging both judgments-Held: Plea of the petitioner/husband that subsequent fixation of dower was without lawful authority did not hold ground in view of the settled principles of Mohammadan law insofar as dower was not a rigid or unalterable condition confined only at the time of marriage, rather it was the right of wife which could be stipulated at any of three stages of marriage i.e. (i) before the marriage, (ii) at the time of marriage, (iii) or even after the marriage has been solemnized-Whilst dilating upon the maintainability of the petition, High Court observed that the impugned judgment passed by the Trial Court on 11.02.2021, while the same was assailed before the appellate court on 19.07.2021 after lapse of five months-Admittedly, petitioner kept silent for a long-lasting period of more than five months without any justifiable reason and sufficient cause for delay in filing the appeal, which was hopelessly time barred-Even otherwise, the application for condonation of delay filed in the appellate court also did not show any plausible justification, which again showed the conduct and irresponsibility of petitioner-Further, family court had the jurisdiction to take cognizance of the dower claim which had arisen out of the post-marital agreement between the parties-Constitutional petitions were dismissed, in circumstances. Ghania Hassan v. Shahid Hussain Shahid and another 2016 SCMR 2170 and Mst. Naziran Begum through Legal Heirs v. Mst. Khurshid Begum through Legal heirs 1999 SCMR 1171 rel. (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)- -S.5, Sched.-Dower-Essence and significance-Right of wife-Scope-Dower is not a rigid or unalterable condition confined only to the time of marriage-Rather, it is a right of the wife which may be stipulated at any of three stages: before the marriage, at the time of marriage, or even after the marriage has been solemnized-Jurisprudential authorities as well as judicial precedents consistently recognize that dower may not only be fixed subsequently but may also be increased by mutual consent after the marriage-The rationale underlying this principle is that dower (mehr) is an obligation imposed upon the husband as a mark of respect for the wife and as a token of responsibility undertaken by him, therefore, its fixation or enhancement at a later stage does not offend any principle of law or equity. (c) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)- -Ss. 5, Sched. & 17-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.79-Dower, claim of-Petitioner/husband alleging the dower agreement between parties to be fake and forged while questioning the jurisdiction of family court to take cognizance of the matter-Jurisdiction of family court-Scope-The family courts, established under the Family Courts Act, 1964, are vested with special jurisdiction to entertain, try, and decide all matters specifically enumerated in the Schedule of the Act, which explicitly includes disputes pertaining to dower-It is also to be borne in mind that the family courts function outside the strict rigors of the C.P.C., and the technical requirements of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984-The legislative intent behind this departure is to facilitate an inquisitorial and conciliatory procedure, keeping in view the sensitive nature of family disputes-For instance, Art. 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 ordinarily requires production of at least two attesting witnesses to prove execution of documents creating future financial obligations; yet, by virtue of S. 17 of the Family Courts Act, 1964, such rigid formalities stand excluded in family disputes-Thus, in matters concerning dower, the family court is not shackled by technical evidentiary requirements but is empowered to adopt a more flexible approach to arrive at a just and equitable resolution within the familial context. Mushtaq and others v. Mst. Fatima and others PLD 2025 SC 434 rel. (d) Limitation- -Principles-The structure of the law of limitation is founded upon the legal maxims, that delay defeats equity; time and tide wait for none; and law helps the vigilant not the indolent-The object of law of limitation is to help the vigilant and not the indolent-Helping hand could not be extended to a litigant who became forgetful of his rights-Besides, invoking of remedy by some aggrieved person beyond the period of limitation prescribed for redressal of grievance, creates a valuable right in favour of the opposite party, therefore, in such case, delay of each day has to be explained by the defaulting party to the satisfaction of the Court, which could not be condoned lightly or as of routine, as such arbitrary exercise of discretion would cause serious prejudice to the opposite party. Changaiz Dashti, Assistant A.G. for the State.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)- -S. 42-Inheritance-Dispute regarding right of inheritance in the property left by predecessor-in-interest who passed away two-decades ago-Daughter of the deceased claiming her share of inheritance-Male heir claiming property was gifted to him by their late father-Burden to prove-The case aroses from a family inheritance dispute concerning immovable property owned by the parties’ deceased father, who passed away in 2002 leaving behind several heirs, including the petitioner and respondent No.1-In 2015, respondent No.1 instituted a suit for declaration, partition, recovery of mesne profits, and injunction regarding the said property-The trial court decreed the suit, holding all heirs entitled to their respective shares, and the first appellate court and the High Court upheld this decision by dismissing the petitioner’s appeals-The petitioner thereafter filed the present civil petition before the Supreme Court challenging the High Court’s judgment-Held: Petitioner (defendant No. 6) neither produced the attesting witnesses nor adduced trustworthy and confidence-inspiring evidence to establish the document in his favor as genuine-The Trial Court, as such, rightly noted that the Iqrar Nama relied upon by the petitioner lacked the particulars of witnesses such as their addresses and CNIC numbers, rendering it-dubious and unreliable-Similarly, the purported certificate of possession remained unproven-It was undisputed that the predecessor-in-interest continued to exercise possessory rights over the property during his lifetime and that utility connections remained in his name-The concurrent findings of the courts below required no interference nor did any question of law arise for consideration by the Supreme Court-Leave to appeal was refused and the petition was dismissed. (b) Islamic law- -Inheritance-Significance and essence stated-The right of inheritance vested in every legalheir, male or female, is a divine right that cannot be curtailed, directly or indirectly-The practice of depriving legal heirs, particularly women of their inheritance is a social evil and contrary to the public policy-The violation of inheritance laws under sharia amounts to the exploitation of vulnerable family members, particularly women, and it is wholly impermissible-The estate of a deceased vests automatically and immediately in the heirs upon death without the intervention of any authority-This principle is firmly embedded in the public policy of Islamic law. Syeda Fauzia Shah v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2025 FSC 1 ref. (c) Islamic law- -Gift-Validity-Dispute over inheritance share-Key ingredients of a valid gift-Onus to prove-Heirs acquire ownership of the property immediately upon death of the predecessor-in-interest-The possession of one co-sharer is deemed to be for the benefit of all co-sharers, and delay in asserting a right or challenging a mutation does not extinguish that right-The doctrines of waiver, estoppel, relinquishment, or adverse possession do not apply amongst co-heirs-Even when a gift is pleaded, the donee bears a heavy onus to prove that the donor made a valid offer, that it was accepted, and that possession was delivered-The donor must also establish the date, time and place of the offer and acceptance-Failure to do so, renders such a plea untenable. Mst. Khalida Azhar v. Viqar Rustom Bakhsi and others 2018 SCMR 30; Islam-ud-Din through LRs and others v. Mst. Noor Jehan through LRs and others 2016 SCMR 986; Ghulam Ali and others v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi PLD 1990 SC 1; Anwar Muhammad and others v. Shard Din and others 1983 SCMR 626; Haji v. Khuda Yar PLD 1983 SC 453; Mirza Abib Baig v. Zahid Sabir (decd.) through LRs and others 2020 SCMR 601 and Farhan Aslam and others v. Mst. Nuzba Shaheen and others 2021 SCMR 179 rel. (d) Islamic law- -Inheritance-Women’s inheritance right, protection of-It is incumbent upon the State under the Constitution and the clear injunctions of Islam, to ensure the effective and unfettered realization of women’s right to inheritance-This right is not a concession granted by human law but a divinely ordained command, explicitly declared in the Holy Quran-Any denial or obstruction of this right is, therefore, not merely unlawful but transgression against Divine Will-Cultural or societal practices that deprive women of their rightful inheritance are rooted neither in faith nor in justice, they are remnants of ignorance which the message of Islam came to abolish-The State bears a sacred constitutional duty to uproot such practices by ensuring that every woman is informed of, and enabled to claim, her rightful share in inheritance without delay, fear or dependence on lengthy litigation-It must establish a proactive and accessible mechanism through which women can be identified, reached out to, and assisting in securing their lawful entitlements-Furthermore, those who, through coercion, deceit, or undue influence deprive women of this divinely bestowed right must be held accountable under the law and made answerable-A society, that turns a blind eye to deprivation of inheritance rights to its women defies the spirit of Constitution and express Command of Almighty Allah-The strength of a nation lies in the protection of its most vulnerable classes-A State that fails to safeguard the inheritance rights to its women fails in its duty to uphold the principles of equity, faith and justice.

Summary: ----S. 5, Sched.---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.5---Dower---Dispute arising from a post-marital agreement between husband and wife relating to dower---Subsequent enhancement and fixation of dower---Scope---Jurisdiction of family court to take cognizance of dower matter arising out of a post-marital agreement between husband and wife---The petitioner/husband and respondent No.2/wife entered into a valid marriage, with a dower of Rs.200,000 fixed at the time of Nikah---Later, an agreement was executed between the parties, wherein the petitioner/husband undertook to provide monthly maintenance, separate accommodation, and other financial commitments---However, their relationship subsequently deteriorated due to alleged maltreatment and non-fulfilment of obligations, following which respondent No.2/wife filed a suit for recovery of dower, gold, and maintenance before the family court, which decreed the suit---The petitioner’s appeal before the district court was dismissed as time-barred, leading to the filing of the present Constitutional petitions challenging both judgments---Held: Plea of the petitioner/husband that subsequent fixation of dower was without lawful authority did not hold ground in view of the settled principles of Mohammadan law insofar as dower was not a rigid or unalterable condition confined only at the time of marriage, rather it was the right of wife which could be stipulated at any of three stages of marriage i.e. (i) before the marriage, (ii) at the time of marriage, (iii) or even after the marriage has been solemnized---Whilst dilating upon the maintainability of the petition, High Court observed that the impugned judgment passed by the Trial Court on 11.02.2021, while the same was assailed before the appellate court on 19.07.2021 after lapse of five months---Admittedly, petitioner kept silent for a long-lasting period of more than five months without any justifiable reason and sufficient cause for delay in filing the appeal, which was hopelessly time barred---Even otherwise, the application for condonation of delay filed in the appellate court also did not show any plausible justification, which again showed the conduct and irresponsibility of petitioner---Further, family court had the jurisdiction to take cognizance of the dower claim which had arisen out of the post-marital agreement between the parties---Constitutional petitions were dismissed, in circumstances. Ghania Hassan v. Shahid Hussain Shahid and another 2016 SCMR 2170 and Mst. Naziran Begum through Legal Heirs v. Mst. Khurshid Begum through Legal heirs 1999 SCMR 1171 rel. (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched.---Dower---Essence and significance---Right of wife---Scope---Dower is not a rigid or unalterable condition confined only to the time of marriage---Rather, it is a right of the wife which may be stipulated at any of three stages: before the marriage, at the time of marriage, or even after the marriage has been solemnized---Jurisprudential authorities as well as judicial precedents consistently recognize that dower may not only be fixed subsequently but may also be increased by mutual consent after the marriage---The rationale underlying this principle is that dower (mehr) is an obligation imposed upon the husband as a mark of respect for the wife and as a token of responsibility undertaken by him, therefore, its fixation or enhancement at a later stage does not offend any principle of law or equity. (c) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----Ss. 5, Sched. & 17---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.79---Dower, claim of---Petitioner/husband alleging the dower agreement between parties to be fake and forged while questioning the jurisdiction of family court to take cognizance of the matter---Jurisdiction of family court---Scope---The family courts, established under the Family Courts Act, 1964, are vested with special jurisdiction to entertain, try, and decide all matters specifically enumerated in the Schedule of the Act, which explicitly includes disputes pertaining to dower---It is also to be borne in mind that the family courts function outside the strict rigors of the C.P.C., and the technical requirements of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---The legislative intent behind this departure is to facilitate an inquisitorial and conciliatory procedure, keeping in view the sensitive nature of family disputes---For instance, Art. 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 ordinarily requires production of at least two attesting witnesses to prove execution of documents creating future financial obligations; yet, by virtue of S. 17 of the Family Courts Act, 1964, such rigid formalities stand excluded in family disputes---Thus, in matters concerning dower, the family court is not shackled by technical evidentiary requirements but is empowered to adopt a more flexible approach to arrive at a just and equitable resolution within the familial context. Mushtaq and others v. Mst. Fatima and others PLD 2025 SC 434 rel. (d) Limitation--- ----Principles---The structure of the law of limitation is founded upon the legal maxims, that delay defeats equity; time and tide wait for none; and law helps the vigilant not the indolent---The object of law of limitation is to help the vigilant and not the indolent---Helping hand could not be extended to a litigant who became forgetful of his rights---Besides, invoking of remedy by some aggrieved person beyond the period of limitation prescribed for redressal of grievance, creates a valuable right in favour of the opposite party, therefore, in such case, delay of each day has to be explained by the defaulting party to the satisfaction of the Court, which could not be condoned lightly or as of routine, as such arbitrary exercise of discretion would cause serious prejudice to the opposite party. Jalal ud Din Kakar and Kaleemullah Kakar for Petitioner. Muhammad Nawaz Tareen for Respondents. Changaiz Dashti, Assistant A.G. for the State. Date of hearing: 20th August, 2025.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----S. 42---Inheritance---Dispute regarding right of inheritance in the property left by predecessor-in-interest who passed away two-decades ago---Daughter of the deceased claiming her share of inheritance---Male heir claiming property was gifted to him by their late father---Burden to prove---The case aroses from a family inheritance dispute concerning immovable property owned by the parties’ deceased father, who passed away in 2002 leaving behind several heirs, including the petitioner and respondent No.1---In 2015, respondent No.1 instituted a suit for declaration, partition, recovery of mesne profits, and injunction regarding the said property---The trial court decreed the suit, holding all heirs entitled to their respective shares, and the first appellate court and the High Court upheld this decision by dismissing the petitioner’s appeals---The petitioner thereafter filed the present civil petition before the Supreme Court challenging the High Court’s judgment---Held: Petitioner (defendant No. 6) neither produced the attesting witnesses nor adduced trustworthy and confidence-inspiring evidence to establish the document in his favor as genuine---The Trial Court, as such, rightly noted that the Iqrar Nama relied upon by the petitioner lacked the particulars of witnesses such as their addresses and CNIC numbers, rendering it “dubious and unreliable”---Similarly, the purported certificate of possession remained unproven---It was undisputed that the predecessor-in-interest continued to exercise possessory rights over the property during his lifetime and that utility connections remained in his name---The concurrent findings of the courts below required no interference nor did any question of law arise for consideration by the Supreme Court---Leave to appeal was refused and the petition was dismissed. (b) Islamic law--- ----Inheritance---Significance and essence stated---The right of inheritance vested in every legalheir, male or female, is a divine right that cannot be curtailed, directly or indirectly---The practice of depriving legal heirs, particularly women of their inheritance is a social evil and contrary to the public policy---The violation of inheritance laws under sharia amounts to the exploitation of vulnerable family members, particularly women, and it is wholly impermissible---The estate of a deceased vests automatically and immediately in the heirs upon death without the intervention of any authority---This principle is firmly embedded in the public policy of Islamic law. Syeda Fauzia Shah v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2025 FSC 1 ref. (c) Islamic law--- ----Gift---Validity---Dispute over inheritance share---Key ingredients of a valid gift---Onus to prove---Heirs acquire ownership of the property immediately upon death of the predecessor-in-interest---The possession of one co-sharer is deemed to be for the benefit of all co-sharers, and delay in asserting a right or challenging a mutation does not extinguish that right---The doctrines of waiver, estoppel, relinquishment, or adverse possession do not apply amongst co-heirs--- Even when a gift is pleaded, the donee bears a heavy onus to prove that the donor made a valid offer, that it was accepted, and that possession was delivered---The donor must also establish the date, time and place of the offer and acceptance---Failure to do so, renders such a plea untenable. Mst. Khalida Azhar v. Viqar Rustom Bakhsi and others 2018 SCMR 30; Islam-ud-Din through LRs and others v. Mst. Noor Jehan through LRs and others 2016 SCMR 986; Ghulam Ali and others v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi PLD 1990 SC 1; Anwar Muhammad and others v. Shard Din and others 1983 SCMR 626; Haji v. Khuda Yar PLD 1983 SC 453; Mirza Abib Baig v. Zahid Sabir (decd.) through LRs and others 2020 SCMR 601 and Farhan Aslam and others v. Mst. Nuzba Shaheen and others 2021 SCMR 179 rel. (d) Islamic law--- ----Inheritance---Women’s inheritance right, protection of---It is incumbent upon the State under the Constitution and the clear injunctions of Islam, to ensure the effective and unfettered realization of women’s right to inheritance---This right is not a concession granted by human law but a divinely ordained command, explicitly declared in the Holy Quran---Any denial or obstruction of this right is, therefore, not merely unlawful but transgression against Divine Will---Cultural or societal practices that deprive women of their rightful inheritance are rooted neither in faith nor in justice, they are remnants of ignorance which the message of Islam came to abolish---The State bears a sacred constitutional duty to uproot such practices by ensuring that every woman is informed of, and enabled to claim, her rightful share in inheritance without delay, fear or dependence on lengthy litigation---It must establish a proactive and accessible mechanism through which women can be identified, reached out to, and assisting in securing their lawful entitlements---Furthermore, those who, through coercion, deceit, or undue influence deprive women of this divinely bestowed right must be held accountable under the law and made answerable---A society, that turns a blind eye to deprivation of inheritance rights to its women defies the spirit of Constitution and express Command of Almighty Allah---The strength of a nation lies in the protection of its most vulnerable classes---A State that fails to safeguard the inheritance rights to its women fails in its duty to uphold the principles of equity, faith and justice. Petitioner in person along with Ms. Shubnum Sultan, Advocate High Court for Petitioner. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 29th August, 2025.

Summary: Balochistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)--- ----S.13---Balochistan Waqf Properties Act (III of 2020), S.7---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.11---Eviction application---Summary rejection of plaint by Rent Controller---Validity---Mixed questions of law and facts---Recording of evidence necessary---Applicability of provisions of C.P.C. in rent laws/special laws---Scope---Control of mosque by Auqaf department---Notification and registration, absence of---Effect---In absence of notification and registration with Auqaf department, mosque does not fall exclusively within the control of the Auqaf Department---The appellant acting as Mutawalli/Munazzim-e-Ala of a mosque filed eviction applications under S.13 of the Balochistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 against the respondents who occupied shops belonging to the mosque as tenants---The eviction was sought on the ground that the mosque, accommodating around 200 worshippers, required reconstruction and expansion due to congestion, as worshippers were forced to pray outside---The tenants had also defaulted in paying monthly rent---The Trial court/Rent Controller dismissed the applications under O.VII R.11, C.P.C., holding the same not maintainable---The appellant challenged that dismissal through several connected appeals---Question for determination was as to “Whether the Rent Controller erred in law by dismissing the appellant’s eviction applications under O.VII R.11, C.P.C., despite such provisions of the C.P.C. not being strictly applicable to proceedings governed by the special law of rent restriction, and whether the mosque property in question, not notified by the Auqaf Department, fell within the purview of rent laws permitting eviction of tenants for reconstruction and expansion purposes”?---Held: No notification establishing that the mosque had been notified or assumed by the religious affairs department under the provisions of S.7 of the Balochistan Waqf Properties Act, 2020 and duly registered with Auqaf department had been produced, therefore, the contention that mosque fell exclusively within the control of the Auqaf department was without legal foundation---As far as applicability of the provision of C.P.C. was concerned, though provisions of C.P.C. were not applicable in their strict sense to proceedings before a Rent Controller, nevertheless, equitable principles embodied therein could be resorted for a just and proper adjudication---Even then, dismissal of an eviction application under O.VII, R.11 of C.P.C., without affording opportunity to the parties to lead evidence, was not justified---Rent Controller was bound to adopt a legal procedure that ensured fair trial and complete adjudication of the dispute---Question of locus standi and authorization of the appellant to institute the proceedings being a Muntazim-e-Ala of the registered society was essentially a mixed question of law and fact which ought to have been decided after framing of issues and recording of evidence rather than through summary rejection---Impugned orders passed by trial court/ Rent Controller was set aside and matter were remanded with direction to proceed with the matters by framing of issues with regard to properties being waqf and duly notified cum registered with the Auqaf department and provide full and fair opportunity to parties to lead evidence---Appeals were partly allowed, in circumstances. Chief Administrator, Auqaf, Sindh, Thandi Sarak, Hyderabad and another v. Mst. Masooma PLD 2001 SC 75; Muhammad Tariq Khan v. Khawaja Muhammad Jawad Asami and others 2007 SCMR 818 and Saeed Pervaiz v. Syed Masood Hussain 2008 SCMR 568 rel. Tariq Ali Tahir for Appellants. Ameenullah Tareen for Respondents. Date of hearing: 20th August, 2025.

Summary: (a) Muhammadan Law----Inheritance----Devolution of estate on death of Muslim; co-heirs’ rights; unlawful exclusion of sharers----Predecessor-in-interest, father of parties, died on 1.1.2002 leaving behind five sons and four daughters; suit filed by daughter (respondent No.1/plaintiff) seeking declaration/partition, mesne profits and injunction regarding property admittedly owned by deceased; petitioner/defendant No.6, a son, took exclusive possession, rented out portions and appropriated rent, refusing to recognise shares of other heirs----Held, that under Mohammadan Law, inheritance devolves automatically and immediately upon all legal heirs at the moment of the propositus’ death; every heir, male or female, acquires ownership in the estate as a matter of right, and no heir can lawfully exclude or dispossess another; possession of one co-sharer is deemed, in law, to be on behalf of all co-sharers, and delay in asserting share or challenging mutation does not extinguish such right----Doctrines of waiver, estoppel, relinquishment or adverse possession do not apply inter se co-heirs so as to deprive any heir of his or her share in the inherited property; in the present case, petitioner’s long possession could not ripen into exclusive title against his siblings nor justify their deprivation from inheritance; trial court and first appellate court rightly declared all heirs entitled to their respective shares and ordered partition/sale with distribution of proceeds. Cited cases: Mst. Khalida Azhar v. Viqar Rustom Bakhsi and others (2018 SCMR 30); Islam-ud-Din through LRs and others v. Mst. Noor Jehan through LRs and others (2016 SCMR 986); Ghulam Ali and others v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi (PLD 1990 SC 1); Anwar Muhammad and others v. Shard Din and others (1983 SCMR 626); Haji v. Khuda Yar (PLD 1983 SC 453); Mirza Abib Baig v. Zahid Sabir (decd.) through LRs and others (2020 SCMR 601); Farhan Aslam and others v. Mst. Nuzba Shaheen and others (2021 SCMR 179). (b) Muhammadan Law----Gift (Hiba) by predecessor-in-interest pleaded to defeat inheritance claim----Burden of proof and essential ingredients----Petitioner/defendant No.6 set up plea that deceased father had gifted suit property to him during his lifetime out of love and affection, supported by an alleged iqrar nama dated 30.06.2000 and a purported certificate of possession issued by Nazim of the union council----Held, that person asserting exclusive title on the basis of gift bears a heavy onus to prove valid hiba; he must establish that donor made a clear and bona fide offer of gift, that it was accepted, and that possession was delivered in pursuance thereof; donor/donee must prove date, time and place of offer and acceptance and produce credible, confidence-inspiring evidence including attesting witnesses----In instant case, iqrar nama was devoid of particulars of witnesses, such as addresses and CNIC numbers, rendering it “dubious and unreliable”; no attesting witnesses were produced; alleged certificate of possession by Nazim was likewise not proved; it was undisputed that till his death predecessor-in-interest continued to exercise possessory rights and utility connections remained in his name----Petitioner failed to discharge burden of proof; plea of gift was rightly rejected by trial court and concurrently by appellate fora as untenable and an attempt to defeat co-heirs’ inheritance. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----Ss. 96 & 100----First appeal; second appeal; concurrent findings of fact; scope of interference by High Court and Supreme Court----Suit for declaration/partition and mesne profits decreed by trial court after framing of issues and recording evidence; first appeal under S.96, CPC dismissed on merits; second appeal under S.100, CPC dismissed by High Court vide impugned judgment dated 04.03.2023, finding no legal infirmity or misreading/non-reading of evidence in concurrent judgments----Petitioner nonetheless invoked Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, assailing concurrent findings on facts without pointing to any substantial question of law----Held, that concurrent findings of fact recorded by two competent courts carry great sanctity and are not to be lightly interfered with in second appeal or at leave stage unless shown to be arbitrary, perverse, based on misreading/non-reading of evidence or in derogation of settled law; in present case, judgments of courts below were well-reasoned, rooted in proper appreciation of evidence, consistent with principles of Muhammadan Law regarding inheritance and gift, and raised no question of law warranting interference; petition amounted merely to another attempt to reopen concluded findings and delay enjoyment of lawful inheritance by other heirs; leave to appeal was, therefore, refused and civil petition dismissed. (d) Civil procedure----Partition suit; mesne profits; co-sharer collecting rent to exclusion of others----Trial court decreed suit, declaring all heirs entitled to their respective shares and directing partition or sale; further directed petitioner to pay mesne profits at rate of Rs.25,000/- per month for three years preceding institution of suit, representing rent collected from property; petitioner restrained from creating third-party interest----Held, that where one co-sharer is in exclusive control of income from joint estate and appropriates rent without accounting to others, he is liable to render accounts and pay mesne profits corresponding to co-heirs’ shares; trial court’s approach in awarding mesne profits and protecting estate from alienation was in accordance with law and equity; concurrent affirmation by appellate court and High Court called for no interference. (e) Inheritance of women----Islamic law and public policy----Divine nature of right; impermissibility of curtailment; social evil of deprivation----Federal Shariat Court in Syeda Fauzia Shah v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2025 FSC 1) after detailed examination of Quran, Sunnah and principles of sharia declared that right of inheritance vested in every legal heir, male or female, is a divine right which cannot be curtailed directly or indirectly; practice of depriving women of inheritance is a social evil and contrary to public policy----In present case, petitioner’s conduct in excluding sister (respondent No.1) and other siblings from estate and contesting their lawful shares stood in clear conflict with settled sharia principles and constitutional policy; Supreme Court reiterated that estate of deceased vests automatically and immediately in heirs without intervention of any authority, and violation of inheritance laws amounts to exploitation of vulnerable family members, particularly women, and is wholly impermissible under Islamic law and constitutional norms. Cited case: Syeda Fauzia Shah v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2025 FSC 1). (f) Civil procedure----Frivolous and vexatious litigation; abuse of process; costs as corrective measure----Petitioner, despite having no sustainable case on merits and facing concurrent findings from trial and appellate courts, persisted in litigation up to Supreme Court, causing prolonged deprivation of co-heirs, especially female heir, from their lawful inheritance since 1.1.2002----Held, that continued resort to courts in face of clear and concurrent findings amounted to abuse of judicial process, contributed to mounting backlog and undermined efficient dispensation of justice; such conduct warrants deterrent costs----Accordingly, Supreme Court not only dismissed petition for leave but also imposed cost of Rs.5,00,000/- on petitioner, to be deposited with Registrar within seven days and distributed among legal heirs declared by trial court, thereby both penalizing abuse and partially compensating those whose rights were delayed. (g) Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973----Islamic injunctions; women’s inheritance rights; State’s constitutional duty----Scope----Court, while affirming decrees in favour of female heir, underscored that under Constitution and clear injunctions of Islam, State is obliged to ensure effective and unfettered realization of women’s right to inheritance; such right is not a concession by human law but a divinely ordained command explicitly declared in Holy Quran; any denial or obstruction of this right is not merely unlawful but a transgression against Divine Will----Cultural or societal practices that deprive women of inheritance are rooted neither in faith nor justice but in ignorance which Islam came to abolish; State bears sacred constitutional duty to uproot such practices by ensuring that every woman is informed of, and enabled to claim, her rightful share without delay, fear or dependence on lengthy litigation; it must develop proactive, accessible mechanisms to identify entitled women, reach out to them and assist in securing their entitlements----Those who, through coercion, deceit or undue influence, deprive women of inheritance must be held accountable under law; a society indifferent to such deprivation defies spirit of Constitution and express Command of Almighty Allah; a State that fails to safeguard women’s inheritance rights fails in its duty to uphold principles of equity, faith and justice.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199--- Constitutional petition--- Scope--- Constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked as a substitute for revision or appeal and the interference is on limited grounds as an exception and not the rule. Arif Fareed v. Bibi Sara and others 2023 SCMR 413 and M. Hamad Hassan v. Mst. Isma Bukhari and 2 others 2023 SCMR 1434 rel. (b) Sindh Public Property (Removal of Encroachment) Act (XVIII of 2010)--- ----Ss. 3, 4 & 5--- Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 42--- Removal of encroachment--- Declaration of title--- Fraud--- Petitioner / plaintiff was aggrieved of dismissal of his suit by respondent / Anti-Encroachment Tribunal against recovery of possession of suit property as encroachment--- Validity--- Petitioner / plaintiff did not prove any legal title or character in the property--- Plaintiff under S.42 of Specific Relief Act, 1877 must establish a legal character or right to property to maintain a declaratory suit--- Petitioner / plaintiff lacked registered instrument or sanctioned mutation and had no such legal character--- Bare declaration, under proviso to S.42 of Specific Relief Act, 1877 was barred when further relief could be sought--- Petitioner / plaintiff could have sought specific performance against his vendors or approached the competent authority for regularization but instead sought a negative declaration against statutory authorities, which was not maintainable--- Fraud vitiates even the most solemn proceedings--- Reliance on fabricated and forged allotment orders was itself sufficient to non-suit the petitioner / plaintiff--- Courts could not lend their discretionary jurisdiction to a party which had based its case on forged documents--- High Court declined to interfere in the order of Anti Encroachment Tribunal, which had carefully examined the material, applied correct principles of law, and dismissed the suit, as there was no illegality, misreading or non-reading of evidence in the judgment--- Petitioner / plaintiff sought a declaration of ownership without any valid instrument, mutation or sanction from the Board and had relied on inadmissible photocopies and unregistered agreements lacking witnesses--- Petitioner / plaintiff failed to rebut the record of authorities marking his documents as fake--- Petitioner / plaintiff leveled scandalous allegations of bribery without proof and obstructed lawful anti-encroachment operations--- Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances. Ghulam Sarwar Qureshi for Petitioner. Allah Bachayo Soomro Additional A.G. Sindh for the State. Date of hearing: 26th August, 2025.