Summary: Bail granted----Background: The case arises from the conviction of two individuals, for their involvement in a criminal offense. They were sentenced by the Additional District Criminal Court, Muzaffarabad, to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment under sections 302(c)/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC). They were also convicted under other sections of the PPC and the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Act, 1985. However, the trial court dismissed some charges and extended the benefit of Section 382-B, Cr.P.C., ensuring the sentences would run concurrently. Both the prosecution and the convicts filed appeals in the Shariat Court— the former seeking enhancement of the sentence and the latter seeking acquittal. However, the appeals remained pending since 2013, prompting the convicts to file applications for bail on the grounds of statutory delay. The Shariat Court accepted the applications, suspending their sentences and releasing them on bail. The complainant, Mst. Hakim Jan, challenged this order through a criminal revision petition before the Supreme Court. -----Issues: 1- Was the Shariat Court justified in suspending the sentences and granting bail based on the delay in deciding the appeals? -----2- Was the appeal filed by the convicts before the Shariat Court time-barred? -----3- Did the Shariat Court fail to properly consider the seriousness of the offense and the prosecution’s evidence? -----Holding / Reasoning / Outcome: --Suspension of Sentence and Statutory Delay The Supreme Court held that Section 426(1-A)(c), Cr.P.C. provides a convicted person the right to seek bail if their appeal is not decided within two years, except when the delay is caused by the appellant's negligence. In this case, the appeals had been pending since 2013, and the convicts had served a significant portion of their sentences. The record indicated that the delay was not attributable to the convicts but rather to court proceedings. --Application of Discretion by the Shariat Court The Court emphasized that statutory bail under Section 426, Cr.P.C. is not absolute. If the convict is a hardened or dangerous criminal, the court may refuse bail. However, the convicts in this case were not classified as dangerous or desperate criminals. Therefore, the Shariat Court acted within its discretion to suspend the sentence and grant bail. --Timeliness of the Appeal The complainant argued that the appeal filed by the convicts before the Shariat Court was time-barred. However, the Court held that the appeal was filed under Section 25 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Penal Laws (Enforcement) Act, 1974, which allows 60 days for filing an appeal. As the special law takes precedence over general limitation rules, the appeal was found to be within time. --Assessment of Prosecution’s Evidence and Public Policy Concerns The complainant argued that the Shariat Court did not adequately consider the seriousness of the offense and the evidence against the convicts. However, the Supreme Court clarified that bail during the pendency of appeals based on statutory delay is not a reflection of the merits of the case. It simply ensures that the right to a timely hearing is protected. The Supreme Court dismissed the criminal revision petition, holding that the Shariat Court committed no illegality in suspending the sentences and releasing the convicts on bail. -----Citations / Precedents: Habib-ur-Rehman Chaughtaie vs. Habib-ur-Rehman & another [2013 PSC (Cri.) 725]

Summary: Background: The appellant, a Superintending Engineer (BPS-19) in the Local Government and Rural Development Department, challenged the amendments introduced to departmental rules on February 14, 2014. These amendments impacted the promotion criteria for the post of Director General, Local Government, and Rural Development, which was upgraded to BPS-20. The appellant argued that the changes were discriminatory and deprived him of his rightful promotion. His appeal to the Service Tribunal was dismissed on December 23, 2014. The appellant then sought relief from the Supreme Court. -----Issues: 1- Did the amendments to the departmental rules unfairly disadvantage the appellant and deny him his right to promotion? -----2- Were the amendments to the rules made in accordance with the law, and can they be challenged on the grounds of discrimination or violation of constitutional rights? -----3- Did the Service Tribunal err in dismissing the appellant's claim regarding the proportionate distribution of quotas between technical and non-technical officers? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court found that the amendments to the departmental rules, which provided for a promotion quota of 67% for non-technical officers and 33% for technical officers, were valid. The appellant's contention that the rules were discriminatory and aimed at depriving him of promotion lacked merit. The court noted that framing or amending rules is the prerogative of the government, and unless the rules are inconsistent with the parent Act or the Constitution, they cannot be declared illegal. The court also held that there was no evidence of malice or bad faith in the government's actions, and the amendments were made in accordance with the law. The appellant failed to demonstrate that the amendments were designed to target him personally. The court affirmed that the government is entitled to decide promotion criteria, and the appellant could not claim a vested right to promotion based on his expectations. The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs. -----Citations/Precedents: Kamran Hafeez’s case [2014 SCR 676] Syed Shabir Shah Gillani v. Imtiaz Ahmed Abbasi & 5 others [2014 SCR 418] Minister Forest and 3 others v. Aurangzeb and 12 others [2014 SCR 848] Rizwan Muzaffar v. Azad Government & 8 others [2010 SCR 156] Syed Rasheed Hussain Shah v. Azad Govt. and 6 others [2014 SCR 883] The State of Mysore v. M.H. Bellary [AIR 1965 SC 868]

Summary: Summary pending

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Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) & Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997): ----S. 419, S. 512, S. 366, S. 374, S. 423, S. 561-A Cr.P.C., & S. 19(10), (11), (11-A), S. 25 Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 Trial in Absentia—Right to Appeal by Absconding Convicts—Maintainability Appellants were tried in absentia under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, convicted, and sought to file appeals through their legal representatives or relatives without surrendering to the authorities—Primary question before the High Court was whether an appeal could be entertained without the convict surrendering to the process of law—Held, that a fugitive from justice forfeits the right to seek relief from a higher court without first submitting to the jurisdiction of the court—A convict sentenced in absentia must surrender before filing an appeal, as permitting appeals without surrender would encourage lawlessness and undermine the administration of justice—Precedents from the Supreme Court and High Courts, including Chan Shah v. Crown PLD 1956 FC 43, Gul Hassan v. State PLD 1969 SC 89, and Miraj Begum v. Ejaz Anwar PLD 1982 SC 294, upheld the principle that courts would not act in aid of fugitives from law—Similarly, cases such as Benazir Bhutto v. State 1999 SCMR 1619 were distinguished, as the appellant was out of the country with court permission and had not intentionally absconded—Further, the statutory provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975, allowed for trial in absentia but did not expressly provide for the right of appeal without surrender—Appeals filed by legal representatives or relatives of absconding convicts were deemed incompetent and dismissed. ----Cited Cases: • Chan Shah v. Crown PLD 1956 FC 43 • Gul Hassan v. State PLD 1969 SC 89 • Miraj Begum v. Ejaz Anwar PLD 1982 SC 294 • Hayat Bakhsh v. State 1982 SCMR 623 • Haq Nawaz v. State 1999 PCr.LJ 1381 • Benazir Bhutto v. State 1999 SCMR 1619 • Mehharam Ali v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1998 SC 1445 ----Disposition: Appeals filed by absconding convicts through legal representatives or relatives were held to be incompetent and were accordingly dismissed.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: Summary pending.