Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199----Civil service----Upgradation of posts for civil servants, matter of----Exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction by the High Court----Principles----The question of upgradation of posts for civil servants is one that can be examined by the High Court in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction, however, while exercising such jurisdiction, certain principles of law must necessarily be kept in view:-(i.) The foremost consideration is whether upgradation constitutes a vested right of a civil servant, enforceable through judicial intervention, or whether it remains a concession extended by the Government depending upon exigencies of service and availability of resources; (ii.) The second question is whether upgradation can be granted in favor of an individual on a person-specific basis, or whether the policy of upgradation must apply uniformly to a class or cadre of employees to avoid arbitrariness and favoritism ; (iii.) The third aspect relates to the domain of policymaking itself. (b) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 199----Civil service----Upgradation of posts for civil servants---Scope----Credentials of the civil servant----Effect---- Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, invoking of---- Argument of the petitioner was that her advanced qualifications and long service warranted upgradation---Validity---Upgradation of posts, being a matter intrinsically linked to administrative structure, financial implications and service requirements, ordinarily falls within the exclusive competence of the Government---Therefore, the role of the Court is not to substitute its wisdom for that of the executive, but only to examine whether such policy decisions are tainted with mala fides, arbitrariness, or discriminatory treatment in violation of constitutional guarantees----While the petitioner’s credentials (advanced qualifications and long service) were commendable, they did not in themselves justify a judicial directive for post-reclassification---The authority to restructure posts lies squarely with the executive branch, and Courts are reluctant to intrude upon such policy matters absent a showing of clear illegality, arbitrariness, or unconstitutional discrimination---Petitioner failed to establish that the denial of her request was arbitrary or discriminatory---Constitutional petition was dismissed. (c) Civil service---- ----Upgradation and promotion---Distinction---Promotion or upgradation is not a vested right of any civil servant, rather it is a policy tool exercised by the Government to address service exigencies, restructure institutions, or alleviate stagnation in posts lacking promotional avenues---Distinction between promotion and upgradation was that “promotion” is a merit and seniority-based advancement, and “upgradation” is a policy-driven adjustment of posts for broad and systemic reasons---Upgradation is not to be conflated with promotion; it is a mechanism employed to address structural imbalances and cannot be claimed as an individual entitlement. Muhammad Amjad v. Director General, Quetta Development Authority and others 2022 SCMR 797 ref. (d) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts. 4, 24 & 199---Civil service---Upgradation of posts for civil servants---Equality with comparators asserted by civil servant (petitioner)---Equal protection---Scope---Record showed that the petitioner had already benefited from a time-scale upgradation policy, which was designed to address the precise concern of stagnation---Granting the petitioner further individualized relief would amount to an enrichment beyond the policy's intent, creating preferential treatment rather than correcting an inequality---Thus, Petitioner's reliance on alleged comparators did not suffice----Constitutional equal protection was implicated only where similarly situated individuals are treated differently without any rational basis---In the present case, the determination of Committee on Upgradation that the petitioner’ post had already been benefited and was thus ineligible for further upgradation, constituted a rational and policy-based justification for the decision----Thus, the Petitioner had not demonstrated any vested right to further upgradation---Constitutional petition was dismissed. G. Shabbir Akbar for Petitioner. Raja Zamir Uddin Ahmed, A.A.G. for Respondent. Arshad Riaz, Superintendent Pakistan Post. M. Tariq Afzal, Admn. Officer, Pakistan Postal Office. Date of hearing: 9th September, 2025.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Employment---Probationary employee, termination of---Constitutional petition field by probationary employee---Maintainability---After joining the post on probation it was revealed that petitioner/candidate failed to meet the prescribed criteria on the date of submission of his application---Eligibility---The petitioner applied for the post of Director Human Resource Management (HRM) in the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA) by presenting his academic credentials, including an MBA in Information Technology Management (ITM) and a Ph.D. in Social and Economic Sciences, which he claimed to be in HRM---He was appointed to the post, however, upon later scrutiny, the PPRA found that his degrees did not correspond to the prescribed qualification of a Master’s degree (16 years education) in HRM or an equivalent field, and that he had misrepresented his Ph.D. as being in HRM---Consequently, the managing director directed him to provide an HEC equivalence certificate validating his qualification, failing which his services were terminated---The core issue for determination was as to “whether the petitioner was eligible at the time of submitting his application for the advertised post”?---Held: The answer to question was clearly in negative as the petitioner did not possess the qualification prescribed in the advertisement, rather he maneuvered his credentials in a manner designed to misrepresent his eligibility and thereby enter public service through deceptive means, ultimately causing loss of confidence in the integrity of recruitment process---Once a public servant was found to have secured appointment by misrepresentation thereby betraying the public trust it would be wholly inappropriate to permit his continuation in service---Since the petitioner lacked the basic qualification for the post he could not in law or equity claim any right to continue in office---His appointment was vitiated from its very inception and being on probation, his services were rightly terminated by the competent authority in exercise of delegated powers---Termination of probationary employee did not warrant interference in the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Petitioner being devoid of any merit was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Employment---Probationary employee, termination of---Constitutional petition, maintainability of---Probationary employee challenging his termination by invoking Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Maintainability---A probationer has no vested right of permanence in service and termination during probation if supported by valid reasons cannot be termed unlawful---Termination of a probationary employee by the competent authority does not warrant interference in the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court. 2022 PLC (C.S) 730 rel. Afnan Karim Kundi and Muhammad for Petitioner. Taimoor Aslam Khan for Respondent No.1. Muhammad Tayyab Malik for Respondent No.4. Date of hearing: 18th September, 2025.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, ‘Sched.---Suit for recovery of maintenance allowance, dower and dowry articles---Non-consummation of marriage, plea of---Paternity, denial of---DNA test, request for---Legitimacy of a child born during subsistence of marriage, presumption of---Scope---Constitutional petition filed after 23 months but connected petitions filed promptly---Effect---Laches, non-applicability of---Facts:---The petitioner/wife filed a suit against the respondent/husband for maintenance, dower and dowry; the respondent/husband filed a counter-suit for jactitation of marriage; the family court dismissed suit of husband, but on the view that consummation was not proved, awarded only 50% dower and declined maintenance/dowry; the appellate court upheld this decision; later, the parties reconciled and cohabited and a minor was born, and the petitioner filed the minor’s maintenance suit against the minor’s father and the grandfather; the family court refused DNA testing and fixed minor’s maintenance at Rs.5,000 per month with 10% annual increase---Issue:---“Whether, after a registered nikah stood proved (and a child is born during its subsistence), denial of the petitioner’s matrimonial claims on “non-consummation” and reopening issue of paternity through seeking DNA testing was justified?”---Held: At the outset, it was noted that the petitioner instituted her constitutional petition against the impugned judgment after a delay of more than 23 months and as such, was badly hit by laches, however, when a common question of law being decided in one case, another case involving the same point that was time barred was liable to be heard on merits---Petitioner approached the High Court though belatedly yet during the pendency of petition of respondent No.1 and assailed the same judgments and decrees in the wake of subsequent developments including birth of the minor and as such, delay on account of laches was condoned as the same did not cause any prejudice to respondent No.1---Petitioner successfully proved her marriage including consummation of marriage---The issue of non-consummation of marriage lost its relevance after the birth of the minor during subsistence of valid and proven ‘nikah’, hence, the family as well as the appellate court fellin error to award half dower and dismiss the claims of dowry and maintenance due to love and non-consummation of marriage---Petitioner could not lead substantive evidence as to her claim of gold as dowry articles, whereas, other articles such that were normally given to a bride as part of her dowry, by applying reasonable depreciation due to subsistence of marriage, the petitioner was held entitled to recover her dowry articles to the tune of Rs.200,000/- as alternative value of dowry articles---Adjusting four months of post-reconciliation period from the claimed period of maintenance, the petitioner was held entitled to receive maintenance at the rate of Rs. 15,000/- per month from the date of institution of the suit with 10% annual increase till her legal entitlement---Application of the respondent/husband for conducting DNA test was rightly turned down since it was trite law that a child born during the subsistence of a valid marriage was presumed legitimate and the mode of determining paternity through DNA test had been deprecated by the Supreme Court---Suit of the petitioner/wife was decreed and judgments and decrees of the courts below were modified---Constitutional petition was partly allowed, in circumstances. Ghazala Tehsin Zohra v. Mehr Ghulam Dastagir Khan and another PLD 2015 SC 327 rel. (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, ‘Sched.’---Maintenance allowance to wife and minor---Obligation of husband---Under the law, a husband is duty bound to maintain his wife and children till their legal entitlement---Right of maintenance flows unconditionally from the date of a valid Nikah and constitutes a binding legal duty. Ambreen Akram v. Asad Ullah Khan and others C.Ps. Nos. 1107-L of 2015 and 247-L of 2017 rel. (c) Administration of justice--- ---Laches---Not an absolute bar---A litigant cannot be non-suited by allowing laches to be stumbling block in the way of dispensation of justice since rule of laches is applied in accordance with facts and circumstances of each case and it cannot be made rule of universal application. FBR through Chairman, Islamabad and others v. Messrs Wazir Ali and Company and others 2020 SCMR 959 ref. (d) Constitution of Pakistan--- ---Art.199---Time-barred connection constitutional petition---Laches, inapplicability of---Hearing on merits---Scope---When a common question of law is decided in one case, another case involvingthe same point that is time barred is liable to be heard on merits. FBR through Chairman, Islamabad and others v. Messrs Wazir Ali and Company and others 2020 SCMR 959 rel. (e) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Scope---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court is extra-ordinary, corrective, remedial, supervisory and equitable to redress grave miscarriage of justice occasioned on account of misapplication of law and failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in the courts below. S.M. Javed Thaheemi for Petitioner. Tariq Mahmood Khan for Respondent No. 3 and for Petitioner (in Writ Petition No. 3949 of 2025). Muhammad Ahmad Khan for Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 (in Writ Petition No. 3949 of 2025). Date of hearing: 22nd September, 2025. Abid Hussain Chattha, J .--- This single Judgment shall decide the titled Petitions intrinsically connected to each other qua mutual family claims of Benish Ghaffar, Muhammad Essa, Muhammad Umar Farooq and Muhammad Aslam, hereinafter referred to as (the “Petitioner”, the “Minor”, “Respondent No. 1” and “Respondent No. 2” or the latter two collectively as the “Respondents”), whereby, they have questioned the impugned Judgments and Decrees dated 22.10.2021 and 24.04.2025 passed by Judge Family Court and 01.02.2022 by Additional District Judge, Liaquatpur, District Rahim Yar Khan.

Summary: (a) Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance (XLV of 1977)--- ----Ss.3, 7 & 10---CSS Competitive Examination Rules, 2019, R.7---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 199 & 242---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.11---Constitutional petition challenging vires of rules---Maintainability---Vires of rules already upheld by Supreme Court---Res judicata---Applicability---Constitutional petition was hit by res judicata since Supreme Court had already upheld the vires of rules---Brief facts were that the petitioner filed a Constitutional petition seeking declarations that the CSS Competitive Examination Rules, 2019 were ultra vires the Constitution and R.7 in particular was unconstitutional, and that the Chairman of the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) lacked authority to unilaterally frame such rules, which should instead be made by the FPSC as a whole with approval of the federal government---The legal issue before the Court was “whether the CSS Competitive Examination Rules, 2019, and in particular R.7, were unconstitutional on the ground that they were framed by the Chairman alone rather than by the full Commission acting under its statutory authority”?---Held: Pursuant to Art.242, the FPSC Ordinance, 1977, was promulgated, S.3 of which defined the composition of the commission, while S.7 enumerated its functions---These provisions, inter alia, authorized the commission to conduct examinations, advise the President on recruitment policies, and hold promotional examinations as to be specified by the federal government and in light of the said provisions, CSS Competitive Examination Rules, 2019 were framed---The report furnished by the commission further revealed that the vires and validity of the CSS Competitive Examination Rules, 2019 had already been subjected to judicial scrutiny before the Supreme Court, as well as before the High Courts and on each occasion, the Rules were upheld as having been lawfully framed and duly approved by the federal government---In the presence of such authoritative pronouncements, the matter could not be re-agitated merely by altering the form of the relief sought---Grievance raised by the petitioner was misconceived and devoid of substance---The challenge to the CSS Competitive Examination Rules, 2019 did not with stand Constitutional or legal scrutiny, particularly when the Supreme Court had already affirmed their validity---Constitutional petition was barred by the principle of res judicata and failed on merit as well and was dismissed. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.11---Res judicata, doctrine of---Scope---Applicability---The doctrine of res judicata, which is firmly embedded in our jurisprudence, operates as a complete bar to the re-litigation of issues already settled by competent Courts---Entertaining a petition which has been conclusively determined up to the level of the Apex Court would amount not only to disregarding binding precedent but also to unsettling a matter. Barrister M. Usama Rauf for Petitioner. Raja Zamir-ud-Din Ahmed, A.A.G. M. Arshad, Assistant Director, FPSC. Malik Muhammad Khalid for NAdra . Date of hearing: 8th September, 2025.

Summary: (a) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)--- ----S. 122---Insurance claim---Utmost good faith, doctrine of---Scope---Pre-insurance ailment, assertion of---Medical examination of policy-holder not conducted by Insurance Company---Effect---It was the duty of insurance company (Appellant/Respondent) to conduct medical examination of policy holder prior to issuance of policy, who did not opt to do so, as evident in statement of an Executive Officer of Appellant being its witness (RW-1)---Appellant had no legal or moral justification to reject the death claim of policy holder---Appellant consecutively received two annual premiums of Rs. fifty thousand per year---Appellant had not investigated the health condition of policy holder within due time---Therefore, the Appellant could not approbate and reprobate by shifting the burden to policy holder in order to escape its liability---Thus , the Trial Court rightly appraised the evidence and decided the matter in favour of respondents / plaintiffs and no illegality, therefore, existed in the impugned judgment and decree calling for interference---Appeal filed by the Insurance Company, being merit-less, was dismissed. Mst.Nazeeran and others v. Ali Bux and others 2024 SCMR 1271 ref. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. XIII, Rr. 3 & 4---Documents tendered (exhibited) by appellant’s counsel---Scope---Pertinently, the documents should be produced in the evidence by the party itself and a fair opportunity should be given to the opposite party to cross-examine the same, therefore, documents produced by the appellant/defendant’ counsel in his statement could not be taken into consideration---Documents that have been tendered in evidence through counsel's statement cannot be considered---As per settled law disputed documents cannot be tendered in evidence in statement of the counsel for a party because such procedure deprives the opposing party to test the authenticity of those documents by exercising the right of cross-examination---Thus, all those documents brought on record in the statement of the counsel for the appellant were inconsequential. Mst. Hameeda Begum and others v. Mst. Irshad Begum and others 2007 SCMR 996; Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Defence and another v. Jaffar Khan and others PLD 2010 SC 604; Province of the Punjab through Collector, Sheikhupura and others v. Syed Ghazanfar Ali Shah and others 2017 SCMR 172 and Rustam and others v. Jehangir (deceased) through LRs. 2023 SCMR 730 ref. (c) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)--- ----S. 122---Insurance claim---Pre-insurance ailment, assertion of---Documentary proof in favour of insurance claimant---Scope and effect---Record revealed that the medical reports generated and statements made in relation to the life issuance policy had been in line of insurance laws---Insured cannot be held to account for any non-disclosure that would enable the insurer to escape liability on the policy unless there is fraud or a fraudulent misrepresentation---Even if the insurer considers that the policy holder suffered from the ailment mentioned in terms of hypertension or diabetes etc. the insurer at the time of insurance must satisfy itself and should get the prospective buyer of the policy medically checked up to its satisfaction---Appellant (Insurance Company) never challenged the validity of death certificate which was the official document and presumption of truth was attached to it and the same should be taken into consideration---Thus, the Trial Court rightly appraised the evidence and decided the matter in favour of respondents / plaintiffs and no illegality, therefore, existed in the impugned judgment and decree calling for interference---Appeal filed by the Insurance Company, being merit-less, was dismissed. State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan v. Atta ur Rehman 2021 SCMR 1347; State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan through Chairman and another v. Razi-ur-Rehman 2009 CLD 1666; Khurshid Ali and 6 others v. Shah Nazar PLD 1992 SC 822; State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan and another v. Mst. Zubeda Bibi 2024 SCMR 426 and State Life Insurance Corporation and another v. Mst. Razia Ameer and another 2023 CLD 517 ref. (d) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)--- ----Ss. 118 & 122---Insurance claim, lodging of---Procedural requirements’ fulfillment of---Liquidated damages---Entitlement---Record transpired that insurance claim was lodged by the respondents / plaintiffs with the appellants (Insurance Company) by complying with all procedural requirements, however, the appellants (Insurance Company) had badly failed to make due payment within time (i.e. a period of ninety days) as prescribed under S. 118 of Insurance Ordinance, 2000---Thus, the Trial Court had rightly decreed the suit for recovery of claim along with liquidated damages---No illegality, therefore, existed in the impugned judgment and decree calling for interference---Appeal filed by the Insurance Company, being merit-less, was dismissed. Muhammad Faisal Malik, Nuzhat Fatima Chaudhry and Ch. Ali Azam for Appellant. Tanvir Iqbal Khan for Respondents Nos.1 to 4. Date of hearing: 22nd September, 2025.

Summary: After proving Nikah and consummation of marriage, the Petitioner was entitled to her complete dower as stipulated in the Nikahnama; the Petitioner has an unconditional right to claim her maintenance from the date of Nikah; the claim of dowry articles could not have been denied on the score that family members of the husband did not participate in the Nikah; and the Minor born during subsistence of a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate and is entitled to maintenance. 254Crl. Appeal 67614/21 Sajjad Ali . Vs State Etc Justice Abher Gul Khan 19-09- 2025 2025 LHC 5769

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (VIII of 1939)- -Ss. 2(ii), 2(ii-a) & 2(viii)-Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961), Ss.6 & 8-Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), S.5, Sched.-Wife seeking dissolution of marriage-Family Court granting khula to wife without her asking for it-Legality-Cruelty as a ground, proving of-Standard of proof to be adopted by courts in family cases highlighted-Husband contracting second marriage without wife’s permission constituting cruelty and such ground alone sufficing for seeking dissolution of marriage-Scope-Brief facts were that the petitioner/wife filed a suit against respondent/husband seeking dissolution of marriage, during which the family court granted khula and ordered her to return her dower comprising a plot, gold, and money-Petitioner’s (wife's) appeal and constitutional petition were dismissed-During the marriage, the respondent/husband contracted a second marriage without the petitioner’s (wife) consent or permission from the arbitration council-The legal issue for determination before the Supreme Court was-whether the family court could lawfully convert a suit for dissolution into khula without the wife’s consent, and whether the correct legal standard was applied in assessing the statutory grounds for dissolution, particularly cruelty, non-payment of maintenance, and contracting a second marriage in violation of law-?- -Held: Family Court dismissed the petitioner’s (wife's) evidence because it was unsupported by documents establishing cruelty-Family court failed to consider the evidence as a whole on the balance of probabilities, to determine whether the petitioner (wife)was entitled to dissolve the marriage-It was the duty of the family court and the appellate court to give weightage to the petitioner’s story on the balance of probabilities rather than treat the absence of documentary proof as conclusive to the fact that cruelty was not established-Both the family court and the appellate court readily accepted the respondent’s (husband) evidence even though he did not produce a single witness to corroborate his stance of good behavior or to corroborate his stance that he did not cause her any form of mental or emotional trauma-In doing so, the family court and the appellate court fell into grave error by not conforming to the standard of proof and by ignoring the principle of balance of probabilities-Hence, it failed to assess the evidence as per the required standard of proof to establish whether the petitioner (wife) was entitled to dissolution on the ground of cruelty-As to the High Court and the impugned judgement, it ignored the issues in totality-The second marriage was contracted by respondent (husband) in clear violation of Section 6 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (MFLO), thereby attracting clause (ii-a) of Section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 (DMMA), which alone was sufficient for the family court to dissolve the marriage-The family court, instead of dissolving the marriage granted a khula to the petitioner without her asking for it-The question was whether the family court could of its own accord grant khula-Khula was a distinct cause of action grounded in the wife’s consent and autonomy, and it could not be judicially imposed to replace a failed statutory ground under the DMMA-The practice of converting a suit for dissolution of marriage into one of khula without the consent of the wife was totally in contravention to the law, as khula being an alternate mode of dissolution required the wife’s voluntary decision to end the marriage and pay compensation in exchange for release from the marital bond-In consequence of the family court granting a decree for khula instead of the dissolution as prayed for, the petitioner (wife) was wrongly disentitled from her maintenance and dower despite these being legal obligations of the respondent (wife)-Judgments and decrees of the family court and the appellate court as well as the order of the High Court were set aside to the extent of khula, dower, and maintenance-The marriage was dissolved on the ground that the respondent (husband) contracted a second marriage in violation of the law-Consequently, the petitioner (wife) was not required to return her dower and was to keep the gold, money, and plot given to her-She was also entitled to maintenance of Rs.10,000/- per month for the period during which the marriage subsisted, to be calculated and paid according to law-Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, in circumstances. Ibrahim Khan v. Mst. Saima Khan PLD 2024 SC 645 rel. (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)- -S.5, Sched.-Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (VIII of 1939), S.2-Wife seeking dissolution of marriage-Family court granting khula to wife without her asking for it-Legality-Filing of a suit for dissolution does not in itself amount to seeking khula-The practice of converting a suit for dissolution of marriage into one of khula without the consent of the wife is totally in contravention to the law, as khula being an alternate mode of dissolution requires the wife’s voluntary decision to end the marriage and pay compensation in exchange for release from the marital bond. (c) Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (VIII of 1939)- -Ss. 2(ii), 2(ii-a) & 2(viii)-Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961), Ss.6 & 8-Statutory grounds empowering women to seek dissolution of marriage-Scope-Legal framework-Dissolution of marriage means that the marriage can be brought to an end at the instance of the woman if she is able to successfully establish one or more of the statutory grounds provided within the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 (the DMMA)-Section 2 of the DMMA lists the grounds, which include the husband’s disappearance, failure to provide maintenance, imprisonment, impotence, insanity, cruelty and, by virtue of clause(ii-a) of the DMMA inserted through the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (MFLO), the taking of an additional wife-Each of these grounds reflects a recognition that the marital bond may become so impaired by the husband’s conduct or circumstances that its continuation would cause injustice to the wife-Among the grounds outlined in the DMMA, Section 2 (ii) lists out the ground for failure to provide maintenance, Section 2 (ii-a) lists out the ground for taking an additional wife and Section 2 (viii) presents the ground of cruelty. (d) Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (VIII of 1939)- -S. 2(viii)-Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961), S.6-Wife seeking dissolution of marriage-Grounds for decree-‘Cruelty’ explained-Factors assessing/determining ‘cruelty’-Where the impact of behavior renders marital life unsafe or intolerable then it is termed as cruelty-Cruelty can range from physical assault, to mental or emotional abuse, to interference with property or religion, to inequitable treatment in the context of a second marriage-Cruelty is related to the conduct of the husband such that his behavior or treatment towards the wife involves physical abuse in the form of assault as well as emotional and mental abuse such that his conduct is so reprehensive for her that she is miserable and unable to live with him-This means that cruelty can be physical, mental as well as emotional-The examples listed in Section 2 (viii) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 (the DMMA) are not exhaustive but illustrative, ensuring that courts remain flexible in recognizing cruelty in its many different forms-Accordingly, cruelty is not limited to physical harm rather it includes any conduct, which results in mental and emotional harm, that makes it impossible for the wife to live with dignity and security within the marital home and relationship-Courts in Pakistan have defined cruelty as being behavior which is not limited to physical abuse but involves behavior which can result in mental and emotional abuse-Therefore, cruelty encompasses physical harm; such as slaps, beatings or assault, as well as mental cruelty, such as humiliation, verbal abuse, or unfounded allegations of unfaithfulness in a marriage; emotional cruelty, such as neglect or indifference; and, at times, the broader environment of the marriage, such as hostility in the home or oppressive behavior by in-laws tolerated or encouraged by the husband-Cruelty can involve a series of acts, disconnected but collectively causing harm which renders it intolerable for the wife to remain in the marriage bond-Courts have also expanded on what constitutes cruelty by holding that cruelty includes the intentional or malicious infliction of mental suffering, abusive treatment, or false accusations-This means that physical injury is not a prerequisite and cruelty may consist entirely of conduct that causes anguish, loss of confidence, or injury to self-respect and may even encompass violent or non-violent acts, gestures, words, and even silence or neglect-Cruelty may be physical or mental, intentional or unintentional, pre-meditated or not-Essentially, it is behavior, the impact of which is so painful, so severe, and so harsh that it would be impossible to live in the marriage-The relevant and decisive factor is the impact of the husband’s conduct on the woman such that she no longer deems it possible to live with him-Accordingly, for a court examining whether a case of cruelty is made out to dissolve the marriage, cruelty must be assessed in all its forms in the context of its impact whether physical, mental, emotional, and even environmental-Cruelty is a subjective test, to be assessed in light of the effect of the behavior on the aggrieved woman, rather than by reference to strict categories or technical rules of proof. Tayyeba Ambareen v. Shafqat Ali Kiyani 2023 SCMR 246 rel. Muhammad Shariful Islam v. Suraya Begum PLD 1963 Dacca 947; Shahana Bibi v. Nadeem Shah 2015 MLD 1623; Rabia Rasheed v. Faisal Mir 2013 CLC 1203; Evans v. Evans 1 Hag. Con. 35 and 161 E.R. 466; Russell v. Russell [1897] AC 395 (HL); Horton v. Horton [1940] p. 187; Gollins v. Gollins [1964] AC 644 (HL); Williams v. Williams [1964] AC 698 (HL) and Lvingstone-Stallard v. Livingstone-Stallard [1974] Fam 47 ref. (e) Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (VIII of 1939)- -Ss.2, 2(ii), 2(ii-a) & 2(viii)-Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), S.5, Sched.-Wife seeking dissolution of marriage-Cruelty-Proof-Correct standard of proof while assessing evidence-Dispute under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 (the DMMA) being governed by family law is essentially a civil dispute pertaining to the dissolution of the marriage and same is to be assessed on civil standards of evidence-Woman can obtain a decree for dissolution of marriage provided she can establish one or more of the grounds stipulated in section 2 of DMMA on the balance of probabilities-Where a woman invokes the ground of cruelty, it becomes a factual matter to be determined on the basis of evidence to be assessed according to the civil standard of proof being the balance of probabilities meaning that there must be sufficient evidence to show that a fact is more likely to be true than not-Therefore, the family court is required to look at the woman’s testimony narrated in her own words and supported by surrounding circumstances-The standard of proof applied under the DMMA being the balance of probabilities means that the Court must decide whose side of the story is more likely to be true, that is more probable than the other, while examining the evidence and testimony of the woman, the circumstances she describes, and the impact of the conduct on her ability to continue marital life in the context of the defense he sets out by way of evidence-The law does not condition woman’s entitlement on being able to demonstrate injuries or police reports or bring medical reports to support every slap or instance of emotional or mental trauma-In considering the evidence, the court must remember that there is no single definition of cruelty-What may be cruelty in one marriage may not be cruelty in another-The concept of cruelty differs from person to person depending upon the upbringing, level of sensitivity, educational, family and cultural background, financial position, social status, customs, traditions, religious beliefs, human values and their value system-The prudent and appropriate way to adjudicate the case would be to evaluate it on its peculiar facts and circumstances on the balance of probabilities-The essential factor being the impact of the behavior termed as cruelty on the life of the woman. Salamat Ali v. Muhammad Din PLD 2022 SC 353; Nazeeran v. Ali Bux 2024 SCMR 1271; Khalid Hussain v. Nazir Ahmad 2021 SCMR 1986; Muhammad Amir v. Khan Bahadur PLD 1996 SC 267 and Begum Hamid Mehmood v. Muhammad Masood 1995 SCMR 955 rel. Meezan Bank Limited v. WAPDA First Sukuk Company Limited 2022 CLC 974 ref. (f) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)- -S. 6-Husband contracting second marriage during subsistence of first marriage-Process and pre-requisites-A husband may contract another marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage only after seeking the consent of his existing wife-If such consent is refused, he must then apply to the Chairman of the Union Council, stating his reasons for the proposed marriage-The Chairman is then required to constitute an arbitration council which may grant permission only if it is satisfied that the proposed marriage is-necessary and just-Non-compliance with this process attracts penal consequences under Section 6(5) of the MFLO, including the immediate payment of the entire dower to the first wife and criminal liability punishable with imprisonment or fine. (g) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)- -S. 6-Family court justifying the second marriage of husband on the presumption that wife was disobedient and self-deserting-Legality and permissibility-No one can be compelled to contract a second marriage and similarly a husband cannot be forced to contract a second marriage by blaming the woman for her behavior. Faryal Maqsood v. Khurram Shehzad Durrani PLD 2025 SC 262 rel. (h) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)- -Art. 30-Admitted facts-Facts admitted require no further proof. Rehmat v. Zubaida Begum 2021 SCMR 1534 and Nazir Ahmad v. M. Muzaffar Hussain 2008 SCMR 1639 rel. (i) Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (VIII of 1939)- -S. 2-Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), S.5, Sched.-Wife seeking dissolution of marriage-Wife’s right to pursue her career or education-Scope-Husband alleging disobedience against wife on that account-Legality-Wife’s desire to pursue her career or education abroad is not disobedience and is not to be equated to misconduct rather it is an exercise of her personal autonomy. (j) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)- -S. 5, Sched.-Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (VIII of 1939), S. 2-Patriarchal/male-centric language used by family courts-Correcting gendered mischaracterizations that undermine women’s dignity, autonomy, and fundamental rights-Language used by the family courts reflecting patriarchal mindset would require courts attention-Mischaracterization of a woman as a-disobedient wife-and a-self-deserted lady-, or the assumption that she-created such circumstances which compelled the husband to contract a second marriage,- shifts the discussion from, cruelty of husband, towards the woman and the exercise of her autonomy to her obedience and disobedience-This reasoning shields the cruel behavior and unlawful acts of a husband while portraying him as a dutiful and-good husband-These are social judgments disguised as findings of law-Family court’s presumption that only an-obedient wife-is entitled to maintenance must be replaced with the legally correct position as maintenance is a husband’s statutory obligation during the subsistence of the marriage-It is therefore necessary to address and correct such language as a matter of substantive justice-Family courts must consciously move away from such words like-disobedient,- -self-deserting,- -mummed,- -served the husband’s family by heart-and-compelled the husband to contract second marriage-as they reinforce a moral hierarchy that measures women by servitude and compliance in total disregard of her fundamental rights especially to have life with dignity and to exercise her right to choice. Haseen Ullah v. Mst. Naheed Begum PLD 2022 SC 686 rel.

Summary: (a) Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (VIII of 1939)--- ----Ss. 2(ii), 2(ii-a) & 2(viii)---Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961), Ss.6 & 8---Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), S.5, Sched.---Wife seeking dissolution of marriage---Family Court granting khula to wife without her asking for it---Legality---Cruelty as a ground, proving of---Standard of proof to be adopted by courts in family cases highlighted---Husband contracting second marriage without wife’s permission constituting cruelty and such ground alone sufficing for seeking dissolution of marriage---Scope---Brief facts were that the petitioner/wife filed a suit against respondent/husband seeking dissolution of marriage, during which the family court granted khula and ordered her to return her dower comprising a plot, gold, and money---Petitioner’s (wife's) appeal and constitutional petition were dismissed---During the marriage, the respondent/husband contracted a second marriage without the petitioner’s (wife) consent or permission from the arbitration council---The legal issue for determination before the Supreme Court was “whether the family court could lawfully convert a suit for dissolution into khula without the wife’s consent, and whether the correct legal standard was applied in assessing the statutory grounds for dissolution, particularly cruelty, non-payment of maintenance, and contracting a second marriage in violation of law”?-- -Held: Family Court dismissed the petitioner’s (wife's) evidence because it was unsupported by documents establishing cruelty---Family court failed to consider the evidence as a whole on the balance of probabilities, to determine whether the petitioner (wife)was entitled to dissolve the marriage---It was the duty of the family court and the appellate court to give weightage to the petitioner’s story on the balance of probabilities rather than treat the absence of documentary proof as conclusive to the fact that cruelty was not established---Both the family court and the appellate court readily accepted the respondent’s (husband) evidence even though he did not produce a single witness to corroborate his stance of good behavior or to corroborate his stance that he did not cause her any form of mental or emotional trauma---In doing so, the family court and the appellate court fell into grave error by not conforming to the standard of proof and by ignoring the principle of balance of probabilities---Hence, it failed to assess the evidence as per the required standard of proof to establish whether the petitioner (wife) was entitled to dissolution on the ground of cruelty---As to the High Court and the impugned judgement, it ignored the issues in totality---The second marriage was contracted by respondent (husband) in clear violation of Section 6 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (MFLO), thereby attracting clause (ii-a) of Section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 (DMMA), which alone was sufficient for the family court to dissolve the marriage---The family court, instead of dissolving the marriage granted a khula to the petitioner without her asking for it---The question was whether the family court could of its own accord grant khula---Khula was a distinct cause of action grounded in the wife’s consent and autonomy, and it could not be judicially imposed to replace a failed statutory ground under the DMMA---The practice of converting a suit for dissolution of marriage into one of khula without the consent of the wife was totally in contravention to the law, as khula being an alternate mode of dissolution required the wife’s voluntary decision to end the marriage and pay compensation in exchange for release from the marital bond---In consequence of the family court granting a decree for khula instead of the dissolution as prayed for, the petitioner (wife) was wrongly disentitled from her maintenance and dower despite these being legal obligations of the respondent (wife)---Judgments and decrees of the family court and the appellate court as well as the order of the High Court were set aside to the extent of khula, dower, and maintenance---The marriage was dissolved on the ground that the respondent (husband) contracted a second marriage in violation of the law---Consequently, the petitioner (wife) was not required to return her dower and was to keep the gold, money, and plot given to her---She was also entitled to maintenance of Rs.10,000/- per month for the period during which the marriage subsisted, to be calculated and paid according to law---Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, in circumstances. Ibrahim Khan v. Mst. Saima Khan PLD 2024 SC 645 rel. (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched.---Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (VIII of 1939), S.2---Wife seeking dissolution of marriage---Family court granting khula to wife without her asking for it---Legality---Filing of a suit for dissolution does not in itself amount to seeking khula---The practice of converting a suit for dissolution of marriage into one of khula without the consent of the wife is totally in contravention to the law, as khula being an alternate mode of dissolution requires the wife’s voluntary decision to end the marriage and pay compensation in exchange for release from the marital bond. Ibrahim Khan v. Mst. Saima Khan PLD 2024 SC 645 rel. (c) Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (VIII of 1939)--- ----Ss. 2(ii), 2(ii-a) & 2(viii)---Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961), Ss.6 & 8---Statutory grounds empowering women to seek dissolution of marriage---Scope---Legal framework---Dissolution of marriage means that the marriage can be brought to an end at the instance of the woman if she is able to successfully establish one or more of the statutory grounds provided within the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 (the DMMA)---Section 2 of the DMMA lists the grounds, which include the husband’s disappearance, failure to provide maintenance, imprisonment, impotence, insanity, cruelty and, by virtue of clause(ii-a) of the DMMA inserted through the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (MFLO), the taking of an additional wife---Each of these grounds reflects a recognition that the marital bond may become so impaired by the husband’s conduct or circumstances that its continuation would cause injustice to the wife---Among the grounds outlined in the DMMA, Section 2 (ii) lists out the ground for failure to provide maintenance, Section 2 (ii-a) lists out the ground for taking an additional wife and Section 2 (viii) presents the ground of cruelty. (d) Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (VIII of 1939)--- ----S. 2(viii)---Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961), S.6---Wife seeking dissolution of marriage---Grounds for decree---‘Cruelty’ explained---Factors assessing/determining ‘cruelty’---Where the impact of behavior renders marital life unsafe or intolerable then it is termed as cruelty---Cruelty can range from physical assault, to mental or emotional abuse, to interference with property or religion, to inequitable treatment in the context of a second marriage---Cruelty is related to the conduct of the husband such that his behavior or treatment towards the wife involves physical abuse in the form of assault as well as emotional and mental abuse such that his conduct is so reprehensive for her that she is miserable and unable to live with him---This means that cruelty can be physical, mental as well as emotional---The examples listed in Section 2 (viii) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 (the DMMA) are not exhaustive but illustrative, ensuring that courts remain flexible in recognizing cruelty in its many different forms---Accordingly, cruelty is not limited to physical harm rather it includes any conduct, which results in mental and emotional harm, that makes it impossible for the wife to live with dignity and security within the marital home and relationship---Courts in Pakistan have defined cruelty as being behavior which is not limited to physical abuse but involves behavior which can result in mental and emotional abuse---Therefore, cruelty encompasses physical harm; such as slaps, beatings or assault, as well as mental cruelty, such as humiliation, verbal abuse, or unfounded allegations of unfaithfulness in a marriage; emotional cruelty, such as neglect or indifference; and, at times, the broader environment of the marriage, such as hostility in the home or oppressive behavior by in-laws tolerated or encouraged by the husband---Cruelty can involve a series of acts, disconnected but collectively causing harm which renders it intolerable for the wife to remain in the marriage bond---Courts have also expanded on what constitutes cruelty by holding that cruelty includes the intentional or malicious infliction of mental suffering, abusive treatment, or false accusations---This means that physical injury is not a prerequisite and cruelty may consist entirely of conduct that causes anguish, loss of confidence, or injury to self-respect and may even encompass violent or non-violent acts, gestures, words, and even silence or neglect---Cruelty may be physical or mental, intentional or unintentional, pre-meditated or not---Essentially, it is behavior, the impact of which is so painful, so severe, and so harsh that it would be impossible to live in the marriage---The relevant and decisive factor is the impact of the husband’s conduct on the woman such that she no longer deems it possible to live with him---Accordingly, for a court examining whether a case of cruelty is made out to dissolve the marriage, cruelty must be assessed in all its forms in the context of its impact whether physical, mental, emotional, and even environmental---Cruelty is a subjective test, to be assessed in light of the effect of the behavior on the aggrieved woman, rather than by reference to strict categories or technical rules of proof. Tayyeba Ambareen v. Shafqat Ali Kiyani 2023 SCMR 246 rel. Muhammad Shariful Islam v. Suraya Begum PLD 1963 Dacca 947; Shahana Bibi v. Nadeem Shah 2015 MLD 1623; Rabia Rasheed v. Faisal Mir 2013 CLC 1203; Evans v. Evans 1 Hag. Con. 35 and 161 E.R. 466; Russell v. Russell [1897] AC 395 (HL); Horton v. Horton [1940] p. 187; Gollins v. Gollins [1964] AC 644 (HL); Williams v. Williams [1964] AC 698 (HL) and Lvingstone-Stallard v. Livingstone-Stallard [1974] Fam 47 ref. (e) Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (VIII of 1939)--- ----Ss.2, 2(ii), 2(ii-a) & 2(viii)---Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), S.5, Sched.---Wife seeking dissolution of marriage---Cruelty---Proof--- Correct standard of proof while assessing evidence---Dispute under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 (the DMMA) being governed by family law is essentially a civil dispute pertaining to the dissolution of the marriage and same is to be assessed on civil standards of evidence---Woman can obtain a decree for dissolution of marriage provided she can establish one or more of the grounds stipulated in section 2 of DMMA on the balance of probabilities---Where a woman invokes the ground of cruelty, it becomes a factual matter to be determined on the basis of evidence to be assessed according to the civil standard of proof being the balance of probabilities meaning that there must be sufficient evidence to show that a fact is more likely to be true than not---Therefore, the family court is required to look at the woman’s testimony narrated in her own words and supported by surrounding circumstances---The standard of proof applied under the DMMA being the balance of probabilities means that the Court must decide whose side of the story is more likely to be true, that is more probable than the other, while examining the evidence and testimony of the woman, the circumstances she describes, and the impact of the conduct on her ability to continue marital life in the context of the defense he sets out by way of evidence---The law does not condition woman’s entitlement on being able to demonstrate injuries or police reports or bring medical reports to support every slap or instance of emotional or mental trauma---In considering the evidence, the court must remember that there is no single definition of cruelty---What may be cruelty in one marriage may not be cruelty in another---The concept of cruelty differs from person to person depending upon the upbringing, level of sensitivity, educational, family and cultural background, financial position, social status, customs, traditions, religious beliefs, human values and their value system---The prudent and appropriate way to adjudicate the case would be to evaluate it on its peculiar facts and circumstances on the balance of probabilities---The essential factor being the impact of the behavior termed as cruelty on the life of the woman. Salamat Ali v. Muhammad Din PLD 2022 SC 353; Nazeeran v. Ali Bux 2024 SCMR 1271; Khalid Hussain v. Nazir Ahmad 2021 SCMR 1986; Muhammad Amir v. Khan Bahadur PLD 1996 SC 267 and Begum Hamid Mehmood v. Muhammad Masood 1995 SCMR 955 rel. Meezan Bank Limited v. WAPDA First Sukuk Company Limited 2022 CLC 974 ref. (f) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)--- ----S. 6---Husband contracting second marriage during subsistence of first marriage---Process and pre-requisites---A husband may contract another marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage only after seeking the consent of his existing wife---If such consent is refused, he must then apply to the Chairman of the Union Council, stating his reasons for the proposed marriage---The Chairman is then required to constitute an arbitration council which may grant permission only if it is satisfied that the proposed marriage is “necessary and just”---Non-compliance with this process attracts penal consequences under Section 6(5) of the MFLO, including the immediate payment of the entire dower to the first wife and criminal liability punishable with imprisonment or fine. (g) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)--- ----S. 6---Family court justifying the second marriage of husband on the presumption that wife was disobedient and self-deserting---Legality and permissibility---No one can be compelled to contract a second marriage and similarly a husband cannot be forced to contract a second marriage by blaming the woman for her behavior. Faryal Maqsood v. Khurram Shehzad Durrani PLD 2025 SC 262 rel. (h) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ----Art. 30---Admitted facts---Facts admitted require no further proof. Rehmat v. Zubaida Begum 2021 SCMR 1534 and Nazir Ahmad v. M. Muzaffar Hussain 2008 SCMR 1639 rel. (i) Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (VIII of 1939)--- ----S. 2---Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), S.5, Sched.---Wife seeking dissolution of marriage---Wife’s right to pursue her career or education---Scope---Husband alleging disobedience against wife on that account---Legality---Wife’s desire to pursue her career or education abroad is not disobedience and is not to be equated to misconduct rather it is an exercise of her personal autonomy. (j) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S. 5, Sched.---Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (VIII of 1939), S. 2---Patriarchal/male-centric language used by family courts---Correcting gendered mischaracterizations that undermine women’s dignity, autonomy, and fundamental rights---Language used by the family courts reflecting patriarchal mindset would require courts attention---Mischaracterization of a woman as a “disobedient wife” and a “self-deserted lady”, or the assumption that she “created such circumstances which compelled the husband to contract a second marriage,” shifts the discussion from, cruelty of husband, towards the woman and the exercise of her autonomy to her obedience and disobedience---This reasoning shields the cruel behavior and unlawful acts of a husband while portraying him as a dutiful and “good husband”---These are social judgments disguised as findings of law---Family court’s presumption that only an “obedient wife” is entitled to maintenance must be replaced with the legally correct position as maintenance is a husband’s statutory obligation during the subsistence of the marriage---It is therefore necessary to address and correct such language as a matter of substantive justice---Family courts must consciously move away from such words like “disobedient,” “self-deserting,” “mummed,” “served the husband’s family by heart” and “compelled the husband to contract second marriage” as they reinforce a moral hierarchy that measures women by servitude and compliance in total disregard of her fundamental rights especially to have life with dignity and to exercise her right to choice. Haseen Ullah v. Mst. Naheed Begum PLD 2022 SC 686 rel. Sher Afzal Khan Marwat, Advocate Supreme Court and Sh. Mahmood Ahmad, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner. Sh. Muhammad Suleman, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents. Date of hearing: 19th September, 2025.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----S.54---Sindh Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967), S.52---Dispute over land recorded as part of Pinyari Canal since 1953---Plaintiff instituted suit for mandatory and permanent injunction claiming ownership on the basis of gift deed from his mother---Onus to prove---Plaintiff failing to demonstrate title of his mother on the date of gift deed in his favor---Brief facts were that the petitioner instituted a suit for mandatory and permanent injunction in respect of suit land claiming ownership on the basis of a registered gift deed executed by his mother in 1999 and mutation made in his favour in 1999---In 2001, upon seeking certified copies from the Settlement Department, he discovered that parts of his land were recorded as part of the Pinyari Canal since 1953, which he contended was incorrect as his land was never used for canal purposes---The respondent authority maintained that the land had been part of the Pinyari Canal alignment since 1953 and was government property not capable of transfer or gift---Held: Firstly, it was incumbent upon the petitioner/plaintiff to have established the title of the alleged donor as well as the genuineness and validity of the purported gift deed, obligations which he had failed to discharge---Petitioner/plaintiff admittedly had not produced the alleged gift deed and the witnesses---Moreover, he had not approached revenue authorities for correction of record prior to instituting the civil suit---Such admissions were fatal for the petitioner's case---Mere reliance on a mutation as conclusive proof of title was legally untenable---Moreover, it was fatal to petitioner's case, as he failed to demonstrate what title, if any, his mother possessed at the time of execution of the alleged gift deed in his favor---No illegality or material irregularity was found in the impugned judgments and decrees---Present civil revision petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Muhammad Sarwar v. Mumtaz Bibi and others 2020 SCMR 276 and Rehmat Noor v. Zulqarnain 2023 SCMR 1645 rel. (b) Sindh Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)--- ----S.52---Mutation---Mutation entries are maintained solely for fiscal purposes and by themselves neither confer nor extinguish ownership rights---Ownership of immoveable property cannot be established merely by a mutation entry. (c) Sindh Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)--- ----S.52---Presumption of correctness being attached to official record---Scope---Original field-book of settlement department, Ghat Wadh Form and Deh Form, being prepared by public functionaries in discharge of their statutory duties, enjoy a presumption of correctness, which cannot be displaced except by cogent, reliable and independent evidence. (d) Maxim--- ----"Acta publica praesumuntur rite esse acta"---Meaning---Official acts are presumed to have been rightly done. (e) Qanun-e- Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ----Art.117---Decree, grant of---Proving of facts---Onus to prove---Defendant being proceeded against ex parte, plea of---Plaintiff's contentions that defendants have been proceeded against ex parte would be of no legal consequence---A decree cannot be granted merely on account of the absence of some parties when the documentary record itself negates plaintiff's claim. (f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.115---Revisional jurisdiction of the High Court---Scope---This jurisdiction is supervisory in nature and is not to be exercised as if it were a second appeal---Revisional court is not to reappraise the entire evidence or substitute its own conclusions for those of the courts below merely because another view is possible---Interference is justified only in three eventualities; (i) when a subordinate court has exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law; (ii) when it has failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested; or, (iii) when in exercising jurisdiction it has acted illegally or with material irregularity and such illegality has occasioned failure of justice---Moreover, concurrent findings of fact, if supported by the record and not shown to be perverse, cannot be disturbed in revision---The scope is confined to examining jurisdictional defects or material irregularities; it does not extend to reassessing oral and documentary evidence already considered by the courts below. Muhammad Sarwar v. Hashmal Khan PLD 2022 SC 13 rel. M. Saleem Hashmi Qureshi and Zaman Zaib for Applicant. Wali Muhammad Jamari, Additional Advocate General for Respondents. Date of hearing: 6th August, 2025.