Summary: Intra Court appeal in WP 318-20 (Against impugned notification dated 30.01.2020 and seeks direction to respondent no.1 to issue revise election schedule)

Summary: This legal document pertains to a case involving a strike by medical professionals, including doctors, nurses, paramedics, and allied service providers, against the Medical Teaching Institutes Ordinance, 2019. The petitioner argues that the strike is premature as no teaching institution has been notified under the ordinance, and a draft act for medical reforms has been submitted for legislation. The court emphasized the illegality of strikes by professionals regulated by their respective bodies and cites constitutional obligations to obey the law. The authorities have taken action against the striking individuals under the Punjab Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1958, and the PEEDA Act, 2006. A committee has been constituted to hold a consultative workshop to address stakeholders' concerns on the draft act. The court directed the committee to incorporate appropriate changes and calls for an end to the strike. It appoints Momin Agha as the convener of the committee, with specific members identified for participation in the consultative process. The Secretary, Specialized Healthcare and Medical Education Department, is tasked with organizing the workshop and submitting a finalized draft to the court. The court restricted adverse actions against the striking individuals until a specified time but allows authorities to take stern action against continued strikes after a given deadline, citing violations of the constitution and legal obligations.

Summary: Background:The case involves a criminal petition filed by Raja Muhammad Nadeem against an order dated March 20, 2020, issued by the Islamabad High Court in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 214/2020. The petitioner challenges the said order before the Supreme Court of Pakistan.---Issues:The primary issue is whether the order issued by the Islamabad High Court in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 214/2020 is lawful and justifiable.Whether notices should be issued to various respondents, including government officials and legal representatives, to provide their input on the matter.Whether the release of prisoners from jails, as ordered by some High Courts and Provincial Governments, should be stayed until further orders.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court heard arguments from the petitioner's counsel, the Attorney General for Pakistan, President of the Supreme Court Bar Association, President of the Peshawar High Court Bar Association, Vice Chairman of the Pakistan Bar Council, and appointed an amicus curiae to assist in the case. The Court decided to issue notices to relevant respondents, including government officials and legal representatives, and appointed an amicus curiae to provide expert opinion. Additionally, the Court ordered a stay on the implementation of any orders regarding the release of prisoners from jails until further orders.

Summary: Bail granted---Background:In Criminal Petition No. 251 of 2020, Alamgir Khan, the petitioner, sought admission to bail after being arrested on December 1, 2019. He was accused of delivering an inflammatory speech at a rally on November 29, 2019, on the Mall Road in Lahore. The speech allegedly incited participants against state institutions.---Issues:Whether Alamgir Khan's speech constituted sedition under section 124-A of the Pakistan Penal Code.Whether Alamgir Khan's release on bail would jeopardize public peace, security, and tranquility.Whether Alamgir Khan's right to freedom of speech was violated, considering the reasonable restrictions under Article 19 of the Constitution.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Court recognized freedom of speech as a fundamental right under the Constitution, subject to reasonable restrictions. The determination of whether Alamgir Khan's speech violated these restrictions would be best decided by the trial court after considering the full context of the discourse.Despite the serious nature of the charges, the petitioner's status as a student and the lack of usefulness in his continued incarceration led the Court to grant bail. The Court emphasized the importance of the state being tolerant of dissent and criticism from its citizens, even if expressed crudely or emotionally.The criminal petition was converted into an appeal, and Alamgir Khan was granted release on bail upon furnishing a bond of Rs. 100,000 with one surety to the satisfaction of the trial court or Duty Magistrate.---Citations/Precedents:Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1960Punjab Sound Systems (Regulations) Act, 2015Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, Article 19

Summary: Background: The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir initiated contempt of court proceedings against Liaqat Ali Mir, the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) of the High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, for entertaining a writ petition filed by Mujahid Hussain Naqvi that contained scandalous, contemptuous, and objectionable content. The writ petition disparaged the judiciary, including the Chief Justice and Senior Judge of the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, and used highly indecent and immoral language. ----Issues: 1- Whether the writ petition filed by Mujahid Hussain Naqvi containing contemptuous contents can be entertained by the Courts. 2- Whether the language and contents of the writ petition violate constitutional provisions, particularly concerning public order, decency, and morality. 3- Whether contempt of court proceedings are warranted against the Deputy Registrar for accepting such a petition. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court found that: The language and contents of the writ petition were highly scandalous, contemptuous, and against the morality, decency, and public order mandated by the Constitution of Azad Jammu and Kashmir. The Deputy Registrar, Liaqat Ali Mir, acted irresponsibly by entertaining the petition and should have rejected it outright due to its contemptuous nature. The respondent apologized unconditionally and placed himself at the mercy of the Court, admitting his error in judgment. The Court accepted the apology of Liaqat Ali Mir and discharged the contempt notice against him. However, the Court emphasized the importance of maintaining the dignity and independence of the judiciary and instructed all concerned to avoid entertaining petitions that violate constitutional limits and decorum. ----Citations/Precedents: The Prisoners Act, 1894 Muhammad Ikram Chaudhary vs. Federation of Pakistan [PLD 1998 SC 103] Dr. D.C. Saxena Contemnor v. Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India [AIR 1996 SC 2481] In Re: Professional Conduct of Two Lawyers in Civil Miscellaneous Petition No.45 of 1982 [1982 SCMR 713] Various relevant case laws from Pakistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir pertaining to contempt of court and judicial decorum.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Appeal against acquittal- -Scope-Question of law-Error of law-Under S. 676(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985 (Canada), the State could only appeal an acquittal on a question of law alone-Appealable error must be traced to a question of law, rather than a question about how to weigh evidence and assess whether it met the standard of proof-State could not appeal merely because an acquittal was unreasonable-Errors of law arose, for example, where the legal effect of findings of fact or of undisputed facts raised a question of law and where there was an assessment of the evidence based on a wrong legal principle-When interpreting a trial judge's reasons, appellate courts should not parse the reasons of the trial judge in a line by line search for errors-Instead, the reasons were to be read as a whole, in the context of the evidence, the issues and the arguments at trial, together with an appreciation of the purposes or functions for which they were delivered-Appellate courts must attempt to understand the reasoning of the trial judge-However, even if the trial judge articulated the right test, appellate courts may find an error of law if the judge's reasoning and application demonstrated a failure to properly apprehend the law. R v. J.M.H., 2011 SCC 45, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 197, at paras. 25-27; R. v. George, 2017 SCC 38, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 1021, at paras. 15-17); R. v. Biniaris, 2000 SCC 15, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 381, at para. 33; R. v. Laboucan, 2010 SCC 12, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 397, at para. 16 and R. v. R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 16 ref. (b) Criminal law- -Dangerous operation of motor vehicle causing death [section 249(4) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985 (Canada)]-Mens rea for offence-Reasonable person standard-Scope-Momentary speeding-Momentary excessive speeding on its own could establish the mens rea for dangerous driving where, having regard to all the circumstances, it supported an inference that the driving was the result of a marked departure from the standard of care that a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have exhibited-Court had to analyse whether the reasonable person would foresee the dangers to the public from the momentary conduct-Fact that foreseeable consequences occurred within a short period of time after someone engaged in highly dangerous behaviour could not preclude a finding of mens rea for dangerous driving-When undertaking the mens rea analysis, the trial judge must work with the facts as found and consider whether, in the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have foreseen the risk and taken the same actions as the accused-Duration and nature of an accused's conduct were only some of the factors to be considered with all of the circumstances in the mens rea analysis; they were not factors that could be taken out of context; it was conceivable that in some contexts, even grossly excessive speed may not establish a marked departure from the standard of care, while in other circumstances speed may not need to be grossly excessive in order to still be a marked departure-Concerning the required mental element it was not necessary to find that accused was subjectively aware of the risk of his conduct and intentionally created this risk, as the test for mens rea was based on the reasonable person. Per Martin, J (Majority view): In the present case the trial judge made two inter-related errors of law; he applied the wrong legal principle and most importantly, failed to apply the correct legal test by not assessing what a reasonable person would have foreseen and done in accused's circumstances. R. v. Roy, 2012 SCC 26, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 60, at para. 36 ref. Focus of the trial judge in the present case on the momentariness of the speeding by the accused demonstrated an error of law. Momentary excessive speeding on its own could establish the mens rea for dangerous driving where, having regard to all the circumstances, it supported an inference that the driving was the result of a marked departure from the standard of care that a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have exhibited. Momentary conduct was not assessed differently from other dangerous conduct. Conduct that occurred over a brief period of time that created foreseeable and immediate risks of serious consequences could still be a marked departure from the norm. Trial judge erred in focusing on the momentary nature of accused's conduct, rather than analyzing whether the reasonable person would foresee the dangers to the public from the momentary conduct. In the present case the brief period of rapidly changing lanes and accelerating towards an intersection by the accused was not comparable to momentary mistakes that may be made by any reasonable driver. Risky conduct at excessive speeds foreseeably could result in immediate consequences. Fact that foreseeable consequences occurred within a short period of time after someone engaged in highly dangerous behaviour could not preclude a finding of mens rea for dangerous driving. Secondly, the trial judge in the present case did not apply the correct legal test. Trial judge did not turn to the core question at issue in the present case i.e. whether the dangerous manner of driving was the result of a marked departure from the standard of care which a reasonable person would have exercised in the same circumstances. At some point in the mens rea analysis, the trial judge must work with the facts as found and consider whether, in the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have foreseen the risk and taken the same actions as the accused. Only when there had been an active engagement with the full picture of what occurred could the trial judge determine whether the accused's conduct was a marked departure from the conduct of a reasonable and prudent driver. In the present case instead of focussing on what a reasonable person would have foreseen and done in the circumstances, the trial judge engaged in reasoning focussed on the type (speeding) and duration (momentariness) of accused's conduct, to the exclusion of the full picture. Trial judge found that accused was not inattentive while driving, but did not consider how the accused's awareness of his surroundings contributed to his conduct being a marked departure from the conduct of a reasonable person. A full analysis in the present case would have considered the duration of the speeding, as well as the accused's control of the car (he switched lanes and then accelerated), the magnitude of speeding (almost three times the speed limit), the location of speeding (approaching a major intersection), and the accused's awareness of at least two vehicles at the intersection as he approached it. The trial judge then had to consider whether, on these facts as found, a reasonable person would have foreseen the risk of endangering the public by engaging in such conduct and taken steps to avoid it, presumably by not driving so fast. Duration and nature of an accused's conduct were only some of the factors to be considered with all of the circumstances in the mens rea analysis. They were not factors that could be taken out of context. It was conceivable that in some contexts, even grossly excessive speed may not establish a marked departure from the standard of care, while in other circumstances speed may not need to be grossly excessive in order to still be a marked departure. Courts must be careful to avoid adopting hard and fast rules regarding when isolated factors would or would not be marked departures. Although case law may be helpful in providing examples of what had previously been determined to be a marked departure, courts must still analyze the accused's actions relative to the reasonable person in the specific circumstances at issue. Concerning the required mental element, it was not necessary to find that accused was subjectively aware of the risk of his conduct and intentionally created this risk. The test for mens rea was based on the reasonable person. A reasonable person would have foreseen the immediate risk of reaching a speed of almost three times the speed limit while accelerating towards a major city intersection. Accused's conduct in such circumstances was a marked departure from the norm. Accused had been rightly convicted by the Court of Appeal. Appeal was dismissed. Per Karakatsanis, J, dissenting (Minority view): Trial judge's decision to acquit the accused in the present case was not tainted by an identifiable legal error. Trial judge's reasons disclosed that he was aware that both excessive speed and momentary conduct could meet the marked departure standard, depending on the circumstances. Questions about whether the trial judge should have placed less weight on the short duration of speeding, and more weight on the degree to which speeding exceeded the limit, where the speeding occurred, or on other factors relating to accused's control of the car and awareness, were not questions of law alone. The trial judge understood that what represented a marked departure in the circumstances was a matter of degree, and that the mens rea test was fundamentally comparative. Inferring that the trial judge failed to compare accused's conduct to that of a reasonable person because he did not explicitly describe what a reasonable person would have done in the circumstances was tantamount to presuming that he misunderstood the applicable legal principles. The trial judge was ultimately left with a reasonable doubt as to whether the manner of driving met the mens rea standard. Whether his decision to acquit on such basis was reasonable under the circumstances was not an issue in an appeal against acquittal such as the present one. Trial judge's decision to acquit the accused was not tainted by an identifiable legal error. Acquittal of accused should therefore be restored.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending