Summary: The respondent had filed a suit (Suit No.1427 of 2000) against the appellants for the recovery of arrears of rent for the premises in question.The appellants argued that no formal agreement had been executed between the parties, and therefore, the suit was misconceived. They also disputed the amount of rent claimed by the respondent.The appellants contended that they had only rented a portion of the building at a specific rate, and the impugned judgment did not meet the requirements of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) regarding the discussion of evidence.The respondent, on the other hand, relied on certain documents and correspondences to support their claim that the appellants had rented multiple floors of the building.Several issues were framed, including the possession of the demised premises, the number of floors rented, the liability of the appellants, the quantum of rent and other charges, and the limitation on the recovery of arrears of rent.The respondent's prayer in the suit sought a decree for a specific sum against the appellants, along with interest and costs.The court's judgment, delivered by Justice Muhammad Faisal Kamal Alam, addressed each of the issues raised in the case:The court determined that only the 4th and part of the 5th floor of the building were rented by the appellants.The possession of the premises was taken on two separate occasions, with the court finding that the appellants had taken possession before the execution proceedings.The court ruled that the appellants were liable to pay rent at a specified rate for the occupied area.There was no substantial evidence to support the respondent's claim for additional charges, and utility bills were not produced as evidence.The court held that the claim for arrears of rent was not time-barred and awarded the respondent a 10% markup on the arrears from the date of the suit.Ultimately, the court set aside the impugned judgment and allowed the appeal in favor of the appellants, with directions for the payment of the specified amount of rent and markup to the respondent. Each party was ordered to bear their respective costs.

Summary: The appellants were convicted and sentenced by the trial court for their involvement in obtaining fraudulent sales tax refunds through bogus claims. The convictions were made under the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance 1999 (NAO), and the appellants were found guilty of corruption and corrupt practices. The prosecution presented evidence including bank transaction records, documents related to refund claims, and witness testimonies to establish the guilt of the appellants. The appellants were accused of collaborating to cause substantial loss to the government exchequer through these fraudulent activities. During the appeals, the appellants did not contest the evidence against them and sought a reduction in their sentences based on various mitigating factors. The court upheld the convictions of Muhammad Asif Arshad and Muhammad Adil Arshad but reduced their sentences due to mitigating circumstances. The court maintained the conviction and sentences of Mumtaz Ali Nizamani.

Summary: The petitioner initiated the suit in 1988 based on an agreement to sell, claiming Rs.20,000 as consideration, of which Rs.15,000 was allegedly paid. The petitioner asserted that respondents No.2, 3, and 4 were the sons of deceased Faiz Rasool, and the property devolved upon them after Faiz Rasool's death in 1976. The Cantonment Board defended the mutation through written statements, while respondents No.2, 3, and 4 acknowledged the agreement but denied breach of promise, asserting that ownership rights were not transferred. The trial court initially decreed the petitioner's suit, but Barkatullah's successful appeal led to the reversal of the decision. The petitioner contended that the agreement's execution was convincingly proven, relying on the testimony of witnesses. However, the appellate court found the evidence insufficient to establish the ownership of respondents No.2, 3, and 4. The court also emphasized that the petitioner lacked the right to enforce the agreement, as it was contingent upon respondents No.2, 3, and 4 acquiring ownership, which did not happen. The Civil Revision was dismissed.

Summary: Justice Jawad Hassan deliberates on the challenges raised by the respondents against an interim order, centering around the transfer of the petitioner from the position of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) at Faisalabad Electric Supply Company (FESCO) to the Pakistan Electric Power Company (PEPCO). The Supreme Court of Pakistan directed this court to make a decision based on specific observations. The petitioner contested an order issued by the Ministry of Energy (Power Division) alleging political motivation, violation of established policies, and infringement of fundamental rights. The court engaged in a thorough analysis, initially addressing the maintainability of the petition. It underscores the contractual nature of the petitioner's employment, emphasizing that in the absence of statutory rules governing terms and conditions, a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution is not maintainable. Furthermore, the judgment highlighted the principle of "pacta sunt servanda," emphasizing the importance of adhering to agreements and stating that the petitioner has no vested right to a specific posting. The court draws on precedents, including the judgment in "Lt. Col. Rtd. Aamir Rauf Versus Federation of Pakistan through Secretary M/o Defence and 3 others(2015 PLC (C.S.) 1056)," to assert that in cases without statutory rules, the master and servant principle applies, making constitutional petitions non-maintainable. The judgment dismissed the petitioner's claim, stating that the transfer was a result of administrative exigencies, and the petitioner, having accepted the terms of the contract, cannot challenge the order. The court also addressed objections regarding the issuance of the order during a ban on transfers amid Covid-19, emphasizing that such policies are general guidelines and not absolute limitations on the competent authority's powers. In conclusion, the court deems the instant petition not maintainable, dismissing it based on the principles of contractual employment and the absence of statutory rules.

Summary: Background:The Civil Revision No. 26 of 2020 was filed in the Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court challenging the judgment/order dated 02.03.2020 passed by the learned Additional District Judge Nagar in Civil Appeal No. 10/2019. The appeal was accepted by the appellate court, setting aside the judgment/order dated 28-09-2019 passed by the Civil Judge 1st class Nagar.---Issues:Whether the learned Additional District Judge Nagar erred in accepting the civil first appeal filed by the respondents/defendants?Whether the respondents were afforded sufficient opportunity to file their written statement in accordance with the law?----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The petitioners/plaintiffs contended that the judgment/order passed by the learned Additional District Judge Nagar was contrary to law and facts on the record. They argued that the respondents failed to file their written statement within the prescribed time frame, and the trial court rightly struck off their right to file it. However, the appellate court set aside this order, leading to the filing of this revision petition.The court examined the record and noted that the trial court did not issue specific directions to the respondents to file their written statement. While sufficient time was consumed in issuing summons and notices, the trial court did not afford a specific last opportunity to the respondents. Instead, it struck off their right to file a written statement abruptly. The court emphasized that the right to file a written statement is a substantial right and cannot be taken away without a fair opportunity. Therefore, the appellate court rightly set aside the trial court's order.The court reiterated the principle that courts are sanctuaries of the rights of individuals and should leave no stone unturned in discharging their duties to ensure justice.Consequently, the court found no illegality or material irregularity in the impugned judgment passed by the appellate court. Therefore, the revision petition was dismissed.Overall, the revision petition was dismissed, affirming the judgment of the appellate court.

Summary: (a) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)- -S. 6 & Preamble-Capital Development Authority Ordinance (XXIII of 1960), Chapt. VI & Preamble-Federal Laws (Revision and Declaration) Ordinance (XXVII of 1981), S. 5-Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT)-Land Acquisition Act, 1894, with necessary substitutions and amendments was applicable to Islamabad Capital Territory. In order to remove any doubts, as to applicability of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (‘LAA 1894’) in Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT), and in exercise of legislative competence conferred under the enabling provisions and Constitutional mandate, the Federal Laws (Revision and Declaration) Ordinance, 1981, was enacted on 8th July 1981 which enlisted laws in the IVth Schedule vide item 9 thereof; sections 3, 9, 14, 43, 45, 47, and 54 of the LAA 1894 were substituted and amended to make it compatible in its application to ICT. Only certain provisions of the LAA, 1894, and not the entire Act, were amended in order to clarify its application to the ICT. Such action manifested that the LAA, 1894 was applicable to ICT at all times and, any doubts as to its applicability were legislatively removed by virtue of enactment of the Federal Laws (Revision and Declaration) Ordinance, 1981. The reinforcement of the LAA, 1894, with necessary substitution and amendment, was made during currency of Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960, which was a clear manifestation of the intention of the Federal Legislature that LAA, 1894 applied with full force in ICT and was not eclipsed by the provisions of Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960. PLD 1982 Q 63 ref. Perusal of Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960, revealed that the legislature did not completely exclude the application of LAA, 1894 in Islamabad Capital Territory, for public purpose and for acquisition by companies. The conspicuous absence of a ‘non-obstante’ or overriding or superseding clause in Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960, manifested the intention of the legislature that each of two contemporaneous statutes were to exist side by side and operate in their respective domain. The two legislations were merely overlapping and there appeared to be no conflict between both the statutes. There was no apparent reason as to why these statutes could not exist coextensively as each of them catered to a different object and purpose. However, planning and development was still the domain of the Capital Development Authority and it maintained the authority to conduct such planning and development of any land that was acquired under the LAA, 1894 for public purpose. (b) Interpretation of statutes- -Doctrines and tools of interpretation applied by the superior courts to adjudge the legitimacy, vires, ultra vires, repeal, overriding, or supremacy of one statute over the other stated. To determine the repeal, overriding effect, repugnancy, vires, intra-vires or otherwise of any competing or comparable statutes, or analogous provisions contained therein, several litmus tests, tools of interpretations, and legal doctrines were applied. These accessories of interpretation were harvests of long drawn jurisprudential expositions and judicial interpretational wisdom culled by the superior courts. The tests to determine the validity of legislation were applied, inter-alia, on the touchstone of Constitution, legislative competency, limitation and distribution of legislative authority between Federal and Provincial legislature, doctrine of occupied field, pith and substance, special and general law, earlier and later law, delegated and subordinate legislation, directory or mandatory enactment or provisions, effect of obstante or non-obstante provisions in any enactment or otherwise. These were some of the illustrative and non-exhaustive tools of interpretation and doctrines applied by the superior courts to adjudge the legitimacy, vires, ultra vires, repeal, overriding, or supremacy of one statute over the other. Foremost tool of interpretation of any statute was the Constitution which set the ‘gold standard’ to adjudge constitutionality, repugnancy, and validity and, vires of any legislative instruments or, provisions contained therein. In addition to the Constitutional filter, other tools such as legislative history, statement of object, and the preamble of a statute were important tools in deciphering intention, legitimacy, repugnancy, validity, and overriding or dominance of competing statutes, or provisions contained therein. (c) Vires of statute- -Presumption that ‘Legislature was presumed to know the law’-Scope-Legislature was presumed to know the ‘existing laws’, judicial pronouncements, and general principles of law-Legislature must be presumed to know the facts and conditions rendering a statute expedient and beneficial-Ignorance of existing laws, judicial pronouncement, and judicial interpretation of law by the highest judicature of the State could not be attributed to the legislature. NS Bindra’s Interpretation of Statutes Tenth Edition by Lexis Nexis, Page 235; Raval & Co. v. Ramachandran AIR 1967 Mad 57, at page 69; Andrus v. Glover Const. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980) (citing Continental Casualty Co. v. United States, 314 U.S. 527, 533 (1942) and (2003) 7 SCC 389 ref. (d) Interpretation of statutes- -Implied repeal, doctrine of-Presumption-Scope. There was a presumption against repeal by implication and the reason of said rule was based on the theory that the legislature, while enacting a law, had the complete knowledge of existing laws on the same subject matter. Therefore, when the legislature did not provide a repealing provision, the intention was clear not to repeal the existing legislation. However, the presumption of implied repeal could be rebutted. Repeal was inferred by necessary implication when the provisions of the later law were so inconsistent with, or repugnant, to the provisions of the earlier law that the two could not stand together. Although, if the two could be read together and some application could be made of the words in the earlier Act, repeal would not be inferred. The necessary questions to be asked were; (i) whether there was direct conflict between the two provisions; (ii) whether the legislature intended to lay down an exhaustive Code in respect of the subject matter replacing the earlier law, and (iii) whether the two laws occupied the same field. (2003) 7 SCC 389 ref. The doctrine of implied repeal, based upon the theory that the legislature, which was presumed to know the existing law, did not intend to create any confusion by retaining conflicting provisions and, therefore, when the court applied the doctrine, it did no more than give effect to the intention of the legislature by examining the scope and the object of the two enactments and by a comparison of their provisions. (e) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)- -Ss. 23 & 24-Land acquisition-Compensation, quantum of-Parameters-Divergent Federal and Provincial regimes/laws for determining compensation-Observations recorded by the Supreme Court for adopting a single uniform compensation mechanism. After the 18th Constitutional amendment, land acquisition had become a provincial subject which had led to the creation of diverging legislative regimes. Each legislation provided for different parameters for compensation which created disparity. In order to alleviate such disparity, other jurisdictions, such as India, had enacted the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, whereby, a uniform compensation mechanism existed for the entire State and the compensation afforded to the land owners, whose land was acquired under the exercise of Eminent Domain for public purpose, was significantly greater. It was desirable that one uniform compensation mechanism should also be adopted by the parliament of Pakistan by conducting a similar exercise to bring forth an identical, or more beneficial, legal regime to recompense land owners for the compulsory acquisition of their land. Scheme of compensation provided under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 remained a remnant of colonial times that should have been timely amended to cater to our evolving socio-economic circumstances. Therefore, such overhaul became necessary in light of the shortcomings of the current scheme of land acquisition with respect to compensation and matters incidental thereto. (f) Interpretation of statutes- -Two competing or overlapping statutes/provisions-Doctrine of ‘pith and substance’, ‘incidental encroachment’, and ‘occupied field’-Scope. When two or more competing laws or provisions contained therein, were seemingly similar or overlapping, then legislative intent of the parliament may be discernible from examining the Preamble, legislative history, doctrine of pith and substance, incidental encroachment, and occupied field to adjudge their co-existence in their respective domain or for one to nudge out and claim dominance over the other. Superior courts had expounded such doctrines, amongst others, as interpretive techniques, which were used to adjudge the predominance and constitutionality of a statute or of any provision contained therein. 1999 SCMR 1477 at page 1495 ref. Doctrine of occupied field, which was auxiliary to the larger doctrine of pith and substance, and incidental encroachment, may be invoked by the courts to determine the extent of legitimacy only in cases where the competing statutes or any of the provisions contained therein are by different tiers of legislature. Therefore, it would be an exercise in futility to invoke the doctrine of ‘pith and substance’, ‘incidental encroachment’, or ‘occupied field’ where there was no legislative competition between the federal and provincial tier of statutes. (g) Constitution of Pakistan- -Arts. 141, 142 & 143-Competing Federal and Provincial laws-Legislative supremacy-Scope. Where legislative instruments in competition, one promulgated by the Federal and the other by the Provincial legislature, or any provisions contained therein, were pitched against each other, the test to determine the legislative supremacy or dominance was comparatively simple and provided by Article 141 and Article 142 of the Constitution, which clearly demarcated the legislative edges, competency and supremacy test. In case of conflict between Federal and Provincial enactments, privilege of overriding supremacy was conceded to the Parliament/Federal legislature under Article 143 of the Constitution. Where one or more Provincial Assemblies, through resolution, authorized the Parliament to pass law in respect of a residuary subject, in such event, power to repeal and amend such law was exclusively retained by such Provincial legislature(s). Government of Sindh v. Dr. Nadeem Rizvi 2020 SCMR 1 (para 16 (v), para 20) ref. (h) Constitution of Pakistan- -Arts. 1(2), 142(c) & 142(d)-Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT)-Legislative competence-Exclusive domain of Federal Government-Only the Federation itself had the exclusive domain to legislate on all matters that were, in their nature, ‘residuary subjects’, with respect to ICT. The Constitution not only made specific provision for the exclusive legislative domain in respect of-residuary subjects- (i.e. subjects/entries left out of Federal Legislative List) over the respective provincial territories of the provincial assembly by virtue of Article 142(c), but it also recognized the exclusive domain of the Federal legislature over-residuary subjects-in respect of territories or areas ‘not included in any province’ by the operation of Article 142(d) which includes Islamabad Capital Territory. Given the nature of Islamabad Capital Territory under Article 1(2), only the Federal Legislature was empowered with the exclusive domain to legislate in areas not forming part of a territory of any province as enumerated in Article 142(d). It becomes evident that only the Federation itself had the exclusive domain to legislate on all matters that were, in their nature, ‘residuary subjects’, with respect to ICT. (i) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)- -Preamble-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 24(2)-Land Acquisition Act, 1894, vires of-For the purpose of acquisition of any property or depriving any person of a property, such exercise of authority needed to be backed by law-Land Acquisition Act, 1894 had constitutional blessing as it was covered under the exception contained in Article 24(2) of the Constitution. (j) Constitution of Pakistan- -Arts. 9, 24 & 152-Eminent domain, power of-Scope-Power of the State to take private property and convert it into public use-Power of ‘Eminent Domain‘ was a proprietary aspect of sovereignty (of State) and was inseparable from it; it was an inherent attribute of a sovereign State and the manifestation of the sovereign authority of ‘Eminent Domain’ could be traced to Art. 24 of the Constitution-Such power vests within the State, or its delegated instrumentality, to expropriate private property for public use, and/or for company against adequate, or reasonable, compensation payable to the owner of property-Historical origin and recognition of the concept of ‘Eminent domain’ in the United States and the sub-continent stated. Fauji Foundation v. Shamimur Rehman PLD 1983 SC 457; American Jurisprudence, 2d Vol. 26, pp. 638-39 para1, and Sooraram Pratap Reddy and others v. Deputy Collector, Ranga Reddy and others (2008 (9) SCC 552), Para 47; 109 U.S. 513 (1883); Chicago, B & Q Railroad Co v. Chicago 166 U.S 226 (1897); 1 SCR 869; AIR 1952 SC 252 = (1952)1 SCR 899 and PLD 1981 FSC 23 at page 41 ref. (k) Rules of Business, 1973- -Sched. I, Entry No. 11 & Sched. II, Serial No. 14, Entry No. 2-[Erstwhile] Federal Government Employees Housing Foundation, nature of-Scope-Purpose that was being carried out by the [erstwhile] Federal Government Employees Housing Foundation (‘the Foundation’) was one that fell within the powers of the Division of the Ministry of Housing and Works-Fact that the Chairman of the Board of Governors for the Foundation was the Minister of Housing and Works lent support to the fact that the Foundation exercised functions allocated to the Ministry of Housing and Works under the Rules of Business, 1973-Control of the former Foundation vested solely in the hands of the government as the Board and its Executive Committee were the decision makers in the Foundation-Control of the Foundation, in its entirety, vested within the hands of the government-Given that the Foundation was conducting the affairs of the government, it was the State itself that allocated funds for financing the operation, salary of all its Board members, who were civil servants, and for the staff and activities of the Foundation. 2002 PLC (C.S.) 1655 = PLD 2002 SC 1079 ref. (l) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)- -S. 6-Acquisition of land for housing society-Public purpose-Scope-Acquisition of land for residence of Government servants/ housing society was a "public purpose". PLD 1960 SC 60 and 2018 SCMR 705 ref. (m) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)- -S. 6-Acquisition of land for the benefit of a segment of the society-Public purpose-Scope-Public purpose-included any purpose wherein even a fraction of the community may be interested or by which it may be benefited. (2008) 9 SCC 552 ref. (n) Capital Development Authority Ordinance (XXIII of 1960)- -Ss. 11 to 21 & Preamble-Capital Development Authority (‘CDA’) and [erstwhile] Federal Government Employees Housing Foundation (‘the Foundation’)-'Regulatory capture', doctrine of-Applicability-Both the CDA and the Foundation were not regulators but service providers-Doctrine of 'regulatory capture' as laid down in the case of Imrana Tiwana v Province of Punjab PLD 2015 Lah. 522 did not apply to both of them. The Capital Development Authority (CDA) was established as a public service provider and not as a regulatory Authority. The Authority was essentially responsible for making all arrangement for the planning and development of Islamabad, within the framework of regional development plan. In addition, the municipal services earlier entrusted to the Authority in the year 1966 were withdrawn and entrusted to Islamabad Local Government. The [erstwhile] Federal Government Employees Housing Foundation (‘the Foundation’) was merely a non-trading, not for profit entity that was created for the betterment or service to the society generally or any segment of society particularly. It functioned was under the Ministry of Housing and Works and performed one of its functions assigned to Housing and Works Division. Neither, the CDA nor, the Foundation were the regulatory authority, none regulated any sector of business or, commercial activities of commercial bodies rather both were service providers. As a state functionary, the CDA, was executing its statutory function, which did not include regulating any group of trade or business, let alone, being manned by a person from any of such commercial group or entity it was regulating. The Foundation and/or CDA failed the test of regulatory capture laid down in the case of Imrana Tiwana v. Province of Punjab PLD 2015 Lah. 522. PLD 2015 Lah. 522 ref. (o) Interpretation of statutes- -Where the Parliament intended for the law to have overriding effect, the words of the statute, in their natural, ordinary, or popular sense, would clearly declare so-Courts were not under a duty to either enlarge or curtail the scope of the legislation or the intention of the legislators. (p) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)- -Ss. 6 & 16 & Preamble-Capital Development Authority Ordinance (XXIII of 1960), Chapt. VI & Preamble-Federal Government Employees Housing Authority Act (IV of 2020), Ss. 3(2) & 12-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 173-Acquisition of land by [erstwhile] Federal Government Employees Housing Foundation (‘Foundation) in terms of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for a housing scheme-Plots in the said housing scheme allotted to government/civil servants and advocates of the Supreme Court-Questions as to whether such acquisition of land was for a valid public purpose; and whether subject land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, could only have been acquired by the Capital Development Authority (‘Development Authority’) under the Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960- [ Per Mushir Alam, J: Capital Development Authority (CDA) under the Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960 (‘the Ordinance’) did not have exclusive jurisdiction to acquire land and it did not exclude acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (‘the Act’)-Provisions of the Ordinance did not exclude those of the Act with respect to acquisition of land for a public purpose-Furthermore acquisition for a housing scheme for Federal Government employees and allied group constituted a valid public purpose-Acquisition under the Act did not become State largesse under Art. 173 of Constitution read with S. 16 of the Act]- [Per Qazi Faez Isa, J, concurring: Applicable law in the present case for the compulsory acquisition of the land was the Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Subject land was legally acquired by the Foundation and its distribution amongst the allottees did not violate the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 nor the Constitution]- Appeals were allowed accordingly. (q) Constitution of Pakistan- -Art. 175(2)- Jurisdiction of courts-Scope-Jurisdiction on court could not be conferred even by consent; unless it was so conferred by or under the Constitution and or law. Per Qazi Faez Isa, J; concurring with Mushir Alam, J (r) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)- -S. 6-Federal Government Employees Housing Authority Act (IV of 2020), Ss. 3(2) & 12-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 24(3)(e)(ii), 38(a) & 38(d)-Acquisition of land by [erstwhile] Federal Government Employees Housing Foundation (‘Foundation) in terms of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for a housing scheme-Plots in the said housing scheme were allotted to government/civil servants and advocates of the Supreme Court-Question as to whether such acquisition of land was for a valid public purpose-Held, that providing housing was specifically mentioned in Art. 24(3)(e)(ii) of the Constitution, therefore, land which was compulsorily acquired for providing housing was for a public purpose and government/civil servants and lawyers, were a specified class of citizens as mentioned in Art. 24(3)(e)(ii)-To provide housing was a basic ‘necessity of life’, it also ‘secured the well being of the people’ and ‘raised their standard of living’-Said Principles of Policy (mentioned in Arts. 38(a) & 38(d) of the Constitution) reiterated that providing housing was a public purpose-To acquire land in order to provide it to those in need of housing, after compensating the owners, did not detract from the objective of social justice as enunciated in Islam, and it constituted social justice as understood in common parlance-Appeals were allowed. PLD 1960 SC 60; 2018 SCMR 705; 2001 CLC 1853; R. L. Arora v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1962 SC 764; Anand Kumar v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1963 Madhya Pradesh 256; Veeraraghavachariar v. Secretary of State for India AIR 1925 Mad. 837; 2007 CLC 107; PLD 2011 SC 619 and PLD 2011 SC 619, 646 ref. (s) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)- -S. 6 & Preamble-Capital Development Authority Ordinance (XXIII of 1960), Chap. VI & Preamble-Federal Laws (Revision and Declaration) Ordinance (XXVII of 1981), S. 5-Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT)-Applicability of Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960 (‘the Ordinance’) did not contain an overriding or non-obstante clause nor vested exclusive jurisdiction in Capital Development Authority (CDA) with regard to land acquisition in ICT-When land was required for the use and/or purpose of CDA it could be compulsorily acquired under the Ordinance, but where land was not required for the use and/or purpose of the CDA it could not be acquired under the Ordinance, but only under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. PLD 1972 SC 279 ref. (t) Constitution of Pakistan- -Art. 205 & Fifth Sched.- Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894), S. 6-Federal Government Employees Housing Authority Act (IV of 2020), Ss. 3(2) & 12-Judges of the High Courts and Supreme Court-Entitlement to State land/plots-Neither the Constitution nor any law entitled judges of superior courts to receive land or plots from the [erstwhile] Federal Government Employees Housing Foundation or out of any compulsorily acquired land-Practice of giving away the ummah’s land to judges was also contrary to the Injunctions of Islam. Remuneration and other terms and conditions of service of a Judge of the Supreme Court or of a High Court provided in the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution did not contain any clause entitling judges to (State) land/plots. The Constitution and the law (Presidential Orders) did not entitle chief justices and judges of the superior courts to plots of land. The ‘Supreme Court of Pakistan: Judicial Estacode’ (‘the Judicial Estacode’) also did not contain anything therein entitling chief justices and judges to plots of land. Likewise, the Manual of ‘Pay, Pension and other Privileges’ (‘the Manual’), compiled the presidential orders, rules, and notifications regarding the pay, pension and privileges of judges, but the manual also did not contain anything entitling chief justices and judges of the superior courts to plots of land. The executive giving plots to judges constituted a favour. The independence of the judiciary was a necessary concomitant to ensure its respect and credibility in the eyes of the people. Without specific legal sanction, no one, including the Prime Minister, had the discretion to grant land, a house or an apartment to anyone. Those who served in the judiciary received a salary for their services and received a pension on their retirement; they did not serve in the expectation of receiving land from the State. The practice of giving away the ummah’s land to judges is also contrary to the Injunctions of Islam. Islam jealously guards the properties and assets of the ummah (community/State). Islam is a religion of balance, and its followers are directed not to ‘transgress the balance’; the balance is/are ruptured when lands were bestowed on the elite. When the ummah’s land are bestowed upon the privileged elite, those blessed with good salaries, secure jobs and pensions may attract the Qur’anic rebuke, ‘Competing to piling up (worldly things) distracts you, until you visit your graves’ [Al-Qur’an, Surah At-Takathur verses 1 and 2]. Al-Qur’an, Surah Ar-Rahman (55) verse 7 and Al-Qur’an, Surah At-Takathur verses 1 and 2 ref. (u) Pakistan Army Act (XXXIX of 1952)- -Preamble-Pakistan Air Force Act (VI of 1953), Preamble-Pakistan Navy Ordinance (XXXV of 1961), Preamble-Pakistan Rangers Ordinance (XIV of 1959), Preamble-Frontier Constabulary Act (XIII of 1915), Preamble-Frontier Corps Ordinance (XXVI of 1959), Preamble-National Guards Act (LXI of 1973), Preamble-Pakistan Coast Guards Act (XVIII of 1973), Preamble-Airports Security Force Act (LXXVII of 1975), Preamble-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 24, 25, 205 & 227-State land, entitlement to-Different laws governing those employed in the Army, Air Force, Navy, Rangers, Frontier Constabulary, Frontier Corps, National Guards, Coast Guards and Airports Security Force, did not provide that they be given residential plots, commercial plots or agricultural land (belonging to State/public) nor permitted them to receive the same-Practice of giving away the ummah’s land to members of the armed forces was also contrary to the Injunctions of Islam. The prevailing practice of granting State/public plots and land to members of the Armed Forces was contrary to the Constitution and the law. Laws could also not be enacted to enable such allotments/grants because if enacted these would violate the Constitution (Articles 24, 25, 205 and 227) and be void. The Constitution did not permit self-enrichment and personal aggrandizement. Ghulshan Hussain v. Commissioner (Revenue), Islamabad, 2000 YLR 1711, 1727 and Federal Government Employees Housing Foundation v. Muhammad Akram Alizai PLD 2002 SC 1079, 1095 ref. However, a government or an organization controlled by a government may launch a housing scheme for the members of the Armed Forces, and when this happened they may apply for the allotment of a single plot for housing. But, they like every other applicant of such schemes, they would have to pay the requisite amount (not subsidized by the State), stand in queue and await their turn for allotment in terms of the applicable methodology. And, the plot which was allotted/granted must not be large because available land was finite and the list of beneficiaries was long, and kept growing longer. Those who served in the Armed Forces of Pakistan received a salary for their services and received a pension on their retirement; they did not serve in the expectation of receiving land from the State. When free or heavily subsidized State/public land was distributed amongst the elite, people lost faith in the system of governance, despondency set in and society then came to be held together by sheer force. The practice of giving away the ummah’s land to members of the armed forces was also contrary to the Injunctions of Islam. Islam jealously guarded the properties and assets of the ummah (community/State). Islam was a religion of balance, and its followers were directed not to ‘transgress the balance’; the balance was ruptured when lands were bestowed on the elite. When the ummah’s land was bestowed upon the privileged elite, those blessed with good salaries, secure jobs and pensions may attract the Qur’anic rebuke, ‘Competing to piling up (worldly things) distracts you, until you visit your graves’ [Al-Qur’an, Surah At-Takathur verses 1 and 2]. (v) Constitution of Pakistan- -Arts. 19A, 205 & 260(1) & Fifth Sched.-Pakistan Army Act (XXXIX of 1952), Preamble-Pakistan Air Force Act (VI of 1953), Preamble-Pakistan Navy Ordinance (XXXV of 1961), Preamble-Right to information-Scope-Distribution of State land amongst those in service of Pakistan (including judges of superior judiciary and members of the Armed Forces)-Neither the Constitution nor any law provided for such distribution-Affront to the people was confounded when information with regard to distribution of State/ummah’s land was kept under wraps-People had every right to know what was given to those in the service of Pakistan and holding constitutional positions-To withhold such information from the people was unconstitutional-Constitutional goal of ‘creating an egalitarian society was undermined when public land furtively found its way into private hands-His Lordship observed that since the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 was enacted to ensure accountability, transparency and good governance by optimizing the free flow of information’, therefore, a copy of present judgment should be sent to the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (‘PEMRA’) which should send copies onwards to its licencees, who may want to broadcast it; and that PEMRA should ensure that such broadcasts were unimpeded. Holy Qur’an, Surah An-Nisa (4) verse 114; Holy Qur’an, Surah At-Tawbah (9) verse 78, Surah Al-Isra (17) verse 47, Surah Ta Ha (20) verse 62, Surah Al-Anbiya (21) verse 3, Surah Az-Zukhruf (43) verse 80 and Surah Al-Mujadilah (58) verse 10; Holy Qur’an, Surah Al-Anfal (8) verse 8 and Holy Qur’an, Surah Al-Baqarah (2) verse 42 ref. In person (in C.A. No. 1481 of 2018). In person (in C.A. No. 1482 of 2018). Khushdil Khan Malik, in-person (in C.M.A. No. 10950 of 2018). Nemo (in C.M.As. Nos. 10951-10953 of 2018). Niaz Ullah Niazi, A.G. Islamabad on Court’s Notice. Sajid Ilyas Bhatti, Additional AGP for Federation. Ch. Hassan Murtaza Mann, Advocate (in C.As. Nos. 1476-1480 of 2018). Dates of Hearing: 15th, 16th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd May, 2nd, 7th, 10th, 23rd October, 12th, 25th November of 2019 and 7th, 9th, 13th and 14th of January, 2020.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Service Matter: Pensionary Benifits

Summary: Challenges decree and order by family court wherein dower,maintenance and dowery