Summary: [PEMRA Ordinance, 2002]Reasonable restriction imposed by law, by no stretch ofimagination means to condemn a person/entity without anyjustification and without hearing3. According to (RSF) Reporterswithout borders Pakistan press, since beginning is oscillatedbetween civil societys demand for greater press freedom and thepolitical and executive/establishment elites constant reassertion ofextensive control over the media. This has to be streamlined withinframe of law not by dictations

Summary: BackgroundARY Communications Ltd., a licensee of Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA), engaged in television broadcasting, filed a lawsuit against the Federation of Pakistan and others. The lawsuit challenges the withdrawal of a No Objection Certificate (NOC) by the Ministry of Interior. The NOC was initially provided for security clearance when the license was granted, but was retracted in response to certain news content aired by ARY, which the government found objectionable. The withdrawal occurred while ARY's application for license renewal was pending.---IssuesThe central legal issue in this case is the legality of the NOC's withdrawal by the Ministry of Interior, particularly whether:The withdrawal of the NOC was conducted in a lawful manner.PEMRA had any jurisdiction or basis to override or disregard the withdrawal made by the Ministry of Interior.The plaintiff's rights to due process and a fair hearing were violated by the withdrawal of the NOC without proper reasoning or rationale, which could potentially lead to the cancellation of ARY's broadcasting license.---Holding/Reasoning/OutcomeJudge Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui ruled that the withdrawal of the NOC was handled improperly, citing it as mala fide, without proper notice, and lacking substantive reasoning. The court found that PEMRA, as a regulatory body, could not independently challenge or disregard the Ministry's decision, which was significantly influenced by security agency reports. Moreover, the court emphasized that ARY was not given an adequate opportunity to respond or contest the allegations, which infringed on their legal rights and procedural fairness as guaranteed under the PEMRA Ordinance and the Constitution of Pakistan.The court granted ARY's injunction, challenging the NOC's cancellation, and dismissed the applications filed by the defendants that supported the cancellation. The decision underscored the principle that regulatory actions impacting constitutional rights must adhere strictly to principles of natural justice and due process.---Citations/PrecedentsPakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) Ordinance, 2002: This legal framework governs the licensing and regulation of the broadcast media in Pakistan.Section 30A of the PEMRA Ordinance, 2002: Provides the right of appeal against decisions made by PEMRA.Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, particularly Article 19: Guarantees freedom of speech and expression while allowing reasonable restrictions in specific cases such as security of the state.Case law such as the ruling in "Independent Music Group" which discussed PEMRA's limited scope in contradicting the Ministry of Interior's security-related decisions.Various procedural statutes including those concerning judicial reviews and injunctions, supporting the stance that decisions impacting a license holder?s rights require careful legal scrutiny and adherence to due process.

Summary: (The PEMRA (TV/Radio Broadcast Operations) Regulations, 2002 did not derive their power from the parent statute i.e. the PEMRA Ordinance, 2002 and therefore, were void ab initio and remained non est., there is no power to levy and recover surcharge on late payment of annual fee under the PEMRA Ordinance, 2002) The case revolved around the demand for payment of surcharge by PEMRA on late payment of annual fees by private broadcasters who owned and operated television channels. The surcharge was claimed under Regulation No. 9(5) of the PEMRA (TV/Radio Broadcast Operations) Regulations, 2002. The respondents challenged the validity of the surcharge, arguing that it was beyond the scope of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002. The Supreme Court examined the legal framework and found that the 2002 Regulations, under which the surcharge was imposed, were made without proper authority and were not notified in the official Gazette. The court concluded that the 2002 Regulations were ultra vires to the Ordinance and, therefore, void ab initio. Furthermore, the court determined that even after the Ordinance was amended through the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (Amendment) Act, 2007, there was no specific provision empowering PEMRA to impose a surcharge on late payment of annual fees. The power to levy and recover surcharge was not included in the term "other charges" mentioned in the amended Ordinance. In light of these findings, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, declaring the demand for surcharge under the 2002 Regulations as ultra vires to the Ordinance. The show cause notices demanding the surcharge were set aside, and the respondents' constitutional petition was allowed.

Summary: The dispute arose when the Authority delegated its powers under Section 30 of the Ordinance to its Chairman, a decision challenged by the Pakistan Broadcasters Association and another respondent. The High Court of Sindh declared the delegation null and void, ruling that the powers vested in Section 30 could not be delegated without framing rules. The Authority appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the High Court had erred in its interpretation of the relevant provisions. The Authority contended that the power of delegation provided in Section 13 of the Ordinance was broad and did not require the framing of rules. The respondent defended the High Court's judgment. The Supreme Court analyzed the relevant statutory provisions and concluded that Section 13 should be interpreted as a whole. The Court emphasized the interlocking nature of the three parts of Section 13 and the importance of properly identifying the specific power, responsibility, or function to be delegated. The Court recognized that not all powers, responsibilities, or functions could be treated the same in terms of delegation, considering factors such as the impact on affected parties. Ultimately, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's decision. The Court held that the power to suspend a broadcast media or distribution service license could be delegated under Section 13, but delegation must be done in a structured manner and take into account the nature and impact of the power being delegated.

Summary: Background: The petitioner, an association representing broadcasters, filed a constitutional petition challenging specific regulations under the PEMRA (Eligibility Criteria and Bidding Procedure for DTH Licensing) Regulations, 2016. The petitioner argued that the challenged regulations exceeded PEMRA’s authority under the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2000, and violated several constitutional rights. The petition sought the court's intervention to declare the regulations unlawful and restrain the regulatory authority from proceeding with DTH licensing without addressing the petitioner’s concerns. -----Issues: 1- Does the petition violate the principle of res judicata due to prior litigation on similar regulations? -----2- Does PEMRA have the authority to frame Regulation 2.5, which allows foreign-controlled companies to apply for licenses, in light of Section 25 of the PEMRA Ordinance? -----3- Is Regulation 7, which governs the airing of foreign content, discriminatory or in violation of constitutional rights? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Res Judicata: The court held that res judicata did not apply, as the specific issues concerning Regulations 2.5 and 7 had not been conclusively addressed in prior judgments. Therefore, the petition was eligible for review. --Validity of Regulation 2.5: The court found Regulation 2.5 to be in direct conflict with Section 25 of the PEMRA Ordinance, which explicitly prohibits licensing entities with foreign control. The court emphasized that PEMRA’s authority to grant exemptions under Section 32 was limited to specific cases based on documented public interest, which did not apply broadly as framed in Regulation 2.5. Consequently, the regulation was partially struck down to eliminate provisions allowing foreign-controlled companies to apply for licenses. --Regulation 7 and Constitutional Compliance: The court upheld Regulation 7, finding no evidence that it violated constitutional rights or contradicted the provisions of the parent statute. The court determined that PEMRA's regulatory decisions, particularly regarding foreign content limitations, fell within its statutory authority. --Relief for Petitioner: The court allowed the petitioner to seek redress on remaining issues directly with PEMRA under the existing regulatory framework. The petition was partially allowed, with modifications to Regulation 2.5 to bring it in line with the parent statute. Regulation 7 was upheld in its entirety. -----Citations/Precedents: Mir Badshah Qaisrani v. The State (2007 PCr.LJ 604): Discusses discretionary relief in protective bail matters. MAG Entertainment (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Independent Newspapers Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. and others (2018 SCMR 1807): Addresses issues of statutory interpretation and regulatory authority. M/s Leo Communications (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. The Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 2017 Lahore 709): Involves a challenge to PEMRA’s authority regarding content restrictions. Lahore Development Authority through D.G. and others v. Ms. Imrana Tiwana and others (2015 SCMR 1739): Lays down principles of statutory interpretation, especially regarding the constitutionality of regulations. Farrukh Raza Sheikh v. The Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue and others (2022 SCMR 1787): Establishes that rules cannot override the provisions of the parent statute. Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited and others v. Said Rehman and others (2013 SCMR 642): Affirms that statutory authorities derive power strictly from statutes and cannot exceed this authority. Suo Motu Case No.11/2011, in the matter of National Police Foundation Land (PLD 2014 SC 389): Rules that regulations cannot conflict with the parent statute or exceed statutory authority. Mian Zaiuddin v. Punjab Local Government and others (1985 SCMR 365): Reinforces the principle that rules cannot overreach or go beyond the statute. Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary v. through Deputy Convener (PLD 2014 SC 531): Emphasizes “reading down” and “rule of severance” for statutory interpretation. Khawaja Ahmad Hassan v. Government of Punjab and others (2005 SCMR 186): Outlines the principles of delegated legislation and the limits of regulatory authority in light of statutory provisions.

Summary: (a) Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 (as amended by PEMRA Act, 2007) —S. 27—Prohibition order on live speeches—Blanket prohibition order declared ultra vires— Appellant, Imran Ahmad Khan Niazi, challenged a prohibition order issued by PEMRA under Section 27 of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002, restricting live coverage of his speeches. The Court observed that Section 27 does not empower PEMRA to issue blanket prohibition orders. PEMRA's counsel admitted that the order was issued to ensure the enforcement of the delaying mechanism by licencees. However, the Court held that such a prohibition order was outside the statutory powers conferred under the PEMRA Ordinance. (b) Supreme Court Directions —Binding nature—Compliance by PEMRA— The Court referred to the Supreme Court judgment reported as PLD 2019 SC 1, specifically paragraph 19, which outlines directives binding upon PEMRA and licencees to enforce a delaying mechanism. PEMRA was directed to ensure compliance with these directives and take lawful action against licencees failing to implement the mechanism effectively. (c) Disposition —Prohibition order set aside—Direction to PEMRA— The impugned prohibition order dated 20-08-2022 was declared ultra vires and set aside. The Court directed PEMRA to enforce the Supreme Court’s directions effectively. Non-compliance by licencees must be addressed in accordance with the law. Cited Case: In the matter of: Suo Motu Case No. 28 of 2018 (PLD 2019 SC 1)

Summary: [PEMRA - Members of the Council of Complaints - importance of open selection process for public appointments - even though to honorary positions - headhunting can be a part of open selection process] The case revolved around the appointment process for the Chairperson and Members of the Council of Complaints (COC) of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA). The High Court of Sindh had directed that future appointments to these positions should be made after advertising them, and Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) filed petitions to appeal this direction. The petitioners argued that the COC positions were honorary and therefore did not require an open selection process. They contended that the PEMRA Ordinance did not explicitly mandate advertising for these positions, and the requirement for "citizens of eminence" made it unlikely for such individuals to apply themselves. After considering the arguments, the Supreme Court concluded that appointments to honorary public offices should be made through an open and competitive process. It emphasized that PEMRA is an independent statutory body, and the COC plays a crucial role in addressing public complaints against electronic media. The court stated that a transparent selection process ensures the best candidates are considered and appointed to these positions, fostering governance, performance, and public confidence. The court further highlighted the importance of adhering to constitutional guarantees of equality and non-discrimination in appointments to public offices. It noted that even honorary positions should be subject to fair, transparent, and non-discriminatory processes. While acknowledging the concerns that advertising may exclude high-caliber candidates who prefer direct appointments, the court suggested a parallel approach. It proposed that the government could conduct its own search for suitable candidates alongside the advertising process, allowing identified individuals to be considered along with applicants. All candidates would then be assessed based on objective criteria, and the most eligible would be selected. Ultimately, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's direction for advertising the COC positions, subject to clarifications and observations provided in the judgment. The petitions were disposed of accordingly.

Summary: Background: The petitioner, The Communicators (Pvt.) Ltd., sought a directive against the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) to refrain from demanding a license renewal fee based on PEMRA's letter dated 18.05.2020 and public notice dated 13.11.2020. The petitioner operates three FM Radio Broadcast Stations in Islamabad, Abbottabad, and Vehari. Their licenses, initially granted on 18.10.2002 for a ten-year period, expired on 17.10.2012, but the petitioner continued operations without paying the renewal fee, citing ongoing litigation regarding the fee's validity. ----Issues: 1- Whether PEMRA can demand a license renewal fee without first categorizing licenses as required by Regulation 9(2) of the 2012 Regulations. 2- Whether the petitioner is liable to pay the license renewal fee for the period following the expiration of their initial licenses. 3- Whether the 2012 Regulations are ultra vires the provisions of the 2002 Ordinance and the Constitution. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Demand for License Renewal Fee: The court held that PEMRA is authorized to demand a license renewal fee based on the Supreme Court's ruling in Trade Serve's case (2020 SCMR 206), which stated that the renewal fee should be the last bidding price plus the rate of inflation as prescribed by the State Bank of Pakistan. The petitioner was obligated to pay the renewal fee as demanded by PEMRA. --Liability for License Renewal Fee: Despite the expiration of the licenses, the petitioner continued operating the FM stations without paying the renewal fee, citing ongoing litigation. The court rejected the argument that PEMRA could not demand the fee without first categorizing licenses, finding no legal basis for such a requirement in the 2002 Ordinance or 2012 Regulations. --Vires of the 2012 Regulations: The petitioner argued that the 2012 Regulations were invalid as they were made when no PEMRA Chairman was appointed. However, the court noted that PEMRA ratified the 2012 Regulations on 05.09.2016 when a Chairman was in place, and further amendments were made in 2019. The vires of the amended regulations were not challenged. The writ petition and civil miscellaneous appeal were dismissed with costs. The court upheld PEMRA's demand for the license renewal fee and found no merit in the petitioner's arguments against the categorization process and the validity of the 2012 Regulations. PEMRA was within its rights to enforce the payment of the license renewal fee as per the applicable laws and regulations. ----Citations/Precedents: Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Vs. Trade Serve International (Pvt.) Ltd. (2020 SCMR 206) Hamid Mir Vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2013 SC 244)

Summary: -Definition of a person is provided under Ordinance, 2002, whichincludes an individual, partnership, association, company, trust orcorporation. Invariably in the show-cause/decision impugned, PEMRApresumed to have issued licenses to individual directors h

Summary: In the Supreme Court of Pakistan, an application was filed by five working journalists, including the President of the Press Association of the Supreme Court, alleging widespread violations of Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the Constitution of Pakistan. The application claimed that journalists were facing harassment, intimidation, attacks, and even criminal cases for reporting independently against certain individuals or institutions.The Court, took up the matter and acknowledged the importance of press freedom as guaranteed by Article 19 of the Constitution. It noted that attacks on journalists and their abductions were a violation of Article 9 (right to liberty) and Article 10 (safeguards against illegal arrests and detention). The Court expressed concern that some organizations, allegedly under government control, were involved in suppressing press freedom.The Court issued notices to relevant authorities, including the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA), Inspector General of Police of the Islamabad Capital Territory, and the Ministry of Interior. It asked them to provide written responses and disclose actions taken against attacks on journalists and violations of press freedom.Additionally, the Court issued notices to the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Inter-faith Harmony to inquire about their roles in ensuring press freedom and encouraging the broadcasting of truth.The Court also treated the application as one filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, as it raised matters of public importance related to the enforcement of Fundamental Rights. It directed the relevant representative bodies of the press, such as the Pakistan Broadcasters Association (PBA) and the Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists (PFUJ), to state whether the allegations in the application were true.