Summary: Background:This case pertains to a series of land acquisition disputes, originating from proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for lands in Nowshera District. The Government of Pakistan, through its Ministry of Defence, and various local administrative bodies sought to acquire approximately 3413 acres initially leased in 1955 and later aimed for permanent acquisition in 1977. Protracted legal and administrative processes ensued, culminating in a Supreme Court judgment in 2018 that set compensation rates. However, difficulties in fund allocation for compensation led the acquiring authorities to attempt withdrawing from the acquisition in 2019, which prompted landowners to challenge this decision.----Issues:The central issue was whether the appellants/petitioners had the legal authority to withdraw from the land acquisition after the process had been effectively completed and possession taken, under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.-----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court, led by Justice Shahid Waheed, ruled that once possession of the land had been taken, the acquisition was complete, and the appellants/petitioners no longer retained the right to withdraw from the acquisition. The Court found that the attempt to withdraw was not only legally unfounded but also acted in bad faith towards the landowners who had been embroiled in decades of legal struggle. The Court dismissed all related appeals and upheld the High Court's decision to quash the notification of withdrawal, emphasizing that the notification issued under Section 48 in October 2019 was invalid, illegal, and without jurisdiction.----Citations/Precedents:Land Acquisition Act, 1894, particularly Section 48, which discusses the conditions under which acquisition can be withdrawn.M/s Dewan Salman Fiber Ltd. and others v. Government of NWFP (PLD 2004 SC 441), and Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Rawalpindi and another v. Farzand Begum and others (2022 SCMR 1383), which clarify the implications of taking possession under the Land Acquisition Act.Lt. Governor of Himachal Pradesh and another v. Sri Avinash Sharma (AIR 1970 SC 1576), for interpretation of related administrative actions under the law.B.N Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat (AIR 1975 SC 1767), cited for understanding the nature of possession under the Act.

Summary: Background: The petitioner, a first-class state subject of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and holder of an M.Sc. in Statistics, filed a writ petition challenging the lack of a reserved quota for differently-abled candidates in the subject of Statistics in the Public Service Commission (PSC) advertisement dated 06.09.2020. The petitioner had previously attempted to secure a lecturer position in Statistics but was not considered due to the absence of a reserved quota for differently-abled persons. ----Issues: 1- Whether the respondents were required to reserve a quota for differently-abled candidates in the subject of Statistics. 2- Whether the failure to reserve a quota for differently-abled candidates constitutes discrimination. 3- Whether the petitioner, who is over the age limit, should be granted age relaxation. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Quota Requirement: The court found that the respondents failed to advertise the post of Lecturer in Statistics for differently-abled candidates despite the availability of such a quota for other subjects. This omission was deemed discriminatory. --Discrimination: The court held that the absence of a reserved quota for differently-abled candidates in the subject of Statistics constituted discriminatory treatment. The respondents were required to reserve quotas for differently-abled candidates in all subjects, including Statistics. --Age Relaxation: The court noted that the petitioner’s age should be considered from the date she approached the court. The time spent in litigation should be excluded when calculating the age limit for applying against the post. Given the petitioner's circumstances, the court directed age relaxation as a special case. The court accepted the writ petition and directed the respondents to reconsider the matter, create a quota for differently-abled candidates in the subject of Statistics, and send a de-novo requisition to the PSC within two months. ----Citations/Precedents: 2012 SCR 115 2016 SCMR 1417 2010 SCMR 1630 2004 SCMR 1001

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan- -Art. 199(1)(b)(i)-Hebeas corpus, writ of-Scope-Invocation and passing of the writ of habeas corpus is subject to the satisfaction of the High Court that no adequate remedy is provided by the law. (b) Constitution of Pakistan- -Art. 199(1)(b)(i)-Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890), Ss. 7 & 25-Habeas corpus, writ of-Scope-Custody of minor-Whatever the inter se relations between the parents may be, the purpose of a writ of habeas corpus when it comes to the production of a child is to ensure that the child is, at any given moment, capable of being produced before a Court of law-However, there can be no question that a writ of habeas corpus is not to be issued as a matter of course, particularly when the writ is sought against a parent for the custody of a child-Clear grounds must be made out and the writ must only be issued in favour of a person who is entitled to custody of the child-Issuing of such a writ is subject to the satisfaction of the High Court that a minor is not being held in custody without lawful authority or in an unlawful manner-Before issuing writ of habeas corpus the High Court should be satisfied that seeking remedy under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, or any other law for the time being in force, would not be an adequate remedy; that the production of the child before the High Court is in the best interests of the child/minor; and, that handing over custody of the minor/child to the person petitioning the High Court is in the best interests of the child/minor. Dushyant Somal v. Sushma Somal AIR 1981 SC 1026 ref. (c) Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890)- -Ss. 7 & 25-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199(1)(b)(i)-Hebeas corpus petition-Maintainability-Alternate remedy, availability of-Incompetently filed petition-Interim custody of minor girl restored to mother-Mother contracting second marriage-High Court awarding custody of minor girl to paternal grandmother as an interim arrangement after mother contracted second marriage-Legality-Grandmother, no matter the love she may have for her grandchildren, is not the parent of a child for the purposes of the law and must clearly specify why a writ of habeas corpus must be issued for the production of her grandchild(ren), especially so when it is admitted that the grandchild is in the custody of one or both parents-Paternal grandmother failed to aver that she was filing the writ petition in her capacity as a friend of the minor-At no point had the paternal grandmother averred that she was authorised by her son (minor’s father) to file the writ petition-No correspondence whatsoever was produced before either the High Court or the Supreme Court which could show that the paternal grandmother was authorised to file the writ petition as a representative of the minor's father-Mere assertion in her petition that paternal grandmother wants to "properly look after the detenue" was insufficient to show that she was interested in the welfare of the child-In the absence of a competently filed writ petition and the presence of an alternative remedy for the paternal grandmother under the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890, the High Court ought to, in the first place, have satisfied itself that despite these shortcomings, it was still in the best interests of the minor that she be produced before the High Court more so: (i) when it was admitted by paternal grandmother in her petition that the minor was in the custody of her real mother; and (ii) an absence as to how the minor being in the custody of her own mother was without lawful authority which necessitated the production of the minor before the Court-Ordering of the divestment of custody by the impugned judgment/order was without lawful authority-In the presence of an adequate remedy, the High Court was constitutionally barred from exercising jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution-All proceedings in the paternal grandmother’s writ petition were declared to be without lawful authority and the writ was liable to be dismissed-Appeal was allowed accordingly with the direction that the Guardian Court, seized of the guardian petition filed by the mother would proceed with the matter expeditiously. (d) Constitution of Pakistan- -Art. 199(1)(b)(i)-Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890), Ss. 7 & 25-Hebeas corpus, writ of-Custody of minor-Friend of minor-Scope-Where a person entitled to custody is shown to be incapable of approaching the Court or where no such person exists, the question of the right of a friend to make such an application arises-In such a situation, the friend of the minor must show that (i) no one who is legally entitled to the custody of the minor or to represent him/her exists, or that such a person, if any, is present and available but unable to file a habeas corpus petition; and (ii) the friend is interested in the welfare of the child. Raj Bahadur v. Legal Remembrancer AIR 1953 Cal. 522 ref. (e) Constitution of Pakistan- -Art. 199(1)(b)(i)-Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890), Ss. 7 & 25-Hebeas corpus, writ of-Scope-Custody of minor-Tendency of the High Courts to readily issue writs of habeas corpus in custody matters-Observations recorded by the Supreme Court deprecating such tendency stated. The tendency of the High Courts to readily and unhesitatingly resort to extreme measures by involving law enforcement agencies in family matters cannot be appreciated, especially so where no element of criminality is there and the child is in the lawful and rightful custody of the parent. Such actions cause unnecessary trauma and harassment for the concerned parent, specially where the concerned parent is the real mother of the child. The High Court must exercise extreme care, caution, and circumspection in such matters. Only in exceptional and extraordinary circumstances, where all other methods and measures fail and an element of criminality, forced removal, kidnapping and/or abduction of the child is involved, the High Court may exercise its constitutional jurisdiction. Issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in a custody matter should be an exception, and not the rule, as the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 provides the Guardian Court with all requisite powers to pass and enforce its orders in matters of custody of the child(ren). It is, inappropriate for a constitutional court to encroach upon and arrogate itself the powers of a Guardian Court, which is the court of competent jurisdiction under the law, to decide all matters relating to custody of child(ren). (f) Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890)- -Ss. 7 & 25-Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Arts. 1 & 16-United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), Arts. 9 & 37-Custody of minor-Mother contracting second marriage-Mother remarrying does not automatically bar her under the law from the custody of her children-Holistic reading of the relevant Islamic principles, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women leads to the conclusion that there is no legal justification for separating a mother from her child if the mother remarries. Shabana Naz v. Muhammad Saleem 2014 SCMR 343; Muhammad Owais v. Nazia Jabeen 2022 SCMR 2123 and Najaat Welfare Foundation v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2021 FSC 1 ref.

Summary: Mst. ZUBEDA BIBI-Respondent (Against the judgment dated 15.10.2020 of the Lahore High Court Lahore passed in Insurance Appeal No. 171 of 2016) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)- -S. 118-Life insurance claim-Death of insured in road accident-Legal heirs opting not to conduct post-mortem examination of deceased (insured)-Proof to establish cause of death-Scope-Payment of liquidated damages on late settlement of claim-Appellant (insurer) never challenged the validity of death certificate of deceased (insured)-Entry in the death register of concerned union council and the report of the incident lodged at police station were official documents and presumption of truth was attached with them and the same should be taken into consideration-In circumstances where a person is met with an accident/unnatural death, his legal heirs ordinarily avoid conducting post-mortem examination, however in the present case, if the appellant/insurer deemed it to be necessary, it should have done the same by itself in order to protect its rights-Record further reflected that the insurance claim was lodged by the respondent with the appellant by complying with all procedural requirements, however, the appellant had badly failed to make due payment (within the time) as prescribed under the law-High Court had rightly decreed the suit for recovery of claim along with liquidated damages as prescribed under section 118 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000-Appeal filed by insurer was dismissed. Khurshid Ali and 6 others v. Shah Nazar PLD 1992 SC 822 ref. Asad Ullah Khan, Additional Attorney General for Pakistan for the Federation.

Summary: Article 199 of Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 --- Section 30 of Evacuee Trust Property Board Act, 1975 read with Rule 7(i) Chapter III of the Scheme 1977 Lease of the Trust Property for 99 years ? Section 9 of Wafaqi Mohtasib Ordinance, 1983- jurisdiction and power of Mohtasib --- A minister has no authority under evacuee laws to pass recommendation for lease for a term of 99 years of any evacuee property to any individual--- Wafaqi Mohtasib has no jurisdiction to pass any direction to any department to comply with any recommendation made by a Minster---- An order passed without jurisdiction would be void ab-initio and any subsequent order/ superstructure built on that order would also collapse --- Writ petition allowed.

Summary: If there are reasonable grounds available on the record to connect the petitioner with the commission of heinous offence then he does not deserve concession of bail even on the ground of juvenility in the light of sub-Section: (6) of Section: 4 of the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018.

Summary: Undecided application going to the root of the matter causes prejudice to the rights of a party if without its decision final judgment is passed against the said party.

Summary: Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal is vested with revisional powers under Section 47(5) of the Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010 with respect to an order passed in appeal by the Labour Court under Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936

Summary: In order to provide for constitution of Board of Revenue, the Punjab Board of Revenue Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1957") was promulgated. The Board of Revenue was constituted in terms of section 3 of the "Act, 1957", which was given the general superintendence and control over all Revenue Officers and Revenue Courts. Section 5 of the "Act, 1957" vests certain powers upon the Board. Section 8 of the "Act, 1957" bestows power of review upon the Board. Article 199 of the "Constitution" though bestows power upon this Court to issue different kinds of writs mentioned therein but powers so ordained are not unbridled as is evident from the bare perusal of Article 199 of the "Constitution". There is no cavil to the proposition that despite availability of alternate remedy, this Court is not precluded to exercise its jurisdiction as a rule of thumb and even in case of availability of alternate remedy, if the circumstances so demand that the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction is inevitable, a High Court can invoke the jurisdiction under Article 199 of the "Constitution" but at the same time, such exercise cannot be made in an omnibus fashion. It is an oft repeated principle of law that where any party opts to choose a statutory remedy against an order, it cannot abandon or bypass it without any valid or reasonable cause and file constitution petition challenging such order. Such a trend is even offensive of doctrine of election. Guidance in this respect can be sought from COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, COMPANIES-II and another v. HAMDARD DAWAKHANA (WAQF), KARACHI (PLD 1992 Supreme Court 847).

Summary: Order V "CPC" relates to issuance and service of summons. Ex-parte proceedings were ordered against the "respondent" while resorting to the mode of substituted service through publication in newspaper. Order V Rule 20 "CPC" prescribes the mode of substituted service.