Summary: The impugned Notification dated 04.09.2025 issued by Director General (Food) fixing maximum retail price of indigenous wheat under the Punjab Price Control of Essential Commodities Act, 2024 is unconstitutional and unlawful in view of the deregulation plan approved by the Provincial Cabinet vide Policy Notification dated 22.04.2025 which guarantees that no anti-hoarding actions shall be taken against the privately held declared wheat stocks; there shall be no ban on inter-district and inter-provincial movement of wheat; and the Government of the Punjab is only competent to purchase wheat stocks, if required, through open and competitive bidding under the Punjab Procurement Rules, 2014. Therefore, coercive measures against the declared wheat stocks of the Petitioners under anti-hoarding enactments leading to confiscation of wheat stocks and its forced sale to private flour mills are without any lawful authority. 169Writ Petition- Land- Acquisition of Land 4874-20 HAJI MUSHTAQ HUSSAIN SHAH VS SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE ETC Mr. Justice Rasaal Hasan Syed 28- 10- 2025 2025 LHC 7782

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----S. 21---Territorial jurisdiction---Objection as to place of suing---Stage for raising objection---Objection to territorial jurisdiction must be taken at the earliest possible opportunity before or at settlement of issues and specifically pleaded---Where no such objection raised before Trial Court, no issue framed and trial concluded on merits, objection cannot be entertained for first time at appellate stage unless consequent failure of justice shown---Defect in territorial jurisdiction treated as technical irregularity after full trial---Appellate Court erred in reversing decree on ground of territorial jurisdiction which was neither pleaded nor raised in memo of appeal nor resulted in any failure of justice. (b) West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 & Family Courts Rules, 1965 ----R. 6---Territorial jurisdiction---Suit for maintenance, dowry articles and gold ornaments---Such claims not falling within proviso relating to dissolution of marriage or dower---Even if question of territorial jurisdiction arguable, same stood waived by failure of respondent to raise objection at trial stage---Proceedings allowed to conclude without demur---Non-suiting wife after full trial held unjustified. (c) Civil procedure ----Framing of issues---Jurisdictional objection---Effect of non-framing---Where jurisdictional objection not raised and no issue framed, parties lead evidence and court decides matter on merits---Jurisdictional plea deemed waived---Such plea cannot subsequently be resurrected at appellate stage. (d) Appellate jurisdiction ----Scope---Appellate Court confined to grounds raised---Appellate Court cannot suo motu introduce and decide a new point of territorial jurisdiction not pleaded, not raised in grounds of appeal and not resulting in failure of justice---Such exercise held legally unsustainable. (e) Administration of justice ----Fair trial---Non-suiting after full trial---Plaint filed, written statement submitted, issues framed, evidence recorded and judgment passed on merits---Setting aside decree on purely technical ground at appellate stage held contrary to settled principles of justice. Cited cases: • Khan Muhammad Tareen v. Nasir and Brother Coal Company 2018 SCMR 2121 • Faqir Muhammad v. Pakistan 2000 SCMR 1312 • Chief Engineer, Hydel (North) and Project Director, WAPDA v. Zafarullah Shah 2003 SCMR 686 Disposition: Petition converted into appeal; appeal allowed; judgment of Islamabad High Court set aside; matter remanded to Appellate Court for decision afresh on merits on the basis of evidence already recorded before the Trial Court.

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 140A---Local Government---Role---Petitioner was elected Chairman District Council and was aggrieved of authorities excluding him during making of arrangements of Mela in his district---Validity---Exclusion of elected local representatives from decision-making processes at district or municipal level had defeated the purpose of Art.140A of the Constitution---Provincial Government was bound under Art.140A of the Constitution to devolve political, administrative and financial powers to elected Local Government institutions and to ensure their meaningful participation in district administration---All executive officers at district level, including Deputy Commissioner were to ensure that matters concerning local development, planning and service delivery were to be undertaken in consultation with elected District Council and its committees---High Court refrained Provincial Government from taking any action that would curtail, suspend or render ineffective the Constitutionally protected functioning of elected Local Governments---Governance, under the Constitution has been envisioned through public participation and democratic representation at all levels---Local Government institutions are not a concession but a Constitutional command---Will of people, expressed through their elected local representatives must form the foundation of district management and development planning---Any attempt to bypass or marginalize such institutions undermines the democratic fabric and violates Art.140A of the Constitution---High Court further directed the authorities to ensure Constitutional mandate of Local Government in the form of District Council, as envisaged in the Constitution, in letter and spirit by giving lead of making arrangements for Mela in question---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. Metropolitan Corporation, Islamabad through Mayor v. Chairman C.D.A. (Capital Development Authority) Islamabad and another PLD 2021 Isl. 144 and Muhammad Razzaq and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2024 Lah. 238 rel. Muhammad Akram Shah for Petitioner. Arbab Nasruminallah, Additional Advocate General for Respondents. Date of hearing: 14th October, 2025.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (On appeal against the order/judgment dated 19.06.2014 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in C.R. No. 1147 of 2008). Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)--- ----S.13---Pre-emption---Talb-i-Muwathibat (immediate demand/jumping demand), execution of---The sole issue was whether the respondent-plaintiff (pre-emptor) proved immediate declaration (Talb-i-Muwathibat) as required by law---Pre-emptor to prove execution of talbs---Onus---Doubt in execution of talbs---Effect---Any doubt regarding proper performance of talbs must be resolved in favour of the vendee---The case concerned a parcel of land which was sold to the petitioners/vendees through a registered sale deed---The respondent/plaintiff claimed a superior right of pre-emption, alleging that he had performed the required talbs (formal declarations) and stated that upon learning of the sale at 7:00 a.m. on 7 June 2001 from “UD” in the presence of another witness, he made a declaration to exercise his right---The courts below accepted his version and decreed the suit, but the Supreme Court examined whether the Talb-i-Muwathibat i.e. the immediate demand, was duly and validly performed by the respondent/plaintiff (pre-emptor) so as to sustain his right of pre-emption---Held: The onus was on the respondent-plaintiff (pre-emptor) to substantiate his claims by producing compelling evidence that demonstrated the completion of Talb-i-Muwathibat---Statement of witness (informer) produced by plaintiff/pre-emptor suggested that enough time had passed between when the witness (informer) first learnt of the sale and when he relayed this information to the respondent-plaintiff (pre-emptor)---Consequently, it undermined the assertion that the respondent-plaintiff (pre-emptor) made the declaration at the stated time---This doubt created uncertainty on whether the respondent-plaintiff (pre-emptor) truly executed the Talb-i-Muwathibat as claimed---Respondent-plaintiff (pre-emptor) upon gaining awareness of the sale, did not immediately formally declared his intention to exercise his right of pre-emption, but merely expressed a desire to do so---This was not sufficient to meet the requirements of Section 13 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act of 1991---If any doubt arose regarding the execution of the talbs, the benefit of that doubt must favour the vendee---Given these circumstances, the respondent-plaintiff (pre-emptor) had failed to prove the execution of Talb-i-Muwathibat---The judgments and decrees rendered by the courts below were set aside, and the suit brought forth by the respondent-plaintiff (pre-emptor) was dismissed---Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, in circumstances. Sh. Usman Karim-ud-Din, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (Through Video Link Lahore). Nemo for Respondent. Date of hearing: 27th October, 2025.

Summary: ----Ss.5, Sched., 12A, 17A & 21A---Dependent parent claiming maintenance from sons---Jurisdiction of family court---Scope---Competence to entertain and adjudicate parental maintenance claims---Striking off defence---Penal provision---Strict construction---Impermissibility in suits filed by parents---Briefly, respondent- mother instituted a suit before the family court seeking maintenance from her sons on the ground of dependency and lack of independent income---During pendency of the proceedings, the family court fixed interim maintenance and directed payment by the 14th of each month---Upon alleged non-payment, the family court struck off the defence under S.17-A of the Family Courts Act, 1964 while decreeing the suit and initiating coercive proceedings---The appeal against said orders was dismissed by the district court leading to the filing of the constitutional petition---Pivotal questions requiring determination before the High Court were as to “whether a parent could institute a suit for maintenance against children before the family court”?; and, “whether S.17A of the Family Courts Act, 1964 was applicable to maintenance claims filed by parents”?---Held: Claim of maintenance by dependent parents against their sons, being a family dispute rooted in familial obligations, squarely fell within the domain of “family affairs” and was, therefore, well within the jurisdiction of the family court---As statutory provisions did not expressly define the nature of relationship between the person claiming maintenance and the party against whom maintenance was sought; principles of Islamic law which were the primary source governing family relations had to be applied---Under Islamic jurisprudence, the obligation of sons to maintain their dependent parents squarely fell within the scope of maintenance---Family Court possessed jurisdiction to decide all ancillary issues necessary for complete and effective adjudication of disputes within its domain---The ‘Schedule’ to the Family Courts Act, 1964 was inclusive and had to be interpreted purposively to advance the true spirit and objective of the statute---A mother or father, if left dependent and without means, could competently invoke jurisdiction of the family court to seek maintenance from their sons---Section 17-A was not attracted to the present dispute wherein a mother had sought maintenance from her sons---However, the authority to pass a final decree for maintenance inherently included the power to grant interim relief pendente lite as an ancillary or necessary measure to prevent destitution during litigation, therefore, the family court was fully empowered to fix and direct the payment of interim maintenance during the pendency of a suit filed by any parent and enforce such judicial orders---Impugned orders of the courts below were set aside and the matter was remanded to the family court to decide the same afresh---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched.---Dependent mother seeking maintenance from sons---Jurisdiction of family court---Scope---A mother, if left dependent and without sufficient means, may competently invoke the jurisdiction of the family court to seek maintenance from her sons. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Objection not raised through a specific prayer in a constitutional petition, non-entertaining of---Scope---If an objection had not been pressed through any specific prayer in a constitutional petition before the High Court, then any adjudication on such factual controversy at that stage may effectively result in High Court assuming the role of a court of first instance, thereby, prejudicing the right of appeal of the party who may feel aggrieved by such determination---Thus, findings on such a factual objection should be eschewed and the matter should left open to be examined and decided by the Trial Court in accordance with law. Muhammad Faizan-ur-Rehman for Petitioner. Sami Ullah Azeem for Respondents Nos. 3 and 4. Muhammad Umar Sheikh for Respondent No. 5 Amicus Curiae: Muhammad Saad Khan. Date of hearing: 27th October, 2025.

Summary: (a) National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Act (XXX of 2016)--- ----S. 21---National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority (Service) Regulations, 2021---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Declaration---Petitioner assailed appointment of respondent to the post of Director Strategy Management Office---Plea raised by authorities was that petition was not maintainable as post in question was non-statutory---Validity---Relief claimed was declaration that actions of authorities leading to creation of post in question and hiring of respondent to such office were illegal and ultra vires the provisions of National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Act, 2016 and National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Service Regulations, 2021---Objection that office in question was not a public office was irrelevant---Objection was overruled in circumstances. Ghulam Murtaza v. Federation of Pakistan 2023 PLC (C.S) 1188 rel. (b) National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Act (XXX of 2016)--- ----S. 21---National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority (Service) Regulations, 2021---Notification SRO No.346(I)/2024 dated 25-01-2024---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Aggrieved person---Scope---Principle of locus poenitentiae---Applicability---Petitioner assailed appointment of respondent to the post of Director Strategy Management Office---Plea raised by authorities was that the petitioner was not an aggrieved person, therefore, petition was not maintainable---Validity---Recruitment process was tailored for such purpose and respondent was appointed as Director SMO without written test and transparent recruitment process such as the one that petitioner participated in, and the respondent was appointed to a post higher than that held by petitioner---Petitioner qualified the test of an aggrieved person for the purposes of Art. 199 of the Constitution---Creation of post in question without approval of Board, prescriptions of TORs for such post prescribing a minimum age less than the age prescribed for the office of Director in NPG-1 under National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority (Service) Regulations, 2021, act of publishing Amended Regulations in the Official Gazette without presenting the same to NEECA Board and seeking its approval, together with stand-alone manner in which recruitment for the post of Director SMO was carried out in contrast to other posts during phase-1 of recruitment in NEECA involving IBA, all of which cumulatively tainted the recruitment process---Recruitment criteria and maximum age for the post of Director Strategy Management Office were prescribed in a mala fide manner to tailor recruitment process to benefit certain individual---Post of Director SMO was never legally created and terms and conditions for such position were never prescribed---Appointment of respondent was illegal, who had discharged services against the post of Director Strategy Management Office---Doctrine of locus poenitentiae could not protect illegal appointment of respondent---High Court declined to make any order regarding recovery which could not be affected from respondent for services that he had discharged while holding the office prior to issuance of a declaration that his appointment was illegal---High Court declared appointment of respondent together with creation of post of Director Strategy Management Office to be unlawful and of no legal effect---High Court also declared that Notification SRO No.346(I)/2024 dated 25-01-2024 was devoid of legal authority having never been approved by the NEECA Board---High Court directed that management of NEECA should not continue to act in breach of National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority Act, 2016 and National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority (Service) Regulations, 2021---Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances. Ghulam Murtaza v. Federation of Pakistan 2023 PLC (C.S) 1188; Shahid Mehmood v. BISP (2024 PLC (C.S) 1103; Engineer-in-Chief Branch v. Jalaluddin PLD 1992 SC 207; Shams-ur-Rehman v. Military Accountant General 2020 SCMR 188; Mst. Sajida Javed v. Director of Secondary Education 2007 PLC (C.S.) 364 and Shahbaz Latif v. DIG Pakistan Railways Headquarters PLD 2025 SC 560 rel. Raja Adnan Aslam for Petitioner. Fahad Khan Tareen, Assistant Attorney General. Jameel Hussain Qureshi along with Ali Ata Hashmi, Assistant Director, National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority. Qamar ul Haq Khan Niazi for Respondent No.4. Zafar Ullah Khan, Law Officer, Power Division. Date of hearing: 7th May, 2025.

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 199 & 212---Civil service---Disciplinary proceeding against civil servant, challenging of--- Invoking const itutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Mala fide alleged by civil servant---Effect---Petitioner (Officer Inland Revenue) challenged the Fact Finding Inquiry Report recommending disciplinary proceeding alleging that ongoing disciplinary proceeding was tainted with mala fide---Arguments of the petitioner, invoking constitutional jurisdiction of High Court, was that no final order was passed, hence, no department remedy was available---Validity---As per the Fact Finding Inquiry Report disciplinary action against the petitioner had been recommended together with other officials of the respondents-FBR, including Commissioners and Additional Commissioners ; which (the second set of proceeding) initiated by respondents-FBR eventually was under challenge before the concerned forum---Constitutional bar under Art.212 of the constitution will exclude judicial review jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 199 of the Constitution, if the issue was about the terms and conditions of service of any civil servant---Argument of the petitioner (that no final order was passed, hence, no department remedy was available) was also not tenable, because, disciplinary proceeding being sub judice had not been concluded---No justification to interfere in the ongoing disciplinary proceeding was made out, however, competent authority shall conclude the disciplinary proceeding expeditiously, and should take into account the factors raised---Petition was disposed of. Ahmad Ullah and others v. District Education Officer (Male), Buner and others 2024 SCMR 2004 ref. M.A. Rahman v. Federation of Pakistan and others 1988 SCMR 691 and Syed Muhammad Abbas Rizvi and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Establishment Division, Islamabad and others 2014 PLC (C.S.) 1363 distinguished. Zamir Hussain Ghumro and Faizan Hussain Memon for Petitioner. Muhammad Akbar Khan, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan for Respondent No.1. Mukesh Kumar Khatri for Respondent No.4. Date of hearing: 16th October, 2025.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Employee of District judiciary---Disciplinary proceedings---Show-cause notice, assailing of---Constitutional petition--Maintainability---Petitioner was alleged to have secured employment on the basis of forged documents---Petitioner assailed final show-cause notice issued to him by authorities during departmental disciplinary proceedings---Validity---Show-cause notice, whether initial or final, was not amenable to Constitutional jurisdiction unless it was shown to be a nullity in law---Issuance of show-cause notice was a procedural step intended to afford the employee an opportunity to explain his conduct and did not by itself constitute adverse determination of rights---Constitutional Courts do not sit as appellate forums over departmental inquiries---Petitioner was to exhaust remedies available under service rules, including right to reply, personal hearing and appeal, when the adverse order was passed---Premature judicial intervention undermined disciplinary framework and set a deleterious precedent for circumventing lawful accountability---Mere show-cause notice filed at a stage when no final determination had been made, failed to meet threshold of maintainability under Art. 199 of the Constitution---High Court declined to interfere in the matter as it was premature, misconceived, legally deficient and factually unsubstantiated---High Court directed the competent authority to proceed with the disciplinary inquiry strictly in accordance with the law, ensuring due process and affording petitioner a fair defence opportunity---Constitutional petition was dismissed accordingly. (b) General Clauses Act (X of 1897)--- ----S.21---Locus poenitentiae, principle of---Scope---Provision of S. 21 of General Clauses Act, 1897, provides a statutory basis for revisiting prior administrative orders---Power to issue orders includes power to amend, vary, or rescind them, provided such exercise is undertaken in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as the original order---Provision of S. 21 General Clauses Act, 1897 empowers competent authority to reopen a matter where new and credible evidence emerges, especially in fraud or misrepresentation cases. Muhammad Ali Pirzado for Petitioner. Liaquat Ali Shar, Additional Advocate, General for Respondents. Date of hearing: 27th October, 2025.