Summary: (1) The Principles, which Govern a Suit founded on the basis of a Negotiable Instrument; (2) the Presumption under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 is a Rebuttable Presumption, which can be Rebutted through a Direct or Circumstantial Evidence to demonstrate that the Consideration is Absent; (3) the Standard for Threshold Evidence may Vary from case to case; (4) the Concept of Standard of Balance of Probability and Preponderance of Evidence in Civil Cases. 137Jail Appeal 30048/22 Nauman Ijaz Vs The State The Chief Justice 17-11- 2025 2025 LHC 6798

Summary: Mere pleading of 'Benami' cannot bar civil suit: Misapplication of section 43 of The Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 2017 set aside. Writ petition allowed. 136Regular First Appeal (R.F.A) (Final Decree) 78871/24 Muhammad Anwaar Anjum & 1 Other Vs Muhammad Shakeel Sattar Mr. Justice Khalid Ishaq 17- 11- 2025 2025 LHC 6875

Summary: (a) Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)- -Ss.6 & 7-Foreign arbitral award-Recognition and enforcement-Scope-Facts: The applicant company moved an application under section 6 of the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 seeking recognition and enforcement in Pakistan of a foreign arbitral award passed by China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC), arising out of a tripartite logistics service agency agreement relating to the wharf revamp project at ‘Port Qasim’, which contained an arbitration clause providing for CIETAC arbitration-After a dispute had arisen, arbitration was conducted and culminated in the award, and the applicant sought to have the award recognized, made rule of Court and executed as a decree-Issue: -Whether the CIETAC award fell within the ambit of the 2011 Act and was liable to be recognized and enforced as a decree of the Court, or whether enforcement was to be refused on any legally permissible ground under the Act read with the New York Convention?-Held: The argument advanced by the respondents was that reliance was made on an arbitration clause in a subsequent agreement, while ignoring such a clause in a precursor agreement-While the respondents did not draw the High Court’s attention to any specific precursor clause, it would beggar belief that the concerned respondents could be proceeded against vide a clause in an agreement that it was not a party to-Notwithstanding, the award had discussed and upheld the validity of the agreement and the pertinent arbitration clause-Perusal of the award demonstrated that the arbitration tribunal exhaustively dealt with the aspects of law and jurisdiction in the award-Clause 3 thereof expressly stated that the agreement was in consonance with the relevant laws and regulations-It was also exhaustively deliberated and concluded that clause 5.2 of the agreement did not violate the provisions of the Arbitration Rules-While the said deliberation and conclusion remained within the purview of the tribunal, the respondents remained unable to demonstrate any patent infirmity therewith or that it could not be rested upon the rationale relied upon-The competence of the executants of the present proceedings was called into question before the High Court-The documentation annexed, power of attorney etc., could not be demonstrated to be afflicted with any infirmity; capable of vitiating the award or otherwise-No infirmity with the agreement and / or the award could be identified, within the mandate of Art. V of the New York Convention-The foreign arbitral award was recognized as binding and enforceable against, hence, made rule of Court-Application filed per S. 6 of the Act was allowed, in circumstances. Taisei Corporation v. A.M. Construction Company (Private) Limited 2024 SCMR 640 rel. (b) Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)- -Ss.1, 6 & 7-Foreign arbitral awards-Recognition and enforcement-Claim being barred by limitation, plea of-Legality-Duty of courts-Pro-enforcement regime viz. foreign arbitral awards-Scope-The Act came into force on 19.07.2011 and perusal of S. 1 thereof demonstrates that it applied to arbitration agreements made before, on or after the said date and encompassed foreign arbitral awards made after 14.07.2005-Therefore, it would hold that any qualifying arbitration agreement, irrespective of date of execution thereof, culminating in an award made after 14.07.2005 could be recognized and enforced-Retrospective nature of the Act has been expressly recognized and given effect to-Limitation Act, 1908 provides a period of limitation for filing of an award per the Arbitration Act 1940 and not with regard to enforcement under the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act 2011-Nevertheless, any import of the Arbitration Act, 1940 is specifically disallowed in enforcement of foreign arbitral awards-Court is required to support not supplant the arbitral process and its discretion is precluded to interfere in the merits of a case on points off act or law-Court should circumscribe opposition within the remit of Art. V of the New York Convention, while emphasizing that the stipulations may be read as permissive and not mandatory.

Summary: (a) Passports Rules, 2021--- ----Rr. 21, 22(2) & 23(6)---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S. 24-A---Passport Control List (PCL), placing name on---Procedure---Speaking order---Order for placement of a citizen on PCL cannot be issued in a mechanical fashion without recording reasons and stating grounds applicable to the circumstances of the citizen in terms of R. 23(6) read with R.21 of Passports Rules, 2021---Unless a penal order directing that passport of a citizen be impounded, confiscated, cancelled or inactivated is passed while identifying relevant grounds that mandate that the citizen’s right to liberty and travel ought to be interfered with in accordance with law, such order would not be sustainable in the eyes of law---It is only where an order finding that a citizen’s passport is liable to be impounded, confiscated, cancelled or inactivated has been so passed, can the relevant Division of Federal Government and Directorate General, Immigration and Passport discharge their ministerial function of placing name of such individual on PCL in terms of R. 22(2) of Passport Rules, 2021. Shabana Noor Ahmed v. D.G. Immigration and Passport PLD 2019 Sindh 456 rel. (b) General Clauses Act (X of 1897)--- ----S.24-A---Reasons for an order---Object, purpose and scope---Reasoned order is a sine-qua-non for exercise of discretion, especially when it impinges on the fundamental rights of a citizen---Substance of reasons then forms part of the inquiry undertaken by a Court while exercising judicial review powers, whereby Court can satisfy itself that the reasons are just and proportionate to legitimate State interest being pursued by executive authorities to pursue the objects of law under which such authority is being exercised. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 10A---Right of fair trial and due process of law---Scope---Provision of Art. 10A of the Constitution has been enacted to give right of due process, a Constitutional standing. (d) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----S. 2(6A)---Exit from Pakistan (Control) Ordinance (XLVI of 1981), S.2---Exit from Pakistan (Control) Rules, 2010, R.2(d)---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 4, 9, 10A, 15, 25 & 199---Constitutional petition---Exit Control List---Freedom of movement---Due process of law---Tax defaulter---Placing name on Exit Control List---Petitioner was aggrieved of placing his name on Exit Control List on the allegation of tax default committed by him---Validity---In holding that a person is a defaulter under the provisions of Sales Tax Act, 1990 there must be a finding made after assessment and adjudicatory proceedings that a demand for sales tax due and payable remains outstanding against that person and is yet to be paid---Petitioner could not be considered to be in default of tax or liabilities in terms of R. 2(d) of Exit from Pakistan (Control) Rules, 2010 merely because authorities had formed an opinion that he was liable for sales tax fraud for illegally seeking income tax adjustment---On the basis of such opinion, a penalty could not be inflicted on petitioner in the form of curtailing his civil rights and liberties by placing his name on ECL or PCL or PNIL pending determination of the fate of any criminal charge brought against him or adjudicatory proceedings initiated against him under the provisions of Sales Tax Act, 1990---High Court declared that placement of petitioner’s name on ECL, PCL and/or PNIL was tantamount to colorable exercise of authority in breach of provisions of Passports Act, 1974, Exit from Pakistan (Control) Ordinance, 1981 and Arts. 4, 9, 10A, 15 & 25 of the Constitution and such actions were of no legal effect---High Court directed Federal Government to ensure that name of petitioner was removed from ECL, PCL and PNIL and no fetters were to be placed on the rights of petitioner to travel on the ground that he was liable for tax fraud, unless it was determined through the adjudicatory process provided under provisions of Sales Tax Act, 1990 that he was a defaulter---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. Montgomery Floor and General Mills Ltd. v. The Director, Food Purchase PLD 1957 Lah. 914; Zahur Ilahi v. The State PLD 1977 SC 273; Farooq Ahmed Khan Laghari v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1999 SC 57; Pakistan Muslim League (N) v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2007 SC 642; Government of Pakistan v. Dada Amir Haider Khan PLD 1987 SC 504; Dr. Shireen M. Mazari v. Federation of Pakistan 2024 MLD 1020; Fauji Foundation v. Shamimur Rehman PLD 1983 SC 457; Chairman, NAB v. Nasar Ullah PLD 2022 SC 497; Federation of Pakistan v. E-movers (Pvt.) Ltd. 2022 SCMR 1021; CIR v. M/s Rose Food Industries 2023 SCMR 2070; Sheikh Shan Ilahi v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2023 Lah. 359; Tabish Badar v. Ministry of Interior 2023 CLC 1457; Sabir Iqbal v. Cantonment Board PLD 2019 SC 189; Shehryar Afridi v. Federation of Pakistan (W.P. No.2491 of 2023); Wajid Shamas-ul-Hassan v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1997 Lah. 617; Federal Government v. Miss Ayan Ali 2017 SCMR 1179; Mian Ayaz Anwar v. The Federation PLD 2010 Lah. 230; Kent v. Dulles 357 US 116 (1958); Aptheker v. Secretary of State 378 US 500 (1964); Satwant's case AIR 1967 SC 836; Sheikh Mohammad Mansoor v. Government of Pakistan 2008 MLD 955; Sohail Latif v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2008 Lah. 341; Munir Ahmed Bhatti v. Government of Pakistan PLD 2010 Lah. 697; Masood Ahmed v. Federation of Pakistan 2010 YLR 28; Mian Munir Ahmed v. Federation of Pakistan 2008 YLR 1508; Zurash Industries v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2011 Kar. 385; Gen. (Retd.) Parvez Musharraf v. Pakistan PLD 2014 Sindh 389; Federation v. Gen. (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf PLD 2016 SC 570; Syed Masood Hussain Shah v. Federation of Pakistan 2015 MLD 124; Mohammad Sadiq v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2016 Sindh 263; Tanver Hussain Manji v. Federation of Pakistan 2016 CLC 1534; Yusuf J. Ansari v. Government of Pakistan PLD 2016 Kar. 388; Riaz Ahmed v. Government of Pakistan PLD 2014 Isl. 29; Mst. Nasreen Begum v. Ministry of Interior PLD 2012 Isl. 21; Dr. Joseph Wilson v. Federation of Pakistan 2017 PCr.LJ 1569; Syed Zulfikar Abbas Bukhari v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2019 Isl. 316; Nadir Mukhtar v. D.G. Immigration and Passport (Writ Petition No.130 of 2025); Shabana Noor Ahmed v. DG Immigration and Passports PLD 2019 Sindh 456; Federal Government of Pakistan v. Government of Punjab PLD 1991 SC 505; Taj International (Pvt.) Ltd. v. FBR 2014 PTD 1807; Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation-FBR v. Taj International (Pvt.) Ltd. and others PLD 2025 SC 633; Wasatullah Jafferi v. Ministry of Interior PLD 2014 Sindh 28 and Jahangir Mehmood Cheema v. Government of Pakistan PLD 2015 Lah. 301 ref. Rehan Kayani and Barrister M. Usama Rauf for Petitioner. Fahad Khan Tareen, Assistant Attorney General for Respondents. Hafiz Ahsaan Ahmed Khokhar for FBR. Moazzam Habib along with Respondent No.3. Malik Abdur Rehman, State Counsel. Nawaz Khan, Director (Policy), Directorate General of Immigration and Passports, Islamabad. Muhammad Azeem Khan, Section Officer (ECL) Ministry of Interior, Islamabad. Muhammad Riaz, Assistant Director (Legal), FIA. Date of hearing: 26th August, 2025.

Summary: ----Ss.6 & 7---Foreign arbitral award---Recognition and enforcement---Scope---Facts: The applicant company moved an application under section 6 of the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 seeking recognition and enforcement in Pakistan of a foreign arbitral award passed by China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC), arising out of a tripartite logistics service agency agreement relating to the wharf revamp project at ‘Port Qasim’, which contained an arbitration clause providing for CIETAC arbitration---After a dispute had arisen, arbitration was conducted and culminated in the award, and the applicant sought to have the award recognized, made rule of Court and executed as a decree---Issue: “Whether the CIETAC award fell within the ambit of the 2011 Act and was liable to be recognized and enforced as a decree of the Court, or whether enforcement was to be refused on any legally permissible ground under the Act read with the New York Convention?”---Held: The argument advanced by the respondents was that reliance was made on an arbitration clause in a subsequent agreement, while ignoring such a clause in a precursor agreement---While the respondents did not draw the High Court’s attention to any specific precursor clause, it would beggar belief that the concerned respondents could be proceeded against vide a clause in an agreement that it was not a party to---Notwithstanding, the award had discussed and upheld the validity of the agreement and the pertinent arbitration clause---Perusal of the award demonstrated that the arbitration tribunal exhaustively dealt with the aspects of law and jurisdiction in the award---Clause 3 thereof expressly stated that the agreement was in consonance with the relevant laws and regulations---It was also exhaustively deliberated and concluded that clause 5.2 of the agreement did not violate the provisions of the Arbitration Rules---While the said deliberation and conclusion remained within the purview of the tribunal, the respondents remained unable to demonstrate any patent infirmity therewith or that it could not be rested upon the rationale relied upon---The competence of the executants of the present proceedings was called into question before the High Court---The documentation annexed, power of attorney etc., could not be demonstrated to be afflicted with any infirmity; capable of vitiating the award or otherwise---No infirmity with the agreement and / or the award could be identified, within the mandate of Art. V of the New York Convention---The foreign arbitral award was recognized as binding and enforceable against, hence, made rule of Court---Application filed per S. 6 of the Act was allowed, in circumstances. Taisei Corporation v. A.M. Construction Company (Private) Limited 2024 SCMR 640 rel. (b) Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)--- ----Ss.1, 6 & 7---Foreign arbitral awards---Recognition and enforcement---Claim being barred by limitation, plea of---Legality---Duty of courts---Pro-enforcement regime viz. foreign arbitral awards---Scope---The Act came into force on 19.07.2011 and perusal of S. 1 thereof demonstrates that it applied to arbitration agreements made before, on or after the said date and encompassed foreign arbitral awards made after 14.07.2005---Therefore, it would hold that any qualifying arbitration agreement, irrespective of date of execution thereof, culminating in an award made after 14.07.2005 could be recognized and enforced---Retrospective nature of the Act has been expressly recognized and given effect to---Limitation Act, 1908 provides a period of limitation for filing of an award per the Arbitration Act 1940 and not with regard to enforcement under the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act 2011---Nevertheless, any import of the Arbitration Act, 1940 is specifically disallowed in enforcement of foreign arbitral awards---Court is required to support not supplant the arbitral process and its discretion is precluded to interfere in the merits of a case on points off act or law---Court should circumscribe opposition within the remit of Art. V of the New York Convention, while emphasizing that the stipulations may be read as permissive and not mandatory. Taisei Corporation v. A.M. Construction Company (Private) Limited 2024 SCMR 640 rel. Muhammad Shaiq Usmani and Muhammad Nawaz Mirza for Applicant. Farooq H. Naik and Syed Qaim Ali Shah for Respondents. Date of hearing: 5th November, 2025.

Summary: Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)--- ----Ss.1, 6 & 7---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched., Art.178 ---Foreign arbitral award---Recognition and enforcement---Objection viz. limitation---Relevance---Arbitration Act, 1940, applicability of---Import into foreign award enforcement---Bar---Facts: Applicant company filed application under S. 6 of the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 for recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award made by China International Economic and Trade Administration Commission (CIETAC), arising from agreements between the parties containing an arbitration clause---Respondent resisted enforcement on objections including limitation, alleged procedural impropriety under CIETAC rules, and competency/authority of the person instituting proceedings---Issue: “Whether the CIETAC award was liable to be recognized, made rule of Court, and executed as a decree under the 2011 Act, despite the above-mentioned respondent’s objections?”---Held: There was no cavil articulated to the arbitration agreement and / or award qualifying within the parameters of section 1 of the Act, 2011---It was also undenied that the respondent had failed in its challenge to the award before the Beijing Fourth Intermediate Peoples Court---The crux of the respondent’s defense was that the present proceedings were barred by limitation; per Art. 178 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908---The Act, 2011 came into force on 19.07.2011---Section 1 thereof demonstrates that it is to encompass arbitration agreements made before, on or after the said date and covered foreign arbitral awards made post 14.07.2005---Therefore, any qualifying arbitration agreement, irrespective of date of execution thereof, culminating in an award made after 14.07.2005 could be recognized and enforced---Retrospective nature of the Act, 2011 had been recognized and given effect to---Even otherwise, the provision under reference prescribed a period of limitation for filing of an award per the Arbitration Act, 1940 and had no discernible nexus with enforcement under the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011---The validity of the proceedings had been adequately addressed and since no reference was made to the relevant record, therefore, no occasion arose to displace and / or distinguish the pertinent deliberations and the findings---The documentation demonstrating the power and authority of the person filing the present proceedings, power of attorney etc., could not be impeached before the High Court---Irrespective of the internal management rule, maintained by the Supreme Court time and time again, the documentation annexed was found to be adequate for its intended purpose---No infirmity with the arbitration agreement and / or the award could be identified, within the mandate of Art. V of the New York Convention---The foreign arbitral award was recognized as binding and enforceable against the respondent company, hence made rule of Court---The applicant was granted judgment in the amount mentioned in the award, which was to be executed as a decree of the High Court---Application filed per S. 6 of the Act, 2011 was allowed, in circumstances. Taisei Corporation v. A.M. Construction Company (Private) Limited 2024 SCMR 640 rel. Khalid Mehmood Siddiqui and Zeeshan Kalwar for Appellant. Farooq H. Naek and Syed Qaim Ali Shah for Respondent. Date of hearing: 5th November, 2025.

Summary: Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance (XIII of 2002) --- ----Ss.26(5) & 30-A---Broadcast complaint---Penal order passed without proper hearing---Council of Complaints, jurisdiction of---Whether fine could be imposed directly---Brief facts were that a complaint was lodged before the respondent authority against the appellant company over objectionable remarks made during a broadcast; the Council of Complaints rejected the appellant's adjournment request and imposed a fine of Rs.500,000/- with ancillary directions; in appeal, the appellant questioned the Council's power to impose penalty directly and pleaded denial of hearing; the High Court in the present appeal examined as to whether the Council's powers were merely recommendatory and whether the impugned order was lawful---Held: Jurisdiction of the Council of Complaints was recommendatory in nature---There was no dispute that the Council of Complaint did have the requisite jurisdiction to review and adjudicate on the complaint---Under the circumstances and keeping in the mind that the appellants were also not afforded a hearing, the order passed by the Council of Complaints was set aside and the complaint before the Council of Common Interests was to be treated as pending---The appellant, if they had not done so, was to file its objections to the complaint within one week, whereafter the complaint was to be considered and decided by the Council of Complaints at their next meeting after giving due notice of the date of the hearing to the appellant---Consequentially, the amount paid into court by the appellant was to be returned to the appellants along with any mark-up/profit earned, if any, subject to identification---The appeal was allowed, in circumstances. Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) through Chairman and another v. Messrs ARY Communications Private Limited (ARY Digital) through Chief Executive Officer and another PLD 2023 SC 431 rel. ARY Communications Limited through duly Authorized Officer v. Council of Complaints, Islamabad through Secretary and 2 others PLD 2022 Sindh 552 and JJAG Broadcasting Systems (Private) limited through Duly Authorized person v. Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority a body corporate through Chairman and others 2020 CLC 1081 ref. Mrs. Sana Qamaruddin Valika for Appellant. Khaliq Ahmed for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Muhammad Javed Khalid, DAG for Respondents.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O. II, R. 2----Suit to include whole claim––Pendency of first suit––Whether status or stage of first suit affects bar under O. II, R. 2––Doctrine of election. Order II Rule 2 CPC is a mandatory and prohibitory provision requiring a plaintiff to include the entire claim and all available reliefs arising from the same cause of action in one comprehensive suit, subject only to leave under O. II, R. 2(3)––Its object is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and to prevent a defendant from being vexed repeatedly on the same cause of action––Held, the provision does not require that the first suit be decided before the bar under O. II, R. 2 can operate; the stage or status (pending or decided) of the earlier suit is immaterial––To insist on disposal of the first suit before applying O. II, R. 2 would defeat its purpose, allow parallel suits on the same cause of action, waste judicial time and amount to abuse of process––What is material is: (i) whether the cause of action in both suits is in substance the same; and (ii) whether the plaintiff had the opportunity, at the time of the first suit, to claim the reliefs later sought in the second suit––Principle reaffirmed with reference, inter alia, to Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd. v. Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Ltd. (AIR 2025 SC 849) and Trading Corporation of Pakistan v. Devan Sugar Mills (PLD 2018 SC 828). (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O. II, R. 2––Doctrine of election––Multiple remedies arising from same cause of action––Effect of omission. Order II Rule 2 embodies the doctrine of election: where a single cause of action gives rise to multiple possible remedies or reliefs, the plaintiff must elect and include all such reliefs in one suit, unless leave to omit is obtained––Once such election is made and the suit is filed without claiming other coexistent reliefs, the plaintiff cannot subsequently “shop” for further remedies by instituting a separate suit arising from the same cause of action; any omitted or intentionally relinquished relief would be barred in later proceedings by force of sub-rules (2) and (3) of O. II, R. 2––This bar applies notwithstanding that the earlier suit is pending. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O. II, R. 2––Inheritance dispute––Challenge to family settlement and surrender deeds––Cause of action––Application to facts. Parties, being close family members, were in dispute over the estate of their predecessor-in-interest, Mian Muhammad Sharif––A first suit (filed 12.05.2016) by petitioner No.1 challenged the surrender deed; during its pendency a second suit (filed 16.01.2020) was instituted for declaration, possession and cancellation of the family settlement deed, surrender deed and Hibas––Both instruments (family settlement deed dated 03.08.1991 and surrender deed dated 13.08.1999) were already in existence and available when the first suit was filed; the right to challenge them and seek cancellation flowed from a single cause of action, namely the death and succession of Mian Muhammad Sharif––Held, all such reliefs could and ought to have been claimed in the first suit; having failed to do so, the petitioners were barred by O. II, R. 2 from maintaining the second suit––Learned Additional District Judge rightly held the second suit hit by O. II, R. 2, and the Lahore High Court correctly affirmed that view. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O. II, R. 2, O. VII, R. 11(a) & (d)––Rejection of plaint on ground of bar under O. II, R. 2––Whether recording of evidence is sine qua non. Contention that where a bar under O. II, R. 2 is pleaded, the plaint cannot be rejected under O. VII, R. 11 without framing a preliminary issue and recording evidence, was repelled––Held, the primary question in applying O. II, R. 2 is whether the causes of action in the two suits are the same; this can, and ordinarily should, be determined from the averments and “proposed evidence” discernible from the plaints themselves, without recording oral evidence––Where from the pleadings it is clear that the same cause of action is being split and the omitted relief could have been claimed earlier, the subsequent suit is barred and the plaint is liable to rejection under O. VII, R. 11(d) CPC––Recording of evidence is not a mandatory pre-condition in every case; the procedure under O. II, R. 2 read with O. VII, R. 11 is intended to be summary, to prevent multiplicity and vexation––Earlier observations suggesting that evidence must always be recorded (e.g. certain readings of Jeewan Shah v. Muhammad Shah, PLD 2006 SC 202) were explained as not laying down an inflexible rule; what is required is careful examination of the plaint and record, which was duly undertaken by the courts below––Reliance placed, inter alia, on M/s Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation v. Abdus Sattar (PLD 1985 Kar 481), PLD 1966 Kar 126 and PLD 1948 PC 131. (e) Result. The second suit filed by the petitioners having been rightly held barred under Order II Rule 2 CPC, rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 by the Additional District Judge, as upheld by the Lahore High Court, called for no interference––Civil Petition dismissed; leave to appeal declined; impugned judgment affirmed; no order as to costs.

Summary: Arbitration Act (X of 1940)- -S.14-Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched., Arts.178 & 181-Arbitral award-Filing before the court-Limitation-Filing of award by arbitrator himself-Effect-Objection that filing was barred by limitation-Legality-Distinction from party-initiated filing-Scope-Briefly, the petitioner and the respondent entered into a contract for supply and installation of DG sets at PTCL sites-Contract contained an arbitration clause nominating the CEO of PTCL as arbitrator-An arbitral award was made in favor of the respondent and was initially filed before the civil court but was returned for want of pecuniary jurisdiction, after which the arbitrator himself filed the award before the district court-Petitioner objected that the filing was barred by limitation under Article 178 of the Limitation Act, 1908-Objection was accepted by the district court but set aside by the High Court, leading to the present petition before the Supreme Court requiring determination of the issue as to-whether Article 178 of the Limitation Act, 1908, applied where the award was filed by the arbitrator himself without a party applying to the court, or whether such filing was governed by the residuary Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908?-Held: Article 178 of the Act of 1908 being the primary provision regulated the period within which proceedings could be instituted for making an Award Rule of the Court-It prescribed a period of ninety days, running from the date on which notice of the making of the Award was served-Where a party did not first request the arbitrator or umpire to file the Award in Court, it could directly approach the Court and seek an order directing the Arbitrator or umpire to file the Award or a signed copy thereof-An application of this nature fell within the ambit of Article 178 of the Act of 1908, provided that notice of the Award had been served in terms of Section 14(1) of the Act of 1940-A different legal regime applied where no notice of the Award had been served and the party merely requested the Arbitrator, under Section 14(2) of the Act of 1940, to file the Award in Court-In such a situation, the residuary Article 181 of the Act of 1908 applied-Article 181 prescribed a period of three years commencing from the date when the right to apply accrued-In matters of arbitration, that right accrued when the Award is made and the party obtained knowledge of it-Article 178 of the Act of 1908 has no application where the Award was filed by the Arbitrator himself because he sought no relief for his own benefit-Service of notice upon the party is, therefore, a sine qua non for the applicability of Article 178 of the Act of 1908, and in the absence of such notice, the provision could not be invoked-In the present case, the record clearly demonstrated that the respondent did not, at any material stage, file an application under Section 14(2) of the Act of 1940 seeking a direction from the Court requiring the Arbitrator to file the Award-Instead, it was the Arbitrator who filed the Award before the district court, without any judicial direction compelling him to do so-In such circumstances, the essential preconditions for the applicability of Article 178 of the Act of1908 were not met, and the provision was erroneously invoked-High Court rightly held that Article 178 of the Act of 1908 applied only where a party to the arbitration proceedings applied to the Court for filing of the Award-It did not apply to an application made by the party to the Arbitrator for filing the Award, which would instead been governed by Article 181 of the Act of 1908-Leave was declined and present petition was dismissed, in circumstances.