Summary: It is well settled by now that the High Court cannot interferein the finding on question of law or facts, howsoever,erroneous in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. This viewhas been fortified by case of Hakim Ud Din through L.Rs. &others Vs. Faiz Bukhsh & others (2007 S C M R 870), in whichit has been held that, ìIt is established proposition of law thatfinding on questions of law or fact, howsoever, erroneous the samemay be recorded by a Court of exercise of its revisional jurisdictionunder section 115, C.P.C., unless such findings suffer fromjurisdictional defect, illegality or material irregularity.î Similarview has been reiterated in case of ìAbdul Aziz Vs. SheikhFateh Muhammadî (2007 S C M R 336). But in the presentcase, no such occasion has arisen at the trial as well asappellate stage, so this Court finds no illegality, irregularity orinfirmity, wrong exercise of jurisdiction vested upon theCourts below while passing the impugned order, judgmentand decrees, respectively; therefore, same do not call for anyinterference by this Court while exercising revisionaljurisdiction.7. In view of the above said discussion, when thepetitioner/defendant has failed to establish any illegality,irregularity or infirmity in the findings of Courts below, it canbe safely observed that the same are result of appraising the 7- Civil Revision No.358 of 2009/BWPevidence in true perspective, applying of judicial mind, rightlyinterpreting the law and upto the dexterity, therefore, same donot call for any interference by this Court. Resultantly, byplacing reliance on the judgments supra, this civil revision isdismissed in limine

Summary: Order XV rule 1 CPC--- Option left with the Court after statement made by the defendant conceding prayer of the plaintiff---The Court cannot decide the main case prior to decision of application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940---Subsequent order regarding disposal of the application filed under Section 34 of the Act is of no consequences---The appeal was accepted and the learned trial Court was directed to decide the matter afresh including application filed under Section 34 of the Act.

Summary: (a) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-------Ss. 34, 41(b) & Second Schedule---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Arbitration agreement---Power to stay legal proceedings---Scope---Powers of the court under theSecond Schedule of the Arbitration Act, 1940, could be exercised by issuing an interim order forthe preservation and safety of the subject matter---Mere filing of an application under S.34 of theArbitration Act, 1940, or even stay of the proceedings and referring the matter to the Arbitratorshould not preclude the Trial Court from dealing with the injunction application.(b) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-------S.34---Expression "Any other step into proceeding"---Connotation---Expression was not relatable to any step, action or inaction taken by the defendant during the proceedings of interimapplications but was applicable only to the proceedings of the main case.

Summary: Scope of Arbitration Act,1940 Section 34-----The case involves a plaintiff, a public limited company engaged in the manufacturing, selling, and distribution of gases, seeking recovery of Rs. 65,76,233 from the defendant. The plaintiff had supplied various gases to the defendant as per agreements, but the defendant ceased payments in March 2009, leading to a dispute.Despite repeated demands for payment, the defendant issued post-dated cheques, which were subsequently dishonored due to insufficient funds. The plaintiff filed a suit under Order XXXVII Rule 1 & 2 CPC and also lodged an FIR for the dishonored cheques. The defendant, after being declared ex parte, filed an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, claiming the suit should be stayed as per the arbitration clause in the agreements.The court deliberated on precedents and arguments presented by both parties. The defendant argued for a stay based on the arbitration clause, while the plaintiff emphasized the absence of a genuine dispute and the defendant's default in payment.After considering the submissions, the court dismissed the defendant's application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. The court found that the defendant failed to demonstrate any genuine dispute warranting arbitration. It highlighted that the dishonor of cheques constituted an independent cause of action, not subject to arbitration under Section 34. The court also distinguished previous cases cited by both parties based on their specific facts and circumstances.Ultimately, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, denying the defendant's request for a stay and affirming the continuation of the suit proceedings.

Summary: S.8,9,13,30,42 Arbitration Act 1940:Arbitrator,powers of--scope---arbitrator could neither ignore principles of natural justice nor at back of parties---principles

Summary: Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-------Ss. 13, 17, 32 & 39---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss.12, 42 & 54---Suit forperformance of arbitration agreement---Parties entered into an agreement through which theparties referred their disputes to panel of arbitrators to decide the same out of court---Termsof agreement showed that if any of the parties failed to comply with the decision of thearbitrators, said party only could be allowed to sue the other party after payment ofRs.5,00,000 (Rupees five lac) as a fine---Arbitrators inspected the place in question, heardboth the parties, collected necessary information from the general public and thereafterthrough their judgment or award directed the defendant to remove his four grinding machineswithin a week from the site pertaining to the plaintiff-Both parties accepted the decision ofarbitrators by signing along with the arbitrators the decision in presence of the witnesses---Criminal case pending against the defendant, on account of said settlement arrived at betweenthe parties, was also withdrawn---Defendant, after withdrawal of said case, not only failed toremove his four grinding machines, but also refused to accept the arbitration award---Plaintifffiled suit before Majli-e-Shoora for performance of agreement arrived at between the parties---Said suit was decreed and defendant was permanently forbidden for interfering in the landin dispute and defendant was also directed to remove the four grinding machines from thedecreetal site---Defendant filed appeal against judgment of Majlis-e-Shoora, on two grounds;firstly that suit filed by the plaintiff was not maintainable against an arbitration agreement or award; secondly that as value of the suit for specific performance was Rs.60,000 but no courtfee had been deposited by the plaintiff--Validity-Arbitration award passed out of the court onthe basis of a valid authorized document though could not be executed or treated as 'award' or'decision' like that passed by . court under Arbitration Act, 1940, but where the parties onaccount of an agreement declared to adopt a particular way to solve their dispute and in thatrespect they by their mutual consent, executed written agreement by authorizing the thirdperson as an arbitrator to decide their dispute, in consequence of said written agreement, ifarbitrators after holding inquiry, taking evidence and hearing the parties, had decided thedispute, which the parties had accepted, then law of estoppel would apply to such kind ofaward and parties would not be allowed to go back by such award/decision---Order sheet hadshown that plaintiff had paid the required court-fee-No illegality or impropriety having beenfound in the impugned judgment by the Majlis-e-Shoora, appeal was dismissed by HighCourt.

Summary: S.14,17,39 Arbitration Act:Court not considered all questions raised about award,illegality committed

Summary: The petitioner's firm, "Engineering & Management Services," had been contracted by the respondent to provide consultancy services for the construction of certain apartments in Islamabad. However, the respondent terminated the consultancy contract in April 2010. The petitioner claimed that an outstanding amount of Rs. 7,140,846/- was owed by the respondent, but the respondent disputed this claim.The petitioner sent a notice under Section 306(1)(a) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, demanding payment within 30 days. When the respondent did not respond to this notice, the petitioner firm filed a petition for the winding up of the respondent company.During the legal proceedings, the petitioner argued that the failure of the respondent to respond to the notice created a presumption, as per Section 306(1)(a), that the company was unable to pay its debts, justifying the initiation of winding-up proceedings.However, the respondent's counsel contended that the petitioner had not come to the court with clean hands and had concealed relevant facts. They argued that the petitioner had an alternate remedy available, as per an arbitration clause in their agreement, and had already initiated arbitration proceedings.After considering the arguments from both sides, the court found that the petitioner had an alternate remedy available through arbitration, and the claim had not been established in any court. The court cited previous judgments that stated that the failure to pay the demanded amount was not necessarily due to insolvency but could be due to a bona fide dispute. Therefore, the court dismissed the winding-up petition, stating that the claim of the petitioner was not just or equitable and that an alternate remedy was available. The petitioner was also ordered to pay costs.

Summary: ----Ss. 8, 21 & 23---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 9, 42 & 54--- Suit for possession,declaration and permanent injunction---Appointment of referee---Rival parties had filed suitsagainst each other---Plaintiffs had filed a suit for possession agains

Summary: Sec:12,42 & 54 Specific Relief Act & Arbitration Act,1940 Discussed in reference of law of Estopple U/S 114 of Qanoon-e-Shadat---(a) West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)-------Ss. 4, 13(6) & 15---Ejectment petition---Bona fide personal need of demised land bylandlord for constructing thereon multi-storeyed building---Letter of MunicipalAdministration permitting landlord to construct proposed building---Tenants' plea that 40years ago, they got disputed open land on rent and constructed thereon shops with theirexpenses and spent considerable amount on installing therein machineries for theirbusiness, whereas landlord instead of compensating them was ruining their business---Order of Rent Controller directing tenants to vacate premises within four months whiledirecting landlord to give shops to tenants in newly-constructed building equal to an areaof existing shops in possession of each tenant---Validity---None of the tenants had deniedownership of landlord, its such requirement and obtaining of such letter of permission---Landlord had fully established its requirement---Landlord had obtained necessarysanctions for constructing proposed building, thus, tenants' grievance was not acceptablefor being no more than to stop pace of development---Impugned order did not suffer fromany illegality---Khasra number of shop in possession of tenant did not find mention insuch letter of permission, but he had not disputed that his shop was not part of demisedpremises---Tenants would suffer irreparable loss and would be deprived of theirlivelihood on account of demolition of superstructure of existing shops and removal ofsuch machineries therefrom---Landlord being a welfare society serving the general publichad no resources to compensate tenants for demolition of their superstructure---RentController while passing impugned order had not determined or fixed fair rent in respectof proposed new building, wherein landlord had to accommodate tenants---High Courtdismissed appeals while directing landlord to charge from tenants 30% less rent inproposed new building to that of rent prevailing in market at time of accommodatingthem.1997 SCMR 1819 and PLD 1971 Lah. 210 rel.(b) West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)-------S. 15---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.96---Appeal against ejectment orderpassed by Rent Controller---Powers of Appellate Court---Scope---Such appeal was anappeal from an original decree under S.96, C.P.C.---Appellate Court had same powersand would perform same duties imposed by courts of original jurisdiction.