Summary: Held that second application for submission of list of witnesses under Order XVI, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ("CPC") is not maintainable when first application of the plaintiff was dismissed and the order of dismissal was not challenged, more so when second application was filed naming different individuals required to be summoned as witnesses. Labelling the second application as one under Order XVI Rule 14, CPC and not under Rule 1 thereof is also misconceived argument. It is imperative to observe that Order XVI Rule 14 CPC is not a device for parties to fill gaps in their evidence. It vests a discretionary, suo motu power in the Court, which may be exercised if the Court itself finds a person necessary for effective adjudication even though such person is stranger. It is not intended to compensate for negligence or allow a litigant to expand the record after procedural time limits have expired. In these circumstances, allowing such applications would defeat the statutory discipline of Order XVI, Rule 1; undermine the requirement of timely disclosure, and open the door for parties to repeatedly repair their omissions. The discretion under Order XVI Rule 14 squarely belongs to the Court, which may call any stranger on its own assessment; it cannot be demanded as a matter of right by a party that has failed to comply with Rule 1 of Order XVI, CPC. 133ITR (Income Tax Reference) 53-22 CIR MULTAN VS M/S AL-HILAL INDUSTRIES MULTAN Mr. Justice Asim Hafeez 18- 11- 2025 2025 LHC 6774

Summary: (a) Muslim personal law / Family law----Maintenance of wife---Obligation of husband---Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, Arts.2A, 3, 9, 25(3), 31, 34, 35, 37 & 38---Islamic Injunctions (Quran, Sunnah, Ijma, Ijtihad)---Status of wife and duty of support---Scope. Marriage in Islam is a contract creating reciprocal rights and obligations; one of the most fundamental rights of a wife is to be maintained by the husband in accordance with his financial means for the entire subsistence of the marriage. This obligation covers housing, food, clothing, healthcare and other essentials of a dignified life and is rooted in the Quran, Sunnah, juristic consensus and ijtihad, as well as in constitutional provisions which mandate protection of women from material and moral neglect. Once this obligation arises, it is legally enforceable, and any neglect in performance renders the husband liable in law. The accumulation of unpaid maintenance does not alter the marital bond or extinguish the wife’s right; it merely creates enforceable financial claims (arrears) against the husband. (b) Muslim personal law / Family law----Maintenance of wife---Quran and Sunnah---Extent of obligation---Divorced wife during ‘iddat’---Principles. Quranic verses (inter alia, Surah Al-Baqarah 2:233 & 241; Surah At-Talaq 65:1, 7; Surah An-Nisa 4:34) collectively establish that the husband/father must bear the reasonable cost of food, clothing and residence of his wife and children, and must also provide reasonable maintenance to a divorced wife during her waiting period, according to his means. The Sunnah reinforces this duty: (i) the Farewell Sermon commands kind and generous treatment of women in food and clothing; (ii) the Prophet (SAW), when asked about the wife’s rights, declared that she be fed and clothed as the husband does for himself, without humiliation or violence; and (iii) he permitted a wife, where the husband was neglectful, to take from his property what was reasonably necessary for herself and the children. Under classical fiqh, a settled maxim provides that “whoever is confined for the benefit of another, his maintenance is on that other,” which applies to the wife who, being confined to the matrimonial home, must be maintained by the husband so long as she is not recalcitrant or disobedient. (c) Family Courts Act, 1964 & Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961----Past maintenance---Absence of prior agreement---Jurisdiction of Family Court / Arbitration Council to grant arrears---Delay in approaching Court---Effect. Questions often arose whether, in the absence of a specific agreement, a wife could obtain a decree/certificate for past maintenance; whether an Arbitration Council or a Family Court could grant arrears; and from what date maintenance should run (cause of action, filing of application/suit, or date of order). A Division Bench of Lahore High Court in Sardar Muhammad v. Mst. Nasima Bibi (PLD 1966 (W.P) Lah. 703) held that (i) the husband’s obligation to maintain his wife commences with the solemnization of marriage, subject to recognized conditions; and (ii) a wife’s delay in approaching the Court, or her attempts to seek alternative remedies outside Court, does not take away her right to claim maintenance from the date when the cause of action first arose. The Courts (Arbitration Council or Family Court) are fully competent to grant arrears of maintenance, subject to limitation and the circumstances of each case. This view was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Muhammad Nawaz v. Mst. Khurshid Begum (PLD 1972 SC 302) and later reinforced in Mst. Farah Naz v. Judge Family Court, Sahiwal (PLD 2006 SC 457), thereby settling that past maintenance can be decreed, even without a prior written agreement, once neglect is proved. (d) Limitation Act, 1908----Art.120 & S.23---Suit for past maintenance---“Right to sue”---Continuing wrong---Successive causes of action---Six-year limitation---Whether operates as a rigid cap on arrears. Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908 prescribes a six-year limitation period for suits where no specific period is otherwise provided, to be reckoned from the date when the “right to sue” accrues. In maintenance matters, the obligation is periodic and accrues month by month; each non-payment constitutes a fresh default and creates a recurring debt. Such non-payment is a “continuing wrong” within the meaning of S.23 of the Limitation Act; the cause of action arises de die in diem (day by day) so long as neglect continues. Failure by the wife to sue on an earlier instalment does not bar a later suit founded on subsequent defaults; successive causes of action may be independently pursued. While Art.120 applies to suits for recovery of past maintenance, it regulates only the time within which the suit must be brought, not the underlying validity or subsistence of the claim. Where the husband’s clear refusal or neglect to maintain is shown within six years preceding the suit, and the suit is filed within that period, the wife’s claim for arrears, covering the entire span of established neglect, is maintainable and is not automatically cut down to the last six years alone. In cases of ambiguity, limitation statutes should be construed in a manner that avoids depriving a party of substantive rights and prevents hardship, while still respecting the statutory framework. Cited Cases: • Sardar Muhammad v. Mst. Nasima Bibi and others PLD 1966 (W.P) Lahore 703 • Muhammad Nawaz v. Mst. Khurshid Begum and 3 others PLD 1972 SC 302 • Mst. Farah Naz v. Judge Family Court, Sahiwal and others PLD 2006 SC 457 • Venkopadhyaya v. Kavari Hengusu 2 Madras 36 • Holes v. Chard Union (1894) 1 Ch. 293 • Basawanewa Balappa v. Balappa Shivappa AIR 1936 Bombay 289 • Mst. Ramzanu Bibi v. Ibrahim (deceased) through L.Rs and others 2025 SCMR 955 (e) Family law----Maintenance of wife---Arrears of maintenance as “debt”---Neglect proved---Effect. Once the Family Court determines, on evidence, that the husband has neglected to maintain his wife without her fault, arrears of maintenance are treated in law as a debt owed by the husband to the wife. That finding, having not been set aside by the first appellate Court and not challenged before the Supreme Court, became final. The husband cannot evade that debt by invoking technical pleas of limitation or by relying on a self-serving offer to pay only a truncated portion (e.g. last six years). Where the wife’s suit is held to be within limitation and her claim of continuous neglect is proved, she is entitled to recover the arrears for the entire period pleaded and established, and the Courts are bound to enforce such liability. (f) Practice and procedure----Family disputes---Technicalities of limitation---Approach of superior Courts. In matrimonial and maintenance disputes, the Courts are required to keep in view the constitutional and Islamic command to protect women from neglect and destitution. While limitation provisions must be applied where clearly attracted, they should not be extended by strained interpretation to defeat meritorious claims of vulnerable parties. The husband’s attempt to use Art.120 as a technical shield to avoid his long-standing obligation was, in the circumstances, rejected, and the decree for retrospective maintenance passed by the Family Court and restored by the High Court was maintained. Disposition: Appeal dismissed; judgment of the High Court restoring the Family Court decree for maintenance from June 2004 till subsistence of marriage upheld; no order as to costs.

Summary: (1) The Principles, which Govern a Suit founded on the basis of a Negotiable Instrument; (2) the Presumption under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 is a Rebuttable Presumption, which can be Rebutted through a Direct or Circumstantial Evidence to demonstrate that the Consideration is Absent; (3) the Standard for Threshold Evidence may Vary from case to case; (4) the Concept of Standard of Balance of Probability and Preponderance of Evidence in Civil Cases. 137Jail Appeal 30048/22 Nauman Ijaz Vs The State The Chief Justice 17-11- 2025 2025 LHC 6798

Summary: Mere pleading of 'Benami' cannot bar civil suit: Misapplication of section 43 of The Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 2017 set aside. Writ petition allowed. 136Regular First Appeal (R.F.A) (Final Decree) 78871/24 Muhammad Anwaar Anjum & 1 Other Vs Muhammad Shakeel Sattar Mr. Justice Khalid Ishaq 17- 11- 2025 2025 LHC 6875

Summary: (a) Passports Rules, 2021--- ----Rr. 21, 22(2) & 23(6)---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S. 24-A---Passport Control List (PCL), placing name on---Procedure---Speaking order---Order for placement of a citizen on PCL cannot be issued in a mechanical fashion without recording reasons and stating grounds applicable to the circumstances of the citizen in terms of R. 23(6) read with R.21 of Passports Rules, 2021---Unless a penal order directing that passport of a citizen be impounded, confiscated, cancelled or inactivated is passed while identifying relevant grounds that mandate that the citizen’s right to liberty and travel ought to be interfered with in accordance with law, such order would not be sustainable in the eyes of law---It is only where an order finding that a citizen’s passport is liable to be impounded, confiscated, cancelled or inactivated has been so passed, can the relevant Division of Federal Government and Directorate General, Immigration and Passport discharge their ministerial function of placing name of such individual on PCL in terms of R. 22(2) of Passport Rules, 2021. Shabana Noor Ahmed v. D.G. Immigration and Passport PLD 2019 Sindh 456 rel. (b) General Clauses Act (X of 1897)--- ----S.24-A---Reasons for an order---Object, purpose and scope---Reasoned order is a sine-qua-non for exercise of discretion, especially when it impinges on the fundamental rights of a citizen---Substance of reasons then forms part of the inquiry undertaken by a Court while exercising judicial review powers, whereby Court can satisfy itself that the reasons are just and proportionate to legitimate State interest being pursued by executive authorities to pursue the objects of law under which such authority is being exercised. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 10A---Right of fair trial and due process of law---Scope---Provision of Art. 10A of the Constitution has been enacted to give right of due process, a Constitutional standing. (d) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----S. 2(6A)---Exit from Pakistan (Control) Ordinance (XLVI of 1981), S.2---Exit from Pakistan (Control) Rules, 2010, R.2(d)---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 4, 9, 10A, 15, 25 & 199---Constitutional petition---Exit Control List---Freedom of movement---Due process of law---Tax defaulter---Placing name on Exit Control List---Petitioner was aggrieved of placing his name on Exit Control List on the allegation of tax default committed by him---Validity---In holding that a person is a defaulter under the provisions of Sales Tax Act, 1990 there must be a finding made after assessment and adjudicatory proceedings that a demand for sales tax due and payable remains outstanding against that person and is yet to be paid---Petitioner could not be considered to be in default of tax or liabilities in terms of R. 2(d) of Exit from Pakistan (Control) Rules, 2010 merely because authorities had formed an opinion that he was liable for sales tax fraud for illegally seeking income tax adjustment---On the basis of such opinion, a penalty could not be inflicted on petitioner in the form of curtailing his civil rights and liberties by placing his name on ECL or PCL or PNIL pending determination of the fate of any criminal charge brought against him or adjudicatory proceedings initiated against him under the provisions of Sales Tax Act, 1990---High Court declared that placement of petitioner’s name on ECL, PCL and/or PNIL was tantamount to colorable exercise of authority in breach of provisions of Passports Act, 1974, Exit from Pakistan (Control) Ordinance, 1981 and Arts. 4, 9, 10A, 15 & 25 of the Constitution and such actions were of no legal effect---High Court directed Federal Government to ensure that name of petitioner was removed from ECL, PCL and PNIL and no fetters were to be placed on the rights of petitioner to travel on the ground that he was liable for tax fraud, unless it was determined through the adjudicatory process provided under provisions of Sales Tax Act, 1990 that he was a defaulter---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. Montgomery Floor and General Mills Ltd. v. The Director, Food Purchase PLD 1957 Lah. 914; Zahur Ilahi v. The State PLD 1977 SC 273; Farooq Ahmed Khan Laghari v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1999 SC 57; Pakistan Muslim League (N) v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2007 SC 642; Government of Pakistan v. Dada Amir Haider Khan PLD 1987 SC 504; Dr. Shireen M. Mazari v. Federation of Pakistan 2024 MLD 1020; Fauji Foundation v. Shamimur Rehman PLD 1983 SC 457; Chairman, NAB v. Nasar Ullah PLD 2022 SC 497; Federation of Pakistan v. E-movers (Pvt.) Ltd. 2022 SCMR 1021; CIR v. M/s Rose Food Industries 2023 SCMR 2070; Sheikh Shan Ilahi v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2023 Lah. 359; Tabish Badar v. Ministry of Interior 2023 CLC 1457; Sabir Iqbal v. Cantonment Board PLD 2019 SC 189; Shehryar Afridi v. Federation of Pakistan (W.P. No.2491 of 2023); Wajid Shamas-ul-Hassan v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1997 Lah. 617; Federal Government v. Miss Ayan Ali 2017 SCMR 1179; Mian Ayaz Anwar v. The Federation PLD 2010 Lah. 230; Kent v. Dulles 357 US 116 (1958); Aptheker v. Secretary of State 378 US 500 (1964); Satwant's case AIR 1967 SC 836; Sheikh Mohammad Mansoor v. Government of Pakistan 2008 MLD 955; Sohail Latif v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2008 Lah. 341; Munir Ahmed Bhatti v. Government of Pakistan PLD 2010 Lah. 697; Masood Ahmed v. Federation of Pakistan 2010 YLR 28; Mian Munir Ahmed v. Federation of Pakistan 2008 YLR 1508; Zurash Industries v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2011 Kar. 385; Gen. (Retd.) Parvez Musharraf v. Pakistan PLD 2014 Sindh 389; Federation v. Gen. (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf PLD 2016 SC 570; Syed Masood Hussain Shah v. Federation of Pakistan 2015 MLD 124; Mohammad Sadiq v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2016 Sindh 263; Tanver Hussain Manji v. Federation of Pakistan 2016 CLC 1534; Yusuf J. Ansari v. Government of Pakistan PLD 2016 Kar. 388; Riaz Ahmed v. Government of Pakistan PLD 2014 Isl. 29; Mst. Nasreen Begum v. Ministry of Interior PLD 2012 Isl. 21; Dr. Joseph Wilson v. Federation of Pakistan 2017 PCr.LJ 1569; Syed Zulfikar Abbas Bukhari v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2019 Isl. 316; Nadir Mukhtar v. D.G. Immigration and Passport (Writ Petition No.130 of 2025); Shabana Noor Ahmed v. DG Immigration and Passports PLD 2019 Sindh 456; Federal Government of Pakistan v. Government of Punjab PLD 1991 SC 505; Taj International (Pvt.) Ltd. v. FBR 2014 PTD 1807; Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation-FBR v. Taj International (Pvt.) Ltd. and others PLD 2025 SC 633; Wasatullah Jafferi v. Ministry of Interior PLD 2014 Sindh 28 and Jahangir Mehmood Cheema v. Government of Pakistan PLD 2015 Lah. 301 ref. Rehan Kayani and Barrister M. Usama Rauf for Petitioner. Fahad Khan Tareen, Assistant Attorney General for Respondents. Hafiz Ahsaan Ahmed Khokhar for FBR. Moazzam Habib along with Respondent No.3. Malik Abdur Rehman, State Counsel. Nawaz Khan, Director (Policy), Directorate General of Immigration and Passports, Islamabad. Muhammad Azeem Khan, Section Officer (ECL) Ministry of Interior, Islamabad. Muhammad Riaz, Assistant Director (Legal), FIA. Date of hearing: 26th August, 2025.

Summary: ----Ss.6 & 7---Foreign arbitral award---Recognition and enforcement---Scope---Facts: The applicant company moved an application under section 6 of the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 seeking recognition and enforcement in Pakistan of a foreign arbitral award passed by China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC), arising out of a tripartite logistics service agency agreement relating to the wharf revamp project at ‘Port Qasim’, which contained an arbitration clause providing for CIETAC arbitration---After a dispute had arisen, arbitration was conducted and culminated in the award, and the applicant sought to have the award recognized, made rule of Court and executed as a decree---Issue: “Whether the CIETAC award fell within the ambit of the 2011 Act and was liable to be recognized and enforced as a decree of the Court, or whether enforcement was to be refused on any legally permissible ground under the Act read with the New York Convention?”---Held: The argument advanced by the respondents was that reliance was made on an arbitration clause in a subsequent agreement, while ignoring such a clause in a precursor agreement---While the respondents did not draw the High Court’s attention to any specific precursor clause, it would beggar belief that the concerned respondents could be proceeded against vide a clause in an agreement that it was not a party to---Notwithstanding, the award had discussed and upheld the validity of the agreement and the pertinent arbitration clause---Perusal of the award demonstrated that the arbitration tribunal exhaustively dealt with the aspects of law and jurisdiction in the award---Clause 3 thereof expressly stated that the agreement was in consonance with the relevant laws and regulations---It was also exhaustively deliberated and concluded that clause 5.2 of the agreement did not violate the provisions of the Arbitration Rules---While the said deliberation and conclusion remained within the purview of the tribunal, the respondents remained unable to demonstrate any patent infirmity therewith or that it could not be rested upon the rationale relied upon---The competence of the executants of the present proceedings was called into question before the High Court---The documentation annexed, power of attorney etc., could not be demonstrated to be afflicted with any infirmity; capable of vitiating the award or otherwise---No infirmity with the agreement and / or the award could be identified, within the mandate of Art. V of the New York Convention---The foreign arbitral award was recognized as binding and enforceable against, hence, made rule of Court---Application filed per S. 6 of the Act was allowed, in circumstances. Taisei Corporation v. A.M. Construction Company (Private) Limited 2024 SCMR 640 rel. (b) Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)--- ----Ss.1, 6 & 7---Foreign arbitral awards---Recognition and enforcement---Claim being barred by limitation, plea of---Legality---Duty of courts---Pro-enforcement regime viz. foreign arbitral awards---Scope---The Act came into force on 19.07.2011 and perusal of S. 1 thereof demonstrates that it applied to arbitration agreements made before, on or after the said date and encompassed foreign arbitral awards made after 14.07.2005---Therefore, it would hold that any qualifying arbitration agreement, irrespective of date of execution thereof, culminating in an award made after 14.07.2005 could be recognized and enforced---Retrospective nature of the Act has been expressly recognized and given effect to---Limitation Act, 1908 provides a period of limitation for filing of an award per the Arbitration Act 1940 and not with regard to enforcement under the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act 2011---Nevertheless, any import of the Arbitration Act, 1940 is specifically disallowed in enforcement of foreign arbitral awards---Court is required to support not supplant the arbitral process and its discretion is precluded to interfere in the merits of a case on points off act or law---Court should circumscribe opposition within the remit of Art. V of the New York Convention, while emphasizing that the stipulations may be read as permissive and not mandatory. Taisei Corporation v. A.M. Construction Company (Private) Limited 2024 SCMR 640 rel. Muhammad Shaiq Usmani and Muhammad Nawaz Mirza for Applicant. Farooq H. Naik and Syed Qaim Ali Shah for Respondents. Date of hearing: 5th November, 2025.

Summary: Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)--- ----Ss.1, 6 & 7---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched., Art.178 ---Foreign arbitral award---Recognition and enforcement---Objection viz. limitation---Relevance---Arbitration Act, 1940, applicability of---Import into foreign award enforcement---Bar---Facts: Applicant company filed application under S. 6 of the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 for recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award made by China International Economic and Trade Administration Commission (CIETAC), arising from agreements between the parties containing an arbitration clause---Respondent resisted enforcement on objections including limitation, alleged procedural impropriety under CIETAC rules, and competency/authority of the person instituting proceedings---Issue: “Whether the CIETAC award was liable to be recognized, made rule of Court, and executed as a decree under the 2011 Act, despite the above-mentioned respondent’s objections?”---Held: There was no cavil articulated to the arbitration agreement and / or award qualifying within the parameters of section 1 of the Act, 2011---It was also undenied that the respondent had failed in its challenge to the award before the Beijing Fourth Intermediate Peoples Court---The crux of the respondent’s defense was that the present proceedings were barred by limitation; per Art. 178 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908---The Act, 2011 came into force on 19.07.2011---Section 1 thereof demonstrates that it is to encompass arbitration agreements made before, on or after the said date and covered foreign arbitral awards made post 14.07.2005---Therefore, any qualifying arbitration agreement, irrespective of date of execution thereof, culminating in an award made after 14.07.2005 could be recognized and enforced---Retrospective nature of the Act, 2011 had been recognized and given effect to---Even otherwise, the provision under reference prescribed a period of limitation for filing of an award per the Arbitration Act, 1940 and had no discernible nexus with enforcement under the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011---The validity of the proceedings had been adequately addressed and since no reference was made to the relevant record, therefore, no occasion arose to displace and / or distinguish the pertinent deliberations and the findings---The documentation demonstrating the power and authority of the person filing the present proceedings, power of attorney etc., could not be impeached before the High Court---Irrespective of the internal management rule, maintained by the Supreme Court time and time again, the documentation annexed was found to be adequate for its intended purpose---No infirmity with the arbitration agreement and / or the award could be identified, within the mandate of Art. V of the New York Convention---The foreign arbitral award was recognized as binding and enforceable against the respondent company, hence made rule of Court---The applicant was granted judgment in the amount mentioned in the award, which was to be executed as a decree of the High Court---Application filed per S. 6 of the Act, 2011 was allowed, in circumstances. Taisei Corporation v. A.M. Construction Company (Private) Limited 2024 SCMR 640 rel. Khalid Mehmood Siddiqui and Zeeshan Kalwar for Appellant. Farooq H. Naek and Syed Qaim Ali Shah for Respondent. Date of hearing: 5th November, 2025.

Summary: Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance (XIII of 2002) --- ----Ss.26(5) & 30-A---Broadcast complaint---Penal order passed without proper hearing---Council of Complaints, jurisdiction of---Whether fine could be imposed directly---Brief facts were that a complaint was lodged before the respondent authority against the appellant company over objectionable remarks made during a broadcast; the Council of Complaints rejected the appellant's adjournment request and imposed a fine of Rs.500,000/- with ancillary directions; in appeal, the appellant questioned the Council's power to impose penalty directly and pleaded denial of hearing; the High Court in the present appeal examined as to whether the Council's powers were merely recommendatory and whether the impugned order was lawful---Held: Jurisdiction of the Council of Complaints was recommendatory in nature---There was no dispute that the Council of Complaint did have the requisite jurisdiction to review and adjudicate on the complaint---Under the circumstances and keeping in the mind that the appellants were also not afforded a hearing, the order passed by the Council of Complaints was set aside and the complaint before the Council of Common Interests was to be treated as pending---The appellant, if they had not done so, was to file its objections to the complaint within one week, whereafter the complaint was to be considered and decided by the Council of Complaints at their next meeting after giving due notice of the date of the hearing to the appellant---Consequentially, the amount paid into court by the appellant was to be returned to the appellants along with any mark-up/profit earned, if any, subject to identification---The appeal was allowed, in circumstances. Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) through Chairman and another v. Messrs ARY Communications Private Limited (ARY Digital) through Chief Executive Officer and another PLD 2023 SC 431 rel. ARY Communications Limited through duly Authorized Officer v. Council of Complaints, Islamabad through Secretary and 2 others PLD 2022 Sindh 552 and JJAG Broadcasting Systems (Private) limited through Duly Authorized person v. Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority a body corporate through Chairman and others 2020 CLC 1081 ref. Mrs. Sana Qamaruddin Valika for Appellant. Khaliq Ahmed for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Muhammad Javed Khalid, DAG for Respondents.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O. II, R. 2----Suit to include whole claim––Pendency of first suit––Whether status or stage of first suit affects bar under O. II, R. 2––Doctrine of election. Order II Rule 2 CPC is a mandatory and prohibitory provision requiring a plaintiff to include the entire claim and all available reliefs arising from the same cause of action in one comprehensive suit, subject only to leave under O. II, R. 2(3)––Its object is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and to prevent a defendant from being vexed repeatedly on the same cause of action––Held, the provision does not require that the first suit be decided before the bar under O. II, R. 2 can operate; the stage or status (pending or decided) of the earlier suit is immaterial––To insist on disposal of the first suit before applying O. II, R. 2 would defeat its purpose, allow parallel suits on the same cause of action, waste judicial time and amount to abuse of process––What is material is: (i) whether the cause of action in both suits is in substance the same; and (ii) whether the plaintiff had the opportunity, at the time of the first suit, to claim the reliefs later sought in the second suit––Principle reaffirmed with reference, inter alia, to Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd. v. Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Ltd. (AIR 2025 SC 849) and Trading Corporation of Pakistan v. Devan Sugar Mills (PLD 2018 SC 828). (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O. II, R. 2––Doctrine of election––Multiple remedies arising from same cause of action––Effect of omission. Order II Rule 2 embodies the doctrine of election: where a single cause of action gives rise to multiple possible remedies or reliefs, the plaintiff must elect and include all such reliefs in one suit, unless leave to omit is obtained––Once such election is made and the suit is filed without claiming other coexistent reliefs, the plaintiff cannot subsequently “shop” for further remedies by instituting a separate suit arising from the same cause of action; any omitted or intentionally relinquished relief would be barred in later proceedings by force of sub-rules (2) and (3) of O. II, R. 2––This bar applies notwithstanding that the earlier suit is pending. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O. II, R. 2––Inheritance dispute––Challenge to family settlement and surrender deeds––Cause of action––Application to facts. Parties, being close family members, were in dispute over the estate of their predecessor-in-interest, Mian Muhammad Sharif––A first suit (filed 12.05.2016) by petitioner No.1 challenged the surrender deed; during its pendency a second suit (filed 16.01.2020) was instituted for declaration, possession and cancellation of the family settlement deed, surrender deed and Hibas––Both instruments (family settlement deed dated 03.08.1991 and surrender deed dated 13.08.1999) were already in existence and available when the first suit was filed; the right to challenge them and seek cancellation flowed from a single cause of action, namely the death and succession of Mian Muhammad Sharif––Held, all such reliefs could and ought to have been claimed in the first suit; having failed to do so, the petitioners were barred by O. II, R. 2 from maintaining the second suit––Learned Additional District Judge rightly held the second suit hit by O. II, R. 2, and the Lahore High Court correctly affirmed that view. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O. II, R. 2, O. VII, R. 11(a) & (d)––Rejection of plaint on ground of bar under O. II, R. 2––Whether recording of evidence is sine qua non. Contention that where a bar under O. II, R. 2 is pleaded, the plaint cannot be rejected under O. VII, R. 11 without framing a preliminary issue and recording evidence, was repelled––Held, the primary question in applying O. II, R. 2 is whether the causes of action in the two suits are the same; this can, and ordinarily should, be determined from the averments and “proposed evidence” discernible from the plaints themselves, without recording oral evidence––Where from the pleadings it is clear that the same cause of action is being split and the omitted relief could have been claimed earlier, the subsequent suit is barred and the plaint is liable to rejection under O. VII, R. 11(d) CPC––Recording of evidence is not a mandatory pre-condition in every case; the procedure under O. II, R. 2 read with O. VII, R. 11 is intended to be summary, to prevent multiplicity and vexation––Earlier observations suggesting that evidence must always be recorded (e.g. certain readings of Jeewan Shah v. Muhammad Shah, PLD 2006 SC 202) were explained as not laying down an inflexible rule; what is required is careful examination of the plaint and record, which was duly undertaken by the courts below––Reliance placed, inter alia, on M/s Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation v. Abdus Sattar (PLD 1985 Kar 481), PLD 1966 Kar 126 and PLD 1948 PC 131. (e) Result. The second suit filed by the petitioners having been rightly held barred under Order II Rule 2 CPC, rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 by the Additional District Judge, as upheld by the Lahore High Court, called for no interference––Civil Petition dismissed; leave to appeal declined; impugned judgment affirmed; no order as to costs.