Summary: Mental Health Ordinance, 2001 (Ordinance No.VIII of 2001) Mental health jurisdiction is a shield for the vulnerable, not a sword for the greedy. Judicial examination affirmed the father's competence thrice. Property conflicts cannot masquerade as guardianship claims. Appeal dismissed in circumstances. 100Writ Petition- Service- Miscellaneous 8215-25 HAFIZ AHMED RAZA VS GOVT. OF PUNJAB ETC. Mr. Justice Anwaar Hussain 02- 12- 2025 2025 LHC 7020

Summary: 1. In a suit for pre-emption, proving the chain of source of information is essential. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, in a series of pronouncements, has consistently discussed and affirmed this requirement, and it now stands as a settled principle of law that the chain of source of information must be established. Latest in the series is 2024 SCMR 692. 2. Specific portion of house where the information was received by the pre-emptor is not mentioned in the plaint. 3. Personal service of the respondent is necessary to prove Talb-i-Ishhad. 98STR (Sales Tax Reference) 71-22 CIR MULTAN VS M/S REDCO ENTERPRISES FAISALABAD Mr. Justice Asim Hafeez 02- 12- 2025 2025 LHC 7310

Summary: ----S.17---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Custody of minor---Minor brought up by foster parents---Guardian court handing over custody to real parents---Legality---Welfare of minor, importance of--- ‘Voice of the child’/ ‘Intelligent preference of child’, consideration of---Minor preferring staying with foster parents---High Court handed back custody of minor to foster parents---Facts: Respondents Nos. 3 & 4 (real parents) had, by consent, handed over custody of their minor son (about 13 years old) to the petitioners (foster parents/close relatives) who brought him up for about 9 years; the real parents filed an application for custody, which was allowed by the Guardian Court (with a meeting schedule), and the appeal was dismissed by the District Court, whereupon the petitioners invoked constitutional jurisdiction---Issue: “Whether the Guardian Court and Appellate Court acted illegally or with material irregularity by granting custody to the biological parents without meaningfully ascertaining and weighing the minor’s ‘intelligent preference’?”---Held: High Court while weighing upon the intelligent preference of the minor/voice of the child asked the minor as to his preference that which set of parents he wishes to reside with, upon which he in unequivocal and clear terms deposed that he wished to reside with the petitioners (foster parents)---Courts below also ignored the fact that respondent No.4 was a multi-married man having thirteen children and it would not have been safe to send the minor to such a big family who were all alien to him---Welfare of the minor lay with the petitioners (foster parents)---Courts below wrongly handed over custody of minor to real parents---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890)--- ----S.17---Custody of a minor---Appointment of a guardian---Guidelines provided---The primary and the fore most consideration for taking a decision qua custody of minor is his/her welfare---While determining the welfare of the minor, factors to be considered include the age, sex and religion of the minor, character and capacity of the proposed guardian, his/her nearness of the kin with the minor, wishes, if any, of the deceased parents (if the parents of the minor are not alive) and the existing relationship of the proposed guardian with the minor---Apart from the above, the court can consider the intelligent preference of the minor, if the minor is old enough---The courts while determining the welfare of the minor can ignore the fact that father is the natural guardian or the mother has the right of Hizanat. Raja Muhammad Owais v. Mst. Nazia Jabeen and others 2022 SCMR 2123; Mst. Beena v. Raja Muhammad and others PLD 2020 SC 508; Rashid Hussain v. Additional District Judge, Islamabad (East) and others PLD 2022 SC 32; Mir Bat Khan v. Mst Sherin Bibi and others 2019 SCMR 520; Shabana Naz v. Muhammad Saleem 2014 SCMR 343; Mehmood Akhtar v. District Judge, Attock and 2 others 2004 SCMR 1839; Badruddin Roshan v. Mst. Razia Sultana and another 2002 SCMR 371; Mst. Nighat Firdous v. Khadim Hussain 1998 SCMR 1593 and Dr. Muhammad Asif v. Dr. Sana Sattar and others CRP No.458 of 2024 in CPLA No. 2514 of 2014 rel. (c) Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890)--- ----S.17---Custody of a minor---Minor brought up by foster parents---Real parents claiming custody---Welfare of minor, consideration of---Scope---When a comparison is made between the real parents and the foster parents qua custody of the minor, the real parents have a preferential right, however the primary consideration for determining the custody of the minor is his welfare. Shoaib Akram Bhalli for Petitioners. Ch. Ali Hassan Jajja for Respondents Nos. 3 and 4. Date of hearing: 28th November, 2025.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----Ss.5, Sched. & 9(1) ---Suit for dissolution of marriage, maintenance, recovery of dowry articles and delivery expenses---Right to file written statement struck off---Fire incident in court premises on the date fixed for filing written statement---Effect---Where earlier date becomes in fructuous due to court not functioning due to fire incident---Right to fair trial---Scope---Facts:---In the present constitutional petition, the petitioner/defendant challenged the Family Court’s order whereby his right to file a written statement was closed; the petitioner/defendant was initially proceeded ex parte and later appeared, and his application to set aside ex parte proceedings was allowed subject to costs, with the case fixed for written statement---Due to a fire incident in the building, the case was adjourned, when the written statement and costs were not submitted and the right was closed---Issue: “Whether, in these circumstances, the Family Court lawfully and judiciously exercised its discretion under Section 9(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1964 in closing the petitioner’s right to file the written statement, or whether the order was passed without proper application of mind and in derogation of the right of fair trial?”---Held: Ex-parte proceedings previously initiated against the petitioner/defendant were set-aside on 15.10.2025 and matter was adjourned to 25.10.2025 for submission of written statement and payment of costs, however, on the adjourned date due to previous outbreak fire on 16.10.2025 in the building, where court was situated, the case was adjourned for 19.11.2025, when said right had been closed---Thus, practically, 19.11.2025 was the first date fixed for filing of written statement as on the previous date fixed on 25.10.2025, court work was not possible as per showing of the court order itself that case had been adjourned due to outbreak of fire in the building---The counsel for the petitioner on the said adjourned date made a request for adjournment to comply with the previous orders, which was declined and the right of the petitioner was closed, which appeared to be prima facie done in a hasty manner and without appreciation of record and application of mind as the court did not point out in the said order that how many opportunities had been previously granted that were treated as sufficient time and opportunity by the court to proceed against the petitioner---Impugned order prima facie appeared to have been passed in a haste without consultation of record and was a non-speaking order resulting in prejudice to the right of the petitioner of fair trial provided under Art.10-A of the Constitution---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. Mst. Safia Bano and another v. Home Department Government of Punjab through Secretary and others PLD 2021 SC 488 rel. Sajawal v. Judge Family Court, District Multan and another 2020 YLR 359; Hanif Brothers v. Federation of Pakistan and others 1999 CLC 520; Muhammad Shamim Siddiqui v. Mrs. Kausar Aziz 1988 MLD 1613; Sheikh Abdul Majeed v. Tayab Ali 1984 MLD 793; Habib Bank Limited v. Hazrat Hussain 2005 CLD 1541; Muhammad Waseem v. Rehana Kausar and others 2025 LHC 5566 ref. (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.9(1)---Family suit---Written statement, filing of---Statutory timeline, extension of---Scope---In terms of subsection (1) of S.9 of the Family Courts Act, 1964, the defendant in a family suit is required to file written statement within 15-days of his appearance before the court, which time may be extended by the court if the defendant shows sufficient cause that prevented him to file written statement within time. (c) Administration of justice--- ----Mere expediency of a case could not always mean a hasty and hurried decision without application of judicious mind, yet the court where the said decision has been called in question is always competent to see whether the decision issued due to expediency has advanced the cause of justice or has resulted in prejudice to the rights of any party and for that purpose the court has always to keep in mind the two time tested principles that ‘Justice delayed is justice denied’ and ‘Justice hurried is justice buried’ and balance has to be kept between these two principles to avoid prejudice to any party---Hasty decisions that cause prejudice to a party are generally deprecated by courts. Syed Saeed Muhammad Shah and another v. The State 1993 SCMR 550 rel. Rai Sarfraz Ahmed Kharl for Petitioner. Muhammad Osman Khan, Assistant Advocate General Punjab, Syed Ali Allow-u-Din, Syed Imran Ehsan, Ch. Imtiazullah Warraich, Sh. Waseem Ahmed, Aitzaz Aslam Chaudhry, Syed Muhammad Haider Kazmi for Respondents. Mir Haroon-ur-Rasheed, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan for Respondents.

Summary: When a Family Court does not give adequate opportunity to file a written statement, an additional chance should be granted. It emphasized that speeding up a case should not lead to rushed decisions without proper judicial consideration. Courts must ensure that any decision made for the sake of expediency does not cause injustice or prejudice. In doing so, they must balance the principles that "justice delayed is justice denied" and "justice hurried is justice buried." 105Crl. Appeal- Against Acquittal- PPC 360-15 SOHAIL AHMAD SIDDIQUI VS STATE ETC Mr. Justice Sadiq Mahmud Khurram 27- 11- 2025 2025 LHC 8324

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 ----Ss. 7(1), 7(3) & 8---Talaq “in any form whatsoever”---Effectiveness of divorce---Cooling-off period---Revocation within ninety days---Held, S.7 expressly applies to talaq in all forms without distinction, including talaq-e-bidat---Talaq does not take effect automatically upon pronouncement once the statutory mechanism under S.7 is invoked---By virtue of S.7(3), talaq “unless revoked earlier expressly or otherwise” shall not take effect until expiry of ninety days from date notice is delivered to Chairman---Legislative scheme provides reconciliation opportunity and postpones legal effect of divorce regardless of form---Statutory phrase “talaq in any form whatsoever” must be given effective meaning and cannot be rendered redundant by carving out exceptions for talaq-e-bidat---Held further, where right to divorce is delegated to wife, S.8 applies S.7 mutatis mutandis, placing wife in shoes of husband for purposes of notice, effectiveness, and revocation within ninety days---Unconditional delegation includes authority to revoke/withdraw divorce within statutory period; any contrary view would defeat object of S.8 and uniform application of S.7. (b) Talaq-e-bidat ----Applicability of S.7, Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961---Instant triple talaq---Immediate effect claimed---Held, contention that talaq-e-bidat is outside purview of S.7 is untenable in view of express statutory wording and binding precedent---Where talaq deed contains three pronouncements, divorce still remains ineffective until statutory period expires unless revoked earlier---Court reiterated that statutory requirement of ninety-day period under S.7(3) governs effectiveness and safeguards against hasty dissolution consistent with legislative intent. (c) Delegated divorce (Tafweez-e-talaq) ----Unconditional delegation---Power to revoke---Held, once right to divorce is duly delegated to wife, she acquires all rights/powers and bears all obligations/liabilities contemplated by S.7---Consequently, wife can revoke divorce expressly or otherwise within ninety days, exactly as husband can under S.7(3)---Revocation by wife within statutory period held lawful and effective. (d) Constitutional jurisdiction ----Scope of review---Chairman Union/Arbitration Council’s role---Foreign proceedings---Held, validity of Chairman’s disposal order turns on compliance with S.7 framework and admitted fact of withdrawal within ninety days---Subsequent institution of divorce proceedings abroad, timing, or alleged mala fides held irrelevant for purposes of constitutional review and for Chairman’s administrative disposal of proceedings---Chairman and High Court could not go behind admitted revocation and set it aside on perceived intent or foreign litigation. (e) West Pakistan Rules under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 and S.R.O. No.1086(K)/61 dated 09.11.1961 ----Rule 3(b)---Territorial jurisdiction of Chairman/Union Council---Pakistani citizens residing abroad---Functions of Chairman through Pakistan Missions---Held, in case of notice under S.7(1), jurisdiction lies where wife resides at time of pronouncement---Where wife residing abroad, proceedings are to be pursued through concerned Pakistan Mission abroad pursuant to S.R.O. issued under S.2(b) of the Ordinance---Petitioner’s notice before local Chairman in Karachi held not maintainable due to lack of territorial jurisdiction when wife was residing in New York---Proceedings rightly disposed of with direction to approach Pakistan Mission in New York. (f) Delegated divorce and vires challenge ----Effect of non-challenge to S.R.O.---Held, where vires of S.R.O. was not challenged before High Court, constitutional court could not adjudge its legality and was bound to enforce it as operative instrument---In absence of challenge, orders based upon S.R.O. could not be invalidated on that ground. Cited Cases: • Ali Nawaz v. Muhammad Yusuf PLD 1963 SC 51 • Collector of Sales Tax and Central Excise v. Mega Tech (Pvt.) Ltd. 2005 SCMR 1166 • Aziz Ahmad v. Musarat PLD 2025 SC 469 • Roheela Yasmin v. Neelofar Hassan 2017 CLC 516 • Pakistan International Freight Forwarders Association v. Province of Sindh 2017 PTD 1 Disposition: Civil Petition was converted into appeal and dismissed; impugned judgment of High Court of Sindh dated 07.10.2024 was maintained; respondent-wife’s withdrawal/revocation of divorce within ninety days under S.7(3), read with S.8, was upheld and petitioner was held to have to pursue divorce proceedings through Pakistan Mission in New York in terms of Rule 3(b) and S.R.O. No.1086(K)/61 dated 09.11.1961. (Announced 28.11.2025).

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 204---Contempt proceedings---Scope---Grievance of the petitioner, seeking contempt proceedings against officials of Anti-Corruption Establishment/ respondents, was that no legal proceedings had been conducted in light of previous order passed in constitutional petition filed by him---Held: Record (including report/reply submitted on behalf of respondents) revealed that subject-matter was referred by FIA to Anti-Corruption Establishment, then same was referred to the concerned Regional Directorate of Anti-Corruption Establishment for necessary action as per law; inquiry was initiated and entrusted to a Deputy Director (Investigation), Anti-Corruption Establishment, however, the same had been finalized and consigned to the record; copy of final report in said regard had also been produced---Petitioner did not press present petition while reserving his right to avail each and every remedy for redressal of his grievance in accordance with law including moving application to the concerned authority for re-opening as well as change of inquiry---Criminal Original Petition was disposed of accordingly. Shahid Rafique Mayo for Petitioner. Mudassar Naveed Chatha, Additional Advocate General, Punjab along with Ghulam Mursaleen, Deputy Director, ACE Headquarter, Lahore.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: A wife's sworn statement of extreme aversion, coupled with both parties' refusal to reconcile, mandates dissolution under established Islamic and statutory law. The pendency of a declaratory suit challenging the nikahnama does not bar or suspend the wife's right to khula. 116Family 55216/23 Muhammad Imran Vs Mst. Maham Manzoor etc. Mr. Justice Rasaal Hasan Syed 20- 11- 2025 2025 LHC 7793