Summary: Faiza Basir Syed filed a reference application under Section 196 of the Customs Act, 1969, seeking the court's opinion on the liability imposed on her by the Customs Appellate Tribunal. The issue arose after the Customs department attached her property, alleging that she was liable for the customs duties of a company (Oyster Fiberglass Pvt. Ltd.) in which her late mother, Begum Birjees Zaheer Abbas, was a director. The Customs department claimed the company violated SRO 69(I)/1970 by selling raw materials meant for export in the local market, demanding Rs. 94,763,813 in duties and Rs. 25,000,000 in penalties. The Tribunal upheld this liability, including the attachment of Faiza’s property, which her mother had gifted to her in 2001. ---- Issues: 1) Whether the Tribunal erred in holding the applicant liable for the company’s obligations when there was no provision in the Customs Act, 1969 (before the Finance Act, 1999), making company directors liable for customs duties. ---2) Whether the Tribunal correctly imposed liability on the applicant as a legal heir of her mother (Begum Birjees Zaheer Abbas), even though the latter was a director of the company during the relevant period. ---- Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Liability of Company Directors (Pre-Finance Act 1999): The court held that, before the Finance Act, 1999, the Customs Act did not include provisions making company directors personally liable for the company's customs duties. The definition of "defaulter" under Section 2(y) and the relevant provisions were introduced much later and could not be applied retrospectively. The court concluded that the applicant, who resigned as a director in 1992, was not liable for the company's obligations during the relevant period. ---- Legal Heir's Liability: The court found that the Customs Appellate Tribunal had incorrectly imposed liability on Faiza Basir Syed as a legal heir of her mother. While her mother was a director of the company, the property in question was transferred to the applicant in 2001, before the proviso to Section 202(1) of the Customs Act (introduced by the Finance Act, 2007) could apply. The Tribunal's reliance on Customs Recovery Rules, 1992, was misplaced as those rules applied to the "defaulter" named in the demand note, which was not issued to Faiza or her mother. The court concluded that Faiza Basir Syed was not liable for the company’s tax obligations, and the attachment of her property was invalid. The court answered both legal questions in favor of the applicant and set aside the Tribunal’s order. ---- Citations/Precedents: H. M. Extraction Ghee & Oil Industries (Pvt.) Limited v. Federal Board of Revenue, 2019 SCMR 1081 Discussed the stages of tax imposition and liability. Whitney v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1926] A.C. 37 Clarified the distinction between liability and assessment in tax matters.

Summary: Background: The Respondent, Bilal Akbar, imported a vintage Mercedes 300 SE Coupe, Model 1967, into Pakistan and sought exemption from various taxes and duties under SRO 833(I)/2018, claiming that the vehicle fell under the category of vintage cars. The Customs Department, however, refused to release the vehicle, citing a conflict between the SRO and the Import Policy Order 2016, which restricts the import of vehicles older than three years. Bilal Akbar filed a writ petition, and the Single Judge allowed the release of the vehicle. The Customs Department appealed against this decision. ----Issues: 1) Whether the vehicle qualifies for import under SRO 833(I)/2018, which exempts vintage cars from certain duties and taxes. ---2) Whether the Import Policy Order 2016, which prohibits the import of vehicles older than three years, supersedes the SRO. ---3) Whether the Ministry of Commerce had exclusive jurisdiction to regulate vehicle imports, making the release of the vehicle impermissible under the Import Policy Order. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: SRO 833(I)/2018 and Vehicle Import: The court held that while SRO 833(I)/2018 exempts vintage cars from certain duties and taxes, it does not override the Import Policy Order 2016, which governs the importability of vehicles. The import of vehicles more than three years old is prohibited under this policy unless explicitly allowed by the Ministry of Commerce. Import Policy 2016 Precedence: The court reasoned that the Import Policy Order 2016, as issued under the Imports and Exports (Control) Act of 1950, has precedence in determining what vehicles are importable. Since the vehicle in question is older than three years, it could not be imported unless the Ministry of Commerce granted an exception, which had not occurred. Ministry of Commerce's Jurisdiction: The court agreed that the Ministry of Commerce has exclusive jurisdiction over regulating imports and exports, including vintage cars. The Finance Ministry's SRO cannot override the import restrictions placed by the Ministry of Commerce. Outcome: The appeal was allowed, and the order of the Single Judge, which allowed the import of the vehicle, was set aside. The court emphasized that the SRO 833(I)/2018 did not permit the import of vintage cars, and the Import Policy Order 2016's restrictions remained in effect. ----Citations/Precedents: Moin Jamal Abbasi vs. The Federation of Pakistan (2020 PTD 660) Meena Munawar Khan vs. Federation of Pakistan (2021 PTD 407) Imad Samad and others vs. Federation of Pakistan (2021 PTD 2063) Federal Board of Revenue vs. Kh. Saad Saleem (PTCL 2015 CL 313)

Summary: "(1) A statutory tribunal that has been conferred the power to adjudicate a dispute and pass an order on it also has the power to implement that order. Even if this power has not been specifically spelled out in the statute, it must be deemed to have been impliedly conferred upon the statutory tribunal. (2) The Customs Appellate Tribunal has the power to execute orders passed in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under Sections 194-A and 194-B of the Customs Act, 1969. Consequently, since an adequate remedy is provided by law, the writ jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked for executing orders passed by the said Tribunal." ----- Background: The petitioners, involved in the importation of a quantity of gold alleged to be smuggled, along with a vehicle transporting the gold, were subject to seizure by officials of the Customs Collectorate (Enforcement), Lahore. The Collector of Customs (Adjudication), Lahore, ordered the confiscation of the gold and vehicle, with a provision allowing the release of the vehicle upon payment of a redemption fine. The petitioners appealed to the Customs Appellate Tribunal under Section 194-A of the Customs Act, 1969. The Tribunal partially allowed the appeal, ordering the release of certain pieces of gold and the vehicle to its lawful owner upon payment of the fine, while upholding the confiscation of the foreign-origin gold. Both parties subsequently filed references against the Tribunal’s judgment, which were pending before the Lahore High Court. During this period, the petitioners sought enforcement of the Tribunal’s judgment, arguing that no stay had been granted by the High Court. The petitioners’ request for implementation was ignored by the customs officials, leading them to file a writ petition in the Lahore High Court, which was dismissed. The petitioners then approached the Supreme Court, seeking leave to appeal the High Court's decision. ----Issues: 1) Whether the Customs Appellate Tribunal has the authority to execute its own orders under Sections 194-A and 194-B of the Customs Act, 1969. ---2) Whether the writ jurisdiction of the High Court can be invoked to enforce orders passed by the Customs Appellate Tribunal when the Tribunal's orders have not been stayed. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court held that the Customs Appellate Tribunal possesses the inherent authority to execute its orders passed under Sections 194-A and 194-B of the Customs Act, 1969. The Court emphasized that although the Customs Act does not explicitly confer execution powers on the Tribunal, such authority is implied by the principle of statutory construction. This principle, as articulated in judicial precedents and authoritative texts, holds that when a statute confers a substantive power, it also implies the necessary ancillary and incidental powers required to effectively exercise that power. The Court reasoned that without the power to execute its own orders, the Tribunal’s jurisdiction would be rendered ineffective. The ability to enforce its decisions is essential for the Tribunal to fulfill its judicial function. The Court further cited the Vishwabharathi case from a neighboring jurisdiction, which supports the view that statutory tribunals must have the implied power to enforce their orders. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, agreeing with the Lahore High Court’s dismissal of the writ petition, albeit on different legal grounds. The Court clarified that the proper course of action for the petitioners would be to approach the Tribunal for the execution of its judgment rather than seeking redress through the High Court’s writ jurisdiction. ----Citations/Precedents: Sections 194-A and 194-B of the Customs Act, 1969 Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Ed. Commissioner, Khairpur v. Ali Sher Sarki PLD 1971 SC 242 State of Karnataka v. Vishwabharathi House Building Coop. Society (2003) 2 SCC 412 Union of India v. Paras Laminates (1990) 4 SCC 453 Abdul Hafeez Abbasi v. Managing Director, PIAC 2002 SCMR 1034

Summary: Background: These consolidated appeals involve common questions of law regarding the vires (legal validity) of Section 3A of the Federal Excise Act 2005 and the corresponding notification issued by the Federal Government. The section empowered the Federal Government to levy and collect a special excise duty on certain goods. The Lahore High Court upheld the section, while the Sindh High Court declared it void. The appeals were filed by various sugar mills and other companies challenging the imposition and collection of the special excise duty. ----Issues: 1) Whether Section 3A of the Federal Excise Act 2005 constitutes an impermissible and excessive delegation of legislative power to the Federal Government. --2) Whether the notification issued under Section 3A for the collection of special excise duty is valid. --3) Whether the High Courts of Sindh and Lahore had conflicting views on the validity of Section 3A and the notification. ---4) Whether the Sindh High Court was justified in ordering the refund of the special excise duty collected under Section 3A. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Vires of Section 3A and Notification: The Supreme Court held that Section 3A did not constitute an impermissible and excessive delegation of legislative power. The delegation was limited to ancillary and incidental functions, with the legislature itself fixing the rate and categories of goods subject to the duty. The notification issued under Section 3A was deemed valid as it aligned with the legislative intent and guidelines provided in the statute. Binding Nature of Previous Judgments: The Lahore High Court’s judgment upholding Section 3A had attained finality and was binding. The Sindh High Court could not take a contrary view, and its judgment striking down Section 3A was not sustainable. ---Refund of Special Excise Duty: The Supreme Court held that the Sindh High Court was not justified in ordering the refund of the special excise duty. The proper procedure for refund claims was outlined in the Federal Excise Act 2005, which required proof that the duty burden was not passed to consumers. The High Court lacked the jurisdiction to order refunds outside this statutory framework. ---Resolution of Appeals: The appeals challenging the judgment of the Sindh High Court were allowed, setting aside its judgments dated 22.2.2013, 23.12.2013, 11.8.2015, 2.10.2017, and 25.10.2018. The appeal (CA-749/2013) challenging the Lahore High Court's judgment was dismissed, upholding the latter’s decision dated 27.6.2011. ---Citations/Precedents: Shakarganj Sugar Mills and others v. Government of Pakistan and others (PTCL 2012 CL 604) MFMY Industries Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (2015 SCMR 1550) Elahi Cotton Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 1997 SC 582) Pakistan Lawyers Forum and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 2005 SC 719) Lahore Development Authority and others v. Ms. Imrana Tiwana and others (2015 SCMR 1739) Federation of Pakistan and others v. Shaukat Ali Mian and others (PLD 1999 SC 1026) Zaibtun Textile Mills Ltd. v. Central Board of Revenue (PLD 1983 SC 358) The Province of East Pakistan and others v. Sirajul Haq Patwari and others (PLD 1966 SC 854) Mehran Ali and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 1998 SC 1445)

Summary: The petitioners succeeded to substantiate any malafide intention or ulterior motives on the part of SindhGovernment that exemption was granted to provide anypreferential treatment or favoritism nor established that whilegranting exemption to enter into a contract on fulfillment andensuring certain conditions, the Sindh Government wassomewhat engaged or committed any corrupt and fraudulentpractices as defined under clause (q) of Rule 2 of Sindh PublicProcurement Rules 2010. In fact under the G2G contracts, themonitoring task or audit exercise to ensure transparency andfairness or repressing any corrupt and fraudulent practices ismore easygoing and comfortable from both the sides with sheercommitment to religiously fulfill their contractual obligations dueto restraint of double check command in the affairs ongovernment to government level. In the present case, thoughthe respondent No.3 is an autonomous body but it is under theadministrative control of Ministry of Defence Production,Government of Pakistan. On the face of it, this is a Governmentto Government contract and according to the decision taken inthe minutes of meeting, the Sindh Cabinet considered the proposal of Excise, Taxation and Narcotics Control Departmentfor introducing new number plates and according to thedecision, the case of new number plates is to be negotiated, thefeatures of tracker integrated in RFID must be vetted by wellreputed tracking service providers so that the tracker featuresof new number plates could be more effective. It was furtherdecided that all law enforcement agencies must be consultedfor improvised and standard number plates and all legal andadministrative aspects of G2G must be followed in letter andspirit and in the end exemption was granted by the cabinetunder Section 21 of SPPA 2009 which cannot be declaredillegal or contrary to the powers conferred by the statute.The constitution petition isdismissed along with pending application.

Summary: Sindh Entertainment Duty Act, 1958----The plaintiff challenged an entertainment duty demand imposed under the Sindh Entertainments Duty Act, 1958. The plaintiff operates an amusement park and charged an entry ticket fee of Rs. 5, along with an additional Rs. 5 labeled as "utility charges." The Excise & Taxation Department contended that the latter charge constituted an admission fee, evading entertainment duty. Despite the plaintiff's argument that the extra fee covered maintenance costs, the department issued a notice demanding Rs. 11,50,000 in backdated duty and future duty on the additional charge. The plaintiff filed a revision application, which was dismissed, but this was not challenged in the subsequent lawsuit.The central issue revolved around whether the Rs. 5 charged as utility charges attracted entertainment duty. The court, citing the Sindh Entertainments Duty Act, emphasized that the duty applied to all payments for admission to any entertainment. The court concluded that the plaintiff was liable to pay entertainment duty on both the Rs. 5 entry ticket and the additional Rs. 5 utility charges. The dismissal of the revision application was not contested in the lawsuit. Therefore, the court ruled in favor of the department, dismissing the suit.

Summary: [Federal Excise Duty] no excise duty if royalty or franchise is not paid or established.

Summary: Maintainability of suit to challenge an action taken without issuing the prescribed show-cause notice. Rate of Federal Excise Duty applicable to insurance services under section 10 of the Federal Excise Act, 2005 and the effect of Rule 40 of the Federal Excise Rules, 2005.