Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: The scope of exercise of suo motu jurisdiction in time barred Civil Revisions filed under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The effect of re-insertion of Article 162-A in the First Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1908 (Punjab Amendment). Argument of unjust enrichment & its scope. The scope and applicability of Order XXII Rule 10 CPC. 684Land 234510/18 Muhammad Ameer Vs MBR J-VII Punjab Lahore etc Mr. Justice Ch. Sultan Mahmood 27- 02- 2025 2025 LHC

Summary: Where the cancellation report has been prepared and agreed with by the concerned Magistrate, no further investigation can be conducted/carried out. 683Civil Revision 2536722.1214-

Summary: (Against the order/judgment dated 22.01.2025 passed by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, in Crl. Misc. No. 10324-B of 2024). Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 497 & 103---Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997), S.9 (c)---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.164---Recovery of narcotic substances---Bail, grant of---Recovery proceedings---Evidence through modern devices---Video recording not made---Accused was arrested for recovery of 1100 grams of heroin from his possession---Validity---Neither any video in shape of recording and photographs of alleged recovery was collected by police nor any private witness from locality was associated to prove alleged recovery from the possession of accused---Use of modern devices during recoveries, is not merely a procedural formality but a crucial safeguard to protect innocent persons from potential police atrocities---It provides an objective and unbiased account of recovery process, reducing risk of false implications to ensure that rights of accused are protected---In cases of stringent punishment, prosecution must present clear, cogent and reliable evidence to prove guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt---In absence of video evidence and independent witnesses, prosecution's case relied on testimony of police officers involved in raid, which was insufficient to meet required standard of proof---Ultimate incarceration of guilty person could repair the wrong caused by mistaken relief of interim bail granted to him but no satisfactory reparation can be offered to an innocent man for his unjustified incarceration at any stage of case albeit his acquittal in long run---Supreme Court set aside the order passed by High Court and bail after arrest was granted to accused---Petition was allowed. Zahid Sarfaraz Gill v. State 2024 SCMR 934 and Manzoor v. State PLD 1972 SC 81 rel. Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate Supreme Court/ Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner. Rai Akhtar Hussain, Additional PG for the State. Date of hearing: 27th February, 2025.

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 18.11.2023 of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad passed in I.T.R. No. 60 of 2015). Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----S.122---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185 (3)---Re-assessment---Definite information---Credit entries in bank record---Re-assessment of net worth of respondent/taxpayer was set aside by Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue and the order was maintained by High Court---Validity---Re-assessment proceedings were triggered on the basis of bank statement of respondent/taxpayer---All transactions in bank account did not necessarily demonstrate income of respondent/taxpayer, unless it was established that statements and/or entries therein had disclosed information of income which was 'definite'---Banking instrument could not be applied as one having 'definite information'---Neither Commissioner nor Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue and High Court were of the view that all credit entries in statement of account disclosed income of respondent/taxpayer hence it did not constitute 'definite information'---Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue was the last fact finding forum and such question could neither be raised in reference jurisdiction of High Court nor before Supreme Court---Supreme Court declined to interfere with judgment of High Court---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone-I RTO, Rawalpindi v. Messrs Khan CNG Filling Station, Rawalpindi and others 2017 SCMR 1414 and Commissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Bahawalpur v. Messrs Bashir Ahmed (deceased) through L.Rs 2021 SCMR 1290 ref. Dr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court, Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, Director-General (Law), FBR for Petitioner. Nemo for Respondent. Date of hearing: 27th February, 2025.

Summary: (a) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Fiscal laws---Amendment---Retrospective effect---Principle---Where an amendment is brought about in a fiscal statute it should not be given retrospective construction by applying it to past transactions, unless intention is expressed with irresistible clearness---Permissive basis for such legislative action is the fact that taxation is neither a penalty imposed on taxpayer nor a liability which he assumes by contract---It is but a way of apportioning the cost of government among those who in some measure are privileged to enjoy its benefits and must bear its burdens. The Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Mekotex (Pvt.) Limited and others PLD 2024 SC 1168 and Welch v. Henry 305 U.S. 134 (1938) rel. (b) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Proviso---Scope---Proviso may be an exception to the main provision but it cannot be inconsistent to such an extent that it nullifies what is intended by the main provision. (c) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----Ss. 37A & First Schedule, Division VII, Part-I---Intra Court Appeal---Securities, acquiring of---Change in law---Retrospective effect---Scope---Appellant / taxpayer was aggrieved of rate of capital gain tax imposed on disposal of securities held by him---Appellant / taxpayer contended that rates specified in the Table in Division VII, Part I of First Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 at the time of acquisition of securities were applicable---Validity---Notwithstanding the changes brought about in Division VII, Part I of First Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, the legislature through Finance Act, 2024 again revived 0% rate of tax on disposal of securities acquired between 01-07-2022 and 30-06-2024 where holding period exceeded six years---Disposal of securities acquired before 01-07-2013 were again held liable to 0% tax as per second proviso to Division VII, Part I of First Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Amendments so made had completely nullified the effect of offending proviso added to Division VII, Part I of First Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 through Finance Act, 2022---This lent credence to the allegation of discrimination by appellant / taxpayer---In view of amendments made in Division VII, Part I of First Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 up to year 2021 and in year 2024, there did not appear to be any rational basis for giving a different treatment to the disposal of securities acquired before 01-07-2013 through amendments made in Division VII, Part I of First Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 through Finance Act, 2022---Offending proviso to Division VII, Part I of First Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 which had the effect of nullifying the Table and which on textual plane could only be construed as an independent provision stipulating a new tax, could not be inserted in Division VII, Part I of First Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 for burdening appellant / taxpayer with 12.5% tax on capital gain on disposal of securities---The right that had come to vest in appellant / taxpayer for application of 0% tax could not be taken away by proviso to Division VII, Part I of First Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Division Bench of High Court directed Federal Board of Revenue to constitute a Policy Board consisting of experts to render advice on future legislation keeping in view legal and Constitutional principles interpreted and settled by the Courts in order to avoid such legislation being struck down---Division Bench of High Court set aside judgment passed by Judge in Chambers of High Court and constitutional petition filed by appellant / taxpayer was allowed---Division Bench of High Court declared that proviso added to Division VII, Part I of First Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 through Finance Act, 2022 was inoperative on the right of appellant / taxpayer to be applied 0% tax on capital gain arising on the disposal of securities from 01-07-2022 till January 2023---Intra Court Appeal was allowed, in circumstances. Mian Ashiq Hussain, Muhammad Arshad and Muhammad Rameez Arshad for Appellant. Ahmad Pervez for Respondents. Date of hearing: 14th January, 2025.

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 18.11.2023 of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad passed in I.T.R. No. 60 of 2015). Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----S.122---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185 (3)---Re-assessment---Definite information---Credit entries in bank record---Re-assessment of net worth of respondent/taxpayer was set aside by Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue and the order was maintained by High Court---Validity---Re-assessment proceedings were triggered on the basis of bank statement of respondent/taxpayer---All transactions in bank account did not necessarily demonstrate income of respondent/taxpayer, unless it was established that statements and/or entries therein had disclosed information of income which was 'definite'---Banking instrument could not be applied as one having 'definite information'---Neither Commissioner nor Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue and High Court were of the view that all credit entries in statement of account disclosed income of respondent/taxpayer hence it did not constitute 'definite information'---Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue was the last fact finding forum and such question could neither be raised in reference jurisdiction of High Court nor before Supreme Court---Supreme Court declined to interfere with judgment of High Court---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone-I RTO, Rawalpindi v. Messrs Khan CNG Filling Station, Rawalpindi and others 2017 SCMR 1414 and Commissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Bahawalpur v. Messrs Bashir Ahmed (deceased) through L.Rs 2021 SCMR 1290 ref. Dr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court and Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, Director-General (Law), FBR for Petitioner. Nemo for Respondent. Date of hearing: 27th February, 2025.

Summary: (a) Guardians and Wards Act ( VIII of 1890 ) --- ---- S. 25 --- Custody of minor --- Agreement between the parents regarding custody --- Effect --- Custody of minor was concurrently denied to the fatherwhile discarding the agreement qua custody of the minor --- Validity ---Custody of the minor cannot be settled through a private compromise or even by arbitration and (custody) is liable to be determined on the touchstone of the principle of welfare of minor--Neither any agreement qua custody of the minor, which is in derogation of the right of a child with respect to his welfare nor contracting of a second marriage by divorced mother of the child is an impediment for such a mother to retain custody of her child--- Rather, the matter of custody is to be decided on the touchstone of the principle of welfare--- No illegality, infirmity or jurisdictional defect was found in the impugned judgments passed by both the Courts below for the reason that welfare of the minor was prime consideration to decide custody matters--- Constitutional petition, being merit-less , was dismissed, in circumstances. Mst. Beena v. Raja Muhammad and others PLD 2020 SC 508 and Shaista Habib v. Muhammad Arif Habib and others PLD 2024 SC 629 ref. (b) Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890)--- ---- S. 25 --- Custody of minor --- Second marriage of parent --- Welfare of minor --- Scope --- Custody of minor was concurrently denied to the father --- Validity --- Second marriage of a female mother is not an impediment for a mother to retain custody of a child if she is otherwise found suitable for custody of the child on the principle of welfare---In the present case, even the petitioner (father of minor) had contracted second marriage and had a daughter from his existing wife; in such a situation, the minor could not be left at the mercy of a stepmother when the petitioner was a police officer who remained on assignments out of his house for most of the time--- More so, the minor was living with the respondent / mother since his birth and had developed deep love and affection with her and was being raised in a cordial and comfortable atmosphere and was being properly educated --- Minor, having been produced before High Court, candidly stated that he wanted to reside and be raised by his mother --- No illegality, infirmity or jurisdictional defect was noticed in the impugned judgments for the reason that welfare of the minor was prime consideration to decide custody matters--- Constitutional petition, being merit-less, was dismissed, in circumstances. Muhammad Younas Bhullar for Petitioner. Ch. Muhammad Asghar Bhullar for Respondent No. 3. Date of hearing: 27th February, 2025. Judgment ABID HUSSAIN CHATTHA, J.--- This constitutional Petition is directed against the impugned Judgments and Decrees dated 11.03.2022 and 18.10.2022 passed by Judge Guardian Court and Additional District Judge, Pattoki, District Kasur, respectively. 2. Precisely, the Petitioner instituted a Custody Petition under Section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 against Respondent No. 3 (the "Respondent") seeking custody of Rehan Amjad (the "Minor") on the grounds that Para 357 of the Muhammadan Law entitles him to seek custody of the Minor son who is beyond seven years of age; and the Respondent herself executed an agreement agreeing to handover custody of the Minor in case of second marriage which she has contracted which also attracts Para 354 of the Muhammadan Law disentitling the Respondent from retaining custody of the Minor upon her second marriage. 3. The claim was resisted by the Respondent. The Trial Court after framing of issues and recording of evidence dismissed Custody Petition of the Petitioner and chalked out a visitation schedule in his favour. The Petitioner preferred an Appeal but the same was also dismissed. 4. The Courts below while determining welfare of the Minor on the basis of evidence on record discarded the agreement qua custody of the Minor on the ground that custody of the Minor cannot be settled through a private compromise or even by arbitration and is liable to be determined on the touchstone of the principle of welfare. It was also noted that it is trite law that second marriage of a female is not an impediment for a mother to retain custody of a child if she is otherwise found suitable for custody of the child on the principle of welfare. This is particularly so when in the present case even the Petitioner has contracted second marriage and has a daughter from his existing wife. Rather, the Petitioner has presently contracted his 4th marriage with one Shahnaz Bibi and in such a situation, the Minor cannot be left at the mercy of a stepmother when the Petitioner is a police officer who remains on assignments out of his house for most of the time. More so, the Minor is living with the Respondent since his birth and has developed deep love and affection with her who is being raised in a cordial and comfortable atmosphere and is being properly educated. 5. It is importantly noted that in compliance with the Order dated 06.02.2024, the Minor was produced and he was examined by this Court. He candidly stated that he is studying in Class-V in J.W Grammar School, Phool Nagar and wants to reside and be raised by his mother. Hence, this Court finds no illegality, infirmity or jurisdictional defect in the impugned Judgments for the reasons that welfare of the Minor is prime consideration to decide custody matters. Neither any agreement qua custody of the Minor which is in derogation of the right of a child with respect to his welfare nor contracting of a second marriage by divorced mother of the child are impediments for such a mother to retain custody of her child. Rather, the matter of custody is to be decided on the touchstone of the principle of welfare. Reliance is placed on cases titled, "Mst. Beena v. Raja Muhammad and others" (PLD 2020 SC 508) and "Shaista Habib v. Muhammad Arif Habib and others" (PLD 2024 SC 629). 6. In view of the above, this constitutional Petition, being devoid of any merit, is dismissed, accordingly. MQ/A-15/L Petition dismissed.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----Ss.12(2) & 115---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss.3, 5, 29 & First Sched., Art. 162-A---Civil revision filed beyond prescribed period of limitation---Maintainability---Suo motu revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, exercise of---Scope---Civil revision barred by time---Condonation of delay, seeking of---Petitioner's (vendee's) agreement to sell based on chain of previous agreements to sell---Withdrawal of suits by parties to previous agreement breaking the chain of subsequent agreements---The present case revolved around a commercial property regarding which the petitioner (subsequent vendee) claimed specific performance of an agreement to sell---However, the situation was layered with three agreements, three suits, and multiple orders which were put to challenge through the present civil revision, thereby creating a complex web of transactions and litigation---The intricate and multifaceted facts of the case primarily based on a chain of agreements to sell included the "first agreement" dated 15.12.2004 executed between respondent Nos.3 and 4 (original owners)and the respondent No. 2 (vendee of the first agreement); second agreement dated 26.02.2007 was executed by respondent No.2 (vendee of the first agreement) in favor of respondent No. 1 (vendee of the second agreement); whereas, petitioner's agreement dated 06.03.2008 was executed by respondent No.1 (vendee of the second agreement) in favor of the petitioner (subsequent vendee)---As far as litigation timeline was concerned, first suit was filed on 12.05.2005 by respondent No.2 (vendee of the first agreement) for specific performance of the first agreement (against respondent Nos.3 and 4 (original owners); petitioner's suit was filed on 07.05.2010 for specific performance based on his own agreement (third agreement); and third suit was filed on 19.06.2010 by the respondent Nos.3 and 4(original owners)against both respondent No.2 (vendee of the first agreement) and the petitioner (subsequent vendee), seeking declaration and cancellation of all agreements---Application under O.VII Rule 7 C.P.C. was filed by respondents Nos.3 and 4 (original owners) in petitioner's suit, seeking rejection of plaint on the ground that a mere agreement to sell was not enforceable which application was allowed by the Trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 14.12.2013, resulting in rejection of plaint---On the same day of the judgment dated 14.12.2013 whereby plaint was rejected, both the 'first suit' (by respondent No.2) and 'third suit' (by respondent Nos.3 and 4/original owners) were withdrawn---Respondent No.2 (vendee of the first agreement) stated he received Rs. 20 million back and thus no longer wanted to pursue the first agreement which meant that all prior agreements lost their basic ground and footing---Subsequently, on the basis of withdrawal of the suits mentioned above, petitioner filed an application under S.12(2), C.P.C. alleging fraud and collusion between respondent No.2 (vendee of the first agreement) and respondent Nos.3 and 4 (original owners) to destroy the chain of agreements by unjustly enriching themselves, which application of the petitioner was dismissed by the Trial Court vide order dated 08.01.2016---Subsequently, petitioner filed the present civil revision petition on 25.03.2017, challenging the orders dated 14.12.2013 and 08.01.2016---Along with the civil revision, petitioner also filed applications under Ss. 5, 14, 18 of the Limitation Act, 1908 seeking condonation of delay and/or suo motu revisional relief under S.115, C.P.C---The core question for consideration by the High Court in the present civil revision was as to "whether the High Court could exercise its suo motu revisional jurisdiction under S.115 of C.P.C to set aside time-barred orders, particularly where the petitioner, relying on a chain of agreements and alleging fraud, collusion, and unjust enrichment, failed to seek timely legal remedy or establish sufficient cause for condonation of delay under the Limitation Act, 1908?---Held: On the date of filing of the present application i.e. 25.03.2017, the amendment introduced for insertion of Art.162-A in the First Schedule of Limitation Act,1908 was not in field as it was re-inserted by Limitation (Punjab Amendment) Act, 2018 (VIII of 2018), published in Punjab Gazette (extraordinary dated: 20.03.2018)---Thus, the application under S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 was caught by mischief of S.29 read with S.3 of the Limitation Act, 1908 due to settled position of law that the institution of the suit carried with it the implication that all rights of appeal or revision then in force were preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit and a right to file an appeal or revision, if so conferred by the statute, accrued to the litigant and existed as on and from the date when the lis commenced and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced, such right was to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevailed at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal or revision---There were two aspects to the jurisdiction of the revisional court, firstly, where the revisional court itself took cognizance of a matter while exercising its suo motu powers under S.115(1) of the C.P.C, and secondly, where a person brought the matter to the notice of the revisional court under the first proviso to S.115(1) ibid---This bifurcation was significant, the matter was only between the revisional court and the subordinate court when the court itself invoked its revisional jurisdiction, however, in the second instance, it was essentially adversarial litigation---It was thus clear that revisional court was not mandated to entertain every passionate prayer for exercise of its suo motu jurisdiction under S.115 of the C.P.C---Scope of interference for exercising suo motu jurisdiction had further been thinned by insertion of Art.162-A, in the First Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1908 in Punjab---Petitioner was asked to explain as to what precluded the applicant/petitioner from filing the captioned civil revision petition immediately after 17.12.2016, when application under S.12(2), C.P.C. and S.151, C.P.C. were dismissed by the civil court, as it is trite law that delay of each and every day has to be explained---In response the learned counsel submitted that since the revision petition was within time from the order dated 17.12.2016, therefore, this delay could be condoned---This was not a plausible answer entitling the indulgence of the High Court---Perusal of the prayer clause revealed that the order dated 17.12.2016 was not subject of challenge of the revision petition and instead, the challenge was laid to orders dated 14.12.2013 & 08.01.2016---The delay of each and every day consumed for approaching the court beyond the period of limitation had to be explained but in this case there was no explanation for such long delay---Moreover, in the present case, the applicant/petitioner had not laid any such claim of restitution, therefore, High Court was not inclined to treat the ground of unjust enrichment as a basis for exercising suo motu revisional jurisdiction as divulging into such question at this stage might prejudice anyone's case, if a separate suit was advised for restitution---There were no grounds for invoking suo motu jurisdiction of the High Court in terms of S.115 C.P.C, nor the petitioner was able to make out a case for condonation of delay---Application for condonation of delay being meritless was dismissed, in sequel to which, revision petition was dismissed being barred by time, in circumstances. Colonial Sugar Refining Company Limited v. Irving 1905 SC 369; Muhammad Ishaq v. The State PLD 1956 SC 256; Idrees Ahmad and others v. Hafiz Fida Ahmad Khan and 4 others PLD 1985 SC 376; West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation v. Rashid Ahmad and another 1988 SCMR 526; Hafeez Ahmed's case PLD 2012 SC 400; Ghulam Qadir and others v. Sh. Abdul Wadood and others PLD 2016 SC 712; Khan Bahadur Khan v. Khan Malook Khan PLD 2022 SC 482; Saqib Ali v. Government of Punjab and others 2023 PLC (C.S.) 310; Shahin Shah v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Irrigation Department, Peshawar and others 2022 SCMR 1810; Lal Khan through Legal Heirs v. Muhammad Yousaf through Legal Heirs PLD 2011 SC 657 and Qaisar Mushtaq Ahmad v. Controller of Examination and others PLD 2011 SC 174 rel Muhammad Saif Ullah Khan v. Lahore Development Authorities PLD 2021 Lah. 168 ref (b) Limitation--- ----True import of statute of limitation---Significance and essence---The law of limitation is a statute of repose, designed to quieten title and to bar stale and water-logged disputes and was to be strictly complied with---There is no scope in law of limitation for any equitable or ethical construction to get over them---Justice, equity and good conscience do not override the law of limitation---The hurdles of limitation cannot be crossed under the guise of any hardships or imagined inherent discretionary jurisdiction of the Court---Ignorance, negligence, mistake or hardship does not save limitation, nor does poverty of the parties---There is absolutely no room for the exercise of any imagined judicial discretion vis-a-vis interpretation of a provision, whatever hardship may result from following strictly the statutory provision---The court cannot claim any special inherent equity jurisdiction---The law of limitation is an artificial mode conceived to terminate justiciable disputes---It is therefore to be construed strictly with a leaning to benefit the suitor. Khan Bahadur Khan v. Khan Malook Khan PLD 2022 SC 482 and Khushi Muhammad through L.Rs and others v. Mst. Fazal Bibi and others PLD 2016 SC 872 rel. (c) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----S.5---Condonation of delay, seeking of---Whether wrong advice of counsel constitutes a sufficient cause?---Held: Mistaken advice of counsel does not constitute a sufficient cause for condonation of delay as a matter of course and routine nor is it automatic and per se, rather the party has to specify the reasons with clarity and precision which prevailed with the counsel and led him to commit the mistake and such application must also be supported by an affidavit. Khushi Muhammad through L.Rs and others v. Mst. Fazal Bibi and others PLD 2016 SC 872 rel. (d) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----S.3---It is duty of every Court and forum itself to look into the question of limitation irrespective of the fact whether any objection in this regard has been raised or not. Hakim Muhammad Buta and another v. Habib Ahmad and others PLD 1985 SC 153; Ahsan Ali and others v. District Judge and others PLD 1969 SC 167; Syed Iftikhar Hussain v. Ijaz Ahmad Cheema and another 1996 SCMR 943; Dilmir v. Ghulam Muhammad and 2 others PLD 2002 SC 403; Haji Ghulam Rasul and others v. Government of the Punjab through Secretary, Auqaf Department, Lahore and others 2003 SCMR 1815; Almas Ahmad Fiaz v. Secretary Government of the Punjab Housing and Physical Planning Development, Lahore 2006 SCMR 783; Muhammad Sami v. Additional District Judge, Sargodha and 2 others 2007 SCMR 621 and Government of N-W.F.P. and others v. Akbar Shah and others 2010 SCMR 1408 rel: (e) Limitation--- ----The delay of each and every day consumed for approaching the court beyond the period of limitation has to be explained. (f) Limitation--- ----Void order---Scope---Even a void order has to be assailed within the period of limitation prescribed by law. Chief Engineer, Gujranwala Electric Power Company (GEPCO), Gujranwala v. Khalid Mehmood and others 2023 PLC 65; Muhammad Sharif and others v. MCB Bank Limited and others 2021 SCMR 1158; Abid Hussain v. Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Government of Pakistan through Chief of Air Staff, Islamabad 2021 SCMR 645; Haji Wajdad v. Provincial Government through Secretary Board of Revenue Government of Balochistan, Quetta and others 2020 SCMR 2046; Ghulam Hussain Ramzan Ali v. Collector of Customs (Preventive), Karachi 2015 PTD 107; Ghulam Hussain Ramzan Ali v. Collector of Customs (Preventive), Karachi 2014 SCMR 1594; General (R.) Parvez Musharraf v. Nadeem Ahmed (Advocate) and another PLD 2014 SC 585 and Blue Star Spinning Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Sales Tax and others 2013 SCMR 587 rel. (g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.115---Suo motu revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, exercise of---Doctrine of 'unjust enrichment'---Ground for interference---Validity, essence and scope---In common law systems, five key questions underpin the 'skeleton of principle' on which the law of unjust enrichment and restitution are based: (i) was the payment received by mistake; (ii) was the defendant enriched; (iii) at the expense of the plaintiff; (iv) in the circumstances where there is a recognized reason (an 'unjust factor') why the defendant should not be permitted to retain the benefit; and (v) is there a defence?---Unjust enrichment occurs when a person retains money or benefits which in justice, equity and good conscience, belong to someone else---The doctrine of unjust enrichment, therefore, is that no person can be allowed to enrich inequitably at the expense of another---A right of recovery under the doctrine of "unjust enrichment" arises where retention of a benefit is considered contrary to justice or against equity---Unjust enrichment is, inter alia, anchored in fundamental preambular constitutional value of economic justice---The Constitution abhors any form of economic exploitation---Unjust enrichment is an edifice for laying a claim of restitution; involving factual determinations after granting an opportunity to the defendant---In the present case, the applicant/petitioner did not lay any such claim of restitution, therefore, the High Court was not inclined to treat the ground of unjust enrichment as a basis for exercising suo motu revisional jurisdiction as divulging into such question at this stage might prejudice anyone's case, if a separate suit was advised for restitution---Application for condonation of delay being meritless was dismissed, in sequel to which, revision petition was dismissed being barred by time, in circumstances. Messrs Pfizer Laboratories Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1998 SC 64 and Orient Power Company (Private) Limited v. Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited 2021 SCMR 1728 rel. Sui Northern Gas Pipelines v. Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue and others 2014 PTD 1939 ref. (h) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O.XXII, R 10---Assignment or creation of any interest during pendency of suit---Validity and effect---Rule 10 of O.XXII, C.P.C postulates that in case of an assignment or creation of any interest during pendency of suit, the suit may, by leave of the court, be continued by or against the person to or upon whom such interest has devolved---Sine qua non for such right would be an acceptance by a litigant party that it has transferred or assigned its interest to the applicant seeking leave of the court for continuation of the suit---For invoking this rule in an appeal or revision, the assignment, transfer or devolution must take place during pendency of appeal or revision. (i) Precedent--- ----A case is only authority for what it actually decides and cannot be cited as precedent for a proposition that may be inferred from it. Syed Hammad Nabi and others v. Inspector General of Police Punjab, Lahore and others 2023 SCMR 584; Quinn v Leathem 1901 AC 495; Trustees of the Port of Karachi v. Muhammad Saleem 1994 SCMR 2213; Sindh High Court Bar Association through its Secretary and another v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary. Ministry of Law and Justice, Islamabad and others PLD 2009 SC 879 rel. Barrister Syed Ali Nouman Shah, Mohsin Raza Bhatti and Arslan Aamir Tarar for Petitioner. Umair Ali for Respondent No. 1. Nemo for Respondents Nos. 2 to 4. Date of hearing: 27th February, 2025. Judgment Khalid Ishaq, J .--- Since the captioned Civil Revision is barred by limitation and the petitioner has filed an application for condonation of delay (C.M. No. 01 of 2017), therefore, it is appropriate to decide the same at the outset. C.M No. 01 of 2017. 2. This is an application under sections 5, 14 and 18 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (Limitation Act), read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (C.P.C). The relief claimed through this application is twofold; condonation of delay; and/or exercise of suo motu revisional jurisdiction by this Court in terms of section 115 of the C.P.C. 3. The learned counsel for the applicant/petitioner vociferously argued that the proceedings conducted by the learned Civil Judge, Lahore (the "Lower Court") are depleted of patent illegalities and material irregularities floating on the face of the record; adds that the Lower Court has failed to arrest contraptions of abuse of process of law, which resulted into arbitrary, capricious and unlawful orders passed by it. Further submits that the collusive and questionable conduct of the then counsel for the applicant/petitioner, evidently in league with the beneficiaries, in utter disregard of professional ethics, due care and prudence expected from a professional are such glaring anomalies, which call for invocation of suo motu revisional jurisdiction of this Court. In order to substantiate his submissions, the learned counsel has heavily relied upon Hafeez Ahmad and Khan Bahadur's cases. 4. In order to deal with the ardent quest of the learned counsel for setting up a case for exercise of suo motu jurisdiction, it is imperative to explicate following admitted facts at the outset: i) Gleaned from the record, it is evident that the captioned civil revision petition, which calls into question the orders dated 14.12.2013 and 08.01.2016, was filed on 25.03.2017. In essence, the main thrust of applicant/petitioner's challenge is directed against order dated 14.12.2013. However, even by taking a lenient view, if the limitation is computed from order dated 08.01.2016, it is still barred by more than 11 months. ii) Civil Revision has arisen out of a suit for specific performance of agreement to sell dated 06.03.2008 (Petitioner's Agreement) regarding commercial property No. 29-C-A/3, Gulberg-II, Commercial Zone, Liberty Market, Lahore (Suit Property). As per contents of the plaint filed by the present petitioner, Petitioner's Agreement was executed by Respondent No.1 (Rana Khalid Mehmood) for a total consideration of Rs.155,000,000/-, out of which Rs. 50,000,000/- were paid as earnest money by the applicant/petitioner. It is pertinent to note that Rana Khalid Mehmood executed Petitioner's Agreement on the basis of an earlier agreement to sell dated 26.02.2007 executed in his favour (2nd Agreement) by Respondent No.2 (Ch. Waqas Ali). This chain of transactions does not end here; record depicts that the basis of execution of 2nd Agreement by Ch. Waqas Ali, was an earlier agreement to sell dated 15.12.2004 (1st Agreement) executed in favour of Ch. Waqas Ali, by respondents Nos. 3 and 4, namely Zaka Ullah Ranjha and Mst. Attiqa Rasheed (Original Owners). iii) On 12.05.2005, Ch. Waqas Ali filed a suit for specific performance of 1st Agreement against the Original Owners, titled "Ch. Waqas Ali v. Zaka Ullah Ranjha etc." (1st Suit). It was during the pendency of 1st Suit that 2nd Agreement was executed and, on the basis thereon, the Petitioner's Agreement was penned in the form of an assignment in favour of present applicant/petitioner, who also filed a suit for specific performance regarding the Suit Property on 07.05.2010 titled "Haji Mehboob Alam v. Zaka Ullah Ranjha etc." (Petitioner's Suit). At this juncture, the Original Owners too joined the pending litigation by filing a suit for declaration and permanent injunction on 19.06.2010, titled "Zaka Ullah Ranjha etc. v. Ch. Waqas Ali etc." (3rd Suit), seeking cancellation of all three Agreements. iv) During the pendency of Suits, on 05.07.2012 an application in terms of Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C was brought by the Original Owners (defendants of the Petitioner's Suit), seeking rejection of petitioner's plaint on the ground that since Petitioner's Suit is based on a mere agreement to sell, therefore, the same is barred by law. This application under Order VII, Rule 11 was allowed by the Lower Court and consequently the Petitioner's plaint was rejected vide judgment and decree dated 14.12.2013 (1st Judgment and Decree). Petitioner assailed 1st Judgment and Decree by filing an appeal, bearing R.F.A. No. 07 of 2014 titled "Haji Mehboob Alam v. Zaka Ullah Ranjha and others" (First Appeal), which was dismissed by a learned Division Bench of this Court on 26.05.2014 (Appellate Order), upholding the 1st Judgment and Decree. The applicant/petitioner sought recalling of the Appellate Order by filing a Review Petition under Section 114, read with Order XLVII Rules 1 and 2 of C.P.C bearing Review Application No.17-C of 2014 (Review Petition), which too was dismissed by the learned Division Bench on 22.02.2017 (Order in Review). (Learned counsel for the petitioner informed that the petitioner has challenged the Order in Review by filing CPLA No. 1185-L/2017, which is pending before the Supreme Court of Pakistan). v) On the fateful day of 1st Judgment and Decree i.e. 14.12.2013, when the applicant/petitioner's plaint was rejected, the remaining two suits i.e. 1st Suit for specific performance filed by Ch. Waqas Ali (Respondent No. 2 herein) and the 3rd Suit for cancellation filed by the Original Owners (Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 herein) was dismissed as withdrawn (Withdrawal Order). The learned counsel for the applicant/petitioner has attempted to impugn this arrangement brought about by the Original Owners and Ch. Waqas Ali, contending that Withdrawal Order on the basis of statements of Ch. Waqas Ali, stating to have received back his total earnest money amounting to Rupees Twenty Million from Original Owners, paving way for cancellation of the 1st Agreement, was designed to fail all subsequent agreements. It is on this premise alone that the learned counsel for the applicant/petitioner has ventured to make out a case of 'unjust enrichment' by contending that since Ch. Waqas Ali had already received Rupees twenty-five Million from Rana Khalid Mehmood by executing 2nd Agreement on the basis of 1st Agreement, therefore his conduct of withdrawal of his rights qua 1st Agreement is an uncalled-for act resulting in unjust enrichment. vi) It was in the above background that on 03.09.2014, the present petitioner filed an application under Section 12(2), C.P.C 12(2) Application) seeking setting-aside of Withdrawal Order, on the ground of having been procured and issued on the basis of fraud committed upon the petitioner by the Original Owners and Ch. Waqas Ali. However, said 12(2) Application was dismissed by the Lower Court vide order dated 08.01.2016 (impugned herein). The applicant/petitioner sought recalling of 12(2) Order by filing an application under Section 151 of the C.P.C before the Lower Court, which had earlier dismissed 12(2) Application on merits. Ironically, contents and prayer of this application filed under Section 151, C.P.C depict as an application for restoration of 12(2) Application. This application under Section 151, C.P.C was dismissed vide order dated 17.12.2016. Hence this petition. 5. Following relief has been claimed through captioned revision petition: "In the light of the facts mentioned herein above it is therefore most humbly prayed that the revision petition may kindly be allowed and the impugned order dated 14.12.2023 and 08.01.2016 may kindly be set-aside." 6. Learned Counsel for the applicant/petitioner was confronted as to the core question of maintainability of the application, for the reason that on the date of filing of this application (25.03.2017), the amendment introduced for insertion of Article 162-A in the First Schedule of Limitation Act was not in field as it was re-inserted by Limitation (Punjab Amendment) Act 2018 (VIII of 2018), Published in Punjab Gazette (extraordinary dated:20th March, 2018). Thus, the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act is caught by mischief of section 29 read with Section 3 of the Limitation Act due to settled position of law that the institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal or revision then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit and a right to file an appeal or revision, if so conferred by the statute, accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date when the lis commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced, such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal or revision. In response, the learned counsel for the applicant/petitioner was at loath to cross this bridge, however, he eloquently sought refuge in his endeavor to plead the exercise of suo motu revisional jurisdiction of this Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also made his best to resort to the provisions contained in Order XXII Rule 10 of the C.P.C to argue that since an interest and right had come to vest in the applicant/ petitioner by virtue of Petitioner's Agreement, which right, per counsel, is essentially an assignment, therefore, the Lower Court was required to continue with the Suit despite the fact that Ch. Waqas Ali and Original Owners had joined hands and sought withdrawal of the First Suit. Places reliance upon number of judgments to support his contention. 7. Arguments heard. Record perused. 8. Considering the record of the case and arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the applicant/petitioner, following questions arise for determination by this Court: Hafeez Ahmad's ratio decidendi and its applicability to the case in hand: It is settled by respectable authority that a case is only authority for what it actually decides and cannot be cited as precedent for a proposition that may be inferred from it. Considering the foregoing, one cannot escape to consider the facts which necessitated formation of larger bench of the Supreme Court for determinations handed by Hafeez Ahmed's case; the ratio of Hafeez Ahmad is unequivocally clear for its facts. At the relevant time the docket of the Supreme Court was inundated by the petitions involving questions arising from civil revisions filed in High Courts beyond the period of ninety days, which were all dismissed without exclusion of time consumed for obtaining certified copies. The Hon'ble larger bench assembled '[t]o consider 'inter alia whether the time consumed for obtaining certified copies of the judgment, decree or other documents could be excluded under section 12 read with section 29 of the Limitation Act'. The submissions of the learned counsel also revolved around the same premise. It does not mean that their lordships confined the scope of suo motu exercise of revisional jurisdiction only to those cases where the objection to limitation has surfaced due to delay caused in procuring certified copies of the orders, decrees or documents. Indeed, the contours of revisional jurisdiction have not been construed such stringently by their lordships, which may lead to inference of rendering suo motu exercise of revisional jurisdiction as almost nonexistent. Their lordships had upheld the consistent view of the Supreme Court that the revisional jurisdiction is preeminently corrective and supervisory, the function of the revisional court is to ensure the administration of justice through proper exercise of jurisdiction by procedural accuracy, correctness of the decision and legality thereof by the subordinate Court, therefore, there is no harm if the Court seized of a revision petition, exercises its suo motu Jurisdiction to correct the errors of jurisdiction committed by the subordinate Courts. With great respect, the predominant premise of Hafeez Ahmad is twofold; firstly, the Hon'ble bench hearing Hafeez Ahmad was cognizant of an undisputed fact that since the timeframe of three (3) days for supply of certified copies, as couched in second proviso to clause(c) of subsection (1) of section 115 of the C.P.C, was not adhered to in every other case by the subordinate courts, thus without any fault of the revision petitioners, they were knocked out for filing revisions beyond the statutory period of limitation; secondly, since their lordships were cognizant of the consequences of the omission of Article 162-A of the Limitation Act, from the First Schedule of the Limitation Act by Act XI of 1965, therefore, it was this context that the larger Bench in Hafeez Ahmed ruled that the revisional court may exercise its suo motu jurisdiction where a revision petition has been filed after the period of limitation prescribed therefor. Nonetheless, their lordships had not held that the exercise of suo motu jurisdiction may be claimed as a matter of right in every other case, instead the authority to exercise suo motu revisional jurisdiction was circumscribed to the discretion of the Court, only if the conditions for its exercise are satisfied. Their lordships had summed up the issue in the following unequivocal terms: "23. The case of Banori v. Jilani (supra) being close to the text covers all the essential aspects of the provision including suo motu exercise of jurisdiction with reference to its origin and background. It also highlights the purpose behind prescribing the period of limitation and fixing the outer limit of time for final disposal of such petitions but what is the occasions for the exercise of suo motu jurisdiction has not been elaborately dealt with. We, therefore, while summing up hold that suo motu revisional jurisdiction as vested in the High Court as well as of the District Court may be exercised if conditions for its exercise are satisfied, notwithstanding the revision petition is filed beyond the period prescribed." [Emphasis Supplied] 9. Having considered the ratio decidendi and raison d'etre of Hafeez Ahmed, there is another well founded but subtle distinction which has to be kept in mind, as held in various judgments by the Supreme Court that '[t]here are two aspects to the jurisdiction of the revisional court, firstly, where the revisional court itself takes cognizance of a matter while exercising its suo motu powers under section 115(1) of the C.P.C, and secondly, where a person brings the matter to the notice of the revisional court under the first proviso to Section 115(1) ibid. This bifurcation is significant, the matter is only between the revisional court and the subordinate court when the court itself invokes its revisional jurisdiction, however, in the second instance, it is essentially adversarial litigation'. It is thus clear that Revisional Court is not mandated to entertain every passionate prayer for exercise of its suo motu jurisdiction under section 115 of the C.P.C. This has further been followed and reaffirmed by plethora of judgments, including the one relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant/petitioner i.e. Khan Bahadur supra, which has held: "8 All the more so the case of Hafeez Ahmad (supra) unequivocally makes obvious that this court has not outrightly shelved or abandoned the condition of limitation for revision application rather it was held that the question depends on the discretion of the Court because the exercise of revisional jurisdiction in any form is discretionary and Court may exercise suo motu jurisdiction if the conditions for its exercise are satisfied. ??. ?? ?.. [T]he aforesaid judgment has deciphered us that, even in the above dictum, it was not the intention or spirit of the judgment that in all circumstances or come what may the High Court or District Court should consider every time barred revision as an information but the exercise of jurisdiction based on the prescribed parameters of revisional jurisdiction which is meant to cure and rectify serious illegality'?.." With great respect and deference, the scope of interference for exercising suo motu jurisdiction has further been thinned by insertion of Article 162-A in the First Schedule of the Limitation Act in Punjab. Grounds for condonation of delay and ratio decidendi of Khushi Muhammad's case: 10. The true import of statute of limitation, its significance and essence has conclusive