Summary: Autopsy and inquest report can be used to depict whether the FIR was ante-dated, with medical and criminal jurisprudence on rigor mortis being a relevant factor as well for this purpose. Effect of any conflict between medical and ocular evidence is assessed, alongwith the intrinsic value and purpose of testimony provided by court witnesses under Section 540 Cr.P.C. The court's authority to presume a fact under Article 129 of QSO and parameters of Section 103 Cr.P.C., as elucidated by a Larger Bench have also been deliberated upon. 670Murder Reference 2561325.208-

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Obligation of the service provider in terms of Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012. 667Writ Petition- Guardianship- Custody of Minor 3974-24 NAZIA SADDIQUE VS ADJ ETC. Mr. Justice Syed Ahsan Raza Kazmi 06- 03- 2025 2025 LHC 2078 PLJ 2025 Lahore 965 (Bahawalpur Bench, Bahawalpur)

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (On appeal against the judgment dated 22.03.2017 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Circuit Court, Hyderabad in Cr. Appeal No. D-45 of 2014 and Confirmation Case No. 9 of 2014). (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Night occurrence---Source of light, absence of---Accused was convicted for qatl-i-amd and sentenced to death---Validity---Occurrence took place on the night of 11-01-2011 at 20:15 pm, however no source of light was mentioned in the FIR---In absence of any source of light, identification of accused in the darkness of night was not free from doubt---No recovery was effected insofar as source of light was concerned---In absence of any source of light having been mentioned in FIR and recovery of such source, identification of accused was not free from doubt---Prosecution failed to prove its case against accused beyond shadow of doubt---If there is a single circumstance, which creates doubt in prosecution case, then the same is sufficient to acquit accused---Case against accused was repleted with number of circumstances, which had created serious doubts in the prosecution story---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused and by extending him benefit of doubt acquitted him of the charge---Appeal was allowed. Usman alias Kaloo v. The State 2017 SCMR 622; Najaf Ali Shah v. The State 2011 SCMR 1473; Mst. Asia Bibi v. The State PLD 2019 SC 64; Sardar Bibi v. Munir Ahmed 2017 SCMR 344; Zahir Yousaf v. The State 2017 SCMR 2002; Mst. Nazia Anwar v. The State 2018 SCMR 911 and Muhammad Azhar alias Ajja v. The State 2016 SCMR 1928 rel. (b) Criminal Trial--- ----Medical evidence---Ocular account---Conflict---Medico-ocular conflict regarding number of injuries sustained by deceased is fatal to prosecution case. Usman alias Kaloo v. The State 2017 SCMR 622; Muhammad Ali v. The State 2015 SCMR 137 and Muhammad Shafi alias Kuddoo v. The State 2019 SCMR 1045 rel. Ms. Aisha Tasneem, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant. Khadim Hussain, Additional Prosecutor General Sindh for the State. Prem (In person) along with Kanta, Sahil and Davsi for the Complainant (via video link Karachi). Date of hearing: 6th March, 2025.

Summary: (Against judgments dated 20.09.2022 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in R.F.As. Nos. 77386 and 54663 of 2021). Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)--- ----S. 23---Acquisition of land---Compensation---Object, purpose and scope---Authorities were aggrieved of enhancing of compensation in favour of respondents/landowners by Referee Court and the same was maintained by High Court---Validity---Compensation is a very wide term, indicating that land owners, for various reasons, are to be compensated and not merely paid price of land which is just an interaction of supply and demand fixed between a willing buyer and a willing seller---Mere classification or nature of land, can be taken as a relevant consideration for the purposes of determining compensation but it is not an absolute one---Factors such as location, neighbourhood, potentiality or other benefits cannot be disregarded either---Place and situation of acquired land are paramount considerations that must be accorded due and thoughtful attention in the fair assessment of compensation---Supreme Court declined to interfere in compensation assessed and determined by Referee Court as the same was just and reasonable and the Court had adverted to every aspect of the case and advanced valid and cogent reasons in support of its findings---Appeal was dismissed. Asad Ali and others v. The Bank of Punjab and others PLD 2020 SC 736; Land Acquisition Collector and others v. Mst Iqbal Begum and others PLD 2010 SC 719; The Province of Sindh v. Ramzan and others PLD 2004 SC 512; Malik Aman and others v. Land Acquisition Collector and others PLD 1988 SC 32; Fazalur Rahman and others v. General Manager, SIDB and another PLD 1986 SC 158; NWFP through Collector, Abbottabad Land Acquisition and others v. Haji Ali Asghar Khan and others 1985 SCMR 767; Land Acquisition Collector Abbottabad and others v. Muhammad Iqbal and others 1992 SCMR 1245; Pakistan Burmah Shell Ltd. v. Province of NWFP and 3 others 1993 SCMR 1700; Murad Khan's case 1999 SCMR 1647 and Nisar Ahmad Khan and others v. Collector Land Acquisition, Swabi and others PLD 2002 SC 25 rel. Khalid Masood Ghani, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab (in C.A. No. 119-L of 2022, as well as for the respondents in C.A.No. 3952 of 2022) along with Zakir Shah, Senior Law Officer, CNW for Appellants. Syed Iqbal Hussain Gillani, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.A. No. 119-L of 2022 as well as for the appellant in C.A. No. 3952 of 2022) (via video link from Lahore). Date of hearing: 6th March, 2025. SHAKEEL AHMAD, J.--- This judgment shall decide the above-titled appeals, as both of them have arisen out of the same judgments of the Courts below and the Award under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ("the Act").

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 561-A & 22-A---Inherent powers of High Court under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C.---Scope---Powers of Ex-officio Justice of Peace---Petitioner assailed order passed by Ex-officio Justice of Peace and sought its quashing---Ex-Officio Justice of Peace issued directions under Ss.22-A & B, Cr.P.C., to record the statements of injured persons and witnesses---Such directions were neither arbitrary nor extraneous but were intended to ensure a comprehensive investigation and uncover the truth---Applicants' claim that this amounted to a second version of the incident was untenable---Police must investigate all perspectives, even those that emerged belatedly---Reinvestigation of a criminal case was not barred, and police authorities were legally permitted to file a supplementary challan even after submitting the final report under S.173, Cr.P.C.---However, that was subject to the condition that the Trial Court had not yet disposed of the case on merits, barring certain exceptions---Final challan submitted on 04.09.2024 did not render the investigation immutable---Inclusion of the applicants as accused, based on subsequent statements, was neither unlawful nor tainted with malice but represented a valid exercise of investigative discretion---Applicants' plea for quashing the proceedings at this stage was premature---Since the Trial Court had already taken cognizance of the case, the appropriate forum to assess the merits of the evidence was during trial---Under S.561-A,Cr.P.C., High Court could not summarily terminate proceedings merely because the applicants disputed their involvement---Law required such objections to be addressed during trial, where the credibility of the allegations could be tested through evidence and cross-examination---Furthermore, the applicants had failed to establish any jurisdictional defect or violation of natural justice in the impugned order-- -Trial Court provided cogent reasons for directing the recording of statements, ensuring adherence to procedural fairness---Investigation Officer's actions, being in compliance with statutory mandates, did not warrant judicial interference---It was evident from the record that the applicants had not demonstrated any special or exceptional circumstances justifying the quashing of the pending proceedings---Criminal miscellaneous application was dismissed, in circumstances. Sughran Bibi v. The State PLD 2018 SC 595; Raja Khursheed Ahmed v. Muhammad Bilal and others 2014 SCMR 474 and Muhammad Farooq v. Ahmed Jawaz Jagirani and others PLD 2016 SC 55 rel. Muhammad Daud Narejo for Applicants. Mumtaz Ali Shah, Assistant Prosecutor General for Respondents Nos. 1 to 3. Irfan Gul for Respondent No. 4. Date of hearing: 6th March, 2025. Judgment Jan Ali Junejo, J .--- The present Criminal Misc. Application has been filed by the Applicants (accused), challenging the Order dated 24.08.2024 (here-in-after referred to as the Impugned Order) passed by the Court of learned Sessions Judge, Sujawal in Criminal Misc. Application No.272 /2024 (Muhammad Soomar v. SSP Sujawal and others), whereby the application under Section 22-A, Cr.P.C. filed on behalf of the Respondent No.4 was disposed of with directions to the I.O. to record the statements of the witnesses/injured produced by the Respondent No.4. 2. The case arises from a land demarcation dispute, where Respondent No.4 filed a Criminal Misc. Application (No.272/2024) under Section 22-A Cr.P.C. The dispute had already led to FC Suit No.139/2021, in which the civil court ordered demarcation of a katcha road by Mukhtiarkar and Tapedar with police presence. However, on 13.08.2024, while demarcation was underway without police, the proposed accused-seven individuals armed with lathis, an iron rod, a hatchet, and a pistol-allegedly attacked the applicant and his brother Allah Dino, causing severe injuries and issuing death threats. The injured obtained a police treatment letter and were treated at Civil Hospital, Jati, with a final medical certificate issued on 19.08.2024. Based on their complaint, FIR No.114/2024 was registered under Sections 324, 337-A(i), F(i), 114, 506-2, 147, 148, 149, and 504 P.P.C. Later, Muhammad Soomar, one of the accused, filed Crl. Misc. Application No.272/2024 before the District and Sessions Judge, Sujawal, who directed the Investigation Officer (I.O.) to record witness statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. However, the I.O. subsequently implicated the applicants as accused, even though the court had not explicitly directed their implication, leading to claims of false accusations and misuse of legal provisions in the ongoing land dispute. Lastly, the Applicants have prayed for the following reliefs:- a) To declare that the Impugned Order dated 24-08-2024 of learned court below is against the law natural justice, null, void and illegal having legal sanctity in the eyes of law and the same is liable to be aside being devoid of justice. b) To declare that the applicants have illegally been shown/nominated as accused in additional Challan sheet dated 26.09.2024 by the I.O. of FIR No.114/2024 of P.S. Jati without any authority and acted arbitrary and exorbitantly by using excess and unlimited powers which is not the jurisdiction of the police and the names of the applicants in additional Challan sheet are legally required to be struck off from the Challan sheet. c) That to quash all the proceedings against the applicants arising out of Challan sheet dated 26.09.2024. d) To pass interim order directing the official respondents/police not to arrest the applicant until and unless the above petition is decided by this Honourable Court. (e) To grant any other relief(s) which this Honorable Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. 3. The learned counsel for the Applicants has argued that the impugned order dated 24.08.2024 is void ab initio, legally infirm, perverse, and unsustainable, as it was passed without properly considering the facts, law, and evidence. He further contends that FIR No.114/2024 had already been registered against Muhammad Soomar and others for a cognizable offence, and the trial court failed to recognize the non-maintainability of Criminal Misc. Application No.272/2024 under Sections 22-A and 22-B Cr.P.C., which sought to introduce a second version of the same incident, contrary to settled legal principles. He asserts that the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, despite the absence of legal grounds, wrongly directed the Investigation Officer (I.O.) to record additional statements, leading to the unjust implication of the applicants. He maintains that the final challan had already been submitted on 04.09.2024, and the subsequent challan against the applicants was unjustified, as it merely complied with the impugned order without conducting a proper investigation. He insists that under Section 173(1)(b) Cr.P.C., once an FIR is registered, no fresh FIR is required for a different version of the same incident, and any additional information should be incorporated into the ongoing investigation. He criticizes the trial court for acting in haste, without applying its judicial mind, by dismissing Criminal Misc. Application No.272/2024 while still directing the recording of statements from Muhammad Soomar and his witnesses, which he claims was contradictory and legally flawed. He submits that the impugned order is non-speaking, arbitrary, vague, and based on conjectures, violating natural justice and equity, and therefore warrants immediate setting aside. He questions why the opposing party insisted on a separate FIR, arguing that it was merely a tactic to pressure the police and falsely implicate the applicants. He concludes that the impugned order, which leads to the automatic arrest of the accused based on mere allegations, is misconceived, legally untenable, and should be declared null and void. Lastly, the learned counsel prays for allowing the Cr. Misc. Application. 4. Per contra, the learned APG vehemently opposes the Criminal Misc. Application, arguing that the impugned order dated 24.08.2024 was passed in accordance with the law and does not suffer from any legal infirmity. He contends that the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace rightly exercised jurisdiction under Sections 22-A and 22-B Cr.P.C., directing the Investigation Officer (I.O.) to record additional statements to ensure a fair and impartial investigation. He further argues that the registration of FIR No.114/2024 does not preclude the consideration of another version of the same incident, as different perspectives may emerge during the investigation, and it is the duty of the police to record all relevant information to ascertain the true facts. He submits that the trial court did not act arbitrarily but rather took into account the material placed before it and passed a reasoned order to facilitate proper investigation. He maintains that the I.O. complied with the court's directions and conducted further inquiries, which revealed that the applicants' involvement in the incident could not be ignored. He rebuts the applicants' claim that the second version amounts to an impermissible second FIR, arguing that under criminal jurisprudence, the police are not bound by the first version of an incident and must investigate all available evidence and statements to determine the actual culprits. He asserts that the applicants' plea for setting aside the impugned order is baseless, as it seeks to hamper the due process of law and prevent an unbiased investigation. He insists that the investigation officer acted in accordance with legal principles and merely fulfilled his duty to record all relevant statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. He further submits that the petitioners have failed to point out any jurisdictional error or legal infirmity in the impugned order, making their plea misconceived and liable to be dismissed. He emphasizes that the application under Sections 22-A and 22-B Cr.P.C. was rightly entertained, as it sought a fair probe into the matter, and the applicants cannot claim immunity from investigation merely because an FIR was already lodged. He concludes that the Criminal Misc. Application lacks merit, as the applicants are seeking to frustrate the investigation process, and thus, their plea should be outrightly dismissed to allow the legal process to take its due course. 5. The learned counsel for Respondent No.4 argues that the impugned order dated 24.08.2024 was lawfully passed and ensures a fair and impartial investigation. He contends that the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace rightly directed the I.O. to record additional statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C., as the law does not prohibit further inquiry into new facts despite the existence of FIR No.114/2024. He maintains that the applicants are trying to obstruct the investigation to avoid scrutiny, and their claim that a second version is impermissible is legally flawed, as investigation is a continuous process. He asserts that medical evidence, witness statements, and police reports support Respondent No.4's version, making further inquiry necessary. He concludes that the Criminal Misc. Application is a delaying tactic aimed at suppressing vital evidence, and thus, it deserves outright dismissal. 6. I have carefully considered the arguments advanced by both parties and have thoroughly examined the material available on record. A meticulous review of the case record reveals that the Applicants' principal contention revolves around the alleged impermissibility of registering a "second FIR" for the same incident. They base their argument on the Supreme Court's ruling in Sughran Bibi v. The State (PLD 2018 SC 595). However, this contention misinterprets the true nature of the Impugned Order. The Sessions Court did not authorize a new FIR but merely directed the Investigating Officer (I.O.) to record additional statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. within the framework of the existing FIR No. 114/2024. The Supreme Court, in Sughran Bibi, categorically prohibited the registration of a second FIR for the same occurrence to prevent harassment and inconsistent narratives. However, it was also established that during an investigation, the Investigating Officer is duty-bound to explore all possible aspects of the case, taking into account every version of the incident brought to his attention. This obligation is reinforced by Rule 25.2(3) of the Police Rules, 1934, which mandates the I.O. to uncover the truth objectively. The purpose of the investigation is to ascertain the actual facts of the case and identify the real perpetrator(s) without prematurely committing to any particular stance. The Impugned Order falls squarely within this legal exception. The I.O.'s decision to include the Applicants' names in the supplementary challan is a legitimate exercise of statutory authority aimed at presenting all available evidence rather than initiating a new FIR. The learned Sessions Judge, in his capacity as an Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, issued directions under Sections 22-A and 22-B Cr.P.C. to record the statements of injured persons and witnesses. These directions were neither arbitrary nor extraneous but intended to ensure a comprehensive investigation and uncover the truth. The Applicants' claim that this amounts to a "second version" of the incident is untenable. Criminal jurisprudence firmly establishes that the police must investigate all perspectives, even those that emerge belatedly. It is a settled principle of law that reinvestigation of a criminal case is not barred, and police authorities are legally permitted to file a supplementary challan even after submitting the final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. However, this is subject to the condition that the trial court has not yet disposed of the case on merits, barring certain exceptions. Reference can be made to Raja Khursheed Ahmed v. Muhammad Bilal and others (2014 SCMR 474). The final challan submitted on 04.09.2024 does not render the investigation immutable. The inclusion of the Applicants as accused, based on subsequent statements, is neither unlawful nor tainted with malice but represents a valid exercise of investigative discretion. The Applicants' plea for quashing the proceedings at this stage is premature. Since the trial court has already taken cognizance of the case, the appropriate forum to assess the merits of the evidence is during trial. Under Section 561-A Cr.P.C., this Court cannot summarily terminate proceedings merely because the Applicants dispute their involvement. The law requires such objections to be addressed during trial, where the credibility of the allegations can be tested through evidence and cross-examination. Furthermore, the Applicants have failed to establish any jurisdictional defect or violation of natural justice in the Impugned Order. The Sessions Court provided cogent reasons for directing the recording of statements, ensuring adherence to procedural fairness. The I.O.'s actions, being in compliance with statutory mandates, do not warrant judicial interference. It is also evident from the record that the Applicants have not demonstrated any special or exceptional circumstances justifying the quashing of the pending proceedings. Accordingly, the present Criminal Miscellaneous Application is not maintainable under the law. In Muhammad Farooq v. Ahmed Nawaz Jagirani and others (PLD 2016 SC 55), the Supreme Court reaffirmed this position, holding that: "It is now well entrenched legal position that where a power is coextensive with two or more Courts, in ordinary circumstances, propriety demands that the litigant must first seek remedy in the Court of the lowest jurisdiction. Mr. Shahadat Awan does not dispute that learned trial Court was seized of jurisdiction under Section 249-A, Cr.P.C. No special and or extraordinary circumstances were either pleaded or considered by the learned Judge in Chambers in the High Court, while exercising its inherent jurisdiction Section 561-A, Cr.P.C." 7. For the foregoing reasons, the Criminal Misc. Application is dismissed as devoid of substantive merit. The Impugned Order dated 24.08.2024 is upheld, and the proceedings before the trial court shall continue unabated. The trial Court is directed to adjudicate the case strictly on its merits, uninfluenced by any observations herein. JK/I-21/Sindh Application dismissed.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 148, 149 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Delay of two hours and 15 minutes in reporting the matter to the police---Consequential---Accused were charged for committing murder of the husband of complainant by firing---Occurrence took place on 02.10.2018 at 09.00 pm and was alleged to have been seen by complainant and brother of the deceased, but matter was reported to the police on the same night at 11.15 pm i.e. with delay of about two hours and 15 minutes, despite the fact that police station was just 03-kilometres from the place of occurrence--- Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the instant case, the element of delayed registration of FIR was clear indicator of the fact that in fact it was a blind murder and inference could be drawn that the intervening period was consumed in fabricating the prosecution story after the preliminary investigation---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 148, 149 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Delay of 15 hours and 30 minutes in conducting the postmortem examination of the dead body of deceased---Consequential---Accused were charged for committing murder of the husband of complainant by firing---In the postmortem report of deceased, the Medical Officer who conducted postmortem examination on the dead body of the deceased on 03.10.2018 at 01.30 pm had mentioned probable time between death and postmortem as 15 hours and 30 minutes---Thus, if that time was considered for the purposes of time of death, the occurrence would might be happened at 10.00 pm whereas as per prosecution's case the occurrence took place at 09.00 pm---As per prosecution's own case, the deceased succumbed to the injuries on the way to "S" Hospital and if so, why the dead body remained in "S" Hospital for a sufficient time for which no explanation had been offered by the prosecution and in that regard no report of any Medical Officer of the "S" Hospital, had been brought on the record---Another fact was very important and was missing that why the dead body of the deceased was escorted to the "G" Hospital even though postmortem of the deceased could have also been conducted at the attached mortuary of "M" Hospital, which was near "S" Hospital---Thus, there was obvious delay in sending the dead body to mortuary, as according to postmortem report, the police papers were received at 01:00 p.m. at the mortuary and thereafter postmortem examination was conducted at 01:30 p.m.---Complainant and brother of deceased were closely related inter-se to the deceased and both the witnesses of ocular account were the residents of the same vicinity---In such a situation if those witnesses were present at the place of occurrence and also witnessed the scene of occurrence then such an inordinate and unexplained delay would never have occurred---Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the instant case, the element of delay in preparation of police papers and also delayed post mortem were clear indicator of the fact that in fact it was a blind murder and inference could be drawn that the intervening period was consumed in fabricating the prosecution story after the preliminary investigation, otherwise there was no justification for conducting the postmortem examination with such a delay---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Mehmood Ahmed and others v. The State and another 1995 SCMR 127; Muhammad Nawaz v. The State 2024 SCMR 1731; Irshad Ahmed v. The State 2011 SCMR 1190 and Muhammad Ijaz alias Billa and another v. The State and others 2024 SCMR 1507 rel. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 148, 149 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Mode and manner of the occurrence doubtful---Accused were charged for committing murder of the husband of complainant by firing---Record showed that complainant admitted in her cross-examination that she was second wife of the deceased---Complainant was earlier married to "MA" from whom she got divorce on the basis of Khula---Complainant further admitted in her cross-examination that deceased was already married with "A" who after divorcing "A" contracted marriage with the complainant and that it was her love marriage as well as arranged marriage with deceased---Complainant further stated that she came to know about Nikah of her husband with female accused "RS" about 18/20 days prior to the occurrence---Complainant alleged that on receiving the telephone call from the accused, she along with deceased and other witnesses went to the house of female accused "RS"other wife of the deceased---It was an important factor and phenomenon in our society that first wife specifically tries to keep the new wife away from her family and she cannot tolerate her at any cost---By comparing four typical but contrasting marriages and examining the rules about the formation and breakup of polygamous marriages, the role of the pre-existing and new wife's consent (or not) and the economic consequences of poly-formation in ongoing and divorcing marriages, it was clear that the surpluses generated and distributions currently in place could both benefit and harm the co-wives---It did not appeal to the mind of a prudent man that why first wife i.e. complainant, who was also a school teacher, had accompanied her husband for reconciliation with her husband's co-wife, when her parents were not happy with their marriage and what necessitated the complainant to sit in the punchayat, which was not comprehendible---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (d) Criminal trial--- ----Dishonest improvements by witnesses in their evidence---Effect---Dishonest improvements made by a witness in his statement to strengthen the prosecution case would cast serious doubt about veracity of his statement and make the same untrustworthy and unreliable. Mst. Saima Noreen and another v. The State 2024 1310 rel. (e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 148, 149 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Presence of the complainant and witnesses at the time and place of occurrence not proved---Accused were charged for committing murder of the husband of complainant by firing---As per story of FIR, the complainant, eye-witness and the friends of deceased took the injured then deceased to "S" Hospital for treatment and after his death also escorted the dead body to the mortuary---Admittedly, no blood stained clothes of the witnesses and the friends of the deceased were taken into possession by the Investigating Officer and no explanation in that behalf had been advanced by the prosecution---Stance of the complainant and eye-witnesses was not only improbable, but also got no support from the record, thus, the prosecution had failed to prove the presence of the complainant and the eye-witnesses at the time and place of the occurrence---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Zafar Ali Abbasi and another v. Zafar Ali Abbasi and others 2024 SCMR 1773 rel. (f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 148, 149 & 34---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129(g)---Qatl-i-amd, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Material witnesses not produced for evidence---Adverse presumption---Accused were charged for committing murder of the husband of complainant by firing---Complainant admitted during examination in chief that three friends of her husband of whose names were not known to her went to the house of female accused "RS"---Said friends of the deceased were in a position to make statements qua the occurrence and they being the most natural witnesses of the occurrence had not been produced by the prosecution---Prosecution frankly conceded that neither their statements under S.161, Cr.P.C. were recorded during the investigation of the case nor they ever appeared before the Trial Court, therefore, the prosecution had withheld the best piece of evidence, hence an adverse inference within the meaning of Art.129(g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, could validly be drawn against the prosecution that had the said witnesses been produced in the witness box then their evidence would have been unfavourable to the prosecution---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Abdul Qadeer v. The State 2024 SCMR 1146 rel. (g) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 148, 149 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Night time occurrence---Source of light not established---Accused were charged for committing murder of the husband of complainant by firing---Record showed that it was night time occurrence---Neither any source of light was mentioned in the FIR nor in the site plan of the place of occurrence nor the Investigating Officer collected or gathered any such evidence, meaning thereby, source of light in night occurrence was missing in this case---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (h) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 148, 149 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Recovery of weapon of offence on the instance of accused doubtful---Accused were charged for committing murder of the husband of complainant by firing---According to the prosecution story the accused/appellant slipped away from the place of occurrence along with crime weapon i.e. pistol 30-bore---Said weapon of offencewas recovered on 12.11.2018 i.e. last day of the remand from residential room of accused located at third floor of his house lying underneath of bed---However, it was somewhat difficult to believe that an accused having committed such a serious crime like murder though succeeded in fleeing away from the crime scene along with weapon of offence, would not get rid of such weapon, rather would keep the same in safe custody for its subsequent recovery and use against him---Besides, ocular account had already been disbelieved, such recovery would not be sufficient for recording conviction of an accused on capital charge, because this type of corroborative evidence was always taken into consideration along with direct evidence---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Noor Muhammad v. The State 2010 SCMR 97 rel. (i) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 148, 149 & 34---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 103---Qatl-i-amd, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Non-association of private witnesses at the time of recovery proceedings---Accused were charged for committing murder of the husband of complainant by firing---After the arrest of appellant, the crime weapon was shown recovered on his lead on 12.11.2018 and the recovery memo showed that such recovery proceedings were supervised by Investigating Officer and witnessed by two police witnesses---Said recovery could not be relied upon for the reason that Investigating Officer of the case did not join any witness of the locality during the recovery of such 30 bore pistol on the lead of accused/appellant, which was clear violation of S.103 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898---Therefore, the evidence of such recovery could not be used as incriminating evidence against the accused/appellant, being evidence that was obtained through illegal means and hence hit by the exclusionary rule of evidence---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Muhammad Ismail and others v. The State 2017 SCMR 989 rel. (j) Criminal trial--- ----Medical evidence---Scope---Medical evidence only being corroborative piece of evidence cannot be made basis to record or sustain conviction because medical evidence can only give details about the locale, dimension, kind of weapon used, the duration between injury and medical examination or death and autopsy, etc. but never identifies the real assailant. Munawar Ali alias Munawar Hussain v. The State pld 1993 sc 251 and Muhammad Jahangir and another v. The State and others 2024 SCMR 1741 rel. (k) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 148, 149 & 34---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 342---Qatl-i-amd, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Motive part of the occurrence---Unhelpful for prosecution---Accused were charged for committing murder of the husband of complainant by firing---Allegedly, the complainant's husband contracted Nikah with "RS" secretly and due to that grudge the accused committed his murder while inviting him at their house---Stance of the appellant regarding motive in his statement recorded under S.342, Cr.P.C was that when deceased contracted marriage with "RS", the complainant pressurized the deceased to divorce "RS" and on the day of occurrence, the complainant came to the house of the appellant along with his companions where the deceased was also present---Complainant asked the deceased to divorce "RS" but when the deceased refused rather threatened to divorce the complainant, the complainant's companions who were notorious persons committed the murder of the deceased---Motive even if proved, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, may act as a double edged weapon---If motive could be a reason for the accused to commit the crime, it could also be used by the prosecution as a tool to implicate an innocent person---Therefore, after disbelieving the ocular account, recovery as well as medical evidence, the motive set up in this case was of no help to the prosecution---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (l) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 148, 149 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Co-accused acquitted on same set of evidence---Effect---Accused were charged for committing murder of the husband of complainant by firing---Record showed that on the same set of evidence, co-accused persons, who had been shown present at the place of occurrence and co-accused who were shown present at the place of occurrence while armed with a pistol, stood acquitted---Therefore, present appellant could not be convicted under the principle of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Notice of Police Constable Khizar Hayat son of Hadait Ullah PLD 2019 SC 527; Pervaiz Khan and another v. The State 2022 SCMR 393 and Muhammad Iqbal v. The State and another 2024 SCMR 1133 rel. (m) Criminal trial--- ----Benefit of doubt---Principle---For giving benefit of doubt to an accused, a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in a prudent mind about guilt of accused is sufficient to make him entitled to such benefit. Khial Muhammad v. The State 2024 SCMR 1490 and Muhammad Ijaz alias Billa and another v. The State and others 2024 SCMR 1507 rel. Rai Bashir Ahmad and Sardar Waqas Ahmad Dogar for Appellant. Munir Ahmed Sial, Additional Prosecutor General for the State. Ch. Irfan Sadiq Tarar for the Complainant. Date of hearing: 6th March, 2025. Judgment Sardar Akbar Ali, J.--- Wasif Saeed (convict/appellant) along with his co-accused Muhammad Rashid Saeed, Muhammad Saeed Awan, Mst.Jamila Saeed and Mst.Rabia Saeed was tried by learned Sessions Judge, Lahore, in a private complaint titled "Mst. Jannat-ul-Fairdous v. Wasif Saeed and others" under sections 302, 148/ 149 P.P.C arising out of case FIR No.1178 of 2018, dated 02.10.2018 for offences under sections 302/34 P.P.C registered at Police Station South Cantt., Lahore, and on conclusion of trial vide judgment dated 02.07.2021, co-accused Muhammad Saeed Awan, Mst.Jamila Bibi and Mst.Rabia Saeed were acquitted, whereas, appellant Wasif Saeed was convicted and sentenced as under:- "Under Section 302 (a) P.P.C to death sentence as qisas for committing Qatl-i-Amad of Shakeel Ashraf deceased. He was also directed to pay compensation of Rs.1,000,000/- (one million) to the legal heirs of Shakeel Ashraf (deceased) recoverable as arrears of land revenue and in default whereof to suffer 06-months simple imprisonment." Aggrieved by his conviction and sentence, Wasif Saeed (appellant) filed Criminal Appeal No.56099 of 2021. Likewise, trial Court sent reference under Section 374 Cr.P.C. which was numbered as Murder Reference No.208 of 2021 for the confirmation or otherwise of death sentence awarded to Wasif Saeed appellant whereas complainant Mst. Jannat-ul-Firdous filed Crl. PSLA No.56097 of 2021 challenging the acquittal of co-accused Muhammad Rashid Saeed, Muhammad Saeed Awan, Mst. Jamila Saeed and Mst. Rabia Saeed. 2. Mst. Jannat-ul-Firdous, complainant (PW-1) on 02.10.2018 at 10:45 p.m. submitted written complaint (Ex.PD) before Shahzad Kamal, S.I (not produced), when he on receiving the information of the occurrence reached at Emergency Ward, Services Hospital, Lahore. The complainant stated therein that on 02.10.2018 at about 08:30 p.m. accused Mst. Rabia Awan, telephonically contacted Muhammad Shakeel Ashraf, with whom, he contracted Nikah about 1_ years ago, inviting him to visit her house for reconciliation proceedings and to settle the dispute with her parents and during this call, her father also talked to Muhammad Shakeel Ashraf to the effect to visit their house as they are waiting for them. At about 09:00 p.m. the complainant along with her Dewar/ husband's brother Muhammad Aqeel Ashraf and three unknown friends of her husband reached at the house of Saeed Awan situated in Street No.2 Gulshan Park. The complainant party seated there whereas her husband and dewar Muhammad Aqeel seated in their front and their backs were towards the door. Her husband when started conversation requesting to accept his Nikah with Rabia Bibi and the matters may be settled amicably, upon this accused Saeed Awan loudly shouted to teach a lesson to Muhammad Shakeel Ashraf to molest their honor. Instantaneously accused Wasif and Kashif sons of Saeed Awan came there while armed with pistols. Wasif made a fire shot with pistol hitting on the back of Muhammad Shakeel Ashraf, who fell to the ground whereas Kashif just to harass them made indiscriminate firing which hit the glasses of windows and walls. The complainant and the PWs rescued their lives while sitting and laying. Thereafter the accused Saeed Awan, Wasif and Kashif took flight from the place of occurrence while making firing. The wife of Saeed Awan snatched mobile phone from the complainant and also beaten her. The complainant's dewar and unknown friends of her deceased husband escorted the deceased to Civil Hospital but he succumbed to the injures on the way. The motive behind the occurrence was that complainant's husband contracted Nikah with Rabia Bibi secretly and due to this grudge the accused committed his murder while inviting him at their house. 3. Saif-Ullah Gondal Sub-Inspector (PW-11) initiated the investigation. On 02.10.2018, he reached at Services Hospital, Lahore and inspected the dead body of deceased lying on stature, prepared injury statement Exh.PR, application Exh.PS for postmortem, inquest report Exh.PT and application Exh.PU. Thereafter, he along with complainant and witnesses visited the crime scene/ house situated at Street No.2, Gulshan Park, Lahore, knocked the door which was opened by Jamila Saeed. The crime scene was located at first floor of the house. He inspected the crime scene and prepared unscaled site plan Exh.PV, collected blood imbrued cotton, took the same into possession through recovery memo Exh.PH. Secured a Chitai P-10 from the crime scene and seized it through recovery memo Exh.PG. Secured one empty P-1 from the crime scene, took into possession through recovery memo Exh.PF. PFSA team handed over to him one sealed envelope, took the same through recovery memo Exh.PJ. Secured seven empties of 9 mm pistol P-2/1-7 from outside the house and took it into possession through recovery memo Exh.PK. On 02.10.2018, the complainant submitted another application before him regarding substitution of name of Kashif Saeed stating that the name of Kahsif Saeed was Rashid Saeed. On 03.10.2018 Abu-al-Asar constable produced before him postmortem report and last worn clothes of deceased i.e. shirt P-11, bunyan P-12 patloon P-13 and underwear P-14, took the same into possession through recovery memo Exh.PM. On 06.10.2018 Syed Younas Bukhari, draftsman produced before him scaled site plan in triplicate. On 10.10.2018, he deposited one empty of pistol .30 bore, seven empties of 9 mm, one khaki envelope sealed by doctor and another sealed parcel given by PFSA scientist during inspection of the crime, in the Office of PFSA intact. On 13.10.2018, accused persons Muhammad Saeed Awan and Rashid Saeed were arrested. On 27.10.2018, they were sent to judicial lock up. On 29.10.2018, Jamila Saeed accused submitted application for cross-version received through CCPO and cross-version was not approved. On 31.10.2018 accused Waif Saeed was arrested. On 12.11.2018, accused got recovered pistol P-3 and unloading the same four live bullets P-15/1-4 were recovered, took the same into possession through recovery memo Exh.PN. The investigation of this case was also conducted by Ali Akhtar, DSP who while appearing as PW-09 stated that on 13.11.2019 he joined appellant Wsif Saeed into investigation, confined him in Bukhshi Khana and on 21.11.2019, he completed investigation and in his opinion Wasif Saeed (appellant), Saeed Awan and Rashid Saeed were found involved in the commission of offence, whereas, Jamila Saeed and Rabia Saeed accused were not found involved in the commission of the crime. Subsequently, the complainant opted to file a private complaint (Ex.PA) almost with the same story as set out in the FIR, but added that the Investigating Officer had not correctly recorded statements of witnesses under section 161 Cr.P.C. to benefit the accused and did not recover the pistol from Rashid Saeed Awan during the investigation which he used in the occurrence and out of mala fide declared Jamila Saeed and Rabia Saeed, as innocent, whereas, solid evidence was available against them. 4. The learned trial court after recording cursory evidence summoned all the accused/respondents to face trial. When charge sheeted, the accused/appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried, whereupon, the prosecution examined Jannat-ul-Firdous complainant (PW-1) and Muhammad Aqeel Ashraf (PW-2) who furnished the ocular account of occurrence; Dr. Nasir Abbas (PW-3) conducted postmortem examination of deceased Muhammad Shakeel and observed as under: "Injury No.1-A "A penetrating lacerated wound of 1x1 cm with inverted margins on back of chest at midline, 22 cm below from cervical (C) 5 vertebra and 46 cm from top of heard. Abrasion collor present. Blackening burning and tattooing absent. Bleeding from wound. "Injury No.1-B "A lacerated wound of 1.5x1.5 cm with everted margins in epigastric region, 2 cm towards left side from midline, 18 cm from left nipple and 62 cm from top of head. No blackening burning and tattooing. Bleeding from the wound. No abrasion collor. Whereas, Saif Ullah Gondal, SI (PW-11) and Ali Akhtar, DSP (PW-09) appeared in the dock to give details of their investigation and Tahir Kamal Khan, Junior Scientist PFSA, who visited and inspected the crime scene, appeared as PW-13. It may be clarified here that when cursory statements of witnesses were being recorded, the complainant has also been mentioned as CW-1, whereas, during trial her statement has been recorded as PW-1. The rest of the witnesses were formal in nature. On close of prosecution case, the accused were examined under section 342 Cr.P.C. who refuted the prosecution evidence. However, did not produce any witness in defence nor opted to appear in the witness box as required by section 340(2) Cr.P.C. and the trial ended in the terms as detailed in opening paragraph of this judgment. 5. Heard. Record perused. 6. From the narration of above facts, according to the prosecution's perspective the occurrence took place on 02.10.2018 at 09.00 p.m. and was alleged to have been seen by witnesses namely Jannat-ul-Firdous complainant (PW-1) and Muhammad Aqeel Ashraf (PW-2), but the matter was reported to the police on the same night at 11:15 p.m. i.e. with delay of about two hours and 15 minutes, despite the fact that police station was just 3 kilometers from the place of occurrence. The situation worsens when we see that according to prosecution's stance as taken in the FIR as well as in the private complaint, Muhammad Shakeel Ashraf died on the way to Services Hospital, Lahore and when Shahzad Kamal, SI (not produced) on receiving the information of the occurrence reached at Emergency, Services Hospital, Lahore, Mst. Jannat-ul-Firdous complainant (PW-1) presented before him written complaint. In the postmortem report of Muhammad Shakeel (Ex.PC), the doctor who conducted postmortem examination on the dead body of the deceased on 03.10.2018 at 01:30 p.m., had mentioned probable time between death and postmortem as 15 hours and 30 minutes. Thus, if this time is considered for the purposes of time of death, the occurrence would might be happened at 10:00 p.m. whereas as per prosecution's own case the occurrence took place at 09:00 p.m. 7. In the column regarding date and time of death of the postmortem report (Ex.PC) of Muhammad Shakeel Ashraf (deceased), it is mentioned as 10.00 p.m. on 02.10.2018. Muhammad Kashif (PW-4) stated that on 02.10.2018 at about 10:30 p.m. he along with Muhammad Aqeel Ashraf (PW-02) was present in the emergency of Services Hospital, Lahore and at about 01/01:30, he along with Muhammad Aqeel Ashraf and two police constables left the Services Hospital along with dead body of Muhammad Shakeel Ashraf. Dr. Nasir Abbas in his examination-in-chief stated that the docket was received along with other police papers on 03.10.2018 at 01:00 p.m. and the dead body was examined at 01:30 p.m. He in his examination in chief stated that "Rigor mortis fully developed" He further stated that: "the determining factor to calculate the time of death was only development of rigor mortis" He further clarified that "there was a possibility of survival of deceased if he was provided timely treatment" The question arises here that as per prosecution's own case, the deceased succumbed to the injuries on the way to Services Hospital and if so, why the dead body remained in Services Hospital for a sufficient time for which no explanation has been offered by the prosecution and in this regard no report of any doctor of the Services Hospital, Lahore has been brought on the record. Another fact is very important and is missing that why the dead body of the deceased was escorted to the General Hospital even the postmortem of the deceased could have also been conducted at the attached mortuary of Kind Edward Medical College/ Mayo Hospital, Lahore which was nearby the Services Hospital. Thus, there is obvious delay in sending the dead body to mortuary, as according to postmortem report (Ex.PC), the police papers were received at 01:00 p.m. at the mortuary and thereafter postmortem examination was conducted at 01:30 p.m. Keeping in mind that Jannat-ul-Firdous complainant (PW-1), Muhammad Aqeel Ashraf (PW-2) are closely related inter-se to the deceased and also the fact that both these witnesses of ocular account are the residents of the same vicinity, in such a situation if these witnesses were present at the place of occurrence and also witnessed the scene of occurrence then such an inordinate and unexplained delay would never have occurred. In the case "Mehmood Ahmed and others v. The State and another" (1995 SCMR 127), it was observed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan that:- "Delay of two hours in lodging the FIR in the particular circumstances of the case had assumed great significance as the same could be attributed to consultation, taking instructions and calculatedly preparing the report keeping the names of the accused open for roping in such persons whom ultimately the prosecution might wish to implicate". Similar view was taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in a recent pronouncement in case titled Muhammad Nawaz v. The State and others (2024 SCMR 1731). 8. Another intriguing aspect of the case is that Tahir Kamal Khan (PW-13) who being Junior Forensic Scientist, PFSA stated that on 02.10.2018 he received information about the happening of the occurrence at 10:50 P.M. and at 01:05 a.m. he reached at the place of occurrence and opined that: "It was concluded that multiple gun shots were fired from outside the building as indicated by direction of travel of gun shot impacts at glass window of TV lounge. KM test was positive which could indicate the presence of blood between the sofas in TV lounge. Report was prepared by Adil Umar who has resigned from PFSA. I identify the signature of Adil Umar. Report of crime scene is Exh.PY." He in his cross-examination further stated that: "It is correct that fire travelled from outside to inside from TV lounge." 9. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the instant case, the element of delayed registration of FIR, delay in preparation of police papers and also delayed post mortem are clear indicator of the fact that in fact it was a blind murder and inference can be drawn that the intervening period was consumed in fabricating the prosecution story after the preliminary investigation, otherwise there was no justification for conducting the postmortem examination with such a delay. We may refer here the case of "Irshad Ahmed v. The State" (2011 SCMR 1190), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has observed as under:- "We have further observed that the post-mortem examination of the deadbody of Shehzad Ahmed deceased had been conducted with a noticeable delay and such delay is generally suggestive of a real possibility that time had been consumed by the police in procuring and planting eye-witnesses and in cooking up a story for the prosecution before preparing police papers necessary for getting a post-mortem examination of the deadbody conducted." Similar view was taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in case titled Muhammad Ijaz alias Billa and another v. The State and others (2024 SCMR 1507). 10. As stated above, complainant Jannat-ul-Firdous (PW-1) is wife of the deceased and Muhammad Aqeel Ashraf (PW-2) is real brother of Muhammad Shakeel Ashraf (deceased), therefore, both can be said to be richly interested. It is a fact borne out from the record that complainant Jannat-ul-Firdous (PW-1) admitted in her cross-examination that she was second wife of the deceased. She was earlier married to Mian Anees from whom she got divorce on the basis of Khula. She further admitted in her cross-examination that deceased was already married and the name of her earlier wife was Ayesha who after divorcing Ayesha contracted marriage with the complainant and that it was her love marriage as well as arranged marriage with Muhammad Shakeel Ashraf deceased. She further stated that she came to know about Nikah of her husband with accused Rabia Saeed about 18/20 days prior to the occurrence. 11. When the above narrations of the complainant are compared with her statement recorded before the police for lodging of FIR as well as in the private complaint that on receiving the telephone call from the accused, she along with Muhammad Shakeel Ashraf deceased and other PWs went to the house of Rabia Saeed, other wife of the deceased, it is an important factor and phenomenon in our society that first wife specifically try to keep the new wife away from her family and she cannot tolerate about her at any cost. By comparing four typical but contrasting marriages and examining the rules about the formation and breakup of polygamous marriages, the role of the pre-existing and new wife's consent (or not) and the economic consequences of poly-formation in ongoing and divorcing marriages, we demonstrate that the surpluses generated and distributions currently in place can both benefit and harm the co-wives. Jannat-ul-Firdous complainant (PW-1), in her cross-examination has stated as under:- "I have stated before DSP/SDPO Ali Akbar on 05.11.2019 regarding the motive part of the occur

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 173 & 561-A---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 354, 337-F(i), 337-A(i), 337-L(2), 452, 147 & 149---Report of Police Officer---Addition or deletion of legal provision---Scope---Applicant was aggrieved of an order passed by Trial Court whereby charge under S. 354, P.P.C., was deleted and matter was referred to Judicial Magistrate---Validity---Allegedly, accused persons caught hold the petitioner's mother from her hair, dragged her through a thoroughfare in naked condition exposing her to the people of the vicinity---Perusal of record revealed that in the impugned Order passed by the Court of GBV/Trial Court it was observed instant case was simple case of fight and house trespass; that no recovery memo. of torn apparels of alleged victim were found on record; that the intention to outrage modesty for the purpose of rape or sexual abuse to bring the case under the pail of special Court constituted under S.3 of the Anti-Rape (Investigation and Trial) Act, 2021, was missing, hence, the offence under S.354, P.P.C was not made out, thus was deleted---Said observations had not been found by the High Court to be unfounded, at present---No illegality, perversity or jurisdictional defect in the impugned order had been found, calling for any interference by the High Court justifying the revisional power for setting aside the impugned order---Petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Rupan Deol Bajaj v. KPS Gill AIR 1996 SC 309; Tahir Naqash and others v. The State and others PLD 2022 SC 385; Abwa Knowledge Pvt. Ltd. and another v. Federation of Pakistan and another PLD 2021 Lah. 436; Muhammad Asghar and 3 others v. Station House Officer and 2 others PLD 2020 Lah. 87; Ismaeel v. The State 2010 SCMR 27; Khan Gul Khan and others v. Daraz Khan" 2010 SCMR 539; Muhammad Tariq Khan v. Khawaja Muhammad Jawad Asami and others 2007 SCMR 818; Fazal Dad v. Col.(Rtd.) Ghulam Muhammad Malik and others PLD 2007 SC 571; Sumaira v. The State 2024 PCr.LJ 1783; Muhammad Iqbal v. Nasrullah 2023 SCMR 273; Syed Mushahid Shah v. Federal Investment Agency 2017 SCMR 1218; Commissioner Inland Revenue Lahore v. Messrs Millat Tractors Limited, Lahore and others 2024 SCMR 700; Mulsim Commercial Bank Limited v. Muhammad Anwar Mandokhel and others 2024 SCMR 298; Maqbool Ahmad and another v. the State 2007 SCMR 116; Asad Nawaz v. Zulfiqar Afzal Khan and others 2019 PCr.LJ 883 and Daim v. The State 2021 PCr.LJ 958 rel. Mirza Muhammad Islam and Ch. Basharat Ali for Petitioner. Ms. Rahila Shahid, Deputy District Public Prosecutor for the State. Muhammad Hussain Awan, Muhammad Irshad Jadran and Irfan Ghaus Ghumman, Advocates for Private Respondents. Order Anwaarul Haq Pannun, J .--- Through this criminal revision petition, the order dated 08.06.2023, passed by learned Addl. Sessions Judge/GBV/Special Court, Pasrur has been challenged, whereby the learned trial Judge while deleting the offence under Section 354 P.P.C of the charge, has held that since all the remaining offences are not scheduled offences, and as such are exclusively triable by the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate and consequently, referred the file to the learned District and Sessions Judge, Sialkot for its further entrustment to the court of competent jurisdiction for trial. 2. Precisely, necessary facts for disposal of instant revision petition are that the petitioner had lodged a criminal case vide FIR No.323 dated 15.09.2020, offences under Sections 354/337-F(i)/ 337-A(i)/337-L(2)/452/147/149 P.P.C with Police Station Sabaz Peer, District Sialkot with the allegation that on 03.09.2020 at about 8.30 a.m., respondents Nos.2 to 13 along with one Saeen, armed with sotas made criminal trespass in her haveli, caught hold her; Niamat Ali raised lalkara that he be killed; Waseem, started collecting articles, snatched Rs.50,000/- from mother of the petitioner and gave beating to the complainant and her mother. The accused persons caught hold Ameen Bibi, the petitioner's mother, from her hair, dragged her at thoroughfare in naked condition exposing her to the people of the vicinity. 3. It has borne out from the record that after some investigation, an interim/incomplete report was submitted under Sections 354/337-F(i)/337-A(i)/337-L(2)/452/147/149 P.P.C on 13.04.2021; after taking cognizance, the learned Magistrate 1st Class, Pasrur on 16.09.2021, framed the charge against the accused persons namely Muhammad Saeen, Samra Bibi, Muhammad Waseem, Nargis Bibi, Humaira Bibi and Niamat Ali accordingly, to which, they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. On 23.05.2022, a complete challan was also sent to Court under the same offences, whereupon the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Pasrur, once again framed the charge on 05.10.2022, to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial and the case was adjourned for prosecution's evidence. The learned Magistrate Section 30, Pasrur, later-on, vide his order dated 14.02.2023 made the observations to the effect that:- "as per Amendments in criminal law in shape of Anti Rape Act, 2021, a Special Court for dealing with the matters relating to gender violence and rape offences etc. is designated and above said matters are to be heard by same Court constituted in this regard, therefore, this court has no mandate to hear the matter any longer. Resultantly as per Circular No.3289 dated 14.10.2022 issued by the Worthy Sessions Judge, Sialkot, this case file is humbly transmitted to the GBV/Special Court of Pasrur for 23.02.2023." The learned Addl. Sessions Judge/GBV Court, Pasrur, on 23.02.2023, upon receiving the case file, proceeded with the case and vide his order dated 24.03.2023, after framing the fresh charge against the accused persons for the same offences i.e. under Sections 147/149, 452, 337-F(i)/337-A(i)/337-L(2) and 354 P.P.C, to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial, summoned the prosecution's evidence. Thereafter, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge/GBV/Special Court, Pasrur, vide his impugned order dated 08.06.2023, apart-from deleting the offence under Section 354 P.P.C of the charge, ordered to place the file before the learned Sessions Judge, Sialkot for its onward entrustment to the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate Section 30, Pasrur with the following observations:- "Record of instant case has been meticulously apprized while keeping in juxta-position Anti Rape (Investigation and Trial) Act, 2021. Preamble of ibid Act reflects that it came into existence to ensure the expeditious redressal of rape and sexual abuse in respect of women and children and in recent amendment bill 2022 in the Anti Rape Act (Investigation and Trial) Act, 2021. Word "sexual offenders" has been used for the such culprits, whereas, the instant case as per factual matrix available on record is simple case of fight and house tress-pass. To solidity the version of complainant no recovery memo. of torn apparels of alleged victim finds placed on record. Moreover, intention to outrage modesty for the purpose of rape or sexual abuse to bring this case under the pail of special Court constituted under Section 3 of the ibid Act is missing. Hence, Court is of the considered opinion that offence "under Section 354 P.P.C" is not made out. Thus same is deleted. Remaining offences which are already existence or made out from the available record are not scheduled offences and exclusively triable by the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate. 2. Ergo in the given facts and circumstances propriety demands that instant case which heard and adjudicated upon by the concerned Court of learned Judicial Magistrate Section 30. So the instant file be placed before Worthy District and Session Judge Sialkot on 14.06.2023 to seek its benign indulgence for appropriate orders." 4. Arguments heard and record perused. 5. The entire controversy, described above, has since arisen due to deletion of Section 354 P.P.C of the charge, therefore, it appears to be expedient to reproduce the said provision for its examination in depth being quite relevant "Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty. Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any woman, intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby outrage her modesty, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both". The assault or use of criminal force with intent to outrage the modesty of a woman, by an offender is the foundational requirement to constitute the offence under Section 354 P.P.C. Since the word "modesty" has not been defined in the Pakistan Penal Code, therefore, a resort shall have to be made to its dictionary meanings and import. Black's Law Dictionary refers to "modesty" as a quality of decency or propriety, particularly regarding dress, demeanor, or behavior, without providing its specific definition in the context of sexual offenses. In the Oxford English Dictionary "modesty" is defined as "behavior, manner, or appearance intended to avoid impropriety or indecency." In Cambridge Dictionary as "the quality of not being too proud or confident about yourself or your abilities; the quality in women of behaving and dressing in ways that do not attract sexual attention." The word "modesty", was interpreted by the Indian Supreme Court, in the case of "Rupan Deol Bajaj v. KPS Gill (AIR 1996 SC 309), influencing the legal thought in Pakistan as "modesty is an attribute associated with a woman, and it is the essence of a woman's womanhood. An act that violates the dignity of a woman may be considered as outraging her modesty." Moreover, sexual abuse having its nexus with the Act, also has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary as "any physical or non-physical act of a sexual nature performed on another person without their consent, including molestation, harassment, exploitation, or any other act intended to sexually violate the victim." In Oxford English Dictionary as "the action or an act of subjecting someone to unwanted sexual activity." In Merriam-Webster Dictionary as "the infliction of sexual contact upon a person by forcible compulsion; also: engaging in sexual contact with a person who is below a specified age or incapable of giving consent." In Cambridge Dictionary as "the harmful use of sexual actions or words towards another person, especially a child, in a way that is against the law." In UN Definition (General Context) as "actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions." In view of above described definitions of modesty and sexual abuse, it may be observed that an act outraging a woman's modesty (Section 354 P.P.C) escalates to sexual abuse if the following elements are found present (1) Presence of Sexual Intent (a) "modesty" involves actions that are indecent but may not be overtly sexual (b) Sexual abuse explicitly includes sexual intent to exploit, harm, or degrade. (2) Physical Violation (a) "modesty" can be outraged without physical contact (e.g. verbal harassment), (b) Sexual abuse typically involves physical acts like groping, molestation, or assault, but it can also include non-physical coercion (e.g., forcing someone to view explicit material). (3) Severity and Impact (a) Actions that insult modesty may offend dignity or decency but stop short of sexual harm. (b) Sexual abuse causes deeper emotional or physical harm and violates the victim's bodily autonomy. 6. Moreover, it is settled that the Courts are supposed to interpret the law in such a manner that the same may not defeat the object of legislation under interpretation rather it should be made in aid to the legislature. Reference can be made to the case of "Tahir Naqash and others v. The State and others" (PLD 2022 SC 385), "Abwa Knowledge Pvt. Ltd. and another v. Federation of Pakistan and another" (PLD 2021 Lahore 436), "Muhammad Asghar and 3 others v. Station House Officer and 2 others" (PLD 2020 Lahore 87). The Preamble of any statute is deemed to be a key to understand and interpret its provisions. Reliance is made upon the cases of "Ismaeel v. The State" (2010 SCMR 27), "Khan Gul Khan and others v. Daraz Khan" (2010 SCMR 539), "Muhammad Tariq Khan v. Khawaja Muhammad Jawad Asami and others" (2007 SCMR 818) and "Fazal Dad v. Col.(Rtd.) Ghulam Muhammad Malik and others" (PLD 2007 SC 571). The object and purpose of The Anti-Rape (Investigation and Trial) Act, 2021, hereinafter to be called as The Act, has fully been embodied in its preamble, which in its verbatim is reproduced for better comprehension. "An Act to ensure expeditious redressal of rape and sexual abuse crimes in respect of women and children through special investigation teams and special Courts providing for efficacious procedures, speedy trial, evidence and matters connected therewith or incidental thereto." It may be relevant to state that in a case titled "Sumaira v. The State etc." (2024 PCr.LJ 1783), this Court emphasized the aims and objects of the Anti-Rape (Investigation and Trial) Act, 2021 and held that: "Parliament has enacted the Anti-Rape Act to assure various fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution and to discharge obligations under international law to address the issue of sexual violence and bring offenders to justice. To this end, the Act provides for efficient procedures, speedy trials, evidence and matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. It may be highlighted that being a special legislation, it has precedence over all other general laws on the subject it covers.... The Anti-Rape Act aims to effectively deal with the rape and sexual abuse crimes mentioned in its Schedules (which are hereinafter referred to as the "Scheduled Offences") committed against women and children. It outlines a framework to check the said crimes by establishing (i) Anti-Rape Crisis Cell, (ii) Special Sexual Offences Investigation Units, (ii) Independent Support Advisors, (iv) Special Prosecutors, (v) Special Courts, (vi) a register of sex offences, and (vii) Fund to carry out the purposes of the Act. Each thread is meticulously braided; a break in any of them would render the statute ineffective. In light of the principles discussed above, the courts must interpret the Anti-Rape Act liberally and purposively. They must adopt the construction that advances rather than defeats the statute's objectives." 7. In order to achieve the envisioned objectives behind the Act, right from the stage of investigation to the conclusion of trial, the legislature has incorporated several provisions providing a coherent mechanism to ensure its effective implementation. A Judge of Special Court shall have to be appointed for a period of three years on the terms and conditions, to be determined by the Federal Government. He can only be removed before expiry of his tenure if he is found guilty of misconduct. However, a Judge of Special Court can be transferred, during his tenure as aforesaid to another Special Court within the same Province by the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned after recording reasons. The trial of the scheduled offences, as defined in Sections 2(f) and 2(g) ["Schedule" annexed to this Act] and [as set out in the Schedules against a "victim" or a "child" as defined in this Act] ordinarily has to be conducted by the Special Court, within whose territorial jurisdiction, the offences have been committed. While considering the gravity and sensitivity as well as its implications on the society, a timeline of four months has been provided for expeditious disposal of the cases registered under scheduled offences. The Special Court for achieving the aforesaid purpose has been mandated not to accede to request for adjournments more than two times during the trial of the case, out of which, one adjournment shall be subject to payment of cost by the person seeking adjournment, to quell the unhealthy trend of causing delay in trial to achieve their hidden objectives on one pretext or the other by the parties. In case, the defence counsel, does not appear after two consecutive adjournments in the Court for furtherance of proceedings, the Court may appoint another defence counsel with at-least seven years standing in the criminal matters, out of a penal of defence counsels/Advocates, to be maintained by the Special Committee, to defend the accused. The appointment of a defence counsel with such standing, as aforesaid, would ensure that the accused is represented through a mature and experienced lawyer, possessing reasonably sufficient experience and a legal acumen to rule out the possibility of any improper defence representation. In addition to above, in case of an appeal by an aggrieved person against judgment passed by the Special Court, the same shall preferably be decided within a period of six months. To control the unnecessary delay for the expeditious decision of an appeal, a restriction has also been placed by prescribing that not more than two consecutive adjournments on behalf of the parties shall be granted even at appellate stage. It is very important to highlight that upon commencement of the Act, the trial of scheduled offences pending in other Courts shall stand transferred to Special Court having jurisdiction under this Act. The Special Court shall proceed with the case from the stage at which it was pending immediately before its transfer and shall not be bound to recall or re-hear any witness who had already given evidence and may act on the evidence and procedure already adopted and complied with respectively before the transfer of the case by the previous Court. It is settled proposition of law that a Special Law has to prevail over the ordinary provision of law. Reliance in this regard may be placed upon cases reported as "Muhammad Iqbal v. Nasrullah" (2023 SCMR 273) and "Syed Mushahid Shah v. Federal Investment Agency" (2017 SCMR 1218). Any amendment in the existing law or utterly a new legislation, unlike the substantive law, relating to the procedure shall be operative retrospectively. Reliance may be placed upon cases reported as "Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore v. Messrs Millat Tractors Limited, Lahore and others" (2024 SCMR 700), "Muslim Commercial Bank Limited v. Muhammad Anwar Mandokhel and others" (2024 SCMR 298) and "Maqbool Ahmad and another v. The State" (2007 SCMR 116). The Act has not taken away either the right of a fair trial duly guaranteed in Article 10-A of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 or right of appeal of the parties. It has changed the forum of trial only for the purpose of expeditious disposal of the cases involving the scheduled offences by specially trained Judicial Officers in this regard. In course of a trial, if the Special Court is of the opinion that any of the offences with which the accused has been charged is not a scheduled offence, the Court shall record its opinion under Section 16(3) of the Act, akin to the exercise of power under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, i.e. "power to alter or add to any charge at any stage before judgment is pronounced has been vested with the Court trying an offence, however such alteration or addition shall have to be read and explained to the accused", which is also applicable to the proceeding before the Special Court, because the Court has to try him for scheduled offences. A Special Court, however can also try an accused for other offences, though not listed in the schedule, if the same had been committed along-with the scheduled offences, being un-segregable and concomitant to each other, having their inter-se deep nexus, including where the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 (Act XXVII of 1997) are invoked or invokable in respect of offences under this Act. It is quite axiomatic that an accused charged with a minor offence, having lesser sentence cannot be convicted and sentenced for an offence entailing graver sentence, without giving him the opportunity by way of framing of charge afresh and also giving him the opportunity to defend himself, though vice versa is permissible. 8. In order to examine an important aspect of the matter as to whether it is advisable for a criminal Court trying an offence, to order the deletion of an offence during the trial by making a tentative assessment of the material on record, without recording evidence (examination-in-chief, cross-examination and re-examination of the witnesses), as laid down in the case of "Asad Nawaz v. Zulifqar Afzal Khan and Others" (2019 PCr.LJ 883), "Daim v. The State" (2021 PCr.LJ 958), for giving its conclusive finding on that regard. Suffice it to observe that in view of power vesting with the Court under Section 16(3) of the Act read with Section 227 Cr.P.C, as discussed above, it is the prerogative of the Court to exercise its power at which stage of trial, it deems appropriate. Besides the above, a Court, trying an offence, is also equipped with vast powers to acquit the accused of the charge at any stage of the proceedings, if it comes to the conclusion that on the basis of incriminating material/evidence available on record, there exists no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence. 9. Perusal of record reveals that in the instant case, the observations as contained in the impugned order dated 08.06.2023 passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge/GBV/ Special Court, Pasrur, that "instant case is simple case of fight and house trespass, no recovery memo. of torn apparels of alleged victim finds placed on record, intention or outrage modesty for the purpose of rape or sexual abuse to bring this case under the pail of special Court constitute under Section 3 of the ibid Act is missing, hence, the offence under section 354 P.P.C is not made out, thus is deleted" have not been found by this Court to be unfounded, at present. No illegality, perversity or jurisdictional defect in the impugned order has been found, calling for any interference by this Court justifying the revisional power for setting aside the impugned order. 10. For what has been discussed above, instant petition having no substance is hereby dismissed. I appreciate the efforts of Mr. Ejaz Ahmad Sipra, Civil Judge/Research Officer who collected and provided relevant material in support of question involved in this case. JK/K-4/L Revision dismissed.