Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (Against the order dated 07.10.2022 passed by High Court of Sindh, Karachi in Revision Applications Nos. 73 to 77 of 2004). Land Reforms Act (II of l977)--- ----S. 6---Land holdings---Void transfers---Doctrine of election---Applicability---Appellants assailed order of resumption of land under Martial Law Regulation No. 115, by Land Commission which order was maintained by High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction---Validity---Appellants under the hierarchy of Land Reforms Act, 1977 invoked jurisdiction of Land Commissioner by filing their respective appeals which were taken to their logical end---By applying principle of doctrine of election, appellants could not be permitted to have another bite of the cherry by invoking original jurisdiction of Civil Court for a similar recourse---As per the doctrine of election a person aggrieved of an order/judgment may have a host of remedies to challenge the same but he has to elect one of those remedies and after choosing one he may not avail another remedy---Appellants themselves had chosen to be ousted from availing jurisdiction of Civil Court long back when they opted to invoke jurisdiction in pursuance of Land Reforms Act, 1977---Neither any mala fide could be attributed to actions taken by Land Commissioner nor could resumption of excess area in pursuance of Land Reforms Act, 1977, be termed as void or without jurisdiction---All that was done was within the frame of Land Reforms Act, 1977---Supreme Court declined to interfere with well-reasoned and comprehensive judgment encompassing all questions involved therein---High Court was well within its right to intervene while exercising jurisdiction under section 115 C.P.C., as there was jurisdictional defect---Appeal was dismissed. Trading Corporation of Pakistan v. Devan Sugar Mills Ltd. PLD 2018 SC 828 and Government of Pakistan v. Qazalbash Waqf 1993 SCMR 1697 rel. Muhammad Yousaf Laghari, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Ghulam Rasool Mangi, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants. Suresh Kumar, Additional Advocate General, Sindh, Ms. Lubna Pervaiz, Advocate-on-Record and Ghazanfar Ali Abbasi, Deputy Secretary BoR for Respondents. Date of hearing: 19th March, 2025.

Summary: (Against the order dated 03.09.2021 passed by High Court of Sindh, Karachi in Revision Application No. 239 of 2010). Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----S. 8---Registration Act (XVI of 1908), S. 17---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 115---Suit for possession---Concurrent findings of facts by two Courts below---Reversal---Principle---Registered sale deed---Presumption---Suit for possession of suit property filed by appellants / plaintiffs was decreed in their favour and appeal was dismissed by Lower Appellate Court---High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction set aside concurrent findings of facts by two Courts below---Validity---Registered instrument as a sale deed was a title of suit property and could not be ignored despite the fact that it was challenged belatedly by respondent / plaintiff and such challenge failed not only at trial stage but also at the Lower Appellate stage---Trial Court and Lower Appellate Court decided all questions based on material and evidence placed before them with well-reasoned justification to arrive at such conclusion and within their jurisdiction---Supreme Court set aside the order passed by High Court and restored that of the Courts below---Appeal allowed. Shahenshah Hussain Syed, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Ghulam Rasool Mangi, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants. Shaukat Ali Shaikh, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent. Date of hearing: 20th March, 2025.

Summary: (On appeal against the orders dated 05.11.2024 and 01.11.2024 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in Crl. Misc. No. 1728-B of 2024 and Crl. Misc. No. 1636-B of 2024, respectively). (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497 (1)---Bail---Period of sentence for the offence---Consideration---At bail stage, maximum period of sentence prescribed for an offence is to be considered for determining whether the offence falls under the prohibitory clause of section 497(1) of the Cr.P.C. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497(2)---Anti-Money Laundering Act (VII of 2010), Ss. 3 & 4--- Money laundering---Bail, grant of---Tax returns---Declared properties---Accused persons were arrested in an inquiry initiated on the basis of predicate offence regarding demanding / accepting bribery and purchasing of assets from such money---There was no evidence on record that accused actually paid consideration amount to sellers for the plot purchased by the wife of co-accused---Such fact would be appreciated by Trial Court after reading the evidence---All other properties of accused persons mentioned were not part of FIR and were declared in the appended tax returns of accused persons---Tax returns of accused persons had given rise to the presumption that the same had been legally acquired through declared sources---Whether properties were actually connected to any illegal activity would ultimately be determined by Trial Court---Prosecution case was based upon documentary evidence only which was already available with F.I.A. authorities and there was no apprehension of tampering with the same if accused persons were admitted to bail---Co-accused appended his Asset Declarations for relevant years to demonstrate availability of funds---Appended documents also indicated that sale consideration for vehicle in question was paid by co-accused himself through banking channels---Transactions in question were reflected in bank statements, which had been attached---Case of both the accused persons fell within the ambit of further inquiry under section 497(2), Cr.P.C and they were entitled to grant of post-arrest bail---Bail was allowed. Jamal-ud-Din v. State 2012 SCMR 573; Gul Rehman v. State PLD 2021 SC 795; Hazrat Amin v. State 2020 SCMR 418; Socha Gul v. State 2015 SCMR 1077; Anti-Narcotics Force through its Regional Director/Force Commander, A.N.F. Rawalpindi v. Qasim Ali 2019 SCMR 1928; Ghulam Murtaza v. State PLD 2009 Lahore 362 and Majid Ali v. State 2022 P Cr. L J 981 rel. Khuda Bux v. State 2010 SCMR 1160 distinguished. Saad Mumtaz Hashmi, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in Crl. P. 1565 of 2024). Umair Majeed Malik, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners (in Crl. P. 1574 of 2024). Raja Shafaqat Abbasi, DAG for the State. Arslan, Inspector (FIA) for the State. Assisted by: Johar Imam and Habib Khan, Law Clerks. Date of hearing: 18th February, 2025.

Summary: (a) Co-operative Societies Act (VII of 1925)--- ----S. 54---Registrar---Jurisdiction---Not all disputes arising between a society and its members, officers, or employees fall within the ambit of section 54 of Co-operative Societies Act, 1925. (b) Co-operative Societies Act (VII of 1925)--- ----S. 54---Registrar---Powers---Jurisdiction of Civil Court---Powers of Registrar can in no case exceed the powers of Civil Courts under Civil Procedure Code, 1908. (c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss. 42 & 54---Co-operative Societies Act (VII of 1925), S.54---Suit for declaration and injunction---Ownership right, determination of---Phrase "touching the business of the society"---Registrar, jurisdiction of---Dispute between the parties was with regard to ownership of suit property---Predecessor-in-interest of respondent filed suit which was decreed in his favour---Petitioner/defendant sought ex-parte award in his favour by invoking jurisdiction of Registrar Co-operative Societies-- -Award in favour of petitioner/defendant was set aside by High Court---Validity---Award made by Registrar was void, as dispute between parties was not "touching the business of the society" within the meaning of section 54 of Co-operative Societies Act, 1925---Registrar had no authority to determine title or ownership of disputed property when valid judgment passed by a competent Court of law was already in existence and no appeal had been preferred by petitioner/defendant---Requirement that dispute must be one "touching the business of the society" goes to the very root of the jurisdiction of Registrar or the arbitrators acting under section 54 of Co-operative Societies Act, 1925-- -Award by Registrar under Co-operative Societies Act, 1925 could not directly or indirectly adversely affect or overrule a civil Court's judgment and decree---Arbitration proceedings were initiated in a manner that contravened established legal principles, and award passed therein could not override a final judicial determination by a competent civil Court---High Court was justified in setting aside arbitration award and subsequent lease deed executed in favour of petitioner/defendant---Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment passed by High Court which was well-reasoned and had considered all material aspects of the case---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. Ghulam Moin-ul-Haq Gillani v. Province of Punjab and others 2021 CLC 1286; Deccan Merchants Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dalichand Jugraj Jain and others (1969) (1) SCR 887; Defence Housing Authority Lahore v. Builders and Developers (Pvt.) Ltd. 2015 SCMR 1799 and The National Co-Operative Consumers' Federation Ltd., New Delhi v. Delhi Administration, Delhi and others AIR 1971 Delhi 141 ref. Syed Shahenshah Hussain, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 21st March, 2025.

Summary: ----S.12---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts.17, 75, 76 & 79---Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell---Execution of agreement to sell, denial of---Proof---Producing two attesting witnesses of the agreement, requirement of---Producing original copies of the documents relied upon, requirement of---Primary and secondary evidence---Principle---The petitioner (vendee) filed a suit for specific performance of agreement to sell claiming to have made part payments and that the respondent No.1 (vendor) failed to execute the final transfer of the property---The respondent (vendor) acknowledged the existence of the first sale agreement, but disputed the date, place of execution, agents, and some terms---A second agreement was executed extending the final payment deadline---Only a photocopy of the first page was submitted, whereas, pages 2 to 4 lacked signatures of parties- --Trial Court dismissed the suit for lack of original documentary evidence and failure to examine attesting witnesses---The appellate court upheld this dismissal of Trial Court---Points for consideration before the High Court in the present revision petition were as to "whether the petitioner/vendee, having failed to produce the original sale agreement and examine attesting witnesses in accordance with the mandate of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, could validly seek specific performance of the alleged agreements, particularly where the existence of a second agreement and compliance with contractual obligations remained unproven"---Held: Petitioner did not examine the two attesting witnesses of the agreements of sale, instead, he opted to examine his son, who was not an attesting witness, therefore, the petitioner failed to meet the evidentiary requirements stipulated under Arts. 17 & 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---Petitioner neither pleaded nor provided any substantiating evidence regarding the loss or destruction of the original documents annexed with the plaint---Furthermore, no effort was made to invoke the provisions of Arts. 75 & 76 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, which prescribed the conditions for the admissibility of secondary evidence---In the absence of adherence to these legal prerequisites, and in view of the well-established jurisprudence, the suit lacked legal sustainability on this ground alone---It is settled law that documentary evidence must be presented in its original form unless exceptional circumstances justify the reliance on secondary evidence---The petitioner's reliance on photocopies, without fulfilling the necessary legal requirements for admissibility under the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, lacked evidentiary weight---Additionally, significant discrepancies in witness testimonies and inconsistencies in the documentary evidence cast serious doubt on the authenticity and enforceability of the purported agreement---Civil revision was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ----Arts. 117 & 120---Burden of proof---Scope---The burden of proof lies upon the party asserting a claim, and such a party must substantiate its case through credible and admissible evidence---Party cannot merely rely on highlighting deficiencies in the opponent's case, rather, it must independently establish its own claim through cogent and legally admissible evidence. (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ----Arts. 75 & 76(a) & 76(c)---Document---Proof---Admissibility of documentary evidence---Legal framework---Admissibility of documentary evidence necessitates the submission of primary evidence unless the exceptions outlined under Arts. 76(a) & 76(c) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, are met---Secondary evidence is admissible only in instances where the original document is demonstrably unavailable---However, in cases where the execution and subsequent loss of the original document remain unverified, secondary evidence lacks evidentiary weight. (d) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ----Arts. 75 & 76---Document---Proof---Authenticity of a document, dispute over---Relying on a photocopy instead of original---Effect and scope---When the authenticity of a document is contested and the original is not produced, a certified copy cannot be relied upon as evidence---Mere presentation of a document does not automatically confer evidentiary value unless its contents are established in accordance with the requirements for primary or secondary evidence under Arts. 75 & 76 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984. Hyderabad Development Authority v. Abdul Majeed PLD 2002 SC 84 rel. Nazir Hussain v. Amjad Hussain 2014 MLD 1100 and Syed Adnan Ashraf v. Syed Azhar-ud-Din 2014 MLD 342 ref. (e) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ----Arts. 75 & 76---Document---Proof---Admissibility and authenticity of a document---Principle---The submission of a photocopy, without proper verification through primary or legally recognized secondary evidence, holds no probative value---Furthermore, if a document is placed on record subject to its admissibility, yet no effort is made to establish its authenticity per Arts. 75 & 76 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, such a document cannot be deemed admissible in evidence---Documentary evidence must adhere to legal standards, and unless a document's authenticity is conclusively proven, its mere presentation before the court does not suffice to establish its evidentiary worth. (f) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ---Arts.75, 76, 117 & 120---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.12---Photocopied version of agreement to sell, reliance on---Scope---Mere production of photocopied copies of a sale agreement, without substantiating the existence and execution of the original document, lacks evidentiary weight and cannot be relied upon as conclusive proof. (g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.115---Revisional jurisdiction of the High Court---Scope---Jurisdictional defect or procedural irregularity has to be identified for interference under the revisional jurisdiction---The scope of S. 115 of C.P.C. is confined to addressing jurisdictional errors and misapplications of law. Applicant in person. Respondents (called absent). Abdul Waris Bhutto, Assistant Advocate General for Official Respondents. Date of hearing: 7th March, 2025.

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1860)--- ----S.497(1), first proviso---National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999), S. 9---Anti-Money Laundering Act (VII of 2010), Ss. 3 & 4---Corrupt practices, money laundering---Bail, grant of---Allegations against the accused-petitioner were that she connived with other accused by illegally acquiring pecuniary advantage/crime proceeds---Applicant was a female and was also of advance age of about 80 years, with fragile health---Applicant was a housewife and there was no previous record of her business activity or her previous conviction---Fact of grant of relief of interim bail to the applicant by the Accountability Court and the absence of allegation of misuse of such bail was also part of record---Moreover, there also appeared no likelihood that the applicant, if released on bail, after securing sufficient sureties, would abscond to escape trial, or tamper with the prosecution evidence or influence the prosecution witnesses to obstruct the course of justice, or repeat the offence---Thus, the case of the applicant was fully covered by the first proviso to S.497(1), Cr.P.C.---Bail application was accepted, in circumstances. PLD 2022 SC 764; 2023 SCMR 887; 2025 PCr.LJ 15; 2022 PCr.LJ 883; PLD 2022 SC 497; 2017 PCr.LJ 416; 2023 MLD 400; 2024 SCMR 1419 and PLD 2022 SC 743 ref. PLD 2022 SC 764; 2024 SCMR 1528; 2023 SCMR 887; 2023 SCMR 383; 2023 SCMR 1729; 1994 SCMR 1729; 2025 PCr.LJ 15; 2002 MLD 639; PLD 1995 SC 34; 2009 SCMR 1488; PLD 2017 SC 733 and PLD 2021 SC 799 rel. Farooq H. Naek, Talmoor Ali Mangrio and Syed Qasim Ali Shah for Applicant. Moazam Ali, Special Prosecutor NAB Hyderabad for Respondents. Date of hearing: 13th March, 2025. Order Muhammad Hasan (Akber), J .--- The Applicant is aggrieved by the order dated 26.02.2025, ("impugned order") whereby the learned Accountability Court No.1 Hyderabad dismissed her post-arrest bail application in NAB Reference No.2 of 2021 (The State V. Munawar Ali Bozdar and others) for the offences allegedly committed under section 9(a) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 (NAB Ordinance) and sections 3 and 4 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010 (AMLA). 2. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and examined the record. Brief background of the case is that FIR No.G-0-01/2020 dated 03.03.2020 was registered at P.S Thatta Anti-Corruption Establishment Sindh, against misappropriation and embezzlement of funds allegedly committed by the officers of the Right Bank Out Fall Drain (RBOD-II), Irrigation Department Government of Sindh and its contractors under the garb of flood, lighting/ emergent works. Thereafter, application under section 16-A of the NAB Ordinance was filed before the learned Special Judge Anti-Corruption (Provincial) Hyderabad and vide order dated 15.01.2021, the matter was transferred to the Accountability Court Sindh at Hyderabad. NAB's Investigation, in the form of Investigation Report, culminated into filing of Reference No.2 of 2021. The present applicant (Mst. Zahida) has been arrayed as accused No.9 in the said reference, who is the mother of the accused Muhammad Faheem Soomro. The allegations against the present applicant in the reference, as narrated at para-14 are as follows: "That investigation further revealed that accused No.9 (Zahida) connived with accused No.8 (Muhammad Faheem Soomro) by illegally acquiring pecuniary advantage / crime proceeds to the tune of Rs.153,274,000/- from accused No.37 (Manzoor Ali Solangi) i.e Rs.47,974,000/- into her joint account with accused No.8 (Muhammad Faheem Soomro), Rs.105,300,000/- to make payments for plot No.310 measuring 2,000 sq. yards (29th Street, DHA Phase VIII, Karachi. She in active connivance with accused No.8 (Muhammad Faheem Soomro) then transferred the plot No.310 acquired through crime proceeds in his name, who got it bifurcated the same into 02x plots and transferred them in the names of accused No.12 (Hassan Soomro) and accused No.12 (Mahvish Faheem Soomro)." 3. The applicant moved an application under section 498, Cr.P.C based whereon, ad-interim pre-arrest bail was granted by the Accountability Court, which was later on declined vide order dated 08.02.2025. Thereafter post-arrest bail was filed by the applicant before the learned Accountability Court, which was also declined vide order dated 26.02.2025. 4. At the very outset, it has been argued by learned senior counsel that the applicant has been falsely roped in this case and contends that applicant is a female and an old age lady of about 80 years, with poor health and she is a housewife, who has never been a working lady with no record of business activity and is not a previous convict, hence her case falls under the Proviso to section 497, Cr.P.C.; that Charge has already been framed in the case (page 229 of the court file) and there are around 71 witnesses in the Reference, however not a single witness has been examined till date despite passing of four years, and there is no likelihood of conclusion of the trial in near future; that the applicant is the mother of the accused Muhammad Faheem Soomro (accused No.8) and joint account holder with him whereas she had no knowledge about deposit of the subject money in the joint account; that being a joint account holder would not automatically make her part of the alleged crime, nor could mens rea be presumed automatically against her only for being the mother and joint account holder with her son; that no material was available on record to establish her conscious participation in the crime with the alleged contractors. Per learned counsel, not a single shred or material was available to establish that the applicant had the knowledge at the relevant time, about the said funds being crime proceeds. With respect to the purchase of property No.310, Phase VIII, DHA, Karachi, it was argued that no record has been produced by the prosecution in the Investigation to the effect that the applicant was personally and knowingly withdrawing or utilising such amount out of the subject five entries; nor was she aware about the source of consideration in purchase of the property; that the present owner of the property namely Saleem Malik has not been arrayed as an accused but prosecution has extended benefit of doubt and made a Prosecution witness, hence on the same analogy, the applicant is also entitle to benefit of doubt as well; that it has not even been alleged by the prosecution that applicant is the ultimate beneficiary of the funds obtained through sale of the said property. It was further pleaded that the entire case is based upon documentary evidence, which has already been collected and even Charge has been framed, hence the accused is not required for any investigation, nor is there any possibility of the accused tempering with the prosecution evidence or influencing any witness by the applicant and that no purpose would be served by keeping the female accused behind bars for indefinite period. It was also argued that the earlier interim Pre-arrest bail granted to the applicant was never misused or skipped by her, nor is there any possibility of her absconding or tempering with witnesses or the documentary evidence which is already in custody of NAB. It was finally submitted that after the latest amendment in the NAB Ordinance in the year 2022, the Court is empowered to grant bail under section 17 (a) thereof. Reliance was placed upon PLD 2022 SC 764, 2023 SCMR 887, 2025 PCr.LJ 15, 2022 PCr.LJ 883; PLD 2022 SC 497, 2017 PCr.LJ 416 and 2023 MLD 400. 5. Conversely, the learned Special prosecutor NAB, duly assisted by the Investigation Officer ably argued the matter and vehemently opposed the bail petition. He drew attention to various documents in the Investigation Report and the Reference, including pages 229, 197, 131 and paragraph 17 of the Reference to show that during 2018, money was deposited in the joint bank account of the applicant and her son accused Muhammad Faheem Soomro and that plot was purchased in the name of the applicant through crime proceeds in the name of Mst. Zahida, which was later on bifurcated and then transferred in the name of Mst. Mahwish and her son Hasan Soomro and ultimately sold to the subsequent purchaser Saleem Malik, the Prosecution Witness. He placed reliance upon 2024 SCMR 1419 and PLD 2022 SC 743. 6. The learned counsel for applicant has primarily claimed that applicant' case is covered under the first proviso to section 497, Cr.P.C. That prior to the amendments in the year 2022 in the NAB Ordinance, Bail in NAB matters could only be entertained by the High Courts under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan. However, after such amendment, section 17 provides that the "Court" may grant bail to an accused. Section 497, Cr.P.C. provides that when any person accused of any non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer-in-charge of a police station, or appears or is brought before a Court, he may be released on bail, but he shall not be so released if there appears reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for ten years. The first proviso to section 497 provides that the Court may direct that any person under the age of sixteen years or any woman or any sick or infirm person accused of such an offence be released on bail. 7. In the case of 'Tahira Batool v. State' it has been held by the Supreme Court that irrespective of the category of the offence, in cases concerning women accused etc. as mentioned in the first proviso to section 497(1), the bail is to be granted as a rule and refused only as an exception in the same manner as it is granted or refused in offences that do not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497(1), Cr.P.C. In the cases of 'Mst. Ishrat Bibi v. The State through Prosecutor General, Punjab and another', and 'Mst. Ghazala v. The State' and another', wherein female applicants were alleged to be the master mind behind murder of their respective husbands, it was held that for the purpose of deciding the prayer for grant of bail in exercise of the discretionary power of the court under section 497(1), Cr.P.C., the availability of sufficient incriminating material to connect the accused with the commission of the offence alleged against him is not a relevant consideration. 'Asiya v. State'; 'Munawar Bibi v. State'; and 'Liaquat Ali v. Bashiran Bibi' and 'Bushra Imran Khan v. The State'; are other cases wherein same benefit was granted to female accused person. In the case of 'Mrs. Roshan and others v. The State', female applicant (arrayed as accused persons in NAB case) was admitted to bail, whose bank accounts were operated and used for illegal activities, and against whom documentary evidence was also available on record. It was further observed in the cases of Ishrat Bibi 2 and Ghazal Bibi 3 supra, that the exceptions which justify refusal of bail are, the likelihood of the accused, if released on bail: (i) to abscond to escape trial; (ii) to tamper with the prosecution evidence or influence the prosecution witnesses to obstruct the course of justice; and (iii) to repeat the offence. Reliance is place upon 'Tariq Bashir v. State'; 'Zafar Iqbal v. Muhammad Anwar'; 'Muhammad Tanveer v. State' and 'Iftikhar Ahmad v. State'. 8. Hence, without touching the merits of the case and applying the above principles to the facts and circumstances of the present case, the position which emerges is that the applicant is a female and is also of advance age of about 80 years, with fragile health; that she is a housewife and there is no previous record of her business activity or her previous conviction. The fact of grant of relief of interim bail to the applicant by the Accountability Court and the absence of allegation of misuse of such bail is also part of record. Moreover, there also appears no likelihood that the applicant, if released on bail, after securing sufficient sureties, would abscond to escape trial, or tamper with the prosecution evidence or influence the prosecution witnesses to obstruct the course of justice, or repeat the offence. The case law relied by the special prosecutor are distinguishable and not applicable to the facts of the instant case. We are therefore convinced that the case of the applicant is fully covered by the first proviso to section 497(1), Cr.P.C. This bail application is therefore accepted, and the applicant is admitted to bail, subject to her furnishing bail bond in the sum of Rs.20,00,000/- with two sureties in the like amount, to the satisfaction of the Additional Registrar of this Court and by depositing Passport with the Additional Registrar of this Court. Needless to mention that the observations made herein are tentative in nature; and that this concession of bail may be cancelled by the trial court in the exercise of its power under section 497(5), Cr.P.C. if the applicant misuses it in any manner, including the causing of delay or otherwise hindering the expeditious conclusion of the trial. 9. Before parting with this Order, we appreciate the young law officer for NAB for ably presenting his case in a composed and professional manner, as against a senior counsel. JK/Z-7/Sindh Bail granted.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) --- ----O.XXI ---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 19---Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894), S.31 ---Land acquisition---Compensation---Execution proceedings ---Fresh limitation period---Promissory estoppel and acquiescence---Scope---Bar on raising contrary pleas discussed---Where petitioners previously undertook to satisfy the decree and benefited from adjournments, they stood estopped from subsequently raising limitation as a defence and their conduct amounted to acquiescence and attracted the doctrine of promissory estoppel and a fresh period of limitation was to commence under S.19 of the Limitation Act, 1908---Right to compensation was not extinguished by delay---The statutory scheme under S.31 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 did not extinguish the right to compensation due to delay in claiming or receiving it and the acquiring authority was obligated to pay compensation irrespective of such delay---In the instant case the petitioners challenged the orders passed by the courts below, whereby, the executing court had directed the petitioners (judgment debtors) to deposit the decretal amount for onward distribution to the legal heirs of Respondent No.1 (deceased decree-holder)---The primary controversy between the parties was as to "whether the execution petition filed by the respondents was within limitation and maintainable"---Petitioners contended that the execution petition was time-barred, as the original litigation concluded on 03.03.2004---Petitioners asserted that limitation should run from the finality of litigation on 03.03.2004, hence the execution petition filed on 11.02.2010 was barred by time---High Court observed that on one hand the objections were raised by the petitioners that execution petition was barred by time and petitioners were not bound to pay the remaining amount, and the other side of the picture was whether they were ready to return the land which was acquired for construction of motorway which seemed not possible---If the land acquired was not returnable then point of limitation could not be raised---State institutions were not supposed to hide behind technicalities and they were required to fulfill the cause of substantial justice---Apart from this, S.31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 required payment of subject land at very initial stage and it was nowhere provided that in case of non-receiving of compensation or approaching for the same with delay, the right to receive the compensation would be extinguished---Apart from making partial payment of compensation of land acquired from respondents they kept on promising and gaining time for satisfaction of decree during the execution proceedings, thus acquiescence and promissory estoppel came in the way when point of limitation was raised---As per S.19 of the Limitation Act, 1908 after acknowledgments, which were made by the petitioners, a fresh period of limitation was to be computed---No illegality, legal infirmity, jurisdictional defect, mis-reading, non-reading of record was found in the impugned order---The objection that execution was time-barred was held to be legally untenable---Civil revision being devoid of merits was dismissed. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 3, 10-A & 24---Elimination of exploitation ---State's duty to protect citizens---Protection of property rights---Right to fair trial---State institutions not to hide behind technicalities---State institutions must ensure fulfillment of obligations in line with principles of substantial justice rather than procedural technicalities---Article 3 of the Constitution of Pakistan relates to elimination of exploitation of citizens of Pakistan---From the bare perusal of the said Article, it can safely be observed that State run institutions, working in a representative form, are not expected to exploit the vulnerability of citizens---Undeniably, State is like a mother and its primary duty is to protect the rights of its children (citizens of Pakistan)---In addition to above, High Court emphasized upon importance of Art.24 of the Constitution which deals with protection of property rights---Fundamental rights were a crucial aspect of State's role in protecting its citizens---The High Court observed that substantial justice should not be ignored as it is a key principle of a fair and just society---This principle was held to be fundamental to ensuring that the law was applied fairly and that people's right were respected---It goes hand-in-hand with the right to fair trial (as mentioned in Art.10-A of the Constitution), where the goal is not just to follow procedures but to achieve just outcomes. Umer Sharif, Advocate assisted by Ch. Muhammad Arshad for Petitioners. Mian Tahir Maqsood assisted by Rana Muhammad Yasir for Respondents. Date of hearing: 21st March, 2025. Judgment Malik Waqar Haider Awan, J .--- Through the instant Civil Revision, petitioners have assailed order dated 20.02.2014 passed by learned Senior Civil Judge, Gujrat and judgment dated 05.09.2019 passed by learned District Judge, Gujrat. By virtue of the former order, learned executing court directed the petitioners/judgment debtors to deposit the decretal amount in the court for its onward distribution to the legal representatives of Ghulam Ali (deceased)/decree holders. Through the latter judgment, appeal preferred by the petitioners against order dated 20.02.2014 was dismissed. 2. The controversy involved in this case is whether order and judgment passed by both the learned courts below are legal and execution petition filed by respondents was well within time as prescribed and not barred by limitation. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that execution petition filed by respondents before learned executing court was hopelessly barred by time as litigation between the parties attained finality on 03.03.2004 as limitation starts running from the date of order passed by this Court in R.F.A. No. 56/2002 whereby decision of learned Civil Judge in Reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called "Act") was modified. Adds that although petitioners approached the Supreme Court of Pakistan by filing a CPLA against that order whereby leave was refused vide order dated 13.05.2009 without issuance of notice to present respondents, thus the date for commuting limitation for filing of execution petition would start from 03.03.2004. In support of his arguments, learned counsel has relied upon the judgments reported as Bakhtiar Ahmed v. Mst. Shamim Akhtar and others (2013 SCMR 5), House Building Finance Corporation of Pakistan v. Rana Muhammad Iqbal through L.Rs. (2007 SCMR 1929), National Bank of Pakistan v. Mian Aziz-ud-Din and 7 others (1996 SCMR 759) and an unreported judgment dated 19.03.2008 rendered by this Court in EFA No. 152/2007 titled Sheikh Muhammad Akram v. United Bank Limited etc. Submits that as per Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which is a residuary provision, limitation of 03 years is provided for filing of execution petition and in this way, limitation commenced on 03.03.2004 and expired on 03.03.2007. Submits that admittedly, execution petition was filed on 11.02.2010 which is beyond the limitation provided for filing of execution petition, however, petitioners filed objection petition in response to the execution petition whereby they took a preliminary objection that it was barred by time. He has stressed that learned Senior Civil Judge, Gujrat failed to adhere to the point of limitation and while erroneously entertaining the execution petition directed the petitioners to deposit the decretal amount. Further submits that in sequel to the said order, an appeal was filed by petitioners which was dismissed by learned District Judge, Gujrat while misconstruing the facts and law and referring interim order dated 25.02.2013 whereby present petitioners promised to pay the bank cheque of Rs. 24,00,000/- for satisfying the decree. 4. Conversely, learned counsel for respondents contends that the objection petition referred to by learned counsel for the petitioners was dismissed on 02.05.2011 while considering the objections raised by petitioners' side not maintainable and proceedable and also referring the judgment dated 03.03.2014 passed by this Court wherein in paragraphs Nos. 15 and 16, complete guidance and details were given that how much amount petitioners will pay and with what proportion. Learned counsel makes reference to the undertakings made by petitioners on different dates especially interim orders of executing court dated 08.02.2013, 25.02.2013, 22.03.2013 and 03.04.2013 whereby adjournments were sought for satisfaction of the decree. He has also referred to Section 31 of the Act and at the fag end of his arguments, he submits that land was acquired for construction of motorway but petitioners have not been fully paid the compensation price which is point of deprecation for the Government institutions towards citizens of the country. Further submits that petitioners challenged the execution of money decree, therefore, they were supposed to deposit the amount under Order XXI Rule 23-A and Section 47 of C.P.C. Places reliance on Messrs Nowshera Bricks and Tiles (Pvt.) Limited and others v. Regional Development Finance Corporation (2002 CLC 904), Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. v. Fateh Textile Mills Limited (PLD 2007 Karachi 397), The Madura Hindu Permanent Fund Limited v. Kamakshi Ammal and another (AIR 1926 Madras 492). 5. Heard. Record perused. 6. If the objection raised by learned counsel for the petitioners that execution petition was barred by time and petitioners are not bound to pay the remaining amount as judgments are not executable, then the other side of the picture is whether they are ready to return the land which was acquired for construction of motorway which, to my mind, is not possible now. If the land acquired by the petitioners is not returnable, then they cannot raise the point of limitation. State institutions are not supposed to hide behind the technicalities and they are required to fulfill the cause of substantial justice. Apart from this, Section 31 of the Act requires the payment of subject land at very initial stage and it is nowhere provided in the Act that in case of non-receiving of compensation or approaching for the same with delay, the right to receive the compensation would be extinguished. As in the present case, the land is "acquired" and not a matter of sale and purchase between two parties, due to which legislature has intentionally employed the word "compensation" instead of price of land as the land owner cannot resist the process of acquisition which is a compulsory process, he only can make efforts to get enhanced compensation. 7. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of petitioners, except raising this technical objection of limitation, has not raised any other point. Apart from making partial payment of compensation of land acquired from respondents, they kept on promising and gaining time for satisfaction of decree during the execution proceedings as is evident from the interim orders referred in the preceding paragraph No.4. Thus, acquiescence and promissory estoppel come in the way when learned counsel raised point of limitation as he did not raise any objection regarding their authenticity, even otherwise, judicial record has presumption of correctness. As per Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1908, after acknowledgements which are made by petitioners as per referred interim orders in paragraph No.4, a fresh period of limitation is to be computed. 8. It is very unfortunate to note that instead of being thankful to the respondents from whom land was acquired for the mega project (Motorway), petitioners have made them rolling stones as despite lapse of such a considerable period and decisions of Courts in their favour, they have not been paid according to their entitlement. 9. Article 3 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan (hereinafter called "the Constitution") relates to elimination of exploitation of citizens of Pakistan. From the bare perusal of the said Article, it can safely be observed that State run institutions, working in a representative form, are not expected to exploit the vulnerability of citizens. Undeniably, State is like a mother and it is its primary duty to protect the rights of its children (citizens of Pakistan). In addition to above, Article 24 of the Constitution deals with protection of property rights and after going through said Article, it can safely be said that compensation rights of citizens would not be extinguished in any manner. It is pertinent to mention here that fundamental rights are a crucial aspect of State's role in protecting its citizens. The Constitution guarantees several fundamental rights to its citizens. While focusing the matter in issue, I feel it necessary to observe here that substantial justice should not be ignored as it is a key principle of a fair and just society. This principle is fundamental to ensuring that the law is applied fairly and that people's rights are respected. It goes hand-in-hand with the right to a fair trial (as mentioned in Article 10-A of the Constitution), where the goal is not just to follow procedures but to achieve just outcomes. 10. As regards the judgments cited by learned counsel for the petitioners, in the light of admissions and promises made by petitioners' side before the learned executing court, the same are not applicable to the facts of present case. 11. Epitome of the above discussion is that this Court does not find any illegality, legal infirmity, jurisdictional defect, mis-reading, non-reading of record in the impugned order and judgment to which no exception can be taken by this Court in revisional jurisdiction. With this observation, this Civil Revision being devoid of merits stands dismissed. UN/N-7/L Revision dismissed.

Summary: Bail granted ---- In the instant case, single accused, i.e, the petitioner Rahmat Ullah is charged for launching murderous assault by firing at the complainant party. The recovered six crime empties of 9 mm bore from the place of petitioner, when sent to F.S.L, it has been opined in the report of the expert that “Microscopic examination of the case has revealed that the six crime empties are of 9 mm bore and were fired from different 9 mm bore weapons.” Accused was singularly and directly charged in the FIR for making effective firing at complainant party due to which one Luqman and Bakht Muhammad sustained injuries. According to Fire Arms Expert report said empties were fired from different weapons which certainly raised a question as to whether the act was done by one person or more. This factor alone takes the matter to one of further probe. On the other hand, in Naqal Mad No. 22, Muhammad Afnan (complainant in the instant case) has been attributed charge for making firing which proved ineffective in case of petitioner while remained effective in case of Bakht Muhammad (deceased) who sustained injury on his head. In the above Naqal Mad No. 22, the complainant of the instant case is a nominated accused whose ad-interim pre-arrest bail has been confirmed by the learned trial court. Now it is well settled that in cases of counter versions arising from the same incident, one given by the complainant in the F.I.R. and the other given by the opposite party, bail is granted as a rule on the ground of further inquiry for the reason that the question as to which version is correct to be decided after recording of pro and contra evidence during the trial and also to ascertain which party was the aggressor or was aggressed upon and refusal of bail in such cases is an exception. However, it is noted that the main accused (complainant of instant case), who has been charged for fire arm injury in Naqal Mad No. 22 has been granted bail in the said case and, thus, denying the same to the present petitioner, would not be legally appropriate. Hence, this Court is of the view that the petitioner would not fall within the cases of exception to the rule of grant of bail in cross cases. Almost the place, time of incident and parties in the FIR as well in Naqal Mad No. 22, are similar and the two cases squarely fall in the definition of cross cases. So far as the case of respondent Muhammad Afnan in the connected BCA is concerned, the record tells that the respondent and his co-accused Luqman are allegedly charged for ineffective firing upon Muhammad Ismail complainant of Daily Diary No.22 of the even date and the single injury so caused to Bakht Muhammad. Surprisingly, general role of firing with two weapons has been attributed to the accused, as such in view the number of injuries caused and the number of accused charged the two does not commensurate with each other, more particularly when no crime empty has been collected from the spot by the investigating officer, thus, the respondent/accused remained successful in making out his case one of further inquiry for the purpose of the desired concession. The impugned order was read thoroughly where the learned Judge has beautifully dealt with the material aspect of the case and that his approach is in accordance with law. There is no cavil with the proposition that once the Court of competent jurisdiction releases an accused on bail then extra ordinary circumstances are needed to recall the same, which are missing in the bail cancellation application. [BA allowed, post-arrest bail granted to the accused, while the connected BCA is dismissed]

Summary: Bail granted --- (a) Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010 – Ss. 3 & 4 – CrPC, S. 497(1) – Prohibitory clause – Bail in money laundering cases – Scope of sentence range While determining the applicability of the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1) CrPC, the maximum prescribed sentence under Section 4 of the AMLA (1 to 10 years) must be considered—not the minimum. The Supreme Court clarified that courts at bail stage are not permitted to undertake speculative exercises about the likely sentence. This aligns with the rulings in Socha Gul v. State (2015 SCMR 1077) and Qasim Ali case (2019 SCMR 1928), overruling earlier views that focused on minimum sentence (e.g., Jamal-ud-Din v. State). Held: Section 3 AMLA falls within the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1) CrPC. (b) CrPC, S. 497(2) – Further inquiry – Post-arrest bail – Circumstantial bail grant Petitioner Jabran, alleged to be a front-man aiding money laundering, had no direct role in predicate offences and was not nominated in FIRs based on them. Documentary evidence showed he merely brokered the property deal and his cheque used as security was never encashed. Moreover, he was incarcerated for over six months without submission of challan. Held: Case warranted further inquiry; bail granted under Section 497(2) CrPC. (c) Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010 – S. 2(xxiii) – “Proceeds of crime” – Nexus with predicate offences – Timing of property purchase Accused Muhammad Afnan Alam was alleged to have purchased properties from proceeds of crimes allegedly committed while serving in CDA. However, scrutiny of interim challan and official records showed that the three questioned properties were purchased before the relevant allotment approvals forming the predicate offences, raising doubt over nexus. Held: In absence of clear connection with predicate offences and with bail already granted in all predicate FIRs, case fell under further inquiry. (d) Constitutional Rights – Article 10-A – Fair trial and due process – Bail as a safeguard against pre-trial punishment Both accused were incarcerated without trial for extended durations, with no risk of tampering with documentary evidence. In light of Article 10-A, prolonged pre-trial detention without strong evidence linking them directly to laundering proceeds of crime violated fair trial guarantees. Held: Bail granted to preserve due process rights. Disposition: Leave granted. Petitions converted to appeals. Bail granted to Jabran and Muhammad Afnan Alam in FIR No.02/2024 under AMLA Ss. 3 & 4, subject to furnishing bail bonds of PKR 1,000,000 with two sureties each.