Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.115 & O.XXXVII, Rr.1, 2---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.5 & First Sched., Art.159---Suit for recovery on the basis of three cheques---Leave to appear and defend filed after 40 days---Limitation---Non-service of summons owing to police custody, plea of---No separate application for seeking condonation of delay was filed---Trial Court condoned delay and granted leave---Legality---Brief facts were that through the present civil revision the petitioner/plaintiff challenged the order passed by the district court, whereby the respondent/defendant was granted leave to defend in a summary suit under O.XXXVII, C.P.C. for recovery on the basis of dishonoured cheques---Issue in the present matter was “whether the grant of leave to defend was sustainable, particularly regarding service of summons and the time/limitation for filing leave to defend?”---Held: As regards respondent’s contentions that he was in custody and notice was served in jail without a copy of plaint and he lacked means or opportunity to engage counsel, the superintendent jail’s report was placed on record which unequivocally confirmed proper service of notice---A conjoint reading of the notice and the jail report did not indicate, nor even suggested that the notice was issued without a copy of the plaint or its annexures---Assertion of incomplete service was therefore, bereft of substantive basis---Application for leave to defend was filed after a lapse of 40 days from the date of service---In the present case, no application for seeking condonation of delay was filed before the Trial Court---The indispensable statutory condition for activating the equitable jurisdiction was entirely absent---Court could not assume jurisdiction where the legislature had withheld it, not could it exercise an equitable power in the absence of the very foundation upon which that power rested---Judicial discretion could not operate in a vacuum; it must be triggered through a formal prayer, supported by reasons and material---The court below could not lawfully enlarge the limitation period for filing the application for leave to appear and defend the suit---Impugned order was set aside---Present civil revision petition was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----S.5---Condonation of delay, seeking of---Underlying purpose of the statute is to induce claimants to act promptly and assert their rights without undue delay---Unexplained delay by persons who ought to be aware of their legal position and who have access to legal assistance cannot be encouraged or condoned---The statutory framework thus obliges claimants to act within the prescribed period in order to maintain order and certainty in legal affairs. (c) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----S.5 & First Sched., Art.159---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXVII, Rr.1, 2---Leave to appear and defend a suit under summary procedure, filing of---Limitation---Application for condonation of delay, non-filing of---Significance---Article 159 of Limitation Act, 1908 mandates filing within ten days from the date of service of summons---It is well settled principle of law that where the legislature has prescribed a specific period of limitation, the same cannot be extended or enlarged by the court unless sufficient cause for the delay is demonstrated strictly within the parameters of S.5 of Limitation Act, through an independent application---The court cannot assume sufficient cause not create it on behalf of a litigant---The absence of condonation of delay application therefore, is not a simple omission; it is a jurisdictional vacuum. (d) Limitation--- ----Principles---Limitation is a strict statutory mandate and not a matter of judicial discretion---Law of limitation is a statue of repose, intended to ensure finality in litigation to quieten title, and to bar stale and time-worn claims---It regulates existing rights by prescribing the period within which they may be enforced and does not itself create substantive rights---It cannot extinguish vested rights or curtail remedies unless its conditions are satisfied strictly in accordance with the statutory text---Equitable, ethical, or moral considerations cannot be invoked to circumvent its mandatory provisions, and justice, equity, and good conscience do not override its express language---Flowing from this foundational principle, the barrier of limitation cannot be crossed on the basis of hardship, sympathy, or any assumed inherent discretionary jurisdiction of the court---Ignorance, negligence, mistake, personal hardship, or poverty of a litigant does not save limitation---The statutory time bar is absolute unless the law itself provides an exception. Gabelli v. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n 568 US 422 (2013) ref. Ch. M. Sarmad Abbas Gujjar and Rana Ghulam Murtaza for Petitioner. Ch. Jamshed Jameel for Respondent. Date of hearing: 14th November, 2025.

Summary: As the original gift in favour of petitioner No.1 by his father has not been established through cogent evidence, therefore, the subsequent transactions which are superstructures of the same transaction are also not sustainable and would collapse alongwith the base upon which the same are standing. 70Writ Petition- Service- Recruitment / Appointment 11695-24 MUHAMMAD TAHIR BASHIR VS POP ETC Mr. Justice Asim Hafeez 16- 12- 2025 2025 LHC 7713

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Punjab Urban Immoveable Property Tax Act (V of 1958)--- ----S.3---Punjab Local Government Ordinance (XIII of 2001), Ss.116 & 117---Property tax demand, challenge to---Plea that unless area was declared as rating area no levy could be demanded---Legality---Power of local government to determine/levy property tax---Scope---Facts: Though present constitutional petition petitioners assailed property tax demand notices/challan forms issued to them in respect of properties situated in various localities where property tax on annual rental value had been levied pursuant to notifications issued under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 2001---Moot Point: “Whether property tax demands for the concerned localities were lawful without a specific notification under S. 3 of the Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958 declaring the area a rating/urban area?”---Held: Notifications were issued in exercise of S. 117 of the Ordinance, 2001--Section 116 of the Ordinance, 2001 and relevant entries in Second Schedule thereto extended power to tax immovable property in terms of S. 117 of the Ordinance, 2001---Hence, power to levy and collect tax from petitioners was vested with the local government and such power was correctly exercised by raising demand to pay levy---No illegality was found in issuance of demand notices qua payment of levy in area under reference, which was a rating area for all intent and purposes, without the requirement of fresh notification under S.3 of the Act, 1958---High Court rejected the plea of exclusivity claimed or otherwise attributed to S. 3 of the Act, 1958, for the purposes of throwing challenge to the levy and demand thereof, validly made in context of local government laws---Present writ petition was devoid of any merits and the same was dismissed, in circumstances. Khawar Siddique Sahi for Petitioners. Rana Ghulam Husssain, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan. Bashir Ahmed Buzdar, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab. Ch. Saeed Akhtar Sajid for Respondents Nos.3 and 4. Muhammad Aslam Sipra, Deputy Secretary (Law) and Muhammad Aslam, Inspector, Excise, Taxation and Narcotics Department in person.

Summary: (a) Industrial Relations Act (X of 2012)--- ----Ss.31, 32, 33, 53, 54 & 57---National Industrial Relations Commission (Procedure and Functions) Regulations, 2016, Reglns.3 & 4---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.10---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Territorial jurisdiction of NIRC---Employment contract---Exclusive jurisdiction clause---Effect---Employment contract containing an exclusive jurisdiction clause conferring jurisdiction on courts at place ‘I’---Enforceability and legal effect---Where the cause of action is asserted to have arisen at place ‘Q’ and the employee institutes a grievance petition before NIRC at place ‘Q’---Maintainability of grievance petition at place ‘Q’---Scope---Brief facts were that the petitioner company challenged the NIRC Full Bench order whereby its appeal against the Single Member, NIRC was dismissed; the respondent employee was hired as ‘safety officer’ under an offer letter containing an exclusive jurisdiction clause for Islamabad; after termination notice, respondent employee filed a grievance petition at NIRC Quetta, and the petitioner’s application under O. VII, R. 10, C.P.C. for return of plaint was rejected---Question requiring determination in the present matter was as to “whether NIRC Quetta had territorial jurisdiction despite the parties having confined themselves to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts at Islamabad?”---Held: It was clear from perusal of standard-form contract furnished by the petitioner company that there existed clear inequality of bargaining power between the petitioner company and the respondent employee---Respondent employee had no meaningful opportunity to negotiate any of its terms---This lack of real choice underscored the inequality of bargaining power between the parties and assumed significance while examining the enforceability of the contractual stipulations contained therein---National Industrial Relations Commission being a federal statutory body designed the sitting of its members at different placed was to be flexible and facilitative in nature to adequately address the disputes of trans-provincial establishments---The seat of member of NIRC at Quetta, therefore, did not constitute a separate or distinct forum; it was merely a bench of NIRC through which the NIRC exercised its federally conferred jurisdiction---Proceedings conducted at Quetta remained proceedings of the NIRC itself, and the territorial jurisdiction of Industrial Relations Act, 2012 extended to whole of Pakistan---Jurisdiction flew from the statute creating the forum, not from the place where the forum happened to sit---So long as the subject matter of the dispute fell within the statutory mandate of the NIRC, the exercise of jurisdiction through any of its duly constituted seats/benches could not be questioned on territorial grounds alone---In the present case, the NIRC acting though its Quetta Bench lawfully exercised jurisdiction in the matter---Proceedings before the NIRC were directed to continue---Present constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Jurisdiction--- ----Jurisdiction is not a mere technicality but the very foundation upon which the legality of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings rests. (c) Jurisdiction--- ----Jurisdiction clause in an employment contract---Effect---Parties agreeing to jurisdiction of courts at a particular place---Circumstances where there is inequality of bargaining power between employer and employee---Scope---Where two or more forums are otherwise competent to entertain a dispute, the parties may, by mutual agreement, restrict themselves to one such forum for the adjudication of their disputes---Such clauses, when they merely regulate the choice amongst available forums and do not oust the jurisdiction of all courts, are respected in order to uphold the sanctity of contract and the autonomy of the parties---A jurisdiction clause is a contractual stipulation, where the parties to the contract choose or select one particular forum out of two or more available forums, and the same is permissible---Choice of parties regarding jurisdiction clause has been upheld by Supreme Court to maintain the sanctity of the contract---General rule of contract in common law is founded upon the principle of freedom of contract that parties are ordinarily the best judges of their own interests and that where they freely and voluntarily enter into a contract the primary function of the courts is to enforce to what has been agreed---However, it has to noted that employment contracts are often marked by unequal bargaining power because the employer generally occupies a dominant position, while employee has little or no real opportunity to negotiate the terms of engagement, and only to sign the dotted line of the contract in order to secure his livelihood---In such circumstances, courts are not confined to formal reading of contractual clauses but are required to examine the fairness and reasonableness of enforcing such clauses---However, it has also to be noted that where enforcement of jurisdiction clause would operate oppressively, unfairly, or inequitably, courts may justifiably decline to give effect to it. State Life Insurance Corporation v. Muhammad Saleem 1987 SCMR 393; Messrs Kadir Motors, (Regd.) Rawalpindi v. Messrs National Motors Ltd. 1992 SCMR 1174 and Eden Builders (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Muhammad Aslam and others 2022 SCMR 2044 and Uber Technologies Inc. and others v. David Heller and others 2020 SCMR 1279 rel. Redtone Telecommunications Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited and 3 others v. Federation of Pakistan and 11 others PLD 2014 Sindh 601, Global Quality Foods (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Hardee’s Food Systems, Inc. PLD 2016 Sindh 169; Tahir Tariq Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. and 2 others v. National Development Finance Corporation 2003 CLD 1546; Gillespie Brothers and Co. Ltd. v. Roy Bowles Transport Ltd., (1973) 1 QB 400; Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. and another v. Brojo Nath Ganguly and another AIR 1986 SC 1571 and Snehal Kumar Sarabhai v. Economic Transport Organisation and others AIR 1975 Gujarat 72 ref. Makhdoom Ali Khan and Khwaja Aizaz Ahsan for Petitioner. Kamran Mujrtaza and Hassan Kamran for Respondent No.2. Assisted by: Muhammad Fahad, Research Intern and Muhammad Yahya Khan Niazi, Judicial Law Clerk. Date of hearing: 16th September, 2025.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----S. 11(2)---Assessment /recovery of tax erroneously refunded etc.---Fake / flying invoices issued by the blacklisted/suspended units, allegation of---Transaction made through proper bank channel---Scope and effect---All the transactions made with the supplier by the respondent/registered Person, during the alleged period (from July 2017 to June 2022), were through proper bank channel i.e. crossed banking instrument, whereas, at the time of purchases from the alleged suppliers, both, the buyer and the supplier were duly declared in the sale tax returns as active and no coercive action at that time was taken against the alleged blacklisted/blocked suppliers---Respondent / registered persons also produced complete detail of purchase made along with proof of purchase invoices and bank statements---Before Commissioner Inland Revenue- Appeals/CIR (A), the Department not only remained unable to provide any proof of inquiry or involvement of respondent /registered person in purchases of fake and flying invoices, but also showed unawareness of the business activities of the respondent/registered persons---Thus, at the time when the supplies were made and invoices were issued, the suppliers were neither blacklisted nor the invoices issued had any direct nexus with the blacklisting order---Therefore, the proposed question was answered against the applicant/department---The CIR(A) and the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue passed well speaking orders and had rightly set aside the order-in-original---Thus, no reason / case to interfere in the concurrent findings of the forums below was made out---Sales Tax Reference Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----S. 11(2)---Customs Act (IV of 1969), S. 187---National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999), S.14---Assessment /recovery of tax erroneously refunded etc.---Rejection by department---Fake/flying invoices issued by the blacklisted/suspended units, allegation of---Burden of proof---Whether upon Department or the registered person---Concept of reverse onus---Principle of presumption of innocence---Scope---In the present case, though Show-Cause Notice was issued to the respondent /registered person, but record was silent whether before issuance of Show-Cause Notice any meaningful efforts were made by the Department (sales tax officials ) to conduct an audit or any proper inquiry was made by exercising powers conferred under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, (‘the Act 1990’), in order to verify the allegations---It was revealed from the contents of the Show-Cause Notice that the same had been based on vague allegations and an assumption, such as; the respondent /registered person had claimed input tax adjustment against sales tax invoices of suppliers who were subsequently blacklisted/suspended or made inactive by the Federal Board of Revenue---The court looks to what is clearly said and there is no room for any intendment nor is there any equity about a tax---There is no presumption as to tax and nothing is to be read in or implied and one can only look fairly at the language used---The scheme of the Act, 1990 clearly envisages that the obligation to establish that a person is liable to pay any tax or charge and the same has not been levied or paid or has been short-levied is essentially that of the sales tax authorities---The burden to prove the allegations is on the shoulders of the authorities/department ;and in order to discharge said obligation they have been vested with wide powers under the Act, 1990---Whoever asserts a fact is also burdened with the duty to establish that it is highly probable to be true---In some exceptional cases, the legislature, in its wisdom, has provided for what is known as reverse onus, by placing the burden on the person against whom an allegation has been made; such as S. 187 of the Customs Act, 1969 and S.14 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999---The concept of reverse onus i.e. placing the burden on the person against whom an allegation has been made runs contrary to the established principle of presumption of innocence---It is, therefore, for said reason that Courts lean in favour of interpreting or reading down such provision in an effort to safeguard the fundamental principles of fair trial---There is no provision pari materia with S. 187 of the Customs Act, 1969, or S.14 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, in the Act, 1990---The legislature, therefore, did not intend to reverse the onus of proof in matters relating to the levy, charge and payment of the tax under the Act, 1990---The proceedings before the adjudicating authority or the statutory appellate forum under the Act, 1990 are quasi judicial in nature---When the department alleges that a registered person has committed any illegality, the former is burdened with a statutory duty to establish before the adjudicating forum, through persuasive and proper evidence, that the allegations are highly probable to be true, rather than being unreliable, false or doubtful---The duty to establish facts on the standard of balance of probabilities is on the department under the Act of 1990, thus, the question was decided against the department---Commissioner Inland Revenue (A) and the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue passed well speaking orders and had rightly set aside the order-in-original---Thus, no reason / case to interfere in the concurrent findings of the forums below was made out---Sales Tax reference Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances. Darya Khan, Barrister Iftikhar Raza Khan and Munawar Khan Kasi for Appellant. Muhammad Umar Dogar and Raja Umair Ali for Respondent No.1. Date of hearing: 28th November, 2025.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.12(2)---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.47---Application under S.12(2), C.P.C---Petitioner claiming to be widow of the deceased---Declaration decree obtained by children of deceased after his death---Petitioner/widow not impleaded in the suit---Effect---Courts below relied on testimony rendered in earlier judicial proceedings---Permissibility---Inadmissibility of such evidence against non-party---Non-framing of issues by courts below in S.12(2), C.P.C. application where facts were disputed---Remand of case in circumstances---Facts: The petitioner (claiming to be the widow of deceased) filed an application under S.12(2) C.P.C. to set aside the judgment and decree passed in a suit for declaration filed by the deceased’s children (respondents Nos. 3 to 8) against “public at large” wherein the suit was decreed; the petitioner’s section 12(2) application was dismissed and her revision was also dismissed by the District Court; findings of both the courts below were drawn from the statements/evidence of the deceased and his witnesses recorded in the earlier jactitation-of-marriage proceedings filed by respondent No.9/mother of respondents Nos.3 to 8; petitioner filed present constitutional petition challenging both concurrent orders---Issue: “Whether the evidence recorded in the earlier suit for jactitation of marriage could legally be pressed into service against the present petitioner, who was neither a party to those proceedings nor afforded any opportunity of cross-examination?”---Held: In the present case, none of the mandatory pre-conditions for use of earlier recorded testimony in subsequent proceedings stood fulfilled---The petitioner was neither a party to the suit for jactitation of marriage nor afforded any right or opportunity to cross-examine the deceased or his witnesses---Furthermore, the issues involved in the said proceedings were materially distinct from the controversy arising in the application under S.12(2), C.P.C.---Consequently, the evidence recorded in the earlier proceedings was wholly inadmissible against the petitioner and could not legally form the basis for adjudication of her rights---The courts below, therefore, committed a manifest error of law by treating such evidence as determinative, in clear disregard of the statutory mandate contained in Art.47 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---The omission to implead the present petitioner, who claimed to be the widow of deceased at the time of his death, became significant and prima facie indicative of material concealment---Such selective impleadment, in a suit directly concerning declaration of legal heirship and inheritance rights, struck at the root of fair adjudication and attracted the mischief contemplated under S.12(2), C.P.C.---The controversy squarely involved disputed questions of fact, which could only have been resolved through proper framing of issues and recording of evidence of the contesting parties---Impugned orders were set aside and matter was remanded to Trial Court---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ----Art.47---Testimony recorded in earlier judicial proceedings---Admissibility in subsequent proceedings---Conditions precedent---The relevancy and admissibility of evidence recorded in an earlier judicial proceeding is conditional and circumscribed, and not absolute---Such evidence can be relied upon in a subsequent proceeding for proving the truth of the facts stated therein only if the following conditions prescribed therein are satisfied, i.e. (i) that the earlier proceeding was between the same parties or their representatives-in-interest, (ii) that the adverse party had the right and opportunity of cross-examination, (iii) that the questions in issue in both proceedings were substantially identical. Muhammad Farooq Warind for Petitioner. Ch. Abdul Jabbar for Respondents Nos. 3 to 8. Date of hearing: 10th December, 2025.

Summary: Section 26 of the Punjab Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960 (West Pakistan Ordinance VI of 1960) restricts the jurisdiction of civil courts solely in matters arising under the Ordinance. It does not, however, preclude the civil courts from exercising jurisdiction in cases where deprivation of title is alleged on the ground of fraud; such disputes, by virtue of Section 9 CPC, fall within the exclusive and ultimate jurisdiction of the civil courts. 82Execution Application 1-25 BOP VS M/S AGRI INTERNATIONAL ETC Mr. Justice Abid Hussain Chattha 09- 12- 2025 2025 LHC 7720

Summary: Inter alia, following question requires determination: Whether a wife pursuing claims for dower, dowry articles and maintenance, who appears before the Court without counsel of her choice or any independent advice and withdraws her suit, can later seek to recall that statement on the ground of fraud, undue influence keeping in view the fact that sanctity is attached to the judicial proceedings? Held: Statements recorded by the litigants are generally given full weight because same are presumed to reflect the free and voluntary will of the party making them before the Courts. However, this principle is not an unbending rule of thumb. The Court must examine the attending circumstances to determine whether the act was truly voluntary and free from undue influence or fraud. Further held that in a dispute whenever a statement is to be recorded by a vulnerable litigant, like females in a family matter, the Court must take all necessary steps to ensure that the statement is fully understood by the maker; the statement should be recorded in a language which the party comprehends; particularly, if the maker is illiterate, the Presiding Officer must ensure that she is accompanied by her kin, who is literate, having no adverse interest, and understands the statement she makes and it should be read over to her by the Presiding Officer of the Court, who should specifically question such vulnerable party to ascertain that she understands the contents and implications of the statement, and that it is being made voluntarily, without any inducement, undue influence, or coercion, and that she has the independent advice from counsel of her choice. Such procedural safeguards are essential to uphold the principles of natural justice and to ensure that the sanctity of the judicial proceedings is preserved while protecting the substantive rights of vulnerable parties as required under the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. 81Civil Revision 237987/18 Muhammad Arshad Mehmood etc Vs Muhammad Bashir etc Mr. Justice Malik Waqar Haider Awan 10- 12- 2025 2025 LHC 7797