Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O.VI, R.17---Amendment of pleadings---Inadvertent / typographical error in written statement---Correction of “exchange deed” to “sale deed”, seeking of---Scope---Facts: Respondents/plaintiffs instituted a civil suit for declaration, cancellation of document and permanent / mandatory injunction regarding suit land---Due to an alleged typographical/clerical mistake petitioners/defendant moved an application under O.VI, R.17, C.P.C. to amend the written statement, which was dismissed by the Trial Court and the Appellate Court, hence, the writ petition---Issue: “Whether correction of an asserted clerical mis- description in the written statement, from “exchange deed” to “sale deed” (and allied mutation particulars), constituted a permissible amendment under O.VI, R.17, C.P.C. necessary to determine the real controversy, or an impermissible change in the nature of defence?”---Held: Reference to the Exchange Deed appeared only as an in advertent typographical error in certain paragraphs of the written statement---No new plea was being introduced nor any previous admission withdrawn; rather, the petitioners merely sought to correct the mis-description of the document to avoid future ambiguity---The respondents/plaintiffs could not be prejudiced thereby, as the factual position remained unchanged --- Impugned concurrent orders passed by the courts below were set aside---The petitioners’ application under O.VI, R.17, C.P.C. for amendment in the written statement was allowed---Present constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O.VI, R.17---Amendment of pleadings---Scope---Case being at mature and advance stage---Permissibility---Amendment of pleadings should ordinarily be allowed if it is necessary for determining the real question in controversy between the parties and does not change the complexion of the case or cause prejudice to the opposite side---The jurisdiction to allow amendment is wide and intended to advance the cause of justice rather than to defeat it---Therefore, the proposed amendment if essential for clarification of pleadings and does not alter the fundamental character of the case, it should be permitted even at an advanced stage of the proceedings. Haji Sultan Abdul Majeed (Decd) through Mehboob Sultan and Habib Sultan and others v. Mst. Shamim Akhtar (Decd) through Mah Jabeen and others 2018 SCMR 82; DAUSA and others v. Province of Punjab and others 2016 SCMR 1621 and Lahore Development Authority and others v. Sultan Ahmad and another 2007 SCMR 1682 rel. (c) Pleadings--- ----Amendment of pleadings---The object of pleadings is to define the issues, not to penalize a party for a bona fide clerical error. Barrister Ch. Imran Hassan Ali, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners. Ajam Naz Malik, Advocate Supreme Court and Raja Waqar Ilyas for Respondents. Date of hearing: 19th January, 2026.

Summary: 44Objection Case (Civil) 10-26 MST NAZEERAN MAI VS MUHAMMAD MUMTAZ Mr. Justice Muzamil Akhtar Shabir 16-01- 2026 2026 LHC 89

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908— ----Order XXIII, Rr. 1 & 3—Withdrawal of suit—Effect—Bar to fresh proceedings—Compromise not recorded— Petitioners’ predecessor earlier instituted suit challenging registered lease deed concerning disputed shop, which suit was dismissed as withdrawn (simpliciter) without seeking permission to file a fresh suit on same cause of action—Subsequently, petitioners’ predecessor instituted another suit seeking declaration, injunction and alternate possession on same subject-matter and challenging same lease deed—Trial Court decreed suit and Appellate Court maintained decree; High Court in revision set aside concurrent judgments and dismissed suit—Validity— Supreme Court held that where earlier suit is withdrawn unconditionally without liberty under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC, a subsequent suit on the same subject-matter/cause of action is barred—Plea that earlier withdrawal was based on private compromise was rejected as no compromise/terms were ever placed on judicial record, nor disclosed in withdrawal application, nor recorded by Court—Court can only record compromise on material formally presented—Unchallenged withdrawal order attained finality; petitioners, having acquiesced, could not later re-characterize unconditional withdrawal as conditional—Bar under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC squarely applied. Cited Cases: Ghulam Abbas v. Mohammad Shafi through LRs (2016 SCMR 1403) Azhar Hayat v. Karachi Port Trust (2016 SCMR 1916) Muhammad Yar (Deceased) through LRs v. Muhammad Amin (Deceased) through LRs (2013 SCMR 464) Malik Shahid Mehmood v. Malik Afzal Mehmood (2011 SCMR 551) Ch. Ghulam Rasool v. Mrs. Nusrat Rasool (PLD 2008 SC 146) (b) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908— ----Order XXIII, R. 2—Limitation—Fresh suit after withdrawal—Effect— Where earlier suit is withdrawn, plaintiff in any fresh suit remains bound by limitation “as if the first suit had not been instituted”—Section 14, Limitation Act, 1908—Exclusion of time—Not attracted merely because earlier suit was filed and later withdrawn—Petitioners neither pleaded nor proved due diligence/good faith prosecution before court lacking jurisdiction or other defect of like nature—Challenge to registered lease deed of 1995 after lapse of years held manifestly time-barred. Cited Cases: Mrs. Akram Yaseen v. Asif Yaseen (2013 SCMR 1099) Muhammad Saeed Bacha v. Late Badshah Amir (2011 SCMR 345) (c) Civil procedure— ----Estoppel/acquiescence—Finality of withdrawal order— Withdrawal order passed in presence of parties and remained unchallenged despite availability of remedies—Petitioners estopped from disputing its consequences and from reopening settled position by alleging unrecorded compromise—Private arrangement not reflected in judicial record cannot defeat statutory bar under Order XXIII. Disposition: Leave to appeal refused; Civil Petition dismissed; judgment of High Court in revision upheld, holding subsequent suit barred under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC and also time-barred.

Summary: A revision petition challenging a remand order would bear Court fee of Rs.500/- by treating the same as revision against order and not against a decree in terms of Entry No.12 of amended Schedule of the Court Fee Act, 1870. 45Service 70730/25 Muhammad Shahid Sharif &

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan- -Arts.172 & 185(3)-Private dispute viz. ownership of suit property-High Court declaring the property as ‘escheat’ and directing Government to take over possession, challenge to-Legality-Jurisdictional overreach by High Court-Brief facts were that the plaintiffs filed a suit claiming ownership of the house through inheritance, while the defendants relied on an alleged waqf deed; the suit was dismissed by the Trial Court and the dismissal was maintained in appeal and revision on the ground that neither side proved title, but in the revisional proceedings the High Court additionally treated the property as escheat and directed the Government to take possession although the dispute was only between private parties and the Government was not before the Court-Question requiring determination was as to-whether the High Court, while adjudicating a dispute between private parties, could declare the suit property as escheat and direct the Government to take possession in the absence of any pleadings, issue, evidence, or the Government being a party to the proceedings?-Held: Government was not a party to the lis-No pleadings were raised, no issues framed, and no evidence was led on the question of escheat-Entire lis remained confined to a contest of title between two private parties-Escheat was never set up a case by any party-High Court travelled beyond the pleadings and effectively introduced a third and entirely alien case, which was impermissible-Dismissal of suit on the ground that neither party succeeded in proving the title or claim was to remain intact-Present petitions were converted into appeal and were partially allowed, in circumstances. (b) Constitution of Pakistan- -Art.172-Escheat/ownerless property-Nature, preconditions and mode of declaration-Escheat is a distinct and special legal concept-Property can vest in the State only where the owner dies intestate, and no legal heir exists to inherit the estate, and such foundational facts are established through proper and independent proceedings-A declaration of escheat cannot be made incidentally or collaterally in a civil suit, particularly when it is neither pleaded nor put in issue between the parties.

Summary: Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)--- ----Ss.3 & 4---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.11---Enforcement of arbitration agreement, petition for---Maintainability---Whether in absence of arbitral award, enforcement petition for arbitration agreement would be competent---Brief facts were that the petitioner and respondent companies executed a ‘Gas Sale and Purchase Agreement’ containing an arbitration clause with London as the seat; after the respondent issued a termination notice, the petitioner filed civil suit instead of commencing arbitration; the Civil Court stayed the suit and referred the dispute to arbitration; following dismissal of the petitioner’s writ petition and intra-court appeal, the petitioner filed the present enforcement petition under S. 3 of the 2011 Act seeking recognition of the arbitration agreement and interim relief---Pivotal question requiring determination in the present matter was as to “whether, in the absence of an arbitral award, the High Court could invoke S. 3 of the 2011 Act to enforce a foreign-seated arbitration agreement and grant interim relief?”---Held: Section 3 vested exclusive jurisdiction in the High Court over matters arising under the Act, 2011; however, it did not create an independent cause of action nor confer the right to enforce an arbitration agreement in the absence of an arbitral award---In the present case, the petitioner, having neither voluntarily initiated arbitration nor complied with the Civil Court’s order, could not circumvent S. 4 adjudication by invoking S. 3---Any attempt to do so would have amounted to an indirect re-litigation of a matter already conclusively decided, in contravention of settled principles of law---Having already pursued civil proceedings on the same cause and simultaneously claiming to have invoked arbitration, the petitioner could not be permitted to re-agitate the matter under S. 3 of the Act of 2011---On this ground, the doctrine of res judicata fully applied---The petitioner, having filed its request for arbitration under the ICC Rules, had unequivocally elected to pursue its remedies before the arbitral tribunal---Such election was final and binding---Having consciously invoked the arbitral process, the petitioner was precluded from simultaneously seeking inconsistent, parallel, or duplicative relief from the High Court---A party could not be permitted to ignore the agreed mechanism, manufacture urgency, and thereafter seek relief from a municipal court---Such conduct amounted to an abuse of the arbitral process and directly undermined the principle of party autonomy, which lay at the very heart of modern arbitration law---Petitioner had failed to make out any case under S. 3 of the Act of 2011---Present petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Misbah-ul-Mustafa for Petitioner. Sardar Taimoor Aslam Khan, Mian Haseeb Bukhari, Mudassar Abbas and Umar Malik for Respondent. Date of hearing: 31st December, 2025.

Summary: The legal question put for opinion of this Court is whether ICA is maintainable if part of the original order is not amenable to appeal, revision or review under the applicable law. Held that the ICA is not maintainable, even if the appellant confines the challenge to the part of the original order, against which the right of appeal, revision, or review is not explicitly available under the applicable law. 49Service 22253/25 Mazhar Hayat Vs Govt. of the Punjab etc. Mr. Justice Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi 13-01- 2026 2026 LHC 58

Summary: Alternative Dispute Resolution Act (XX of 2017)--- ----S.2(i)---Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894), S.18---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Land acquisition dispute---Mediation---High Court referring the matter for mediation---Scope---Brief facts were that the petitioners/landowners filed a miscellaneous application in the present constitutional petition pending before the High Court concerning acquisition of land by military authorities; through the application petitioner sought recognition and implementation of a mediation settlement, which approach was adopted by the High Court during the proceedings; the petitioners agreed to accept the compensation earlier determined by the GHQ Board under protest, while reserving the right to seek enhancement by reference under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894---Validity---The settlement through mediation had been arrived at voluntarily, without any coercion, pressure or undue influence and with the consent of both sides--- The terms of settlement were lawful and did not offend any provision of law---The settlement reflected a fair and pragmatic resolution of a long-standing dispute and adequately safeguards the statutory rights of the petitioners---Present application as well as the main petition was disposed of, in circumstances. Sardar Muhammad Ghazi, Sr. Advocate Supreme Court for the Petitioners. Barrister Zain Mansoor, Assistant Attorney General for the State. Barrister Raja Hussain Javed, Assistant Advocate General.

Summary: For Revision to be maintainable, the impugned order should have finality attached to the same otherwise if the said order is only a discretionary procedural interlocutory order, the same would not be a 'case decided' amenable to Revisional jurisdiction. 54Writ Petition- Criminal Proceedings- Bail 15346-25 MUHAMMAD AHMAD RAMZAN VS STATE ETC Mr. Justice Tanveer Ahmad Sheikh 07- 01- 2026 2026 LHC 957