Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)----S. 302(b)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S. 35(1) & (2), proviso (a)---Consecutive or concurrent running of sentences of life imprisonment awarded in one trial by a Sessions Court---Convictions not challenged on merits---Petitioner Qaiser Abbas was convicted by the Trial Court on two counts under S. 302(b), P.P.C., for the shooting deaths of Mst. Faiza Bibi and Abiha in an occurrence on 23.06.2011, in FIR No.828 dated 23.06.2011 registered at Police Station Allama Iqbal Town, Lahore, and the two sentences of life imprisonment were directed to run consecutively rather than concurrently, with compensation under S. 544-A, Cr.P.C.; convictions and sentences were upheld by the High Court---Counsel for the petitioner made a categorical statement that he did not contest the convictions on merits and sought only that the two life sentences be ordered to run concurrently, relying on proviso (a) to S. 35, Cr.P.C. and paragraph-40 of Shah Hussain v. State (PLD 2009 SC 460)---Held, that as the convictions had not been challenged on merits, the Court was not obligated to re-evaluate the entire evidence, and the convictions recorded by the Trial Court and upheld by the High Court were maintained---Argument that in view of the bar in proviso (a) to S. 35, Cr.P.C. the petitioner could not have been sentenced to more than a life span could not prevail, the controversy having already been set at rest by a five-member larger Bench in Bashir v. State (PLD 1991 SC 1145)---Proviso in question did not apply to sentences awarded by the Sessions Judge in the original trial; its application was limited to the trial of cases by Magistrates as well as Assistant Sessions Judges, wherever in existence---Except the case in which the sentence of death was commuted under an executive order, sentences of life imprisonment, unless ordered to run concurrently under subsection (1) of S. 35, Cr.P.C., would run consecutively in view of its qualification in terms of S. 57, P.P.C. (b) Constitution of Pakistan----Art. 189---Precedent---Ratio decidendi---Per incuriam---Whether paragraph-40 of Shah Hussain v. State (PLD 2009 SC 460) displaced the rule declared by a five-member Bench in Bashir v. State (PLD 1991 SC 1145) on consecutive or concurrent running of sentences awarded in a single trial---Doctrine of precedent was not solely a matter of formalism; it was a constitutional and institutional discipline ensuring equality before the law, coherence and certainty---Art. 189 required all Pakistani courts to adhere to the law established by the Supreme Court, but not all observations contained in each report were legally obligatory---What was binding was the law consciously declared on a question genuinely decided on the basis of legal reasoning---A judicial decision comprised a statement of the principle or principles of law applicable to the facts, the findings of fact, and the ultimate judgment; the apex Court's decision was binding only if it resolved a legal issue, established a legal principle, and proceeded on the basis of the law---Mere citation of earlier authorities without engagement with their ratio, or a fleeting conclusion without articulated reasoning, did not meet that constitutional standard---Where a court was unaware of a specific point of law or recorded a conclusion without considering the controlling statutory text or an earlier binding authority, the later view was per incuriam to that extent and did not develop into a precedent of general binding force---Stability in law could not be preserved by permitting an incidental or unexplained observation to supersede a consciously reasoned determination previously rendered by a larger Bench on the same statutory question---Bashir's case was referred to a five-member larger Bench on a common question of law of public importance regarding interpretation of S. 35, Cr.P.C., and the necessity of considering earlier authorities including Javed Shaikh, Juma Khan, Muhammad Ittefaq and Khan Zaman---Statutory point was explicitly raised, consciously observed and expressly determined; the larger Bench investigated the structure of S. 35, the relationship between subsection (1) and subsection (2), the function of proviso (a), and the sentencing scheme of Ss. 30, 31, 32 and 34, Cr.P.C., and held that subsection (2) in conjunction with proviso (a) governed courts of limited sentencing power, whereas Sessions Courts and High Courts exercising original criminal jurisdiction were governed by S. 35(1)---Rule established was that imprisonment sentences issued in a single trial by a Sessions Court were to be served consecutively, unless the court explicitly directed that they should be served concurrently---Bashir's case embodied every attribute of a binding precedent under Art. 189, reviewed the earlier contrary line and held that those decisions did not correctly interpret S. 35(2), and was neither noticed, distinguished nor overruled in Shah Hussain's case---Paragraph-40 of Shah Hussain, observing that aggregate of sentences would be contrary to S. 35 and, following Javed Shaikh, that proviso (a) prohibited consecutive sentences in one trial beyond the stated limit, was made without noticing, distinguishing or overruling Bashir, without independent reasoning on the architecture of S. 35, without discussion of the distinction between subsection (1) and subsection (2), and without engagement with S. 31, Cr.P.C.---Held, that paragraph-40 of Shah Hussain's case, insofar as it concerned interpretation of S. 35, Cr.P.C., did not constitute a valid precedent on that question under Art. 189 and could not displace Bashir---Field continued to be governed by Bashir: proviso (a) to S. 35(2), Cr.P.C. was confined to courts of limited sentencing jurisdiction and did not control sentences passed in one trial by a Sessions Court; in such cases S. 35(1) applied, and the sentences ran consecutively unless the court expressly directed that they shall run concurrently, subject only to the exception specifically recognized in Bashir of executive commutation from death or imprisonment for life. (c) Sentence----Consecutive life sentences for two distinct murders---Proportionality---Petitioner committed two distinct acts of murder resulting in the loss of two precious human lives; each act was an independent and grievous offence that warranted its own punishment---Principle of concurrent sentencing was typically implemented when multiple offences were the result of a single act of diminished gravity or when the ends of justice necessitated it---Punishment must remain proportionate to the seriousness of the offence; where multiple lives were unlawfully taken, each offence must receive independent penal recognition---To direct all sentences to merge into one concurrent term in cases of multiple murders would substantially dilute the gravity of the additional offences and create an artificial equivalence between the taking of one life and the taking of several, conveying the impermissible impression that an offender may "kill two or three, pay for one"---Criminal justice system could not permit a sentencing structure that diminished the distinct value of each human life or undermined public confidence in the administration of justice---No case for interference in the impugned judgment was made out. Cited Cases: • Shah Hussain v. State PLD 2009 SC 460 • Bashir v. State PLD 1991 SC 1145 Disposition: Both petitions dismissed and leave refused; convictions and consecutive sentences of life imprisonment maintained. (Jail Petition No.390 of 2018 and Criminal Petition No.593-L of 2018, Supreme Court of Pakistan, decided 15.04.2026; Approved for reporting.)

Summary: (a) Penal Code----S. 302(b)---Murder of three family members including a minor child, and firearm injury to a fourth, inside the family house---Ocular evidence of related and injured witnesses---Medical and forensic corroboration---Leave to appeal---Petitioner challenged concurrent convictions and sentences, including death as ta'zir on three counts, awarded by the trial Court and maintained by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, arising from FIR No.850 of 2019 registered at Police Station City Shujabad, District Multan---Prosecution case was that on the night between 14/15.10.2019 the petitioner, armed with a 30-bore pistol, entered the house of complainant Altaf Bibi and made successive fire shots at his own son Muhammad Imran, daughter Fozia Bibi and minor grandson Muhammad Madni, all of whom died at the spot, while another son Muhammad Rizwan sustained firearm injury---Held, that the prosecution case rested upon direct ocular evidence of Altaf Bibi (PW-2), Allah Bakhsh (PW-3) and injured witness Muhammad Rizwan (PW-4), whose presence inside the family house during night hours was natural and probable and could not be treated as artificial, procured or doubtful---Mere relationship of witnesses with the deceased did not render their testimony suspect; the rule was one of prudence, not rejection, and related witnesses were competent where their evidence was confidence-inspiring, consistent on material particulars, and supported by medical and forensic evidence---Witnesses remained consistent on time, place, manner of occurrence, identity of the assailant, weapon used, number of victims and sequence of firing, and no plausible reason existed why the petitioner's own wife, son and brother-in-law would falsely substitute him, particularly in a single-accused domestic setting where substitution was ordinarily a rare phenomenon---Medical evidence of firearm injuries on vital parts fully supported the ocular account, and an injured witness carried a built-in assurance of presence unless strong reasons existed to disbelieve him---Six crime empties of 30-bore pistol secured from the spot were forensically matched with the pistol recovered pursuant to the petitioner's disclosure, connecting the weapon, the place of occurrence and the petitioner---Delay of about one hour and twenty-five minutes in reporting the occurrence was neither inordinate nor unexplained, the police station being about ten miles away and the complainant having lost three family members while another son was injured; such delay had not been shown to have been utilised for consultation, deliberation or false implication---Absence of a specifically established motive did not demolish the prosecution case where direct ocular evidence was natural, confidence-inspiring and corroborated by medical and forensic evidence, and this was not a case of an unknown assailant requiring motive as an identifying link---No material misreading or non-reading of evidence was pointed out, and concurrent findings of the two Courts below were neither arbitrary nor perverse---Prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. (b) Penal Code----S. 302(b)---Sentence of death or imprisonment for life---Mitigating circumstances---Rarest of rare case---Multiple murders of own family members including a minor child---S. 302(b) provided two punishments, namely death or imprisonment for life, and the discretion was judicial and to be exercised upon the facts of each case---Death was the normal sentence in a conviction under S. 302(b) except where the Court found mitigating circumstances warranting a lesser sentence, particularly where the manner and method of the incident were brutal, horrific, heinous, shocking, callous and cold-blooded---Expression "mitigating circumstances" was not capable of an exhaustive definition and included circumstances such as extreme youth, sudden provocation, influence of an elder and questions of family honour, but mitigation had to arise from proved facts and could not be assumed merely because the law provided an alternative sentence---Present case was distinguishable from authorities in which death had been converted into imprisonment for life on account of a sudden act, unproved motive coupled with advanced age and long incarceration, non-participation in the actual killing, or a religious altercation---Aggravating factors included murder of three persons and injury to a fourth in one occurrence; extreme breach of domestic trust; occurrence inside the residential house at night; killing of a minor child by a person in a position of familial authority; repeated firing demonstrating persistence of intention; forensic matching of crime empties with the recovered pistol; firearm injuries on vital parts indicating intention to kill; flight from the spot; and support of the case by natural ocular witnesses including an injured witness---Factors pressed in mitigation, namely absence of specifically established motive, relationship of witnesses, short delay in reporting, non-production of independent locality witnesses, and denial of recovery, were neither individually nor cumulatively sufficient to justify commutation---Absence of motive was not an automatic rule of commutation where the petitioner was identified by natural witnesses including his injured son, the occurrence took place inside the family house, and repeated firing upon multiple family members including a minor child demonstrated deliberation and extreme brutality---Relationship of witnesses explained their presence rather than constituting a weakness---Delay was minimal and sufficiently explained---Prosecution was required to produce trustworthy evidence, not a particular number or category of witnesses, and independent locality evidence was not essential where inmates of the house were the most natural witnesses---Period of custody since arrest in October 2019 was nowhere near the threshold which, in appropriate cases, might invite consideration on the principle of expectancy of life, and delay or custody was not an automatic ground for commutation in a case of repeated, deliberate and brutal murders of multiple family members including a minor child---Material regarding previous criminal involvement, placed through Crl. Misc. Application No.553 of 2026, was not necessary to rest the sentence upon, mere involvement unless ripened into conviction being approached with caution; even keeping such material out of consideration, the circumstances of the present offence independently sustained death, and the petitioner could not claim affirmative mitigation on the premise of an unblemished antecedent record---Case fell within the narrow category of rarest of rare, in which imprisonment for life would be wholly inadequate---Aggravating circumstances decisively outweighed mitigating circumstances, and the sentence of death on three counts was maintained. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Ashraf and another v. The State PLD 2004 SC 539 • Muhammad Latif v. The State PLD 2008 SC 503 • Asad Mahmood v. Akhlaq Ahmed and another 2010 SCMR 868 • Ahmad Nawaz and another v. The State 2011 SCMR 593 • Muhammad Sharif v. Muhammad Javed alias Jeeda Tedi PLD 1976 SC 452 • Muhammad Javed and another v. The State and others 2011 SCMR 1462 • Muhammad Ilyas v. The State 2009 SCMR 1042 • Mir Muhammad alias Miro v. The State 2009 SCMR 1188 • Mushtaq and others v. The State 2012 SCMR 109 • Iftikhar Mehmood and another v. Qaiser Iftikhar and others 2011 SCMR 1165 --- Disposition: Leave refused; jail petition dismissed; convictions and sentences awarded by the trial Court, including death as ta'zir on three counts under S. 302(b), P.P.C., together with sentences under Ss. 324 and 337-F(iii), P.P.C., as maintained by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench in Crl. Appeal No.622-J of 2020 and Murder Reference No.35 of 2020, upheld. (J.P. No.178 of 2025, Supreme Court of Pakistan, decided 13.05.2026; Approved for reporting.)

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)----Ss. 302, 324, 337-A(ii), 337-F(i), 337-L(2), 148 & 149---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S. 498---Constitution of Pakistan----Art. 25---Pre-arrest bail---Rule of consistency---Generalized role in unlawful assembly---Identification / afterthought implication---Mala fides---Held, where co-accused with strikingly similar generalized roles already granted bail, denial of bail to petitioner would be asymmetric and unjust; judicial consistency is a substantive imperative under Art. 25---Physical impossibility / afterthought expansion of accused array supports mala fides and protective purpose of pre-arrest bail. Cited Cases: • Abdul Mateen Mehboob v. The State 2026 SCMR 135 Disposition: Petition converted into appeal and allowed; appellant granted pre-arrest bail subject to bail bonds of Rs. 100,000/- with one surety in like amount to satisfaction of Trial Court; observations tentative. Short order dated 13.05.2026. Approved for Reporting.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Art. 188---Criminal review---Error apparent on the face of the record---Scope---Petitioner sought review of order dated 17.02.2026 whereby Criminal Petition No.120 of 2026 had been converted into appeal and allowed along with C.M.A. No.68 of 2026, and operation of the order of attachment of properties of the respondents dated 24.12.2025, passed by the Special Judge (Customs, Taxation, Anti-Smuggling-I), Karachi, had been suspended till final decision of Special Criminal Appeal No.01 of 2026 pending before the High Court of Sindh at Karachi---Main ground of review was that observations in para-5 of the order under review proceeded on the premise that prior to registration of FIR No.6 of 2025 no show-cause notice had been issued, whereas a notice dated 16.12.2025 had been issued, and that reliance in the order under review on Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation-FBR v. Taj International (Pvt.) Ltd. (PLD 2025 SC 633) was inapposite because those proceedings related to the Sales Tax Act, 1990, whereas the present proceedings were under the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010---Held, that the main ground of review was misconceived, as the order dated 17.02.2026 was not based merely on the fact that no opportunity was provided to the respondents before lodging of the FIR and that attachment under S. 8 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010 was illegal; detailed reasons had been given in para-5 of the order under review---Other grounds, including the scope and application of the Act of 2010 and the reported judgment of a Larger Bench in Taj International, had already been examined and deliberated upon in paras-7 and 8 of the order under review, and no ground agitated in the review petition had been left unattended---No apparent legal error in terms of Art. 188 of the Constitution had been pointed out to justify review. Cited Cases: • Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR v. Taj Internation (Pvt.) Ltd. PLD 2025 SC 633 (b) Review---Fresh documents---Documents not placed on record at the hearing of the original matter---Held, that any fresh document which was not made available during the course of hearing, when the order was passed after hearing the parties, cannot be introduced subsequently to justify a ground for seeking review, more particularly where the order under review is based on legal principles settled by the Court in the judgments relied upon therein---Contention that sufficient opportunity was not provided was contrary to the record, as pursuant to notices issued by the Court the petitioner had filed a detailed concise statement, yet the copy of the notices purportedly issued to the respondents on 16.12.2025 was not attached nor even referred to in the reply to the petition. Disposition: Criminal review petition dismissed. (Crl.R.P. No.34 of 2026 in Crl.P. No.120 of 2026, decided 13.05.2026; Approved for reporting.)

Summary: (a) Service law --- Judicial officer --- Punjab Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal --- Charge of corruption not specifically proved --- Finding of bad repute --- Adequacy of evidence in departmental inquiry --- Judicial officer, while serving as Additional District and Sessions Judge at Mailsi, District Vehari, received adverse remarks in his Performance Evaluation Report and was later proceeded against departmentally on charges of corruption, misconduct and maintaining an unrighteous and incorrigible integrity, culminating in the major penalty of removal from service --- Tribunal, in a consolidated judgment dated 17.01.2025, found the evidence insufficient to support the allegation of receiving illegal gratification in exchange for a favourable decision, but upheld the finding of tarnished reputation and substituted the penalty of removal with compulsory retirement, treating the appeal against adverse P.E.R. remarks as redundant --- Held, that the Tribunal correctly concluded that there was insufficient proof of accepting illegal gratification --- Defence that the report of the District and Sessions Judge (Exh.PB) was a product of animosity, based on the judicial officer's abstention from voting for him in Association elections and alleged denial of protocol, was not included in the reply to the charge-sheet, which had merely suggested misunderstanding, misconception or personal bias; raising such a defence during the inquiry was an afterthought advanced to undermine the credibility of the report --- District and Sessions Judge, as superior officer, was best placed to assess performance, conduct and integrity; evaluations based on extensive observations and undocumented materials, if not tainted with malice, can serve as a sheet anchor for initiating disciplinary action and determining the appropriate penalty --- Judicial officer alleged malice but failed to substantiate it --- His service record was replete with remarks negatively affecting his reputation --- Supreme Court does not interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record; if the inquiry has been fairly and properly conducted and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy or reliability of the evidence is not a ground for the Tribunal, or even for this Court, to interfere --- Intervention is warranted where findings of fact are based on no evidence or are clearly perverse --- Finding of bad reputation not being the outcome of a flawed inquiry, it was not disturbed. (b) Service law --- Judicial officer --- Distinction between a judge and a civil servant --- Reputation and integrity --- Standard "beyond reproach" --- Appearance of integrity --- Held, that precedents applicable to civil servants cannot be equated with the position of a judge --- Need to preserve a good reputation is essential for a civil servant, but even more so for a judge --- For a civil servant, a minor lapse may attract censure, stoppage of increment, or even compulsory retirement if it affects efficiency; for a judge, integrity is binary because the confidence of the people in the judiciary is the cornerstone of an Islamic welfare State --- Judiciary derives its authority not from force but from legitimacy, which rests on competence and integrity; competence can be tested in judgments, integrity is tested in reputation --- A judge may render sound law, and yet, if his name carries a stain in the public mind, the judgment will be received with suspicion --- Standard for a judge is not "not guilty" but "beyond reproach", because judicial power is exercised without political accountability and often without immediate review, the only check being the confidence of the people --- Retention of any judge becomes impossible once his reputation is found to be bad --- Judicial institution demands not only integrity, but also the appearance of integrity. (c) Islamic jurisprudence --- Qadi --- Adala (legal uprightness) --- Public office as amana (trust) --- Held, that core principle governing public office in Islam is that authority is a trust to be exercised with justice --- Classical jurists hold that a Qadi who loses adala through conduct that causes the public to doubt his integrity must be removed; the test is not whether a specific sin is proved, but whether the public perception of fairness is undermined --- Appointment to public office, and by implication its continuation, is governed by the principle of fitness (ahliyya) --- Keeping a corrupt or unfit official is essentially equivalent to appointing one: both constitute a betrayal of the divine trust associated with authority --- Duty of the appointing authority is not a one-off act of appointment; it endures throughout the official's tenure. (d) Service law --- Judicial officer of bad repute --- Penalty --- Removal from service versus compulsory retirement --- Proportionality --- Tribunal assumed that, once corruption was not specifically proved, removal was not proportionate and required to be substituted with compulsory retirement --- Held, that the reasoning was unsound and made out a case for misplaced sympathy --- Penalty must be proportionate to the mischief, which here was the loss of public confidence --- Distinction between compulsory retirement and removal is not merely semantic: compulsory retirement may, in appropriate circumstances, be imposed where the aim is to weed out deadwood or where retention is no longer administratively feasible, but it cannot be imposed on a judge of poor reputation, as allowing him to retire with benefits would suggest that reputation is negotiable and would defeat the very purpose of the penalty --- Removal from service becomes justified when the conduct affects the integrity of a judge and the institution's morality and damages public confidence --- Punishment of removal imposed by the Competent Authority of the High Court was proportionate to the guilt established --- Tribunal erred in law by modifying the penalty of removal from service. (e) Service law --- Adverse remarks in Performance Evaluation Report --- Redundancy --- Limitation --- Judicial officer's leave petition seeking expunction of adverse P.E.R. remarks (CPLA No.2172 of 2025) was reported as barred by 48 days, and the application for condonation of delay lacked necessary material particulars --- Held, that there was no need to address the issues in that petition, for the same reasons stated by the Tribunal when dismissing the service appeal against the adverse remarks as redundant upon the officer not being reinstated --- Said petition dismissed. Cited Cases: • Ch. Shabbir Hussain v. Registrar, Lahore High Court, Lahore PLD 2004 SC 191 • Federation of Pakistan v. Saeed Ahmad Khan PLD 1974 SC 151 • Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1996 SC 324 • Federation of Pakistan v. Supreme Judicial Council PLD 2024 SC 698 Disposition: CPLA No.642-L of 2025 converted into appeal and partly allowed; judgment of the Punjab Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal dated 17.01.2025 modified to the extent of the penalty; penalty of removal from service imposed by the departmental authority under Notification No.65/RHC/AD dated 6th of May 2013 restored; CPLA No.1606 of 2025 and CPLA No.2172 of 2025 dismissed with no order as to costs. (CPLA Nos.642-L, 1606 and 2172 of 2025, Supreme Court of Pakistan, judgment by Shahid Waheed, J. (Naeem Akhtar Afghan and Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, JJ. on the Bench), Islamabad, 13.05.2026; Approved for reporting.)

Summary: (a) Service law---Judicial officer---Departmental inquiry---Charges of corruption, misconduct and bad repute---Standard of interference with inquiry findings---Additional District and Sessions Judge, while serving at Mailsi, District Vehari, received adverse remarks in his Performance Evaluation Report and was proceeded against on complaints of illegal gratification---Inquiry officer recorded adverse findings; competent authority imposed major penalty of removal from service by Notification No.65/RHC/AD dated 6 of May 2013---Punjab Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal, by consolidated judgment dated 17.01.2025, found insufficient proof of illegal gratification but upheld the finding of tarnished reputation and substituted compulsory retirement for removal, treating the PER appeal as redundant---Held, that the Tribunal had correctly concluded that there was insufficient proof of accepting illegal gratification---Finding of bad reputation was not disturbed---Judicial officer's plea that the report of the District and Sessions Judge (Exh.PB) was the product of animosity, based on incidents of not voting for him in Association elections and denial of protocol, was an afterthought not taken in the reply to the charge sheet, which had merely suggested misunderstanding, misconception or personal bias---Inquiry officer was justified in treating that defence as an afterthought---District and Sessions Judge, as superior officer, was best placed to assess performance, conduct and integrity; evaluations based on extensive observations and undocumented materials, if not tainted with malice, could serve as a sheet anchor for initiating disciplinary action and determining penalty---Malice was alleged but not substantiated---Service record was replete with remarks negatively affecting reputation---Supreme Court does not interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material; if the inquiry has been fairly conducted and findings are based on evidence, adequacy or reliability of evidence is not a ground for the Tribunal or the Court to interfere---Intervention is warranted where findings are based on no evidence or are clearly perverse---Finding of bad reputation not being the outcome of a flawed inquiry, it was not disturbed. Cited Cases: • Ch. Shabbir Hussain and others v. Registrar, Lahore High Court, Lahore and others PLD 2004 SC 191 • Federation of Pakistan through the Secretary, Establishment Division v. Saeed Ahmad Khan and others PLD 1974 SC 151 (b) Service law---Judicial officer found of bad repute though not proved guilty of a specific act of corruption---Penalty---Removal from service versus compulsory retirement---Judge distinguished from civil servant---Integrity and appearance of integrity---Held, that the Tribunal assumed that once corruption was not specifically proved, removal was disproportionate having regard to length of service and ought to be substituted by compulsory retirement, citing precedents applicable to civil servants---That reasoning was unsound and amounted to misplaced sympathy---Position of a judge cannot be equated with that of a civil servant---Need to preserve a good reputation was essential for a civil servant but even more so for a judge; for a judge, integrity was binary because public confidence in the judiciary was the cornerstone of an Islamic welfare State---Judiciary derived authority from legitimacy resting on competence and integrity; competence could be tested in judgments, integrity in reputation---Standard for a judge was not "not guilty" but "beyond reproach"---Judicial office demanded not only integrity but the appearance of integrity---Retention of any judge became impossible once his reputation was found to be bad---Penalty must be proportionate to the mischief, which here was loss of public confidence---Compulsory retirement might be imposed to weed out deadwood or where retention was no longer administratively feasible, but could not be imposed on a judge of poor reputation, as allowing him to retire with benefits would suggest that reputation was negotiable---Removal from service was justified when the conduct affected the integrity of a judge and the institution's morality and damaged public confidence---Punishment of removal imposed by the competent authority of the High Court was proportionate to the guilt established---Tribunal erred in law by modifying the penalty of removal. Cited Cases: • Ch. Shabbir Hussain and others v. Registrar, Lahore High Court, Lahore and others PLD 2004 SC 191 • Al-Jehad Trust through Raeesul Mujahideen Habib-ul-Wahabb-ul-Khairi and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1996 SC 324 • Federation of Pakistan through the Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice v. Supreme Judicial Council PLD 2024 SC 698 • Akhtar Ali v. Director, Federal Government, Educational Institution PGET DTA, Rawalpindi and others 2009 SCMR 1197 • Farhad Ali v. Director-General, Pakistan Post Office and others 2011 SCMR 608 (c) Service law---Performance Evaluation Report---Adverse remarks---Appeal becoming redundant on refusal of reinstatement---Limitation---Judicial officer's CPLA No.2172 of 2025 seeking expunction of adverse PER remarks was barred by 48 days and the condonation application lacked necessary material particulars---Held, that there was no need to address the issues in that petition, for the same reasons stated by the Tribunal in dismissing Service Appeal No.19 of 2010 as redundant since the officer was not ordered to be reinstated---CPLA No.2172 of 2025 dismissed. Disposition: CPLA No.642-L of 2025 converted into appeal and partly allowed; Tribunal's judgment dated 17.01.2025 modified to the extent of penalty and the penalty of removal from service imposed by Notification No.65/RHC/AD dated 6 of May 2013 restored; CPLA No.1606 of 2025 and CPLA No.2172 of 2025 dismissed; no order as to costs. (CPLA Nos.642-L, 1606 and 2172 of 2025, Supreme Court of Pakistan, decided 13.05.2026 at Islamabad; approved for reporting.)

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.212---Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006---Service Tribunal---Quantum of punishment---Judicial review---Proportionality---Respondent, while serving as Principal/Headmistress (BS-17) at Government Special Education Centre, Lyalpur Town, Faisalabad, was issued show cause notice and statement of allegations under the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006, on charges of inefficiency, grave negligence and failure of supervisory duty, including that a Speech Therapist was living illegally in a room of the Centre without deduction of house rent allowance, causing pecuniary loss to the government exchequer, and that he was in the habit of molesting female teachers by blackmailing them, forcefully inducing them to have illicit relations and threatening them of dire consequences, while a female teacher remained absent for ten days without absence being reported---Competent Authority imposed penalty of forfeiture of past service for a period of five years---Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore, vide order dated 08.12.2023 in Service Appeal No.4212/2022, partly allowed the appeal and modified the penalty to forfeiture of past service for one year---Held, that the astuteness of establishing Service Tribunals under Art.212 of the Constitution is to exclusively deal with and decide matters relating to the terms and conditions of service of civil servants, and a Tribunal has the same powers as vested in Civil Courts, being a first fact-finding judicial forum---Employer/competent authority has unqualified dominion to decide the quantum of punishment after due process in case of proven misconduct, but such prerogative must be in line with the penalties and punishments provided under the law---Courts and Tribunals, under the power of judicial review, may examine whether the punishment is proportionate or disproportionate vis-a-vis the proven guilt, but this must be with proper application of mind, taking account of the gravity of charges and proof of guilt in the departmental inquiry---There is no untrammelled freedom of choice that in all circumstances the quantum of punishment should be modified without justifying the mitigating circumstances---As opposed to structuring the verdict alone on the whim that "punishment seems to be harsh", the Tribunal ought to examine the inquiry report and findings to ensure substantial justice, which is possible only after vetting the entire material on record for awarding a clean chit or confirming or reducing the penalty. (b) Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006---Penalty of forfeiture of past service---Head of educational institution---Supervisory failure in face of sexual harassment of female teachers---Tribunal modified five years' forfeiture to one year on the justification that the actual culprit was the Speech Therapist---Held, that the Tribunal failed to fathom that the allegations were of serious nature; regular inquiry was conducted properly; female teachers appeared and deposed against the respondent; fair right of cross-examination was afforded but the witnesses remained consistent and their evidence could not be shattered---De novo inquiry report was based on oral as well as documentary evidence---In case of serious allegations, the responsible person cannot be let free or exonerated with a low degree of penalty---If such gratuitous leniency is shown in obnoxious and repulsive matters, it will amount to lending a licence to take up alike acts in the future without any deterrence---Department had already taken a lenient view and, instead of dismissal or removal from service, awarded penalty of forfeiture of past service for five years---Tribunal converted the penalty to one year without realizing the responsibilities and role of the respondent as Headmistress of the educational institution---Various complaints had been lodged to the respondent, who, being head of the institution, was the chief administrator accountable for overall administration, including monitoring and controlling a safe and healthy working environment, and could not shut her eyes or remain tight-lipped on written complaints of sexual harassment by lady teachers---There was no justification available to the Tribunal to modify the quantum of punishment awarded by the Competent Authority. (c) Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010----Ss.2(c) & 11---Educational institutions---Duty of head of institution---Internal inquiry and Code of Conduct---Sexual harassment of female teachers by a male colleague in an educational institution is a grave transgression and a violation of law, ethics and workplace dignity---An educational institution is not merely a site of academic activity but a social and moral environment in which the dignity, autonomy and safety of individuals must be protected, especially women---International Labour Organization Convention No.190 on Violence and Harassment in the World of Work recognizes the right of everyone to a world of work free from violence and harassment and imposes affirmative obligations upon employers to prevent, investigate and remedy such conduct---Court referred to Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1997 SC 3011), Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (477 U.S. 57) and Majrowski v. Guy's and St Thomas' NHS Trust (2006 UK HL 34)---Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010, defines "harassment" and "workplace", mandates formation of an Inquiry Committee in each organization consisting of three members of whom at least one shall be a woman, creates the office of Ombudsperson, and makes each employer responsible to incorporate the Code of Conduct as part of management policy and to display copies of the Code at a conspicuous place---Head of the institution has an onerous duty to create an environment conveying unequivocally that no sexual harassment would be acceptable at the workplace---Disciplinary action at departmental level must not always await the outcome of proceedings before the Federal Ombudsperson or Provincial Ombudsman---Higher Education Commission Policy on Protection against Harassment in Higher Education Institutions, enacted pursuant to the Higher Education Commission Ordinance, 2002, and made binding on public and private higher education institutions, was also noticed---Office directed to transmit copy of the judgment to the Federal Secretary of the Ministry of Federal Education and Professional, Chief Secretaries and Secretaries of School and Higher Education of all the provinces, and the Federal Ombudsperson and Provincial Ombudsmen, to ensure elimination of sexual harassment from government and private educational institutions, with strict enforcement of the Code of Conduct ratified pursuant to Ss.2(c) and 11 of the Act of 2010---Directions were to be issued by Office Order/Circular to all persons in command of government and private educational institutions for displaying the Code of Conduct in English and vernacular languages at conspicuous places and for constituting an in-house Inquiry Committee in every such institution so that an aggrieved lady teacher may submit her complaint promptly and directly to the Inquiry Committee. Cited Cases: • Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1997 SC 3011 • Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson 477 U.S. 57 • Majrowski v. Guy's and St Thomas' NHS Trust 2006 UK HL 34 Disposition: C.P.L.A. No.851-L of 2024 converted into an appeal and allowed; order dated 08.12.2023 of Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore, in Service Appeal No.4212/2022 set aside; penalty of forfeiture of past service of five years imposed by the Secretary, Government of Punjab, Special Education Department, Lahore, vide order dated 15.02.2022, restored; service appeal of the respondent dismissed. C.P.L.A. No.1379-L of 2024, barred by 174 days, dismissed and leave refused. (C.P.L.A. Nos.851-L & 1379-L of 2024, decided at Islamabad on 13.05.2026, by Muhammad Ali Mazhar, J. (Musarrat Hilali, J. on the Bench); Approved for reporting)

Summary: (a) North-West Frontier Province Medical and Health Institutions and Regulation of Health-Care Services Ordinance, 2002----S. 11---North-West Frontier Province Medical and Health Institutions and Regulation of Health-Care Services (Amendment) Act, 2006, S. 5---Deeming clause---Contractual employees of a public medical institution deemed appointed on regular basis---Respondents were appointed on 26.12.2001 and had been performing duties in Hayatabad Medical Complex, Peshawar, since 2001 without break---By Notification dated 3rd June, 2010, the Ordinance of 2002 was applied to the Pakistan Institute of Community Ophthalmology (PICO), Hayatabad Medical Complex, Peshawar, bringing PICO under administrative and management control of the Complex---Original proviso to S. 11(1) of the Ordinance of 2002 provided that employees shall be appointed on contract basis and shall not be considered as Civil Servants or Government Servants---S. 5 of the Amendment Act, 2006 substituted that proviso, providing that a person though selected for appointment in the prescribed manner to a service or post, but appointed on contract basis, shall with effect from the commencement of the Ordinance or from the date of his continuous appointment, whichever may be later, be deemed to have been appointed on regular basis in the institution concerned; such employee shall for all intents and purposes be a regular employee of the institution concerned, except for the purpose of pension or gratuity, and shall in lieu thereof be entitled to the benefits of a contributory provident fund scheme---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Medical Teaching Institutions Appellate Tribunal allowed the respondents' appeal and directed that they be treated as regular employees of PICO, HMC, Peshawar, by operation of law---Held, that by virtue of the amended statute the contractual employee was deemed to be regularized, which is a powerful statutory command that should be implemented in letter and spirit---Word "deemed" automatically changed the status of contractual employees by operation of law, subject to the conditions and baseline provided for satisfying the deeming clause---Concerned department was duty bound to complete the paperwork and fulfil legal obligations without administrative delays---If the department, despite statutory command, refuses to convert the status of a contractual employee into permanent employment, it amounts to violation of law---Operation of law was triggered automatically on the date of commencement; the department could not artificially delay the administrative process for regularization---When the lawmaker enacts any beneficial law, there must be blanket implementation without a conservative or rigid approach. (b) Interpretation of statutes---Deeming clause---Legal fiction---Beneficial and remedial provision---Purpose of importing a deeming clause is to place an artificial construction upon a word or phrase that would not otherwise prevail, and sometimes to make the construction certain---Deeming clause is a fiction which cannot be extended beyond the language of the section by which it is created or by importing another fiction---Where the statute says that one must imagine a state of affairs, it does not say that, having done so, one must cause or permit imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs---Court is obligated to give effect to deeming provisions while taking into consideration the object of such legal fiction and to carry the rationales of statutory fiction to their cogent finale vis-a-vis the intention of the legislature so it should not cause any injustice---Legal fictions give rise to explicit objectives restricted to the purposes for which they are created, to be construed contextually and not elongated further than the legislative wisdom---Purpose of ratifying a beneficial provision is to grant rights, privileges or financial advantages which ought to be interpreted profusely in order to achieve the intended framework---Even if language is equivocal, Courts normally incline to an interpretation that favours the public good rather than a restrictive or narrow reading---Ut res magis valeat quam pereat: it is better for a law to have effect than to be destroyed---Primary goal must be to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy---Amended provision changing employment status was not only beneficial but also remedial---When any law is designed for social safety, welfare or administrative equity, courts must interpret it with a purpose-oriented perspective. Cited Cases: • Dr. Abdul Nabi v. Executive Officer, Cantonment Board, Quetta 2023 SCMR 1267 • All Pakistan Newspapers Society v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2012 SC 1 • Mubeen-us-Salam v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2006, SC 602 • East End Dwelling Company Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council [1952] AC 109 (c) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts. 3, 4 & 38---Equal protection of law---Duty of public functionaries---Article 4 accentuates equality before law and equal protection of law, and that no action detrimental to life, liberty, body, reputation or property of any person can be taken except in accordance with law---Public functionaries are duty-bound to perform in good faith within the peripheries of their powers, to ensure equal treatment---Article 3 obligates the State to ensure elimination of all forms of exploitation---Article 38 (Principles of Policy) requires the State to secure the well-being of the people by raising standards of living and ensuring equitable adjustment of rights between employer and employees---No perversity, infirmity or legal flaw found in the impugned judgment of the Tribunal---Civil petition dismissed and leave to appeal declined---Delay in filing the petition was condoned on CMA No.785-P of 2024. Cited Cases: • Province of Punjab through Chief Secretary, Lahore v. Qasim Mehmood 2025 SCMR 14 Disposition: Delay condoned; civil petition dismissed and leave to appeal declined; judgment dated 08.12.2022 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Medical Teaching Institutions Appellate Tribunal in M.T.I. Appeal No.215 of 2021, directing that the respondents be treated as regular employees of PICO, HMC, Peshawar, by operation of the Amendment Act, 2006, left undisturbed. (Civil Petition No.578-P of 2024, Supreme Court of Pakistan, judgment dated 13th May, 2026, by Muhammad Ali Mazhar, J.; Islamabad; Approved for reporting.)

Summary: (a) Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967 & Punjab Land Revenue Rules, 1968, Rr. 17, 19 & 22---Appointment of Lambardar---Nature of right and discretion of revenue authorities---Held, office of Lambardar is a basic tier of village/Mouza revenue administration and a conduit between the State and local populace, governed by statutory regime under the Act and Rules; office is essentially honorary in character though carrying statutory duties and certain incidental remuneration---Rules do not create, confer or recognize any vested or enforceable right in favour of any individual to claim appointment as Lambardar as a matter of entitlement; at its highest the provision is directory, serving as guiding principles to structure the discretionary process of selection---Selection is founded upon comparative assessment of merit and suitability and not on any rigid or purely objective yardstick; discretion is vested in graded hierarchy of Revenue Officers, but though wide it is neither unfettered nor absolute and must be exercised in judicious, rational and reasoned manner in accordance with statutory framework and principles of fairness, reasonableness and non-arbitrariness---Unless discretion is demonstrably shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, mala fide or in flagrant disregard of applicable rules and settled principles, it does not ordinarily call for interference by constitutional or appellate fora---Selection is sui generis and cannot be equated with strict recruitment process for civil service posts; paramount consideration is suitability of candidate, his proximity and effective availability within the revenue estate, and demonstrated capacity to discharge functions of the office. Cited Cases: • Abdul Wahid v. The Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab and another 1971 SCMR 719 • M. Nazir Ahmed v. Muhammad Aslam and others 2013 SCMR 363 (b) Punjab Land Revenue Rules, 1968, R. 18(2)(c) & R. 22---Lambardar---Absentee candidate---Government servant posted away from estate---Disqualification---Respondent No.4, a serving Government servant (Computer Operator in Local Government and Community Development Department) posted at Lahore, approximately 350 kilometers from the village, whose family resided at Burewala owing to employment of his spouse---Held, a person who does business or job elsewhere and normally resides there is an absentee for purposes of appointment as Lambardar, not being available to perform day-to-day functions of the office---Respondent No.4 was an absentee candidate and his physical absence attracted bar under R. 18(2)(c), rendering him ineligible; he neither resided in the village nor maintained effective or continuous physical presence therein and lacked requisite proximity and day-to-day association with the estate---Having regard to duties under R. 22 (collection of land revenue, reporting encroachments, assisting revenue officials, etc.), it is imperative that incumbent maintains regular and effective presence within village/Chak; effective physical presence and functional accessibility are essential attributes of the office. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Yousaf v. Member, Board of Revenue and others 1996 SCMR 1581 • Sohail Amed and others v. Haji Safqat Ali and others 2021 SCMR 1336 (c) Punjab Land Revenue Rules, 1968, R. 17---Comparative merit---Unreasoned preference of candidate with lower marks---Quasi-judicial orders---Inconsistency---Held, in merit assessment chart Respondent No.4 secured 44/100 marks while petitioner Shoukat Ali secured 50/100; Board of Revenue assigned no cogent or legally sustainable reasoning for preferring candidate with lower marks, and adverse material against Respondent No.4, including references to criminal litigation, was not duly adverted to or appreciated, which vitiated the selection process---Petitioner owned 54 Kanals and 16 Marlas of agricultural land against 9 Kanals and 7 Marlas of Respondent No.4; extent of proprietary landholding, though not sole determinative factor, is a relevant and weighty consideration---Earlier orders of Board of Revenue dated 29.04.2015, 15.07.2016 and 14.09.2022 culminated in remand for de novo consideration, but order dated 29.04.2025 departed from the consistent approach without new material, intervening change in circumstances or tenable justification, reflecting non-application of mind and undermining requirement of reasoned adjudication in quasi-judicial determinations---Entire selection process contravened Rr. 17 and 18 and principles of fair play, merit, transparency and reasoned administrative decision-making; petitioner, a permanent resident of the estate, not disqualified and of superior comparative merit, was denied due and fair consideration, defeating his legitimate expectation to be evaluated objectively and in non-arbitrary manner. (d) Punjab Land Revenue Rules, 1968, Rr. 25 & 26---Sarbarah Lambardar---Proxy arrangement---Court observed that Respondent No.4 appeared to have continued to function through a proxy arrangement without lawful appointment of a Sarbarah Lambardar in accordance with Rr. 25 and 26, rendering the arrangement irregular and not in consonance with the statutory scheme, and absence of compliance with the procedural safeguard raised serious questions regarding its legality and propriety. (e) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts. 4 & 199---Scope of judicial review in Lambardar appointments---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XLVII, R. 1---Review---Held, jurisdiction of superior Courts in matters of appointment of Lambardar is essentially supervisory; interference is warranted where order suffers from illegality, arbitrariness, misreading or non-reading of material evidence, violation of statutory provisions or perversity in assessment of comparative merit and suitability; ordinarily reappraisal of evidence or substitution of view is impermissible unless conclusions are demonstrably unsustainable in law or facts---Such restraint does not operate in derogation of Art. 4, which guarantees right to be dealt with in accordance with law and enjoy equal protection of law, obligating all State functionaries including revenue authorities to act within lawful authority and in fair, non-arbitrary and reasoned manner---Court noted that review jurisdiction under O. XLVII, R. 1, C.P.C. is circumscribed and cannot be invoked as substitute for appeal or rehearing on merits, and that appointment process must in any case be examined on anvil of Rr. 17, 18 and 19 and principles of fair, transparent and merit-oriented exercise of administrative discretion. Disposition: Petition allowed; appointment of Respondent No.4, Shahid Rasool, as Lambardar held not sustainable in law, being contrary to the Punjab Land Revenue Rules, 1968, and impugned orders of the revenue authorities in his favour declared without lawful authority and of no legal effect; his appointment set aside; petitioner Shaukat Ali, being better suited on comparative assessment, declared entitled to appointment as Lambardar of Chak No.4/WB, Tehsil and District Vehari. F.C.P.L.A.487 of 2025, order dated 13.05.2026 (Amin-ud-Din Khan, CJ.), against judgment dated 30.09.2025 of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan in W.P. No.7812/2025. Approved for Reporting.

Summary: The requirement to mention “full protocols” in the Forensic Expert's report under unamended rule 6 of the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001 is directory; and identification and mentioning the respective names of the internationally recognized tests described in clause (i) to (vii) of Explanation II to amended rule 6 of the Rules of 2001 in the report amounts to “full and sufficient compliance,” of the rule. The judgment shall have no retrospective effect.