Summary: (On appeal against the judgment dated 12.01.2021 passed by High Court of Sindh, Karachi in Constitutional Petitions Nos. D-2576 and D-3167 of 2020). (a) Civil Aviation Authority Ordinance (XXX of 1982)--- ----S. 27---Civil Aviation Authority Service Regulations, 2000, Regln.21(1)---Contract employment---Vires of law, challenge to---Provision of law [i.e. Regulation 21(1) of Regulations 2000] limiting contract service to a maximum of five years was challenged by the employees---High Court’s omission to adjudicate upon the question of vires of the law---Effect and validity---‘Sub-silentio’, doctrine of---Applicability and scope---Incidence where a court decides a lis without appreciating or addressing a particular point of law raised before it---Legality---Decision rendered without addressing a specific question of law raised before it lacks authoritative weight---Supreme Court remanded the matter to High Court for fresh adjudication---Facts in brevity were that the petitioners (contract employees) were appointed on a contract basis in various posts within the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) after qualifying a merit-based recruitment process and thereafter challenged Regulation 21(1) of the revised CAA Service Regulations, 2019, which limited contract service to a maximum of five years, seeking declaration of their appointments as regular and the said Regulation as ultra vires the Constitution for infringing their fundamental rights---Petitioners’ contracts were initially for two years and were extended periodically and later were denied further renewal---Petitioners (contract employees) contended that the posts they held were of a permanent nature, hence, their continued service warranted regularization, and the impugned regulation enabling fixed-term contracts for permanent posts was unreasonable and without statutory backing---The High Court while dismissing the petitions, confined itself to holding that CAA had no statutory rules, without adjudicating upon the plea of ultra vires raised against Regulation 21(1) of the Regulations, 2000---Held: It was an admitted position that the High Court neither considered the plea of vires of the Regulation under challenge nor discussed anything in this regard in the impugned judgment which completely ignored and overlooked the same---Therefore, doctrine of ‘sub silentio’ was applicable to the present matter since the impugned judgment was rendered without specifically and precisely avowing or attending to the question of law raised for determination---Impugned judgment was set aside and the matter was remanded to the High Court for fresh adjudication---Civil petitions were converted into appeals and were allowed, in circumstances. (b) Judgment--- ----Sub-silentio, doctrine of---Meaning, concept, scope and application---The doctrine of “sub-silentio” accentuates a legal principle where a judgment is rendered without specifically and precisely avowing or attending to the exact question of law raised for determination---In fact, sub silentio, a Latin term, literally translates to “under silence” or “in silence”---In legal milieus, it points towards an incidence where the Court decides a lis without appreciating or deliberating the particular point of law raised before it, which disturbs the precedential value of the judgment---This doctrine often denotes that if the court, in its judgment, overlooked or dispensed with a crucial point of law raised before it, then the precedential value of such decision is seriously disturbed---A decision is not binding if it was reached at without argument, without reference to the critical terms of the law, and without citation of authority---Such a decision, taken as sub silentio, lacks authoritative weight. Uch Power (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal 2010 PTD 1809 rel. Lancaster Motor Co. (London) Ltd. v. Bremith Ltd., (1941) 1 KB 675 and Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur (1989) 1 SCC 101 ref. (c) Words and phrases--- ----Expressions “ultra vires” and “intra vires”---Meaning, concept and scope---The terms “intra vires” and “ultra vires” are both Latin phrases, and diametrical opposites---The expression ultra vires means “beyond the powers”---If an act entails legal authority and it is done with such authority, it is symbolized as intra vires, that is, within the precincts of powers, but if it is carried out shorn of authority, it is ultra vires. (d) Law, vires of--- ----Ultra vires, doctrine of---Scope---Constitutionality of any law, rules, or regulations, can be scrutinized and surveyed, and the law can be struck down if it is found to be offending the Constitution due to an absence of law-making and jurisdictive competence, or found in violation of the fundamental rights enshrined therein---Vires of law, rules, or regulations can be called into question if its provisions are ex facie discriminatory, in which case actual proof of discriminatory treatment is not required to be shown, but there is presumption in favour of constitutionality of the enactments, unless it is ex facie violative of a constitutional provision. Lahore Development Authority v. Ms. Imrana Tiwana and others 2015 SCMR 1739; Province of East Pakistan v. Siraj ul Haq Patwari PLD 1966 SC 854; Mehreen Zaibun Nisa v. Land Commissioner PLD 1975 SC 397; Kaneez Fatima v. Wali Muhammad PLD 1993 SC 901; Multiline Associates v. Ardeshir Cowasjee 1995 SCMR 362; Ellahi Cotton Mills Limited v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1997 SC 582; Dr. Tariq Nawaz v. Government of Pakistan 2000 SCMR 1956; Mian Asif Aslam v. Mian Muhammad Asif PLD 2001 SC 499; Pakistan Muslim League (Q) v. Chief Executive of Pakistan PLD 2002 SC 994; Pakistan Lawyers Forum v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2005 SC 719; Messrs Master Foam (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan 2005 PTD 1537; Watan Party v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2006 SC 697; Federation of Pakistan v. Haji Muhammad Sadiq PLD 2007 SC 133 and Iqbal Zafar Jhagra v. Federation of Pakistan 2013 SCMR 1337 rel. (e) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Presumption in favour of constitutionality of a law---Courts to favour saving the law---Scope---Law should be saved rather than be destroyed and the court must lean in favour of upholding the constitutionality of legislation unless it is ex facie violative of a constitutional provision. (f) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Words of a statute to bear their plain meaning unless context or purpose requires otherwise---Scope---Words contained in statutes, rules, or regulations, are first to be understood in their natural, ordinary, or popular sense, and phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context, or in the object of the statute, to suggest the contrary. (g) Administration of justice--- ----Each case has to be decided on its own facts---Every litigant deserves a fair chance of being heard and the decision of the court must be founded and structured on the facts of the case. M. M. Aqil Awan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Ghulam Rasool Mangi, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants. Khalid Mahmood Siddiqui, Advocate Supreme Court and Jamil Ahmad Virk, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents. Date of hearing: 12th June, 2025.

Summary: (On appeal against the judgment dated 12.01.2021 passed by High Court of Sindh, Karachi in Constitutional Petitions Nos. D-2576 and D-3167 of 2020). (a) Civil Aviation Authority Ordinance (XXX of 1982)--- ----S. 27---Civil Aviation Authority Service Regulations, 2000, Regln.21(1)---Contract employment---Vires of law, challenge to---Provision of law [i.e. Regulation 21(1) of Regulations, 2000] limiting contract service to a maximum of five years was challenged by the employees---High Court’s omission to adjudicate upon the question of vires of the law---Effect and validity---‘Sub-silentio’, doctrine of---Applicability and scope---Incidence where a court decides a lis without appreciating or addressing a particular point of law raised before it---Legality---Decision rendered without addressing a specific question of law raised before it lacks authoritative weight---Supreme Court remanded the matter to High Court for fresh adjudication---Facts in brevity were that the petitioners (contract employees) were appointed on a contract basis in various posts within the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) after qualifying a merit-based recruitment process and thereafter challenged Regulation 21(1) of the revised CAA Service Regulations, 2019, which limited contract service to a maximum of five years, seeking declaration of their appointments as regular and the said Regulation as ultra vires the Constitution for infringing their fundamental rights---Petitioners’ contracts were initially for two years and were extended periodically and later were denied further renewal---Petitioners (contract employees) contended that the posts they held were of a permanent nature, hence, their continued service warranted regularization, and the impugned regulation enabling fixed-term contracts for permanent posts was unreasonable and without statutory backing---The High Court while dismissing the petitions, confined itself to holding that CAA had no statutory rules, without adjudicating upon the plea of ultra vires raised against Regulation 21(1) of the Regulations, 2000---Held: It was an admitted position that the High Court neither considered the plea of vires of the Regulation under challenge nor discussed anything in this regard in the impugned judgment which completely ignored and overlooked the same---Therefore, doctrine of ‘sub silentio’ was applicable to the present matter since the impugned judgment was rendered without specifically and precisely avowing or attending to the question of law raised for determination---Impugned judgment was set aside and the matter was remanded to the High Court for fresh adjudication---Civil petitions were converted into appeals and were allowed, in circumstances. (b) Judgment--- ----Sub-silentio, doctrine of---Meaning, concept, scope and application---The doctrine of “sub-silentio” accentuates a legal principle where a judgment is rendered without specifically and precisely avowing or attending to the exact question of law raised for determination---In fact, sub silentio, a Latin term, literally translates to “under silence” or “in silence”---In legal milieus, it points towards an incidence where the Court decides a lis without appreciating or deliberating the particular point of law raised before it, which disturbs the precedential value of the judgment---This doctrine often denotes that if the court, in its judgment, overlooked or dispensed with a crucial point of law raised before it, then the precedential value of such decision is seriously disturbed---A decision is not binding if it was reached at without argument, without reference to the critical terms of the law, and without citation of authority---Such a decision, taken as sub silentio, lacks authoritative weight. Uch Power (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal 2010 PTD 1809 rel. Lancaster Motor Co. (London) Ltd. v. Bremith Ltd., (1941) 1 KB 675 and Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur (1989) 1 SCC 101 ref. (c) Words and phrases--- ----Expressions “ultra vires” and “intra vires”---Meaning, concept and scope---The terms “intra vires” and “ultra vires” are both Latin phrases, and diametrical opposites---The expression ultra vires means “beyond the powers”---If an act entails legal authority and it is done with such authority, it is symbolized as intra vires, that is, within the precincts of powers, but if it is carried out shorn of authority, it is ultra vires. (d) Law, vires of--- ----Ultra vires, doctrine of---Scope---Constitutionality of any law, rules, or regulations, can be scrutinized and surveyed, and the law can be struck down if it is found to be offending the Constitution due to an absence of law-making and jurisdictive competence, or found in violation of the fundamental rights enshrined therein---Vires of law, rules, or regulations can be called into question if its provisions are ex facie discriminatory, in which case actual proof of discriminatory treatment is not required to be shown, but there is presumption in favour of constitutionality of the enactments, unless it is ex facie violative of a constitutional provision. Lahore Development Authority v. Ms. Imrana Tiwana and others 2015 SCMR 1739; Province of East Pakistan v. Siraj ul Haq Patwari PLD 1966 SC 854; Mehreen Zaibun Nisa v. Land Commissioner PLD 1975 SC 397; Kaneez Fatima v. Wali Muhammad PLD 1993 SC 901; Multiline Associates v. Ardeshir Cowasjee 1995 SCMR 362; Ellahi Cotton Mills Limited v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1997 SC 582; Dr. Tariq Nawaz v. Government of Pakistan 2000 SCMR 1956; Mian Asif Aslam v. Mian Muhammad Asif PLD 2001 SC 499; Pakistan Muslim League (Q) v. Chief Executive of Pakistan PLD 2002 SC 994; Pakistan Lawyers Forum v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2005 SC 719; Messrs Master Foam (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan 2005 PTD 1537; Watan Party v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2006 SC 697; Federation of Pakistan v. Haji Muhammad Sadiq PLD 2007 SC 133 and Iqbal Zafar Jhagra v. Federation of Pakistan 2013 SCMR 1337 rel. (e) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Presumption in favour of constitutionality of a law---Courts to favour saving the law---Scope---Law should be saved rather than be destroyed and the court must lean in favour of upholding the constitutionality of legislation unless it is ex facie violative of a constitutional provision. (f) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Words of a statute to bear their plain meaning unless context or purpose requires otherwise---Scope---Words contained in statutes, rules, or regulations, are first to be understood in their natural, ordinary, or popular sense, and phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context, or in the object of the statute, to suggest the contrary. (g) Administration of justice--- ----Each case has to be decided on its own facts---Every litigant deserves a fair chance of being heard and the decision of the court must be founded and structured on the facts of the case. M. M. Aqil Awan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Ghulam Rasool Mangi, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants. Khalid Mahmood Siddiqui, Advocate Supreme Court and Jamil Ahmad Virk, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents. Date of hearing: 12th June, 2025.

Summary: (a) Illegal Dispossession Act (XI of 2005)--- ----Ss. 3 & 8---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.265-K---Illegal dispossession of property---Appreciation of evidence---Appeal against acquittal---Civil dispute over property between the parties---Application under S.265-K, Cr.P.C, filed by the accused was allowed by the Trial Court---Validity---As per record, appellant/complainant claimed ownership of the property on the strength of an exchange deed dated 20.8.1993, inter-se executed between father of accused-party and complainant---Civil suit was filed by complainant, then plaintiff, in respect of an exchange deed dated 20.8.1993, inter-se executed between father of accused-party and complainant---Civil suit was filed by complainant, then plaintiff, in respect of an exchange deed, however, same deed at first instance was discarded and rejected by Civil Court vide its judgment and decree dated 28.3.2023 and appeal filed against the said judgment and decree also met the same fate by dint of judgment and decree of the appellate Court dated 27.10.2023---Same fact of civil litigation in respect of the property-in-dispute had also been evident from testimony of a witness, who was examined in Court during complaint proceedings---Same was the case with statement of another witness, who was none else but real brother of appellant/complainant---In view of testimonies of both those two witnesses, it was crystal clear that the property in dispute was the subject-matter of civil suit and complainant/appellant had not been able to prove his ownership and possession over the same, what to talk of his alleged dispossession therefrom---Therefore, in such circumstances, even if evidence of prosecution was recorded, still there was almost zero possibility of conviction of accused/respondents and which aspect of the case had expertly been put under its grasp by the Trial Court, while rendering down the impugned order/judgment dated 10.01.2025, qua acquittal of respondents/accused, which was neither perverse nor arbitrary nor whimsical, hence, was upheld and maintained---Appeal being devoid of any merits was dismissed, in limine. Abbas Haider Naqvi and another v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2022 SC 562; Abdul Ghani v. The State 2020 PCr.LJ 1094 and Yasin Khan Baber v. The State 1995 PCr.LJ 1424 rel. (b) Appeal against acquittal--- ----Scope---Appellate Court needed to be cautious while considering the evidence and should avoid reversal of an acquittal, unless it is found that the acquittal was perverse, conjectural, arbitrary, jurisdictionally defective and prompted by mis-reading or non-reading of evidence. Jehangir v. Aminullah and others 2010 SCMR 491 rel. Syed Ahmed (Chitrali) and Behroz Khan for Appellant. (Respondents are not represented being a motion case). Date of hearing: 12th June, 2025.

Summary: The petitioner was appointed as Ombudsperson Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace, Punjab vide notification dated 17.06.2021 for a term of two years. Subsequently, subsections (5) and (6) in Section 7 were added by way of the Amendment Act which was published in the Punjab Gazette (Extraordinary) on 12.01.2022, whereby term of office of the Ombudsperson has been stipulated for four years. Such amendment has not only fixed tenure of the Ombudsperson to be four years but also curtailed her eligibility for extension of tenure or re-appointment. The commencement clause of the Amendment Act clearly stipulates that it "shall come into force at once." This legislative phrasing indicates an immediate application of the amended provisions upon their enactment. Since the Amendment Act, including the revised tenure stipulated in the amended Section 7, came into force while the petitioner was still serving as the Ombudsperson, the extended tenure of four years became applicable to her office. In the absence of any legislative expression within the Amendment Act explicitly suggesting that the new tenure provision would only apply to future appointments, it squarely applied to the petitioner and the notification dated 01.04.2022 was lawfully issued by the Government of the Punjab to give immediate effect to the Amendment Act whereby tenure of the petitioner as Ombudsperson was extended to four years with effect from her initial taking of charge on 18.06.2021.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: When a minor's interests are at stake in litigation, the court may override parental consent for DNA test if it observes that such consent is not in the best interest of the minor.

Summary: The question raised in this appeal was whether an application of Rule 27 of Order XLI of C.P.C could be decided conjointly while hearing appeal against decree? It has been held that if the appellate court determines that the evidence sought to be produced is of such a nature that its inclusion on the record could fundamentally alter the decision of the main case, then it might indeed be prudent to decide the application separately through a distinct order. This would allow for proper consideration of its admissibility and relevance before proceeding to the merits of the appeal. However, if the appellate court, after initial assessment, forms the view that the proposed evidence, even if admitted, would likely have no material impact on the outcome of the main case, then there is no compelling need to decide the application for additional evidence separately. In such a scenario, a conjoint decision of the application and the main appeal becomes a matter of judicial economy and efficiency. Such approach significantly contributes to the sound administration of justice by streamlining proceedings, preventing unnecessary delays, and ensuring expeditious dispensation of justice.

Summary: Determination of benchmark wage under the provisions of Provincial Employee's Social Security Ordinance, 1965, is essential for determining the quantum of contribution payable thereunder.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: The petitioner was appointed as Ombudsperson Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace, Punjab vide notification dated 17.06.2021 for a term of two years. Subsequently, subsections (5) and (6) in Section 7 were added by way of the Amendment Act which was published in the Punjab Gazette (Extraordinary) on 12.01.2022, whereby term of office of the Ombudsperson has been stipulated for four years. Such amendment has not only fixed tenure of the Ombudsperson to be four years but also curtailed her eligibility for extension of tenure or re-appointment. The commencement clause of the Amendment Act clearly stipulates that it "shall come into force at once." This legislative phrasing indicates an immediate application of the amended provisions upon their enactment. Since the Amendment Act, including the revised tenure stipulated in the amended Section 7, came into force while the petitioner was still serving as the Ombudsperson, the extended tenure of four years became applicable to her office. In the absence of any legislative expression within the Amendment Act explicitly suggesting that the new tenure provision would only apply to future appointments, it squarely applied to the petitioner and the notification dated 01.04.2022 was lawfully issued by the Government of the Punjab to give immediate effect to the Amendment Act whereby tenure of the petitioner as Ombudsperson was extended to four years with effect from her initial taking of charge on 18.06.2021. 392Crl. Revision 63117/24 Muhammad Afzal Vs The State etc. Mr. Justice Tariq Mahmood Bajwa 11- 06- 2025 2025 LHC 4795 2025 PCr.LJ 1919 (Lahore)