Summary: (i) The recruitment policy being prerogative of the concerned Authority cannot be challenged in constitutional petition, unless same is found to be irrational, malafide, perverse or arbitrary and this Court can neither assume the role of a policy maker nor that of a law maker. (ii) For passing the test of permissible classification under Article 25 of the Constitution, the classification must be based on intelligible differentia which has rational nexus with the object to be achieved.-----In the case of Akmal Nazeer and others versus the Government of Punjab, the petitioners challenged a provision of the Recruitment Policy 2016-2017 for School Specific Educators and Assistant Education Officers issued by the Government of Punjab. The provision in question granted 12 additional marks to candidates who were residents of rural areas in Union Councils of District Councils, but not to candidates residing in Municipal Committees, Municipal Corporations, and Metropolitan Corporations. The petitioners argued that this distinction was discriminatory and unconstitutional. The court considered the arguments presented by both parties. The petitioners contended that the policy unfairly favored residents of rural areas, while the respondents argued that the policy was designed to address educational needs in underdeveloped localities and was therefore reasonable. The court referenced precedents from both the Supreme Court and Lahore High Court, emphasizing that judicial review of government policies should only occur if the policy is found to be irrational, arbitrary, or discriminatory. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa etc vs. Syed Sadiq Shah etc (2021 SCMR 747): Judicial review of government policies must be based on fairness, reasonableness, and proportionality. Executive District Officer etc vs. Ijaz Hussain etc (2012 PLC (C.S) 917): Courts cannot assume the role of policy or law makers. Government of Pakistan etc vs. Jamshed Hussain Cheema etc (2016 SCMR 442): Policies based on reasonable classification are not subject to judicial scrutiny for discrimination unless they violate fundamental rights.The court noted that the policy in question aimed to address the educational needs of underdeveloped areas and ensure the availability of teachers in those regions. Applying the principles of permissible classification, the court found that the distinction between residents of rural and urban areas was based on intelligible differentia and had a rational nexus with the policy's objectives. Therefore, the court concluded that the policy did not violate Article 25 of the Constitution, which prohibits discrimination. The court dismissed the petition, ruling it as meritless and not maintainable.

Summary: Whether the Order/ Judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal having attained finality in terms of Article 212 could be sought to be set aside in constitutional jurisdiction---In the case of Asif Mushtaq v. Government of the Punjab, heard in the Lahore High Court, the petitioner, Asif Mushtaq, who served as a Hospital Pharmacist (BS-17) on an ad hoc basis, challenged his termination and subsequent denial of regularization. The petitioner argued that his termination on December 21, 2010, and subsequent rejection for regularization were unjust, preventing him from being regularized like other Hospital Pharmacists.The petitioner's termination was based on alleged irregularities in medicine procurement and maintenance, but the Punjab Service Tribunal (PST) partially upheld his appeal by deleting the adverse remarks. Despite this, his termination remained in effect.The petitioner contended that he should have been treated similarly to others in the Muhammad Sheraz case, where some Hospital Pharmacists were regularized. However, the respondents argued that the petitioner's termination was justified due to the alleged irregularities and that ad hoc employees have no automatic right to regularization.The court examined whether ad hoc employees terminated before completion of their term could be reinstated and whether the deletion of adverse remarks affected the petitioner's case. It also addressed the issue of challenging the PST's decision through a writ petition.The court noted that the petitioner's case differed from Muhammad Sheraz's because he was terminated before completing his ad hoc term. It emphasized that ad hoc employees have no inherent right to retention beyond their term and cited precedents like the Abu Bakar case to support this stance.Ultimately, the court dismissed the petitioner's case, finding it lacking in merit and refusing to order regularization, especially since there were no ongoing recruitment processes in the department.

Summary: The respondents had filed a writ petition in the Peshawar High Court, seeking the setting aside of an Office Memorandum issued by the appellant. The High Court partly allowed the writ petition, stating that the appellants could not recover or adjust financial benefits already paid to the respondents due to promotions granted to them, which were ultimately withdrawn by the Supreme Court in an earlier case.Leave to appeal was granted in this case on the grounds that the promotions granted to the respondents were not legally granted, as established in a previous judgment (Akhtar Umar Hayat Lalayka and others Vs. Mushtaq Ahmed Sukhaira and others).The counsel for the appellants relied on the Akhtar Umar Hayat Lalayka case and specifically referred to para-76(i) of the judgment, which stated that the promotions granted to the respondents by the judgments of the High Court, Service Tribunal, and the Supreme Court were withdrawn by exercising Suo Moto Review Jurisdiction.The Supreme Court found no illegality in the impugned judgment of the High Court and maintained it. Consequently, the appeal (Civil Appeal No. 97 of 2021) was dismissed.In the case of Civil Petition No. 3478 of 2021, the petition was found to be time-barred by 581 days. An application for condonation of delay was filed, but it was dismissed as no sufficient cause was given for the delay to be condoned. As a result, Civil Petition No. 3478 of 2021 was also dismissed due to being barred by time.

Summary: BackgroundThe Supreme Court of Pakistan reviewed several related appeals filed by the Government of Pakistan through the Secretary Ministry of Defence, Rawalpindi and others, versus various respondents including Akhtar Ullah Khan Khattak and others. These appeals were against the decision of the Peshawar High Court, which had ruled on multiple writ petitions challenging the Government's attempt to withdraw from land acquisition processes initiated under the Land Acquisition Act of 1894. The land in question, totaling 3413 acres, 1 kanal, and 11 marlas, was located in various mouzas of the Nowshera District and had been under possession since 1955, initially leased to the Ministry of Defence.---IssuesThe core issue in this case revolved around the Government's power to withdraw from the acquisition after a long duration of procedural engagements and after taking possession of the land. The appellants sought to de-notify the acquisition citing a lack of funds to compensate the landowners, despite the Supreme Court's prior order setting the compensation rate.---Holding/Reasoning/OutcomeThe Supreme Court, led by Justice Shahid Waheed, held that the Government's notification to withdraw from the acquisition was invalid, illegal, and without jurisdiction. The Court's reasoning was based on a detailed interpretation of Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which stipulates that withdrawal from acquisition is not permissible once possession of the land has been taken. The Court noted that possession had been taken, and therefore, the land had vested absolutely in the Government, removing any legal grounds for withdrawal.The Court emphasized the procedural failures and delays caused by the appellants, which had extended the litigation and hardship for the landowners. The notification issued on October 7, 2019, to withdraw from the acquisition was seen as an attempt to evade the financial responsibilities duly established by previous court rulings.---Citations/PrecedentsLand Acquisition Act, 1894, particularly Section 48, which discusses the conditions under which the Government may withdraw from land acquisition processes.Supreme Court judgment dated February 15, 2018, which had set the compensation rate for the acquired land.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Criminal appeal against Conviction. Held: (I). The dead-body was shifted to the local police station, where the matter was reported by the complainant and verified by the eye-wttnesses. The Injury sheet and the inquest report was prepared after registration of the case, but surprisingly, the inquest report does notbear FIR Number and section of law. it invites our attention that when report was made at the police station in the shape of first information report, then why inquest report is lacking FIR number and the relevant section of law, it cannot be interpreted in any other way, but that the matter was not reported in the mood and manner.(II). The presence of eye wittnesses is further doubted from the fact that instead of absence at the time of postmortem examination, the docotor mentioned his name in the column of identification, this aspect of the case leads this court nowhere but that the prosecution examination was conducted earlier to the report made; and so the inquest report was prepared and, we cannot refrain ourselves from holding taht preliminary investigation was made in the case.(iii). One of the wittness categorically stated that the distance between the police station and the hospital is about 10/11 kilometer, if so, then it is for prosecution to explain that when the matter was already reported at 12:30 p.m., then why the dead body was produced to the doctor at 2:37 p.m., after a considerable delay of two hours, but prosecution could not explain the same. The belated examination of the dead-body strengthens our belief regardin the absence of wittness, and their conduct.(iv). it spells out from the record that both i.e. the complainant and the eye-wittness were working in the brick kiln of one Karim Khan and a particular question was asked in this respect, to which the wittnesses confirmed. The record is silent and even the statements of wittnesses to give an otherwise explanation regarding their presence at home on the day and at the time of incident , in such eventuality, we lurk no doubt in mind that the wittness were present in the brick kiln in connection of their routine work.(Criminal Appeal Allowed)