Summary: Against the impugned judgment dated 20.6.19 passed by the learned Special Judge Central, ICT whereby respondent no.2 has been acquitted in Complaint U/S 420/468/471/109 PPC & 5(2)47 PCA

Summary: Quashment of FIR No. 01/2021, dated 15 -01 -21, U/s 109/409/420/468/471/477 -A PPC, R/W 5(2) 1947, PCA, FIA, Corporate Crime Circle, Islamabad.

Summary: Lacking of Jurisdiction of High Court to entertain bail in case where appeal against the Judgment of a High Court is pending before the Hon`ble Supreme Court.

Summary: Appreciation of Evidence, more than one person charged, benefit of doubt.

Summary: Background: This case involves a criminal appeal filed under Section 426 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) for the suspension of sentences awarded by the Additional Sessions Judge. The petitioners were convicted of causing hurt under the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) and sentenced to imprisonment and ordered to pay daman (compensation). One petitioner was sentenced to seven years rigorous imprisonment (R.I.) under Section 337F(vi) of the PPC with a daman of Rs. 50,000, while the other was sentenced to two years R.I. under Section 337A(i) with a daman of Rs. 25,000 on two counts. Both sentences were ordered to run concurrently. -----Issues: 1- Whether the sentences awarded to the petitioners should be suspended under Section 426 Cr.P.C. ----2- Whether the trial court acted within its jurisdiction by sentencing the petitioners to imprisonment in addition to daman under Section 337F(vi) of the PPC, considering Section 337-N(2) of the PPC. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: For Petitioner 1 (convicted under Section 337F(vi) of PPC): The court held that Section 337-N(2) of the PPC applies only to cases where arsh (compensation for specific injuries) is awarded and does not cover cases involving daman. Since the punishment under Section 337F(vi) involves daman and imprisonment, the trial court was within its discretion to award both. The petitioner was found guilty based on the evidence, and there was no apparent legal error. Thus, the petition for suspension of the sentence was dismissed. For Petitioner 2 (convicted under Section 337A(i) of PPC): The court found that the sentence awarded to this petitioner was short, and there was a high likelihood that the petitioner would serve the full sentence before the appeal could be decided. In line with the principle of the safe administration of justice, the court granted bail and suspended the sentence, allowing the petitioner to be released pending the decision of the appeal. -----Citations/Precedents: Makhdoom Javed Hashmi Vs. The State (2007 SCMR 246) – Presumption of innocence vanishes after conviction by a competent court. Abdul Wahab and others v. The State and others (2019 SCMR 516) – Distinguished based on the specific provision of the PPC involved. Shah Wali vs. Ghulam Din alias Gama and another (PLD 1966 SC 983) – Interpretation of discretionary powers under Section 148 CPC. Muhammad Ismail vs. Muhammad Akbar Bhatti and others (PLD 1997 Lahore 177) – Declaration of the court becoming functus officio after specified conditions in a decree. Mst. Naseema Salahuddin and 2 others vs. Mst. Daulat Fatima and 4 others (PLD 2004 Lahore 103) – The court’s authority in extending or modifying decrees in specific performance cases. Tasneem Ismail and others vs. Messers Wafi Associates and others (2007 SCMR 1464) – Clarified court’s discretion post-decree in cases of specific performance under Section 35 of the Specific Relief Act.

Summary: ''Discussion: (1) Section 3 & 7 of Pakistan Aeronautical Complex Board Ordinance, 2000 read with Rule 2 & 4 of PAC Board Employees (Service) Rules, 2002. (2) Option under Factory Routine Order No.16 for the new service rules or to be governed by old rules cannot be construed as violation of any fundamental rights but it was founded on consensual act of every individual employee.'' --- Facts:The petitioners were employed by the Ministry of Defence, Production Division, Government of Pakistan and posted in Mirage Rebuild Factory, Kamra.Their terms and conditions were governed under the Civil Servants Act, 1973. Following the establishment of the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex Board (PAC Board) through the PACB Ordinance, 2000, the employees were given the option to remain as civil servants or become PAC Board employees.The petitioners claimed they opted to continue as civil servants and argued for their eligibility for promotion without departmental examinations, which they appeared in under duress.The Federal Service Tribunal dismissed their appeals, leading to these petitions.---Issue:Whether the petitioners were entitled to promotions as civil servants without departmental examinations, despite their participation in such examinations under the PAC Board.---Holding:The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, refusing leave to appeal against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal.----Rationale:The Supreme Court found that the petitioners had not clearly opted to remain civil servants under the PACB Ordinance's provision, which allowed existing employees to choose their employment status.The continuous participation of the petitioners in departmental examinations suggested their acceptance of the PAC Board's employment terms, contradicting their claim of retaining civil servant status.The Court highlighted the principles of estoppel and approbate and reprobate, indicating that the petitioners could not claim rights as civil servants after engaging in actions consistent with PAC Board employment.The Court referenced a similar case (2019 SCMR 1933) where an employee's appeal was dismissed under comparable circumstances, reinforcing the decision to dismiss the current petitions.---Decision:The Supreme Court upheld the Federal Service Tribunal's judgment, confirming that the petitioners were not entitled to civil servant promotions without adhering to the PAC Board's examination requirements.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: RFA by judgement debtor against decree of specific performance

Summary: PETITION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL(i) The Petitioner had earlier filed complaint against the respondents/accused regarding the same allegations as narrated in the instant complaint, which was dismissed by invoking the provisions of section 203, Cr.P.C. Under the law, nobody could be tried twice for the same offence on the basis of maxim nemo debt bis vexari, which means that no person can be tried for the second time for an offence with which he was previously charged.(Petition for special leave to file the appeal was dismissed in the circumstance).