Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 154---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Quashing of FIR---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Scope---Jurisdiction in terms of Article 199 of the Constitution for quashing an FIR can only be exercised in exceptional cases---Exercise of extra-ordinary jurisdiction for quashing an FIR under Article 199 is permissible only in cases when the facts on record unequivocally indicate that no offence can be established against the accused; or if registration of FIR reflects a misuse of legal authority or lacks any sound legal justification because allowing the prosecution to continue under such conditions would constitute an abuse of the process of law, justifying the quashing of the FIR; cases registered without proper authority or in clear violation of established laws must also be quashed to maintain the integrity of the judicial system---However, the court should not invoke this provision if the allegations made by the prosecution establish a prima facie case against the accused---Even if a civil dispute is pending between the parties, FIR cannot be straightaway quashed based on the civil dispute---Criminal proceedings are not barred in presence of civil proceedings and civil and criminal proceedings can proceed simultaneously. Ajmeel Khan v. Abdul Rahim and others PLD 2009 SC 102; FIA, Director General FIA and others v. Syed Hamid Ali Shah and others PLD 2023 SC 265; Seema Fareed and others v. The State and another 2008 SCMR 839 and Central Bureau of Investigation and others v. Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi and others AIR 2021 SC 5041 ref. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Scope---Factual controversies---High Court, in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199, cannot resolve factual controversies---High Court cannot assume the role of an investigation agency or of a trial Court without recording evidence to deliberate upon the factual controversies involved in the cases in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction. Mst. Tayyeba Ambareen and another v. Shafqat Ali Kiyani and another 2023 SCMR 246; Amir Jamal and others v. Malik Zahoor-ul-Haq and others 2011 SCMR 1023 and Fida Hussain v. Mst. Saiqa and others 2011 SCMR 1990 ref. Irfan Zia, Additional Prosecutor General, Punjab for Petitioner (in both cases). Shakeel Javed, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No.1 (in both cases). Date of hearing: 27th September, 2024.

Summary: Punjab Consumer Protection Act (II of 2005)--- ----S.28---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 5---Consumer Court proceedings---Limitation---Condonation of delay---Complaint filed by petitioner/consumer was barred by 90 days---Plea raised by petitioner/consumer was that delay could have been condoned under section 5 of Limitation Act, 1908---Validity---Provision of section 5 of Limitation Act, 1908 was not applicable to the proceedings before Consumer Court---Supreme Court declined to condone the delay in filing of complaint---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. Muhammad Rafique Shah, Advocate Supreme Court (through Video Link from Lahore) for Petitioner. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 18th November, 2024.

Summary: Punjab Consumer Protection Act (II of 2005)--- ----S.28---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 5---Consumer Court proceedings---Limitation---Condonation of delay---Complaint filed by petitioner/consumer was barred by 90 days---Plea raised by petitioner/consumer was that delay could have been condoned under section 5 of Limitation Act, 1908---Validity---Provision of section 5 of Limitation Act, 1908 was not applicable to the proceedings before Consumer Court---Supreme Court declined to condone the delay in filing of complaint---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. Muhammad Rafique Shah, Advocate Supreme Court (through Video Link from Lahore) for Petitioner. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 18th November, 2024.

Summary: ----S. 11EE & Fourth Sched.---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 4---Affiliation with a proscribed organization, allegation of---Placing of name in the Fourth Sched. to the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Right of individuals to be dealt with in accordance with law---Scope---Petitioner, a professional driver, was aggrieved of inclusion of his name in the Fourth Schedule to the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, by concerned Deputy Commissioner (respondent) and his representation seeking review and reconsideration of the impugned order was dismissed---Validity---Fundamental rights of citizens, including the right to life, liberty, and security, has been guaranteed in the Constitution of Pakistan---Article 4 of the Constitution states that every citizen has the right to enjoy the protection of law and to be treated in accordance with the law---Provision of Art. 4 of the Constitution underscores the importance of safeguarding individual liberties against arbitrary state action---In the context of constitutional rights, the interpretation of laws that curtail the liberties of citizens is a critical aspect of legal jurisprudence---Principle of strict interpretation is grounded in the understanding that any law, which imposes restrictions on fundamental rights, must be clear, precise, and unambiguous---Fundamental rights are paramount to ordinary state-made laws and cannot be curtailed without clear legislative intent and such law is required to be scrutinized rigorously to ensure that it does not violate constitutional guarantees---Considering the impugned order on the touch stone of the settled principles of law, the same was based merely on surmises and conjectures to the extent of the petitioner which was neither justified and reasonable nor was in accordance with constitutional provisions---Respondents had failed to produce credible evidence, and not even a single document was produced to substantiate the claim that the petitioner was involved in terrorism; was an activist, or office-bearer or an associate of an organization kept under observation under S. 11D of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, or proscribed under S. 11B of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and/or in any way concerned or suspected to be concerned with such organization or affiliated with any group or organization suspected to be involved in terrorism or sectarianism or acting on behalf of, or at the direction of, any person or organization proscribed under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Petitioner had also sworn in an affidavit/executed a bond as envisaged under S. 11EE of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Deputy Commissioner (respondent) had acted beyond the scope of his authority by issuing the impugned order without any material evidence and through a non-speaking order based on surmises and conjectures---Such order was not only arbitrary but also violated the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of Pakistan---High Court declared the impugned order illegal, unlawful and without lawful authority to the extent of the petitioner and the respondents were directed to delete the name of the petitioner from the Fourth Sched. of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 ---Constitutional petition was allowed. Jameel Ramzan for Petitioner. Date of hearing: 2nd December, 2024.

Summary: ----S. 11EE & Fourth Sched.---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 4---Affiliation with a proscribed organization, allegation of---Placing of name in the Fourth Sched. to the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Right of individuals to be dealt with in accordance with law---Scope---Petitioner, a professional driver, was aggrieved of inclusion of his name in the Fourth Schedule to the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, by concerned Deputy Commissioner (respondent) and his representation seeking review and reconsideration of the impugned order was dismissed---Validity---Fundamental rights of citizens, including the right to life, liberty, and security, has been guaranteed in the Constitution of Pakistan---Article 4 of the Constitution states that every citizen has the right to enjoy the protection of law and to be treated in accordance with the law---Provision of Art. 4 of the Constitution underscores the importance of safeguarding individual liberties against arbitrary state action---In the context of constitutional rights, the interpretation of laws that curtail the liberties of citizens is a critical aspect of legal jurisprudence---Principle of strict interpretation is grounded in the understanding that any law, which imposes restrictions on fundamental rights, must be clear, precise, and unambiguous---Fundamental rights are paramount to ordinary state-made laws and cannot be curtailed without clear legislative intent and such law is required to be scrutinized rigorously to ensure that it does not violate constitutional guarantees---Considering the impugned order on the touch stone of the settled principles of law, the same was based merely on surmises and conjectures to the extent of the petitioner which was neither justified and reasonable nor was in accordance with constitutional provisions---Respondents had failed to produce credible evidence, and not even a single document was produced to substantiate the claim that the petitioner was involved in terrorism; was an activist, or office-bearer or an associate of an organization kept under observation under S. 11D of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, or proscribed under S. 11B of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and/or in any way concerned or suspected to be concerned with such organization or affiliated with any group or organization suspected to be involved in terrorism or sectarianism or acting on behalf of, or at the direction of, any person or organization proscribed under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Petitioner had also sworn in an affidavit/executed a bond as envisaged under S. 11EE of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Deputy Commissioner (respondent) had acted beyond the scope of his authority by issuing the impugned order without any material evidence and through a non-speaking order based on surmises and conjectures---Such order was not only arbitrary but also violated the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of Pakistan---High Court declared the impugned order illegal, unlawful and without lawful authority to the extent of the petitioner and the respondents were directed to delete the name of the petitioner from the Fourth Sched. of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 ---Constitutional petition was allowed. Jameel Ramzan for Petitioner. Date of hearing: 2nd December, 2024.

Summary: ----Art. 199---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12(2)---Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), S. 14---Family Courts Rules, 1965, R.3---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Filing of application under S.12(2), C.P.C., against the decree passed by the Appellate Court---Under R. 3 of the Family Courts Rules, 1965, the courts of the District Judge, the Additional District Judge are also designated as Family Courts along with the Civil Judge but ordinarily functions of Family Courts are assigned to the Civil Judge and the District Judge and the Additional District Judge acts as appellate court as is evident from the bare reading of S.14 of the Family Courts Act, 1964 (Act)---Additional District Judge, who decided the application of petitioners under S.12(2), C.P.C., was officiating as Appellate Court, thus, writ petition was maintainable. (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S. 17---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.12(2)---Decree passed by the appellate court challenged through application under S.12(2), C.P.C.---Maintainability---"Person" competent to file application under S.12(2)---Scope---By virtue of S.12(2), C.P.C., any person can challenge the validity of judgment, decree or order on the plea of fraud, misrepresentation or want of jurisdiction by filing an application to the court which passed the final judgment, decree or order---Term "person" used in S. 12(2) has wider import and cannot be narrowly interpreted, so as to restrict it to refer to only a judgment debtor or his successors but it should be read to include any person adversely effected even though not a party to the proceedings wherein such decree, judgment or order is passed---Scope of S.12(2), C.P.C., is not narrow but wide enough and it is not restricted to the judgment, decree or order obtained while playing fraud with the court but it also extends to the cases where a judgment, decree or order has been obtained by the parties through fraud inter se by concealment of true facts---Despite an embargo in terms of S.17 of the Act there is no legal impediment in the way of an aggrieved person moving an application under S.12(2), C.P.C., before the Family Court---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. Muhammad Arshad Anjum v. Mst. Khurshid Begum and others 2021 SCMR 1145 and Muhammad Akram Malik v. Dr. Ghulam Rabbani and others PLD 2006 SC 773 ref. Muhammad Arshad Anjum v. Mst. Khurshid Begum and others 2021 SCMR 1145; Fozia Mazhar v. Additional District Judge, Jhang and others PLD 2024 SC 771 and Fozia Mazhar v. Additional District Judge and 2 others 2021 CLC 270 rel. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.12(2)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Decree, setting aside of---Plea of fraud and misrepresentation---Application under S.12(2), C.P.C., was dismissed summarily on the ground of maintainability and also on merits without framing of issues---Validity---Though it is not a principle of universal application that in each and every case, the court is bound to frame the issues before deciding the fate of an application under S.12(2), C.P.C., but where misrepresentation and fraud have been alleged and prima facie a case is made out, in such an eventuality said application should not be dismissed summarily---Allegations levelled by the petitioners in their application had due force to compel the court to frame issues instead of dismissing the application in a cursory and slipshod manner---On the one hand, the Appellate Court held the application under S.12(2), C.P.C., not maintainable and on the other dilated upon its merits---After forming negative opinion about the maintainability of application the Appellate Court should have simply dismissed the same on said score instead of delving into its other merits. Muhammad Akram Malik v. Dr. Ghulam Rabbani and others PLD 2006 SC 773 rel. Agha Muhammad Ali Khan for Petitioners. Mirza Muhammad Nazakat Baig for Respondent No.1. Respondents Nos.2 and 3: Ex-parte. Date of hearing: 26th September, 2024.

Summary: Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S. 5, Sched.---Maintenance allowance for minor---Child justice approach---Duty of Courts---Petitioner/father of minor son was aggrieved of fixing of maintenance allowance by the Courts below---Held, that Courts must approach cases involving children with a dedicated child justice approach, rooted in a legal and moral obligation to protect, nurture, and rehabilitate children, ensuring their rights and well-being within the justice system---Child justice encompasses both children in conflict with law, who require rehabilitative interventions rather than punitive measures---Children in contact with law must be safeguarded and supported throughout judicial processes---As custodians of justice, Courts must adopt a child justice approach that prioritizes the best interests of child, recognizing their vulnerabilities, developmental needs and potential---Such approach demands sensitivity to their circumstances, ensuring access to education, shielding them from exploitation, and fostering an environment conducive to their growth and reintegration into society---Supreme Court declined to interfere in the judgments passed by the Courts below as there was no jurisdictional error, illegality or procedural illegality---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. Khalid Ikram Khatana, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner. Respondents not represented. Date of hearing: 19th December, 2024.

Summary: ----Ss. 2(3), 2(10), 38 & O.XXI---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 8, 12 & 54---Compromise decree, scope of---Execution, scope of---Suit for specific performance, recovery of possession, permanent injunction and compensation---Decree holder cannot seek possession on behalf of non-parties---Suit was decreed on the basis of compromise wherein the judgment debtors acknowledged the decree holder's financial assistance in resolving their disputes with their creditor and undertook to pay a sum of Rs.14,100,000/- to the decree holder by 01.03.2016---In the event of default, judgment debtor No. 2 agreed to subdivide her property and transfer four plots to the decree holder's daughters in partial satisfaction of the debt amounting to Rs.11,600,000/-, and an additional plot to adjust the remaining Rs.2,500,000/- and non-compliance with these terms would entitle the decree holder to seek enforcement through intervention of the Court---When respondent No.1 defaulted, execution proceedings were filed by decree holder to enforce the compromise decree---Legal question before the Court was whether a decree-holder, in whose favour a compromise decree has been passed based on acknowledgment of debt and conditional transfer of property to third parties (his children), possesses the locus standi to seek execution for possession on behalf of those third parties, particularly when registered sale deeds have already been executed in their favour?--- Held: Single Judge had meticulously observed that judgment debtor No.2 executed sale deeds in favour of two daughters and two sons of the decree holder, thereby establishing privity of contract directly with them---Should the children of the decree holder be aggrieved by the non-delivery of possession despite the sale deeds, it was incumbent upon them to initiate legal proceedings to claim possession---The decree holder lacked locus standi to seek possession on their behalf through an execution application---Admittedly, in the present case, both the daughters and sons of the decree holder were not parties to the suit, the compromise application, or the execution proceedings---Consequently, as majors, they must have sued for possession if they were aggrieved under S. 8 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877---Therefore, the children of the decree holder, not being parties to the original proceedings, were not directly entitled to the benefits of the compromise decree---They must have independently established their claims through appropriate legal channels---A compromise decree is executable only if it explicitly encompasses the relief sought by the parties involved---This necessitates that the decree clearly address and provide for the specific relief agreed upon in the compromise---In the absence of such explicit coverage, the compromise decree cannot be executed as it stands---In such scenarios, the parties must institute a fresh suit to enforce the compromise agreement---This fresh suit is imperative to obtain a new decree that accurately reflects the terms of the compromise and the relief sought---Appeals were dismissed. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----Ss. 2(3), 2(10), 38 & O.XXI---Execution of decrees---Scope---Compromise decree---Scope and enforceability---Terms "decree-holder" and "judgment debtor"---Definitions---Decree holder cannot seek possession on behalf of non-parties---Section 38 and O. XXI of the C.P.C. govern the execution of decrees---Under S. 38, C.P.C., a decree may be executed either by the court which passed it or by a court to which it is transferred for execution---This provision grants the decree-holder the discretion to seek execution from either the original court that issued the decree or a transferee court---Order XXI, C.P.C. sets out the procedures, modalities, and processes related to execution proceedings---In terms of definitions, S. 2(3), C.P.C. defines a "decree-holder" as any person in whose favour a decree or an executable order has been passed---Conversely, S. 2(10), C.P.C. defines a "judgment-debtor" as any person against whom a decree or an executable order has been passed---The children of the decree holder in the instant case, in whose favour the sale deeds were executed, did not come under the definition of "decree-holder" since no decree was passed in their favour---Thus, the decree holder lacked the locus standi under the execution framework of S. 38 and O. XXI, C.P.C. to seek possession on behalf of third parties (his children), who were not parties to the original proceedings who must independently seek redress for possession---Appeals were dismissed. (c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----S.12---Specific performance, relief of---Nature and Scope---Implied right to possession in decree for specific performance---Decree holder entitled to possession---Fulfillment of contractual obligations in specific performance cases---Whether a decree for specific performance entitles the decree holder to possession of the property even when the relief of possession was not expressly mentioned in the plaint or compromise agreement?---Held: Insofar as the contention that suit filed by the decree holder was for the specific performance of a mutual agreement and no relief of possession was sought in the said suit is concerned it is settled law that a suit for specific performance is always a suit for possession---This principle is grounded in the understanding that the specific performance of a contract inherently involves the transfer of possession of the property in question---When a court decrees specific performance, it essentially orders the fulfilment of the contractual obligations which includes delivery of possession to the party entitled under the agreement---Even if the suit or terms and conditions of compromise do not explicitly seek possession, the compromise decree for specific performance implicitly incudes the right to possession---This legal interpretation ensures that the decree holder receives the full benefit of the contract as intended, including the possession of the property---Appeals along with pending applications were dismissed with no order as to costs. Nabeel Ahmed Kolachi for Appellant (in H.C.A. No. 215 of 2023) and for Respondents (in H.C.A. No. 235 of 2023). Naveed Ahmed Khan and Salman Hamid for Appellants (in H.C.A. No. 235 of 2023) and for Respondents (in H.C.A. No. 215 of 2023) and Imran Rind. Dates of hearing: 13th August and 9th September, 2024.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. VII, R. 11---Rejection of plaint---Principles---Averments in the plaint must be read as a whole to determine whether it discloses a cause of action or whether the suit is barred under any law---This includes a bar created due to the lapse of the limitation period---At the stage of exercise of power under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C., if the averments in the plaint ex-facie do not disclose a cause of action or on a reading thereof, the suit appears to be barred under any law; the plaint can be rejected. (b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----S. 42---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched., Art. 120---Suit for declaration---Limitation period, commencement of---There can be no "right to sue" until there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement or threat to infringe that right---It implies that the date of accrual of the cause of action, and not the cause of action itself, would be terminus a quo for computing limitation time for a suit for declaration under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----Ss. 96, 115 & O.VII, R. 11---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---District Court exercising revisional jurisdiction to issue an order to reject a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C.---Remedy available to the aggrieved party---Constitutional petition before the High Court---Second revision of an order rejecting a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C., by the District Court cannot be pursued by invoking Section 115, C.P.C. before the High Court---Furthermore, although a revisional court's order rejecting a plaint is classified as a decree, it cannot be appealed (before the High Court) under Section 96, C.P.C.---Moreover, a second appeal against such a decree is also not permissible, because this type of appeal can only be made concerning decrees issued by Courts operating in their appellate jurisdiction---Therefore, in such instances where parties feel aggrieved by the revisional order, they may pursue a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution---This writ petition must go beyond merely alleging illegality---It must establish that the underlying merits of the case have been adversely impacted and that a party's legal rights have been compromised as a result---This requirement emphasises the need for a meaningful connection between the alleged procedural irregularities and the substantive rights of the parties involved. Qadir Bakhsh Shah v. Additional District Judge 2004 SCMR 1638; Noor Muhammad v. Sarwar Khan PLD 1985 SC 131; Muhammad Zahoor v. Lal Muhammad 1988 SCMR 322; Hassan Din v. Abdus Salam PLD 1991 SC 65 and Qamar ud Din v. Muhammad Din PLD 2001 SC 518 ref. Muhammad Asif, Advocate Supreme Court via video link from Peshawar for Petitioners. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 14th November, 2024.

Summary: ----S. 9(c)--- Possession of narcotic--- Appreciation of evidence---Confession of accused after amendment of charge---Legality---Prosecution case was that 2300 grams charas was recovered from the possession of accused---Accused did not plead guilty to the charge, yet admitted his guilt when the charge was amended---Validity---No specific prohibition was available for recording plea of guilt at any stage of trial and such arrangement in no case was opposed to right to fair trial if accused opted to waive the same to cut short the process in order to avoid the agony or rigors of protracted trial---However, Court was always on guard to take a careful look why the accused was admitting his guilt and should ensure that the trial of offence entailing capital punishment should not be terminated merely on the admission of guilt by the accused, for which recording of evidence was essential---Admission of guilt in the present case recorded by the Trial Court could not be declared illegal in the given circumstances---Such mode was perfect, in consonance with the dictum laid down by the apex Court; therefore, impugned judgment did not suffer from any illegality and called for no interference---Appeal was dismissed in limine, in circumstances. Nasaruddin Mohammad v. Emperor AIR 1928 Calcutta 775; Shahbaz Masih v. The State 2007 SCMR 1631; Muhammad Ismail v. The State 2017 SCMR 713; Multan Jan v. The State 2020 PCr.LJ 88 and State through the Deputy Director (Law), Regional Directorate, Anti-Narcotics Force v. Mujahid Naseem Lodhi PLD 2017 SC 671 rel. (b) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)--- ----S. 9(c)---Punjab Criminal Prosecution Service (Constitution, Functions and Powers) Act (III of 2006), S. 9(8)---Possession of narcotic---Appreciation of evidence---Confession of guilt---Sentence, quantum of---Prosecution case was that 2300 grams charas was recovered from the possession of accused---Accused who sought sentence on the basis of his plea of guilt, in turn helped in reducing the costs of trial---If after attending the processes of trial the accused was to meet a particular sentence range then the Court could record plea of guilt at any stage, even mid-way, if accused was ready to assist and facilitate the system for cost-reduction of prosecution case and could reward the accused with minimum sentence range as a State bounty--- As per S. 9(8) of the Punjab Criminal Prosecution Service (Constitution , Functions and Powers) Act, 2006, on pleading guilty by the accused, prosecutors were required to suggest appropriate sentence range---As per 'Code of Conduct for Prosecutors' issued under S. 17 of Criminal Prosecution Service (Constitution, Functions and Powers) Act, 2006, while applying 'Full Code Test' which included evidential test and public interest test, it could be applied at any appropriate stage keeping in view the requirement of the said Code---Prosecutors should ensure that prosecution of an offence must be a "Proportionate Response" which meant that quantum of sentence must commensurate to the costs of prosecution---When an accused voluntarily admitted his guilt before the Court, he must be dealt with more leniently in terms of quantum of sentence---Appeal was dismissed in limine, in circumstances . Syed Aftab Ejaz's case PLD 1978 Lah. 361; Muhammad Arif and another v. The State 1991 PCr.LJ 623 and King Emperor v. Kasim Walad Mohamed Saffer AIR 1925 Sind 188 rel. Ch. Asghar Ali Gill, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State.