Summary: ----Ss.23 & 24---Privatization (Modes and Procedure) Rules, 2001, R.3---Privatization Commission (Hiring of Financial Advisors) Regulations, 2018, Regln. 3---Privatization Commission (Confidentiality and Secrecy of Documents) Regulations, 2003, Regln. 3---Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (Conversion) Act (XV of 2016), S. 3---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts.173 and 199---Privatization procedure of Pakistan International Airlines Corporation Limited, challenge to---Notice of intent to commence privatization and valuation of assets---Requirements---The petitioner filed 'pro bono publico' writ petition challenging the privatization process of Pakistan International Airlines Corporation Limited (PIACL), alleging non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of Ss. 23 & 24 of the Privatization Commission Ordinance, 2000, inasmuch as no lawful advertisement of intent was issued nor proper valuation of assets was undertaken, thereby rendering the entire exercise arbitrary, non-transparent, and violative of the fundamental right to information under Article 19-A of the Constitution---Nub of the matter was the determination as to "whether the process of privatization undertaken by the Privatization Commission was in conformity with Ss. 23 & 24 of the Ordinance 2000 and the Rules and Regulations framed thereunder or whether the same was tainted with arbitrariness, procedural impropriety or lack of lawful authority"---Held: There was no doubt that failure to comply with the procedural requirements of S. 23 of the Ordinance 2000 would have rendered the privatization process legally defective and open to judicial review---Bare reading of Ss. 23 of the Ordinance 2000read with S. 5(o) of the Ordinance 2000 made it abundantly clear that it was the duty of the Privatization Commission to invite open applications for the purpose of privatization, after consultation with the Federal Government, for making the process transparent and competitive by preventing favoritism and ensuring fair competition---It was evident from the record that the required newspaper advertisements were published in national newspapers "Daily Express", "Daily Jang" (Urdu Newspapers) and "Dawn" and "Business Recorder" (English Newspapers) on 02.04.2025---Notice of invitation was also got published in international dailies "Financial Times" (03.04.2024), "China Daily" (02.04.2024) and "The Wall Street Journal" (02.04.2024) by the Commission---The said advertisement was also got published on 15.04.2025 with at least thirteen days gap on "Daily Express", "Daily Jang" (Urdu Newspapers) and "Dawn" and "Business Recorder" (English Newspapers)---In this view of the matter, the record demonstrated that advertisement of privatization of the "PIACL" was issued in consultation with the concerned enterprise in accordance with requirement of the S. 23 of the Ordinance 2000---Moreover, the issuance of a formal valuation report was a condition precedent for the progression of the privatization process which ensured that the Commission, bidders, and the public were fully aware of the independently assessed value of the asset being privatized---It was evident from the notice of advertisements that the Privatization Commission had appointed EY Consulting LLC, as the Financial Advisor along with other consortium members to conduct the transaction---If S. 24 of the Ordinance 2000 was read with S. 23 of the Ordinance 2000 along with Ss. 5(o) & 5(p) of the Ordinance 2000, it transpired that Privatization Commission was empowered to evaluate the bids against the criteria fixed by it---Record was indicative of the fact that the Privatization Commission had appointed EY Consulting LLC, as the Financial Advisor to conduct the transaction in the prescribed manner after seeking proper approval from the Cabinet and hence this requirement was also fully met with by the respondents---Privatization Commission had duly conducted the process of privatization as per Ss. 23 & 24 of the Ordinance 2000---Regarding application of the petitioner seeking summoning and production of record pertaining to assets, valuation reports and financial particulars of PIACL regarding process of privatization, such request could not be entertained given the fact that such documents were confidential under Regln. 3 of the Privatization Commission (Confidentiality and Secrecy of Documents) Regulations, 2003---The process of privatization was strictly followed as per prescribed criteria, therefore, present petition was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Competition Act (XIX of 2010)--- ----Ss. 3, 11 & 12---Privatization Commission Ordinance (LII of 2000), Ss.23 & 24---Privatization of Pakistan International Airlines Corporation Limited (the PIACL)---Competition Commission of Pakistan---Role, object and scope---In the privatization of the "PIACL"the role of Competition Commission of Pakistan (the CCP)is both pivotal and exemplary, reflecting its statutory mandate as an independent, quasi-judicial regulatory authority established under S. 3 of the Competition Act of 2010---The CCP's involvement in the acquisition of 100% shareholding of the PIACL by PIA Holding Company Limited (Holdco) underscores its critical function in scrutinizing mergers and acquisitions to prevent any appreciable adverse effect on competition within relevant markets. Dilsons (Private) Limited and others v. Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan and another 2021 CLD 1317 ref. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, invoking of---Public interest litigation---Locus standi---Scope---Public Interest Litigation is an extraordinary jurisdiction enabling the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution to address questions of public importance involving the enforcement of fundamental rights of the public at large, particularly where disadvantaged or unorganized segments of society are unable to approach the Court themselves---Such jurisdiction has been exercised in matters of environment, human rights, detention, labour, prisoners, health, education, and transparency in governance---However, it is settled by now that Public Interest Litigation cannot be misused for private motives or publicity and the petitioner must establish bona fide intent supported by credible material to justify judicial intervention---Public Interest Litigation, though entertained with a liberal approach, must be founded upon some credible material demonstrating violation of law or infringement of fundamental rights---Mere bald assertions, unaccompanied by documents or evidence, cannot constitute a valid cause for invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 199 of the Constitution. Kakakhail Traders v. Province of Punjab and others PLD 2025 Lah. 630 ref. (d) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, exercise of---Non-functionality/non-existence of statutory forum to entertain statutory remedy provided by law---Scope and effect---Ordinarily when a statute provides for an alternate forum, a party must first exhaust such remedy before invoking constitutional jurisdiction---However, where the statutory forum is non-existent or has not been constituted, the litigant cannot be left remediless---The extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 is therefore available in such exceptional circumstances to ensure that justice is not defeated merely on account of the failure of the executive to establish the requisite forum. Kakakhail Traders v. Province of Punjab and others PLD 2025 Lah. 630 ref. (e) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Preamble of a statute---Purpose, scope and significance---Preamble to a statute is though not an operational part of the enactment but it is a gateway, which opens the purpose and intent of the legislature, which necessitated the legislation on the subject and also sheds clear light on the goals which the legislator aimed to secure through the introduction of such law---The preamble of a statute, therefore holds a pivotal role for the purposes of interpretation in order to dissect the true purpose and intent of the law. Director General, FIA and others v. Kamran Iqbal and others 2016 SCMR 447 rel. Messrs Tradhol International SA Sociedad Unipersonal v. Ms Shakarganj Limited 2023 CLD 819; Abwa Knowledge (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2021 Lah. 436; Chenab Flour and General Mills and others v. F.O.P through Secretary Revenue Division and others PLD 2021 Lah. 343; Messrs Jet Green (Pvt.) Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2021 Lah. 770; M.C.B. v. Adeel Shahbaz and others 2023 CLD 655; Pakistan Tehreek e Insaaf through Asad Umar v. Governor Punjab through Principal Secretary PLD 2023 Lah. 179 = PLJ 2023 Lah. 467; Messrs Bahria Town (Pvt.) v. District Consumer Court and others PLJ 2022 Lah. 199; PLD 2022 Lah. 488; F.O.P v. Nasir Munir Ahmed and others 2022 CLC 2072; Addl. Registrar Company v. Al-Qaim Textile Mills Ltd. 2021 CLD 931; Ch Fayyaz Hussain Wains v. Province of Punjab and others PLD 2022 Lah. 1 and Shaheen Merchant v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2021 PTD 2126 ref. (f) Privatization Commission Ordinance (LII of 2000)--- ----S. 5---Privatization Commission---Functions, objectives and purpose---Section 5 of the Privatization Commission Ordinance 2000 makes it abundantly clear that the Privatization Commission has been entrusted with a broad spectrum of functions---Its role is two-fold: firstly, to act as an advisory body to the Federal Cabinet by recommending policy guidelines, preparing comprehensive programmes, and suggesting necessary legislative or regulatory measures; and secondly, to serve as an implementing agency to plan, manage and control the privatization process once it has been duly approved by the Cabinet. (g) Privatization Commission Ordinance (LII of 2000)--- ----S.25---Privatization by the Privatization Commission---Scope, authority, and procedural compliance---The privatization policy aims to create a mechanism for generation of funds for the retirement of government debt while ensuring improvements in service and operational capacity of utilities in a transparent manner for effective management of domestic industry, greater domestic investment and economic growth---The objectives of privatization are to improve the operational efficiency and overall performance of entities, to reduce the fiscal burden of the Government, to promote and strengthen the capital market, the creation of a conducive economic environment and improve overall efficiency---The process of privatization is enshrined in S. 25 of the Ordinance 2000and the Privatization (Modes and Procedure) Rules, 2001---The Board of the Privatization Commission and the Cabinet Committee on Privatization determine the process after deciding one of the modes viz (i) sale of assets and business; (ii) sale of shares through public auction or tender; (iii) public offering of shares through a stock exchange; (iv) management or employee buyouts by management or employees of a SOE; (v) lease, management or concession contracts; (vi) any other method as may be prescribed---The objective of privatization is not merely profit-making, but to enhance productivity, attract investment, and reduce inefficiency in loss-making enterprises---It has also been acknowledged globally that privatization can bring about managerial autonomy and operational flexibility, enabling enterprises to compete in a globalized economy---These decisions affirm that privatization, if conducted within the framework of law and with appropriate safeguards, aligns with the constitutional mandate of economic development and public welfare---Therefore, rather than being viewed with skepticism, privatization deserves protection and support when it is pursued with accountability, fairness, and the broader goal of national progress. Dr. Akhtar Hassan Khan and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2012 SCMR 455 rel. (h) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Privatization Commission Ordinance (LII of 2000), S.25-- -Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court in matters relating to 'privatization policy' and 'economic and commercial matters'---Judicial overreach---Scope---Protection of foreign investment in Pakistan---Constitutional courts must exercise judicial restraint in economic and commercial matters, particularly in relation to the privatization policy, to prevent disruption of national economic objectives and divestment from loss- making State-Owned Enterprises---High Court cannot ignore the instances of judicial overreach wherein extensive interference by courts in contractual and investment matters has, over time, contributed to uncertainty in the regulatory landscape, adversely affecting Pakistan's ability to attract and retain foreign investment---Investor confidence, both domestic and international, hinges upon the predictability and stability of legal framework---The Constitutional courts of Pakistan must exercise judicial restraint in matters that impact foreign investment in Pakistan---The role of Courts in matters of economic policy is necessarily limited---The judicial review of economic decisions is confined to assessing whether the policy is arbitrary, irrational, discriminatory, or violative of constitutional mandates---The wisdom of privatization and the decision to open certain sectors to foreign investment, lies primarily within the competence of the elected branches of Government, provided the process complies with the law and respects Constitutional boundaries. The Commissioner Inland Revenue and others v. Mekotex (Pvt.) Ltd. and others PLD 2024 SC 1168 and Dr. Akhtar Hassan Khan and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2012 SCMR 455 rel. M.C.R. (Pvt.) Ltd. Franchisee of Pizza Hut v. Multan Development Authority and others 2021 CLD 639; China Harbour Engineering Company Ltd. and others v. Z. Z. Enterprises and others 2024 CLD 917 and Messrs 5 H Insaat Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Secretary Local Government and others 2025 CLD 813 ref. (i) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Judicial restraint in matters relating to Government's economic and privatization policies---Scope, purpose, limits and concept---In the absence of any glaring illegality, or violation of fundamental rights, the Courts must exercise judicial restraint for passing any adverse order, which can potentially hinder or nullify any government initiative to encourage and promote the investment process because judicial restraint encourages the judges to exercise their powers with restraint and wisdom and to limit the exercise of their own powers to intervene in the matters relating to policy of the Government having financial perspective and outcome and exercise---Under Art. 199 of the Constitution, the Court is thought competent to exercise the power of judicial review to examine administrative actions from the touchstone of violation of law and breadth of the Constitution, yet the power of judicial review is regulated by the principle of judicial restraint, the purpose and extent of which has already been discussed supra---While using powers under Art. 199 of the Constitution relating to a policy of the Government with financial layout and implications, the Court exercises the power of judicial review with judicial restraint as a substantive approach to interfere in such matters within the contemplation of judicial review while exercising Constitutional jurisdiction. Dossani Travels (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Messrs Travels Shop (Pvt.) Ltd. and others PLD 2014 SC 1 rel. Muhammad Azam v. Province of Punjab and others 2022 CLC 532; Muhammad Umais v. Cantonment Board Rawalpindi and others PLD 2022 Lah. 148 and Syed Faisal Mehboob v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2022 CLC 1153 ref. Nazakat Hussain Abbasi and Asif Mehmood for Petitioner. Barrister Haseeb Shakoor Piracha, Additional Attorney General with Barrister Zain Mansoor, Assistant Attorney General and Barrister Raja Hashim Javed, Assistant Advocate General for Respondents.. Barrister Sardar Kalim Ilyas, Advocate Supreme Court with Barrister Minaal Tariq for Respondent No.2. Barrister Pirzada M. Aurang Zaib with Wajih Hassan Pasha, Safdar Shaheen Pirzada, Advocate Supreme Court, Maham Jamal and Muhammad Talib Shahzad for Respondent No.5. Haroon Abbasi, DGM Legal PIACL for Respondent No.6. Dr. Kabir Ahmed Sidhu, Chairman and Barrister Ambreen Abbasi, Senior Legal Advisor on behalf of Competition Commission of Pakistan. Dates of hearing: 19th, 25th and 27th June, 2025.

Summary: ----Ss. 14, 17 & 42---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched., Art. 178---Application to make the Award of Arbitrator as Rule of Court, filing of---Limitation, commencing date of---Scope---Appellate Court held that the award cannot be made Rule of the Court as it was not filed by the petitioner within 90-day time period stipulated under Art. 178 of the Limitation Act, 1908, ('the Act 1908')---Whether the limitation period commences from the date of issuance of formal notice in writing by the Arbitrator(s) to the parties or the general knowledge of the parties about making and signing of the award is sufficient to non-suit a litigant on question of limitation?---Held: Article 178 of the Act 1908 clearly depicts that the limitation starts from "the date of service of the notice of the making of the award"---Section 14(1) of the Act 1940 makes it clear that the Arbitrators after making and signing of the award have to give a notice, in writing, of the making and signing of the award to the parties---The requirement of a notice in writing is important as the service of notice is the point from which the limitation for making an application to the Court for filing the award commences per Art. 178 of Act 1908---Section 14(1) of the Act 1940 is to be also read with S. 42 of the Act 1940, which (Section 42) provides that any notice that is required to be served by an Arbitrator shall be served in the manner provided in the arbitration agreement or if there is no such provision then by delivering it to the person on whom it is to be served or by sending it by post at the usual address of such person---Provisions under S. 42 of the Act 1940 make it clear that the Act 1940 provides a clear and specific manner in which the notice is to be served by the Arbitrator(s)---There is no room of implied notice under the law in respect of making and signing of the award---Provisions of S. 42 of the Act 1940 have technical meanings and can only be construed as requiring of issuance of a separate notice in writing by the Arbitrator(s) notwithstanding the fact that a party has knowledge of the passing of the award through receipt of any instrument (cheque in the present case) handed over to him for satisfaction of amount awarded by the Arbitrator(s)---Law of limitation contemplates general principle of administration of justice, which has the effect of preventing a party from having recourse to redressal of rights through judicial process even where such rights subsist and therefore, any law whereby the recourse to the Court(s) is restricted, must be construed strictly---The proceedings should only be held to be barred by time if the chicaneries of law of limitation are made applicable in strictest sense---High Court set-aside the impugned judgment rendered by the Appellate Court and directed that the appeal of the respondent shallbe deemed to be pending, which shall be decided on its merits after extending an opportunity of hearing to the parties---Revision was allowed accordingly. Muhammad Shafi and others v. Muhammad Sabir and others PLD 1960 Lah. 591 ref. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----First Sched., Arts. 178 & 181---Arbitration Act (X of 1940), S. 14---Application to make the Award of Arbitrator as Rule of Court, filing of---Limitation, commencing date of---Scope---Appellate Court held that the award cannot be made Rule of the Court as it was not filed by the petitioner within 90-day time period stipulated under Art. 178 of the Limitation Act, 1908, ('the Act 1908')---Question as to how the limitation is to be governed, if no notice is given by the Arbitrator(s) to the party---Held, that in such eventuality it is Art. 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which is residuary clause that will be applicable and the same contemplates a period of three years--- High Court set-aside the impugned judgment rendered by the Appellate Court and directed that, the appeal of the respondent shall be deemed to be pending, which shall be decided on its merits after extending an opportunity of hearing to the parties---Revision was allowed accordingly. (c) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)--- ----Ss. 14, 17 & 42---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched., Arts. 178 & 181---Application to make the Award of Arbitrator as Rule of Court, filing of---Limitation, commencing date of---Scope---Whether the limitation period commences from the date of issuance of formal notice in writing by the Arbitrator(s) to the parties or the general knowledge of the parties about making and signing of the award is sufficient to non-suit a litigant on question of limitation?---Held: The Arbitration Act, 1940,('the Act 1940') makes it clear that after an award is rendered, any party thereto or any person claiming thereunder may request the Arbitrator(s) or the Umpire to cause the award or its signed copy thereof, together with any disposition or the document, which may have been taken and/or proved, to be filed in the Court---Pertinently, no limitation has been provided under the Act 1908 whereby the party is required to make a request to the Arbitrators or the Umpire to cause the award to be filed in the Court and again residuary Art. 181 of the Act 1908 is applicable and a party to arbitration proceedings can make such a request to the Arbitrators within three years' time period from the date of making and signing of the award---Imperatively, the object of giving notice to the parties is to enable them to file an application for setting aside the award---Pertinently, when the respondent filed an application for cancellation of the award, he also categorically acknowledged that the Arbitrators had not issued any formal notice, in writing, to the parties regarding making of the award---High Court set-aside the impugned judgment rendered by the Appellate Court and directed that the appeal of the respondent shall be deemed to be pending, which shall be decided on its merits after extending an opportunity of hearing to the parties---Revision was allowed accordingly. (d) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)--- ----Ss. 14, 17 & 42---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched., Arts. 158 & 178---Application to make the Award of Arbitrator as Rule of Court, filing of---Limitation, commencing date of---Scope---Appellate Court held that the award cannot be made Rule of the Court as it was not filed by the petitioner within 90-day time period stipulated under Art. 178 of the Limitation Act, 1908, ('the Act 1908')---Whether a Court can dismiss the objections to the award but at the same time refuse to make the award a Rule of the Court on the ground that the application of a party for filing/making the award a Rule of the Court was not within limitation---Held: Pertinently, once an award is before the Court, either through the Arbitrator(s) or any party (for example the respondent), then in terms of S. 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, ('the Act 1940'), it is the duty of Court to examine the same and see whether it suffers from any patent illegality or if there is any cause to remit the award to the Arbitrator(s) irrespective of the fact that opposite party (the petitioner in present case) has not approached the Court within time---Provision of S. 17 of the Act 1940 is couched in mandatory terms as the same is signified by use of the word "shall" and cast a duty upon the Court to pass a decree if it sees no cause to remit or set-aside the award---The proceedings under S. 17 commence once an award has been filed in the Court---The very fact that the respondent filed an application seeking cancellation/setting aside of the award means that it was admitted that the award had been made and that the proceedings under S. 17 of the Act 1940 shall commence---Once an award comes before the Court then the Court has got jurisdiction to take further proceedings in accordance with the law and pass a decree thereon---Thus, once the award is before the Court, it is the duty of the Court to scrutinize the award, which is independent of the fact whether any side has objected to the same or not or the application of one of the parties to arbitration proceedings is time barred---In present case, the Trial Court discharged that duty and passed the decree on the basis of the award in favour of the petitioner whereas the Appellate Court has upended the said findings without touching the merits of the case by merely holding that the application of the petitioner to make the award a Rule of Court was time barred which in-fact was not as examined hereinabove, and hence, the finding of the Appellate Court below is erroneous and not sustainable---High Court set-aside the impugned judgment rendered by the Appellate Court and directed that the appeal of the respondent shall be deemed to be pending, which shall be decided on its merits after extending an opportunity of hearing to the parties---Revision was allowed accordingly. Noor Muhammad v. A.D.J. Nankana Sahib and others 1996 CLC 268; Messrs Awan Industries Ltd. v. The Executive Engineer, Lined Channel Division and another 1992 SCMR 65 and A. Qutbuddin Khan v. Chec Milliwala Dredging Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. 2014 SCMR 1268 ref. Syed Kabeer Ahmad Mehmood for Petitioner. Abdul Salam Alvi for Respondent No.1. Date of Hearing: 19th February, 2024.

Summary: ----S. 167---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 7, 21(2) & 21-E---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10(2)---Arrest and detention, safeguard against---Physical remand---Appearance through video link---Accused, protection of---Terms "produced" and "excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the nearest magistrate"---Scope---Accused assailed order of Punjab Government passed under S. 21(2) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, whereby he was made to appear before Magistrate via video link from Adiala jail, for proceedings related to his physical remand---Contention of the authorities was that order was passed under S. 21(2) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 to provide security to accused---Validity---Fundamental right of an arrested person to be brought before a Magistrate within twenty-four hours, has been safeguarded under Art. 10(2) of the Constitution---Terms "produced" and "excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the nearest Magistrate" indicate a requirement for physical presence---Provision of Art. 10 (2) of the Constitution is vital in ensuring judicial oversight of detention process, protecting rights of detainee/accused from the moment of arrest---Special provision under S. 21E of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 specifically addresses the issue of remand---Provision of S. 21(2) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 is a general provision that enables Government to take necessary steps to protect judges, accused individuals, witnesses, prosecutors, defence counsel, and others involved in Court proceedings---Provision of S. 21(2) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 cannot override S. 21-E of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and should not be interpreted in a way that nullifies or undermines it---Division Bench of High Court declared that order in question was ultra vires, illegal, and void---Division Bench of High Court further declared that reliance on and interpretation of S. 21(2) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 by authorities was erroneous which could not justify physical remand of accused without his physical production---Provision of S. 21(2) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 had not granted the Government any authority over remand proceedings, as its scope was limited to matters related to trial proceedings---Division Bench of High Court set aside order in question passed by Punjab Government whereby accused was produced through video link during physical remand---Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances. Salman Akram Raja and another v. Government of Punjab and others 2013 SCMR 203; Khawaja Anwer Majid v. National Accountability Bureau and another PLD 2020 SC 635; Ali Haider alias Papu v. Jameel Hussain and others PLD 2021 SC 362; Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. The State and another PLD 2018 Isl. 148; Munawar Hussain and another v. The State 2020 PCr.LJ 1184; Muhammad Israr v. The State and another PLD 2021 Pesh. 105; Meera Shafi v. Ali Zafar PLD 2023 SC 211; McCowan v. Baine [1891] AC 401, p.409; Messrs Hiralal Ratan Lal v. The Sales Tax Officer and another AIR 1973 SC 1034; Premanand and others v. Mohan Koikal and others AIR 2011 SC 1925; S.M.Zafar, Understanding Statutes, Edn. 2008, pp.483-4; Abdul Nafey v. Muhammad Rafique and others 2023 SCMR 2096; Dawood Abdul Ghafoor v. Justice of Peace and others 2021 PCr.LJ 1527; Government of KPK v. Abdul Manan 2021 SCMR 1871; JS Bank Limited v. Province of Punjab through Secretary Food, Lahore 2021 SCMR 1617; Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary, Peshawar and others v. Intizar Ali and others 2022 SCMR 472; Raj Narain v. Superintendent, Central Jail, New Delhi, and another AIR 1971 SC 178; A. Barak, Purposive Interpretation of Law (Sari Bashi transl.) (2005), pp. 88-91; Muhammad Aslam Awan v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2014 SCMR 1289; Province of Sindh and others v. MQM and others PLD 2014 SC 531; Khurshid Soap and Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2020 SC 641; Aam Log Ittehad and another v. The Election Commission of Pakistan and others PLD 2022 SC 39; Shehla Zia and others v. WAPDA PLD 1994 SC 693; D. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1085, 1101 (1989); Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India and another (2018) 8 SCC 501; A. Barak, Purposive Interpretation of Law (Sari Bashi transl.) (2005), pp. 374-5; Salman Akram Raja and another v. Government of Punjab and others 2013 SCMR 203; Khawaja Anwer Majid v. National Accountability Bureau and another PLD 2020 SC 635; Ali Haider alias Papu v. Jameel Hussain and others PLD 2021 SC 362; Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. The State and another PLD 2018 Isl. 148; United Kingdom through video link. In Munawar Hussain and another v. The State 2020 PCr.LJ 1184; Muhammad Israr v. The State and another PLD 2021 Pesh. 105; Imran Ahmad Khan Niazi v. Federation of Pakistan and others (Writ Petition No.839/2023); Meera Shafi v. Ali Zafar PLD 2023 SC 211; Imran Ahmad Khan Niazi v. Special Judge, ATC and others PLD 2024 Lah. 486; Farhan Masood Khan v. The State PLJ 2021 Cr.C. (Lahore) 550; Blackburn v. Flavelle [1881] 6 App Cas 628; PLJ 2001 Fed. St. 445; Reference No.1 of 2012 [Reference by the President of Pakistan under Article 186 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973] PLD 2013 SC 279; Mullins v. Collins [(1874) L.R. 9 Q.B. 292, 295; Zahid Iqbal v. Hafiz Muhammad Adnan and others 2016 SCMR 430 and Mustafa Impex v. Government of Pakistan PLD 2016 SC 808 rel. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 10(2)---Arrest and detention, safeguard against---Physical presence of accused---Object, purpose and scope---Remand through video link---Scope---Provision of Art. 10(2) of the Constitution aims to protect individuals' Fundamental rights by ensuring judicial oversight of detention, preventing abuse of power, and upholding principles of justice and rule of law---Requirement for physical production of accused before Magistrate is a crucial deterrent to abuse and enhances accountability of law enforcement agencies---Allowing video link remand in place of physical production can undermine such protections, especially in our country where custodial torture is a pervasive issue---Impersonal nature of video communication may not offer the same level of scrutiny as an in-person meeting, potentially leading Magistrate to miss subtle signs of distress, coercion, or mistreatment that would be more noticeable face-to-face---Technical issues such as poor video quality, delays, or disruptions could impair Magistrate's ability to provide effective oversight---Existing language of Art. 10(2) of the Constitution does not support video link remand hearings---Employing purposive interpretation to justify appearance of accused through video link during physical remand hearings would contradict both the text and the provision's intent and this cannot be permitted. Emperor v. Benoari Lal Sarma AIR 1945 PC 48; Kurra Dasaratha Ramaiah and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1992 Cri.LJ 3485; Government of the Punjab v. Abdur Rehman and others 2022 SCMR 25; Senator Asif Ali Zardari v. State 2000 MLD 921; The State v. Nasir Javed Rana PLD 2005 SC 86; Ramesh Kumar Ravi alias Ram Prasad and others v. State of Bihar and others AIR 1988 Patna 199 and Kurra Dasaratha Ramaiah and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1992 Cri.LJ 3485 rel. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 167 & 344---Physical and judicial remand---Distinction---Remand under S. 167, Cr.P.C. differs from that under S. 344, Cr.P.C.---Provision of S. 167, Cr.P.C. allows a Magistrate, whether or not he has jurisdiction to try the case, to remand the accused to either police or judicial custody, depending on judicial determination---Remand to police custody under S. 167, Cr.P.C. is specifically for the purpose of investigation---In contrast, S. 344, Cr.P.C. applies where, due to absence of a witness or any other reasonable cause, it becomes necessary for Court to postpone commencement of any inquiry or trial-- -Court may, at its discretion, postpone or adjourn proceedings and if accused is in custody, remand them by warrant---No magistrate can remand an accused to custody under S. 344, Cr.P.C. for more than 15 days at a time---Remand under S. 344, Cr.P.C. is strictly to judicial custody and can only be to a judicial lock-up---Provision of S. 167, Cr.P.C. deals with detention during investigation, while S. 344, Cr.P.C. pertains to detention during inquiry or trial. (d) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Intention of Legislature---Determination---When wording is explicit, the Legislature's intent should be understood directly from the text, without resorting to interpretative aids. Barrister Salman Safdar, assisted by Usman Riaz Gill, Ch. Ishtiaq Ahmad Khan, Ali Hamza, Ch. Hussain Arshad, Muhammad Asif Khan, Zafar Iqbal Mangan, Mian Sajid Ali, Javed Iqbal, Umar Latif, Muhammad Sohail, Muhammad Tahir Tauseef Cheema, Kashif Bashir, Mian Imran Pasha, Arsalan Altaf, Mustafa Imran Shaukat, Amna Liaqat, Salma Riaz, Mohsin Murtaza Cheema, Zarish Fatima, Khaqan Meer, Malik Khalid Awan, Mazhar Ali Haider, Muhammad Abdullah and Syeda Zunaira Gillani for the Petitioner. Ms. Shehzeen Abdullah, Acting Advocate General, along with Ch. Baleegh-uz-Zaman, Additional Advocate General; Sittar Sahil, Muhammad Farrukh Khan, Falak Sher Bakhsh Gill, Asghar Leghari and Hussain Ibrahim, Assistant Advocates General for Respondents Nos.1, 3 and 4. Syed Farhad Ali Shah, Prosecutor General Punjab for Respondents Nos.5 and 6. Zain Qazi, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan for Respondent No.7. Rao Abdul Jabbar Khan and Rana Nauman Gohar, Special Public Prosecutors for Respondent No.2. Research assistance: Sher Hassan Pervez and Asim Murtaza Cheema, Research Officers, LHCRC. Date of hearing: 25th July, 2024.

Summary: ----S. 7(s)---Judicial Officer---Powers---Scope---Powers extended to Judicial Officer, to act as delegatee of Cooperatives Board, are not in the category of delegation of legislative powers---Notwithstanding conferment of quasi-judicial powers, Judicial Officer cannot claim attributes and features of Court---Performance of quasi-judicial functions by itself does not convert Authority or Tribunal into a Court-- -Status of Judicial Officer is that of an agent, albeit an officer authorized by Cooperatives Board to act as its delegatee, to exercise power of determination regarding rights claimed and statutory obligations ought to be enforced. Government of the Punjab through Secretary, Schools Education Department, Lahore and others v. Abdur Rehman and others 2022 SCMR 25; Shafaatullah Qureshi v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2001 SC 142; S.A. Jameel v. Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Cooperative Department and others 2005 SCMR 126 and Commissioner of Income Tax, East Pakistan, DACCA v. Wahiduzzaman PLD 1965 SC 171 rel. (b) Punjab Undesireable Cooperative Societies (Dissolution) Act (I of 1993)--- ----Ss. 7 & 11---Judicial Officer and Cooperatives Board---Functions---Distinction---Judicial Officer and Cooperatives Board are not mutually exclusive entity(ies) in the context of division of powers, though former isalter ego of the latter, but upon distribution, powers available with Cooperatives Board and those delegated may be termed mutually exclusive, for the purposes of achieving objectives and purpose of the law---Status of delegatee, in the context of exercise of delegated power has been acknowledged under S.11 of Punjab Undesireable Cooperative Societies (Dissolution) Act, 1993---This is the power of determination of rights claimed against Cooperatives Board. (c) Jurisprudence--- ----Law, to survive, has to be logical. (d) Words and phrases--- ----Functus officio---Applicability---Doctrine of functus officio is attracted once the matter/task has been finalized and accomplished and not otherwise. Kh. Muhammad Fazil v. Mumtaz Munawar Khan Niazi (deceased) through L.Rs and another 2024 SCMR 1059 rel. (e) Punjab Undesireable Cooperative Societies (Dissolution) Act (I of 1993)--- ----Ss. 7 & 11---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.11---Punjab Cooperative Board for Liquidation (PCBL)---Annulment of sale transaction---Principle of res judicata---Applicability---Judicial Officer, powers of---Principle of finality---Fraud---Effect---Petitioners were aggrieved of order passed by Judicial Officer annulling transaction of disposal/sale of land in question and cancelling sale deeds executed in their favour---Validity---Restrictions in terms of S. 11, C.P.C. have to be read and interpreted with reference to the Court---Cooperatives Board was competent to seek reconsideration of approval to sale---Cooperatives Board was not a Court, hence not obligated to adhere to provisions of Evidence Act (Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984) and Civil Procedure Code, 1908 or subject to constraints provided therein---Re-opening of transaction of sale required substantive and convincing information regarding fraud---To create exception to principle of finality, fraud must be established---In the present case facts adequately proved fraud, and Judicial Officer had rightly exercised jurisdiction to annul the sale---Facts establishing fraud need to be amplified and focused for the purposes of confirming decision of Judicial Officer, in terms of section 11 of Punjab Undesireable Cooperative Societies (Dissolution) Act, 1993---Once bid lower than base price was rejected there was no justification to accommodate first petitioner, after 10 months, by entertaining offered price lower than the valuation of property discussed in the meeting held earlier---Absence of time-limit for deposit of 75% of bid price was fatal and there was no explanation that why ex-management proceeded to extend approval without settling of terms and conditions of sale---Change of heart from decision of selling through public auction to alleged sale by way of negotiation/private treaty remained a mystery---No explanation was provided to justify any exception---Such gross illegalities could not be swept under the carpet---Management at relevant time erred while granting approval previously, in wake of blatant illegalities and irregularities, allowing execution of sale deeds hastily without adhering to any schedule for payment of 75% of the bid price---Grant of previous approval suffered from wrongful exercise of authority---High Court declined to interfere in the order passed by Judicial Officer annulling the sale in question---Petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Telecard Limited through Authorized Representative v. Pakistan Telecommunication Authority through Chairman 2014 CLD 415; Muhammad Ashraf Khan and 2 others v. Muhammad Khan and 9 others 2004 CLC 1133; Amir Jamal and others v. Malik Zahoor-ul-Haq and others 2011 SCMR 1023; Muhammad Ashraf Tiwana and others v. Pakistan and others 2013 SCMR 1159; S.M. Waseem Ashraf v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Housing and Works, Islamabad and others 2013 SCMR 338; Administrator, Thal Development through EACO Bhakkar and others v. Ali Muhammad 2012 SCMR 730; Nawab Syed Raunaq Ali and others v. Chief Settlement Commissioner and others PLD 1973 SC 236; PCBL v. Zeenat Bibi and others 2020 YLR 2421; Director, Directorate-General of Intelligence and Investigation and others v. Messrs Al-Faiz Industries (Pvt.) Limited and others 2006 SCMR 129 Shahida Bibi and others v. Habib Bank Limited and others PLD 2016 SC 995; Mrs. Sultana Ahmed v. Sindh Industrial Trading Estate Ltd through Managing Director and 2 others 2003 YLR 1760; Punjab Cooperative Board of Liquidation through Chairman v. Muhammad Ilyas PLD 2014 SC 471; Muhammad Hayat and 6 others v. Muhammad Nawaz 1971 SCMR 414; Malik Muhammad Ashraf v. Director Excise and Taxation, Motor Vehicle Registration Authority, Islamabad 2017 YLR 1136; Ch. Latif Akbar, Former Finance Minister, Azad Government of The State of Jammu And Kashmir Muzaffarabad and 8 others v. Azad Government of The State Jammu and Kashmir through Chief Secretary and 10 others PLD 2017 HC (AJ&K) 32) and Bhag Mal v. Muhammad Sharif and 2 others 1991 SCMR 2118 ref. Fazli Hakeem and another v. Secretary State and Frontier Regions Division Islamabad and others 2015 SCMR 795; Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan Limited v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and others PLD 1987 SC 447 and The Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore v. Raja Mohammad Fazil Khan and others PLD 1975 SC 331 rel. (f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- -----S. 11---Res judicata, doctrine of---Exception---Fraud is an exception to doctrine of res-judicata---Right of review of any order/decision of Court or quasi-judicial tribunal is not available in absence of statutory provision but cases of fraud, mala fide and defect of jurisdiction stand on different footing. Muhammad Sharif through legal heirs and 4 others v. Sultan Hamayun and others 2003 SCMR 1221 and Muhammad Raqeeb v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary, Peshawar and others 2023 SCMR 992 rel. Taffazal Haider Rizvi, Haider Ali Rizvi and Benish Sikandar for Petitioners. Ashtar Ausaf Ali and Asad Rahim for Petitioners (in C.P. No. 62924 of 2021). Barrister Muhammad Ahmad Pansota for Petitioners (in C.P. No. 69526 of 2021). Sohaib Ahmad Rumi for PCBL for Respondents. Date of hearing: 12th July, 2024.

Summary: ----S. 10---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Cyber terrorism---Scope---Blasphemous content ---Petitioners had raised serious questions of public importance with regard to uploading of blasphemous posts on different social media to ridicule holy personage and to mock the principles of Islam---Validity---World is rapidly expanding technologically and so is the case of cybercrime, which has many faces like identity thefts, hacking, financial frauds, blackmailing, pornography and above all, offences against religions---All such felonies are committed more or less conveniently, as the wrongdoer has the advantage of concealing his identity and not to leave his footsteps behind the crime---Task of lifting veil from the identity of such criminals is left to be performed only by investigators having expertise in the cybercrime---Uncontrolled evil of cybercrime has the potential to destabilize our society, which comprises upon believers of different religions, faiths and sects, mostly out of whom are not well educated---High Court directed that guidelines and instructions given in earlier cases be complied by giving them practical effect---High Court further directed that joint action plan submitted by different ministries and departments be strictly followed and a compliance report about the steps taken in pursuance thereof be submitted in High Court---High Court also directed that immediate steps were to be taken for implementing suggestions made in joint meeting of Pakistan Telecommunication Authority and Islamic Ideology Council---High Court further directed that in order to discourage false cases of blasphemy/religious hate material, it was discernible that at regional level a team of Islamic scholars from known Islamic sects be constituted---Each case of blasphemy, sectarian hatred and dissemination of anti-religion hate material be placed before such Islamic scholars so as to exclude possibility of registration of false case on account of some external pressure--Constituting team of Islamic scholars would eliminate possibility of false implication in such cases and at the same time would not let the actual culprits go scot-free---Numerical strength of officials posted in FIA to deal with cybercrimes was not compatible with the number of cases registered. Due to such reason investigations of sensitive cases including blasphemy, financial crimes, blackmailing, etc., were being delayed indefinitely---High Court directed Federal Government to enhance numerical strength of FIA officials and to establish a blasphemy cell separately to deal with relevant cases---High Court further directed Federal Government and Punjab Government to observe 15 th of March of each year as Namoos-e-Rasalat Day and on the given date programs should be arranged for imparting information about the Holy Prophet and for enlightening different aspects of his life, as the General Assembly of United Nations in its 76 th Session had specified 15 th March as day to combat Islamophobia---Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly. Islamic Lawyers Movement through Tahir Farooq alias Allah Bakhsh Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Establishment, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and 3 others 2012 CLC 1300; Muhammad Ayoub v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and 6 others 2018 PCr.LJ 1133; Lugman Habib and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2021 MLD 1633 and Salman Shahid v. The State and 6 others PLD 2017 Isl. 218 rel. Raja Imran Khalil, Jalil Akhtar Abbasi, Shaista Chaudhary, Zartasha Tanveer, Sidra Gulzar and Rao Abdul Raheem for Petitioners. Tayyab Bilal Pakhral, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan with Ahmad Ishaque Jahangir, Director General FIA, Ayaz Khan, Addl. Director, Sarfraz Khatana, Deputy Director, Suleman Awan, Deputy Director (Investigation) for Respondents. Date of hearing: 18th October, 2024.

Summary: ----Applicability of enactment---Principle---When an Act of Parliament or a Provincial Assembly provides that it comes into force at once, then every provision of it becomes enforceable from the day the Act receives assent of the President or, as the case may be, the Governor, unless any provision of the Act suggests otherwise. Messrs Khurshid Soap and Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. through Sheikh Muhammad Ilyas and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources and others PLD 2020 SC 641 rel. (b) Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act (IV of 2010)--- ----S. 7 (6) [as amended under Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace (Amendment) Act, 2021]---Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017), S. 230---Election Rules, 2017, R. 170 (1)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Tenure post---Removal---Election Commission---Jurisdiction---Caretaker Government---Limitations---Petitioner was appointed as Ombudsperson for four years but she was removed from service by Election Commission, before completion of her tenure---Validity---In absence of statutorily prescribed procedure for removal of Ombudsperson, particularly when the appointment was for a fixed term, the incumbent could not be removed from office prior to the expiration of that term, save for the universally recognized grounds of proven misconduct or incapacity, which would necessitate a due process even if not explicitly detailed within Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010---Removal of Ombudsperson was not provided under Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010, except in the case of resignation---Even if removal became necessary on grounds of proven misconduct or incapacitation, the power to take such action was logically lie with the appointing authority, i.e., the Government, following due process---Election Commission was nowhere authorized in such regard under the Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010---Primary purposes of Election Commission, as delineated in the Constitution and the Elections Act, 2017, revolves around the conduct of free and fair elections---Achieving such purposes inherently, Election Commission was not empowered to direct permanent removal of any office bearer---Nature of removal contemplated in the notification of Election Commission, the "immediate termination of services" - implied a permanent cessation of employment, which did not directly relate to the Election Commission's core function of ensuring fair elections---At the most, Election Commission's powers in relation to public officials during election period, as indicated by R. 170(1) of Election Rules, 2017, and S. 230(2)(f) of Elections Act, 2017, (regarding the Caretaker Government's limitations), extended to transfer or shuffling of public officials with the Commission's approval---Such had suggested a focus on preventing misuse of official positions to influence elections, rather than permanent removal of appointees, particularly those with a statutorily defined tenure---De-notification of petitioner by Caretaker Government of Punjab by way of notification in question was not within its lawful authority---High Court set aside notification in question issued by Government of the Punjab de-notifying services of petitioner as Ombudsperson Protection against Harassment of Women at Workplace- --High Court declared notification in question to be null and void and petitioner was deemed to be in office as if the notification had not been issued---High Court directed that to ensure that future appointments to the position of Ombudsperson were beyond reproach, it would be apt to direct that the relevant authorities should, with due expediency, formulate and implement a comprehensive, transparent and merit-based appointment procedure---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. Khawaja Muhammad Asif v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2013 SCMR 1205; Badshah Gul Wazir v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary and others 2015 SCMR 43 and Mushtaq Ahmad Moral and others v. The Honourable Lahore High Court, Lahore and others 1997 SCMR 1043 rel. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 10A---Fair trial and due process---Scope---Fair trial and due process rights guaranteed by article 10A of the Constitution are to be read as an integral part of every sub-constitutional legislative instrument that deals with determination of civil rights and obligations of any person. Naveed Asghar and 2 others v. The State PLD 2021 SC 600 rel. (d) Employment--- ----Tenure post---Object, purpose and scope---If incumbent knows he/she can be removed at any time without stated cause or due process, his/her ability to act fearlessly and independently, especially when dealing with potentially sensitive matters involving Government or influential individuals, can be curtailed---Security of tenure, within reasonable limits, is often considered essential for the effective functioning of such roles. Badsha Gul Wazir v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary and others 2015 SCMR 43 rel. Ch. Ishtiaq Ahmad Khan, Adnan Ahmad Chaudhry, Jahangir Ahmad Bhatti, Shahrukh Shahbaz, Ms. Zarish Fatima, Amjad Ali Shah, Ch. Umar Latif and Ms. Uzma Razzaq Khan for Petitioner. Barrister Hassan Khalid Ranjha, Additional Advocate General, Punjab, Muhammad Osman Khan, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab with Ibrar Ahmad, Law Officer, I&C Wing, S&GAD for Government of Punjab. Imran Arif Ranjha, Advocate/Legal Advisor with Bashir Arshad, Deputy Director (Law), Ms. Bushra Rasheed, Senior Law Officer ECP and Hafiz Adeel Ashraf, Assistant Law Officer ECP for Election Commission of Pakistan. Aaminah Qadir and Zeeshan Zafar Hashmi, Amici Curiae. Dates of hearing: 5th, 6th, December, 2023 and 9th April, 2025.

Summary: ----Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Conversion fee, challenge to---Relevant authority charging rate which was not yet approved--- Charging of rate prevalent on the date of filing of application---Scope-- -Principle of non-retroactivity, applicability of---Facts in brevity were that the petitioner filed a Constitutional petition under Art. 199 of the Constitution challenging the vires of the order passed by the Commissioner, Rawalpindi Division (respondent No.2) with the contention that the order was illegal and without lawful authority, as it imposed a conversion fee based on a notification that was still in the drafting stage and was not formally approved---It was the case of the petitioner that he should have been charged according to the rate applicable at the time of filing of his application---The petitioner's appeal was dismissed summarily, citing revised rates---Moot point for determination by the High Court was as to "whether the petitioner was liable to pay conversion fee as per the rate prevailing at the date when he moved an application before the concerned authority/respondent for the said purpose and what would be the effect of the principle of non-retroactivity in such like matters?"---Held: Rights of the parties were to be governed/decided as per the law prevailing at the time when cause of action had accrued, particularly in the matters pertaining to fiscal disputes, unless manifest intention of the law was otherwise---Law did not recognize any retrospective enforceability of a fiscal measure and issuance of a notification was not of any significance in legal importance till it was published in an official Gazette---A party had a right to have his petition heard on the basis of the law prevailing on the day he filed his petition---Since the impugned order failed to specify the applicable provisions of law for it to be deemed a speaking order, the same was set-aside and the matter was remanded back to the respondent No.2 to decide it afresh---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. Sutlej Cotton Mills Ltd. Okara v. Industrial Court, West Pakistan, Lahore and others PLD 1966 SC 472; Brig. (Retd.) F.B. Ali and another v. The State PLD 1975 SC 506; The Karachi Development Authority, Karachi v. Works Co-Operative Housing Society, Karachi and another PLD 1978 SC 307; City District Government, Karachi v. Muhammad Irfan and others 2010 SCMR 1186 and Government of Sindh through Secretary Agriculture and Livestock Department and others v. Messrs Khan Ginners (Private) Limited and 57 others PLD 2011 SC 347 rel. (b) General Clauses Act (X of 1897)--- ----S.24A---Constitutional petition---Passing of non-speaking order by public functionary, challenge to---Failing to mention applicable provisions of law---Effect---Petitioner invoked Art. 199 of the Constitution to challenge the vires of the order passed by respondent No.2 (Commissioner) on the ground that it unlawfully relied on an unapproved draft notification to impose a conversion fee, whereas the applicable rate was contended to have been the one prevailing at the time of filing of his application---Validity---Respondent No.2 failed to mention relevant provision of applicable law in the impugned order which was a legal lacuna---The impugned order did not fulfill the ingredients of a speaking order, therefore, same was set-aside and the matter was remanded back to the respondent No.2 to decide it afresh---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. Mollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of East Pakistan and others PLD 1970 SC 173 rel. (c) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Retrospective and prospective effect of a statute---Scope---A law that takes away or abridges the substantive rights of the parties only applies prospectively, unless either by express enactment or by necessary intendment the legislature gives to it the retrospective effect. Taisei Corporation and another v. A.M. Construction Company (Pvt.) Ltd. and another 2024 SCMR 640 rel. Mst. Sobia Hanif v. The Collector (Deputy Commissioner), Lahore District, Lahore and 5 others 1993 CLC 2073; Major (Rtd.) Muhammad Suleman Khan v. D.C./Registrar, Lahore District 2002 CLC 226; Sardar Muhammad v. Province of Punjab through Sub-Registrar and another 2017 CLC Note 49; Mrs. Nighat Saimi and another v. Province of Sindh through Secretary Revenue and 10 others PLD 2017 Sindh 596; Syed Ali Shah v. Government of Pakistan through Ministry of Defence and 2 others 1994 CLC 369 and Pakistan Mobile Communication Limited v. Abrar Ahmed and 4 others 2019 CLD 578 ref. (d) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Retrospective and prospective effect of a statute---Scope---The proper approach to the construction of a statute as to its prospective or retrospective applicability, in the absence of legislature's express enactment or necessary intendment, is not to decide what label to apply to it, procedural or otherwise, but to see whether the statute, if applied retrospectively to a particular type of case, would impair existing rights and obligations. Taisei Corporation and another v. A.M. Construction Company (Pvt.) Ltd. and another 2024 SCMR 640 rel. Mst. Sobia Hanif v. The Collector (Deputy Commissioner), Lahore District, Lahore and 5 others 1993 CLC 2073; Major (Rtd.) Muhammad Suleman Khan v. D.C./Registrar, Lahore District 2002 CLC 226; Sardar Muhammad v. Province of Punjab through Sub-Registrar and another 2017 CLC Note 49; Mrs. Nighat Saimi and another v. Province of Sindh through Secretary Revenue and 10 others PLD 2017 Sindh 596; Syed Ali Shah v. Government of Pakistan through Ministry of Defence and 2 others 1994 CLC 369 and Pakistan Mobile Communication Limited v. Abrar Ahmed and 4 others 2019 CLD 578 ref. (e) Legislation--- ----Non-retroactivity, principle of---Scope---Principle of non-retroactivity in context of prospective, fair and transparent application of laws---Scope---The principle of non-retroactivity was first articulated in Roman law, where, already by the end of the second century B.C. it applied in both criminal and civil law to protect the existing legal order and economic interest---Its significance is such that the individuals should be able to rely on laws in the expectation that the State will not afterward interfere with individuals' rights---This expectation would help to ensure the equality of all before the law, guarding predictability and legal certainty---The principle of non-retroactivity is actually a fundamental concept (in law) and it makes sure that statute/law is applied prospectively, rather than retrospectively---Its basic and most important purpose is to protect rights of individuals and organizations by preventing arbitrary or unjust applications of the relevant law---This principle is essential in ensuring that the laws and regulations are applied in a fair and transparent manner---One of its legal features is to restrict the enactment of retroactive laws, which can undermine trust in the legal system and create uncertainty---So, it can be safely stated that non-retroactivity is the legal principle that laws do not apply retroactively and ex-post facto laws are forbidden---This principle may be applied to judicial decisions as well as statutory law. (f) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts.4 & 199---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S.24A---Public functionary---Duty to pass speaking order---Scope---Every citizen of the country has an inalienable right to be treated in accordance with law as envisaged by Art. 4 of the Constitution---Hence, it is duty and obligation of every public functionary to act within four corners of mandate of the Constitution and pass a speaking order. Town Committee, Piplan v. Muhammad Hanif and others 2008 SCMR 723 rel. (g) Administration of justice--- ----Speaking orders, passing of---Duty, significance and scope---Litigants who bring their disputes to the law courts with the incidental hardships and expenses involved do expect a patient and a judicious treatment of their cases and their determination by proper orders---A judicial order must be a speaking order manifesting by itself that the court has applied its mind to the resolution of the issues involved for their proper adjudication---The ultimate result may be reached by a laborious effort, but if the final order does not bear an imprint of that effort and on the contrary discloses arbitrariness of thought and action, the feeling with its painful results, that justice has neither been done nor seems to have been done is inescapable---When the order of a lower court contains no reasons, the appellate court is deprived of the benefit of the views of the lower court and is unable to appreciate the processes by which the decision has been reached. Mollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of East Pakistan and others PLD 1970 SC 173 rel. Arfan Ullah Malik, Advocate Supreme Court and Fayyaz Ahmad Khan for Petitioner. Barrister Raja Hashim Javed, Assistant Advocates General, Sh. Kamran Shehzad on behalf of the Respondent No.3/District Council, Attock. Date of hearing: 30th April, 2025.

Summary: ----Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Public Interest Litigation (PIL)-- - Habitual litigants---Effect---Petitioner on behalf of a Non-Governmental Organization invoked constitutional jurisdiction of High Court on the same cause of action which had already been dismissed by another High Court---Held: Habitual litigants are increasingly flooding Courts with frivolous petitions---Police Interest Litigations (PILs) are filed on almost every subject under the sun---Many such petitions are (mere) exercises for garnering publicity---This tends to destroy sanctity of PILs which are a powerful instrument of securing socio-economic justice for the marginalized and underprivileged---Time of Court is exhausted in dealing with frivolous cases with no genuine cause of public concern---Such tendency must be firmly stopped by providing orders for anticipatory costs---Unless this is done, the Court would become a helpless spectator to loss of public time and resources in dealing with motivated litigation---When several hundred thousand cases await judicial decision, Court cannot allow an institution, administering justice to become a hapless victim of frivolous filings---High Court restrained itself from taking any adverse action against the petitioner at present stage---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Muhammad Azhar Siddique and Amna Liaqat for Petitioner. Mirza Nasar Ahmad, Additional Attorney General and Nauman Khalid, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan, with Aqeel Khan; D.D. Law/FIA and Muhammad Azeem A.D Law/FIA for Respondents.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 8(1), 23, 24(1), 24(2) & 24(3)---Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894), S. 4---Acquisition of land sought by a company for a factory---Public purpose---Scope---Compulsory acquisition, non-permitting of---Scope---Protection of property---Scope---Company, having already established factory by acquiring land, sought additional land from private land owners in order to enhance its production capacity by extending its area---Company invoked constitutional jurisdiction of High Court being aggrieved of rejection of acquisition by Respondents (Board of Revenue-Settlement and all relevant departments)---Contention of the petitioner/company was that acquisition of land for a company was not necessarily required to be for the public purpose as the same might be for construction of a work that was likely to prove useful to the public---Objection of respondents was that even for industrial purpose acquisition of land could be allowed only when it served public purpose while the request of the petitioner/company for acquisition of land was merely for commercial purpose as was manifest from their application---Validity---Article 8(1) of the Constitution postulates that any law or any custom or usage having the force of law, insofar as it is inconsistent with the rights conferred by Chapter 1 of Part II, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void---Article 23 of the Constitution grants every citizen the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property within Pakistan, subject to the Constitution and any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the public interest---Article 24 of the Constitution guarantees/embodies protection of property rights, which inter alia postulates that no person shall be deprived of his property save in accordance with law---Sub-Article (2) of Art. 24 of the Constitution further restricts acquisition or taking possession of any property except for public purpose only and that too by the authority of law which provides for compensation therefor---Sub-Article (3) of Art. 24 of the Constitution contains specified exceptions to the general rules articulated in the first two provisions of Art. 24 of the Constitution, whereby validity of any law permitting compulsory acquisition or taking possession of any property has been made immune from challenge for certain purposes specified therein---Inasmuch as the exceptions specified in sub-Article (3) of Art. 24 of the Constitution limit the protection of fundamental right to property guaranteed under sub-Article (1), therefore, the same are to be construed narrowly and there is no room for reading into the said Article anything that abridges or undermines the protection of property rights---Thus, the principle of harmonious construction of the provisions of Art. 24 of the Constitution makes it abundantly clear that protection of property rights guaranteed under Art. 24 of the Constitution is only abridged or taken away for compulsory acquisition or taking possession of it under any law for any public purpose or such other purpose as have been clearly specified in Art. 24(3) of the Constitution---No provision of Art. 24 of the Constitution permits compulsory acquisition or taking possession of any property by or under any law merely because the same is required for a company for its commercial purposes---Petitioner/Company failed to point out any illegality, material irregularity, any violation of acquisition laws or jurisdictional defect in the impugned orders passed by the respondents regretting petitioner's request for acquisition of land owned by private owners---Constitutional petition, filed by company/factory, being merit-less, was dismissed, in circumstances. Hamza Rasheed Khan and another v. Election Appellate Tribunal, Lahore High Court, Lahore PLD 2024 SC 256 ref. (b) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)--- ----Ss. 3(e) & 4---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 23 & 24(2)---Acquisition of land by a company fora factory---Public purpose---Scope---Compulsory acquisition, non-permitting of---Scope---Protection of property---Scope---Company, having already established factory by acquiring land, sought additional land from private land owners in order to enhance its production capacity by extending its area---Company invoked constitutional jurisdiction of High Court being aggrieved of rejection of acquisition by respondents (Board of Revenue-Settlement and all relevant departments)---Contention of the petitioner/company was that acquisition of land for a company was not necessarily required to be for the public purpose as the same might be for construction of a work that was likely to prove useful to the public-- -Objection of respondents was that even for industrial purpose acquisition of land could be allowed only when it served public purpose while the request of the petitioner/company for acquisition of land was merely for commercial purpose as was manifest from their application-- -Validity---"Company" has been defined in S. 3(e) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which means a Company having been registered/ incorporated under prevalent law and includes a society registered under the prevalent law (i.e. Societies Registration Act, 1860 or Cooperative Societies Act, 1912)---In the present case, the request of the petitioner/Company for acquisition of land was merely for commercial purpose as was manifest from their own relevant application---The proposed expansion of the Company's factory aims to increase production of Soda Ash and Sodium Bicarbonate, which is essentially a commercial purpose---Article 24(2) of the Constitution erects a formidable barrier against the Government's use of authority for advancing private commercial interests---Article 23 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to property, emphasizes that any restriction on this right must be reasonable and in the public interest---Compelling landowners to relinquish their property for a private company's commercial gain, without a direct public utility, failed this test---Acquisition of private land for a purpose other than public purpose is not legal---Requisition and acquisition for purpose of private business concern and not for public purpose or in public interest is illegal---Petitioner/Company failed to point out any illegality, material irregularity, any violation of acquisition laws or jurisdictional defect in the impugned orders passed by the respondents regretting petitioner's request for acquisition of land owned by private owners---Constitutional petition, filed by company/factory, being merit-less, was dismissed, in circumstances. Federal Government Employees' Housing Foundation through Director-General, Islamabad and another v. Muhammad Akram Alizai, Deputy Controller, PBC, Islamabad 2002 PLC (C.S.) 1655 and Radba Kanta Banik v. The Province of East Pakistan and 2 others PLD 1969 SC 545 ref. Muhammad Ishaq and others v. Government of Punjab and others 2002 SCMR 1652 and Suo Motu Case No.13 of 2007 PLD 2009 SC 217 distinguished. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 24 & 268---Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894), Preamble---Land Acquisition Act, 1894, being a colonial law, continuity of---Scope---In terms of Art. 268 of Constitution, continuance in force of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, ('the Act 1894') is subject to the Constitution and with necessary adaptations until altered, amended or repealed by the appropriate legislature---The phrase "subject to the Constitution" indicates that the continuance in force of laws was made subordinate to the constitutional scheme---Thus, continuance in force of the Act 1894, by virtue of Art. 268 of the Constitution, does not render any of the provisions of the Act, 1894,immune from challenge for being ultra vires the Constitution including on the ground of repugnancy to the fundamental right guaranteed under Art.24 of Constitution---Petitioner / Company failed to point out any illegality, material irregularity, any violation of acquisition laws or jurisdictional defect in the impugned orders passed by the Respondents regretting petitioner's request for acquisition of land owned by private owners---Constitutional petition, filed by company/factory, being merit-less, was dismissed, in circumstances. (d) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)--- ----S. 4---Acquisition of land sought by a company for a factory---Public purpose---Scope---Compulsory acquisition, non-permitting of---Protection of property---Scope---Interpretation of statutes---"Reading down" of a provision--- Company, having already established factory by acquiring land, sought additional land from private land owners in order to enhance its production capacity by extending of its area---Company invoked constitutional jurisdiction of High Court being aggrieved of rejection of acquisition by Respondents (Board of Revenue-Settlement and all relevant departments)---Contention of the petitioner/company was that acquisition of land for the company was not necessarily required to be for the public purpose as the same might be for construction of a work that is likely to prove useful to the public---Objection of Respondents is that even for industrial purpose acquisition of land could be allowed only when it served public purpose while the request of the petitioner/company for acquisition of land was merely for commercial purpose as was manifest from their application-- -Validity---In the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ('the Act 1894'), land can be acquired either for public purpose or for a Company---A literal construction of the provisions of the Act 1894 appears to be in conflict with Art. 24 of the Constitution insofar as those apparently permit acquisition of property by a Company even in the absence of any public purpose or such other purposes as have been specified in the exceptions stipulated in Art. 24(3) of the Constitution---A statutory provision, when read literally, leads to any violation of a fundamental right, or renders it without legislative competence---Court read such a provision narrowly to save it from invalidity---This is a rule of interpretation of statutes termed as "reading down"---The rule of "reading down", when applied to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, would permit acquisition of property only for public purpose or any other purpose specified in sub-Article (3) of Art. 24 of the Constitution- --Petitioner/Company failed to point out any illegality, material irregularity, any violation of acquisition laws or jurisdictional defect in the impugned orders passed by the Respondents regretting petitioner's request for acquisition of land owned by private owners---Constitutional petition, filed by company/factory, being merit-less, was dismissed. Messrs Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and 6 others PLD 1997 SC 582; Haroon-ur-Rasheed v. Lahore Development Authority and others 2016 SCMR 931; Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary and others v. M.Q.M. through Deputy Convener and others PLD 2014 SC 531 and Syed Mushahid Shah and others v. Federal Investment Agency and others 2017 SCMR 1218 ref. Shamim ur Rehman Malik for Petitioner. Muhammad Osman Khan, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab for Respondents. Date of hearing: 19th March, 2025.

Summary: ----Ss. 497(5), 435, 369 & 561-A---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324, 148 & 149---Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, rioting armed with deadly weapon, unlawful assembly---Ad-interim pre-arrest bail---Non-appearance of petitioner/accused---Petitioner was granted post-arrest bail in the case but later on it was cancelled---Petitioner challenged the bail cancellation order by filing revision petition but the same was dismissed due to the petitioner's non-appearance---Petitioner challenged the bail cancellation order by filing another revision petition---Validity---Dismissing the matter solely due to the petitioner's absence might have defeated the very purpose for which it was admitted---Therefore, although the Court retained the discretion to dismiss application for non-prosecution, judicial propriety demanded that such discretion be exercised cautiously where the petition had passed the threshold of admission---Even where a revision petition was dismissed in default, the aggrieved party may seek its restoration under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court---High Court was empowered under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C., to set aside such an order if sufficient cause for non-appearance was shown---Restoration in such circumstances did not attract the prohibition under S. 369, Cr.P.C., as a dismissal for non- prosecution did not constitute a judgment on merits---Second revision petition against the same order was not maintainable where the first was dismissed for non-prosecution because such dismissal did not operate as a decision on merits---However, that did not leave the aggrieved party remediless---Appropriate course was to seek restoration of the earlier petition under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C., by demonstrating sufficient cause for non-appearance---Mere assertion is not enough, the reasons must be stated with particularity and supported by material on record, where possible-- -Petition being not maintainable was dismissed accordingly. Nisar Ahmad v. The State and another 1975 PCr.LJ 400; Muhammad Ramzan v. Allah Ditta and others 1982 SCMR 215; Munir Ahmad v. The State 1991 MLD 1781; Muhammad Hanif v. The State 1991 PCr.LJ 1353; Yar Mat Khan v. The State and another 2004 PCr.LJ 468 and Maulvi Asad Ahmad alias Asad and others v. The State and another PLD 1990 Lah. 1 rel. Hafiz Naimat Ullah for Petitioner. Rana Tasawar Ali Khan, Deputy Prosecutor General for Respondents.