Summary: ----S. 498---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.489-F---Dishonoring of cheques---Pre-arrest bail, confirmation of---Concurrent jurisdiction of High Court and Sessions Court to entertain pre-arrest bail directly---Scope---Applicant had approached High Court directly for the reason that police in connivance with the complainant had cordoned off the Sessions Court---By not availing one remedy, applicant had lost one opportunity without causing any prejudice to the complainant party---Superior court can entertain the application for pre-arrest bail and grant relief to the accused in appropriate cases where the accused could inter alia establish that he was prevented from approaching the lower Court in the first instance---If the accused was entitled to bail under the law on merit, consequences could not be taken into consideration while entertaining the bail plea of the accused, if he had directly approached High Court under S.498, Cr.P.C.---Applicant had succeeded in making out the case for the confirmation of the pre-arrest bail---Bail was allowed, in circumstances. Muhammad Kashif Iqbal v. The State 2022 SCMR 821; Naeem Qadir Shaikh v. The State 2022 SCMR 2068; The State v. Zubair 2002 SCMR 177; Muhammad Riaz v. The State 2002 SCMR 184; Imtiaz v. Azam Khan 2021 SCMR 111 and The State v. Zubair PLD 1986 SC 173 ref. Raees Wazir Ahmad v. The State 2004 SCMR 1167; Abdul Majeed Afridi v. The State 2022 SCMR 676; Khair Muhammad, and another v. The State through P.G Punjab and another 2021 SCMR 130; The State v. Malik Mukhtar Ahmed Awan 1991 SCMR 322; Rafiq Ahmed Jilani v. The State 1995 PCr.LJ 785; Shamrez Khan v. The State 1999 PCr.LJ 74 and Meeran Bakhsh v. The State and another PLD 1989 SC 347 rel. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 498---Pre-arrest bail---Concurrent jurisdiction of High Court and Sessions Court---Scope---Accused normally can approach in the first instance the Court of Sessions for bail before arrest as propriety so demands but depending on the compelling circumstances, an accused can approach the High Court directly by invoking its concurrent jurisdiction. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S.498---Pre-arrest bail---Meaning and pre-requisites---Considerations for pre-arrest bail are different from that of post-arrest bail---Pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary relief, whereas post-arrest bail is an ordinary relief---While seeking pre-arrest bail it is the duty of the accused to establish and prove mala fide on the part of the Investigating Agency or the complainant---Bail before arrest is meant to protect innocent citizens who have been involved in heinous offences with mala fide and ulterior motives---Grant of pre-arrest bail essentially requires considerations of mala fide, an ulterior motive, or abuse of the process of law. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 498---Pre-arrest bail---Proof of mala fide---It is not possible in every case to prove the mala fide but the same can be gathered from the facts and circumstances of the case---If an accused person has a good case for post-arrest bail then merely at the wish of the complainant, he cannot be sent behind bars for a few days by dismissing his application for pre-arrest bail. Khalil Ahmed Soomro v. The State PLD 2047 SC 730 and Shahzada Qaiser Arfat alias Qaiser v. The State and another PLD 2021 SC 708 rel. (e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 498---Pre-arrest bail---Merits of case, consideration of---Scope---While granting pre-arrest bail, the court can consider the merits of the case in addition to the element of mala fide/ulterior motives---Courts of law are under the bounded duty to entertain a broader interpretation of the "law of bail" while interpreting material placed before it arrive at a conclusion. Ms. Raana Khan for Applicant along with Applicant. Ms. Rubina Qadir, Deputy Prosecutor General along with I.O./S.I. Rasool Khan P.S. Shahrah-e-Faisal, Karachi. Syed Zulfiqar Ali Shah for the Complainant along with Complainant. Date of hearing: 24th July, 2024.

Summary: (a) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974)--- ----Arts. 42(11)(d), 42(11)(e) & 42(12)---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42 & 54---Suit for declaration, perpetual injunction and correction in the revenue record during settlement---Value of subject-matter less than Rs.50,000/=---High Court setting aside judgment passed by District Court---Whether appeal or petition for leave to appeal---Respondents raised objection regarding maintainability of appeal against the judgment passed by High Court---Objection of the respondents was that although, through the impugned judgment, the High Court had set aside the judgment of the District Judge, however, the value of the subject matter was less than Rs.50,000/-, hence, against the impugned judgment, Petition to Leave to Appeal (PLA) was competent and not direct appeal---Validity---Reading of the provisions of Arts. 42(11)(d), 42(11)(e) & 42(12) of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, showed that a direct appeal laid in the (Supreme) Court when the value of the subject matter in the Court of first instance and in the appeal was not less than fifty thousand rupees and the High Court had altered or varied or set aside the impugned judgment or decree of the Court immediately below---First condition for filing the direct appeal before this (Supreme) Court under the said statutory provision was the value of the subject matter before the Court of first instance, as well as in the appeal, which should not be less than Rs.50,000/-, and the second condition was that the High Court had altered, varied or set aside the judgment and decree of the Court immediately below---Except for these two conditions, Art. 42(12) of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, shall apply---An appeal to the Supreme Court may be filed only if the Court grants leave to appeal upon a petition, and not otherwise---In the present case, the plaintiff (predecessor of the appellants) filed a suit for declaration etc. regarding suit-property before the Senior Civil Judge (Muzaffarabad); and in relevant para of the plaint, the plaintiff himself fixed the value of the suit for the purpose of Court fee and jurisdiction of the Court as Rs.5000/---Thus, admittedly, the value of the subject matter was less than Rs.50,000/- in the Court of first instance i.e. the Trial Court as well as in the appeal---Had the value of the subject matter been above 50000 rupees in the Court of 1st instance and the High Court had also varied or set aside the judgment and decree of the Court immediately below, then the direct appeal was competent, otherwise, PLA was competent before this (Supreme) Court, even though the High Court set aside, altered or varied the judgment of the Court immediately below---Present appeal had been filed incompetently and was liable to be dismissed on this sole ground, therefore, there was no need to discuss the merits of the case---Appeal, having being filed incompetently, was dismissed. WAPDA and others v. Taj Begum and others 2014 YLR 2649 ref. (b) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974)--- ----Arts. 42(11)(d), 42(11)(e) & 42(12)---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42 & 54---Suit for declaration, perpetual injunction and correction in the revenue record during settlement---Value of the subject-matter less than Rs.50,000/- High Court setting aside the judgment passed by the Court immediately below---Whether appeal or Petition for Leave to Appeal---Conduct of advocate---Effect---Respondents raised objection regarding maintainability of appeal against the judgment passed by High Court---Contention of the Advocate, representing the appellants, was that the appellants filed the PLA against the impugned judgment, however, the Assistant Registrar of the Court, raised objection on the maintainability of the PLA and advised for filing direct appeal---Validity- --Such assertion and conduct of the Advocate, who was appearing before the Supreme Court, was regrettable---An Advocate, appearing before this (Supreme) Court has to be well-versed with the Supreme Court Rules and has to file a case against the judgment(s) of the Courts below according to his own wisdom and not on the advice of the Assistant Registrar of the Court---At least, if there was any confusion in understanding the statutory provision, he had to consult with some senior Advocates---Thus, assertion made by the Advocate, being vague in nature was repelled---Present appeal had been filed incompetently and was liable to be dismissed on such sole ground---Appeal was dismissed. Maqbool-ur-Rehman Abbasi and Raja Muhammad Altaf for Appellants. Muhammad Yaqboob Khan Mughal for Respondents. Date of hearing: 9th December, 2024.

Summary: (a) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974)--- ----Arts. 42(11)(d), 42(11)(e) & 42(12)---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42 & 54---Suit for declaration, perpetual injunction and correction in the revenue record during settlement---Value of subject-matter less than Rs.50,000/=---High Court setting aside judgment passed by District Court---Whether appeal or petition for leave to appeal---Respondents raised objection regarding maintainability of appeal against the judgment passed by High Court---Objection of the respondents was that although, through the impugned judgment, the High Court had set aside the judgment of the District Judge, however, the value of the subject matter was less than Rs.50,000/-, hence, against the impugned judgment, Petition to Leave to Appeal (PLA) was competent and not direct appeal---Validity---Reading of the provisions of Arts. 42(11)(d), 42(11)(e) & 42(12) of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, showed that a direct appeal laid in the (Supreme) Court when the value of the subject matter in the Court of first instance and in the appeal was not less than fifty thousand rupees and the High Court had altered or varied or set aside the impugned judgment or decree of the Court immediately below---First condition for filing the direct appeal before this (Supreme) Court under the said statutory provision was the value of the subject matter before the Court of first instance, as well as in the appeal, which should not be less than Rs.50,000/-, and the second condition was that the High Court had altered, varied or set aside the judgment and decree of the Court immediately below---Except for these two conditions, Art. 42(12) of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, shall apply---An appeal to the Supreme Court may be filed only if the Court grants leave to appeal upon a petition, and not otherwise---In the present case, the plaintiff (predecessor of the appellants) filed a suit for declaration etc. regarding suit-property before the Senior Civil Judge (Muzaffarabad); and in relevant para of the plaint, the plaintiff himself fixed the value of the suit for the purpose of Court fee and jurisdiction of the Court as Rs.5000/---Thus, admittedly, the value of the subject matter was less than Rs.50,000/- in the Court of first instance i.e. the Trial Court as well as in the appeal---Had the value of the subject matter been above 50000 rupees in the Court of 1st instance and the High Court had also varied or set aside the judgment and decree of the Court immediately below, then the direct appeal was competent, otherwise, PLA was competent before this (Supreme) Court, even though the High Court set aside, altered or varied the judgment of the Court immediately below---Present appeal had been filed incompetently and was liable to be dismissed on this sole ground, therefore, there was no need to discuss the merits of the case---Appeal, having being filed incompetently, was dismissed. WAPDA and others v. Taj Begum and others 2014 YLR 2649 ref. (b) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974)--- ----Arts. 42(11)(d), 42(11)(e) & 42(12)---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42 & 54---Suit for declaration, perpetual injunction and correction in the revenue record during settlement---Value of the subject-matter less than Rs.50,000/- High Court setting aside the judgment passed by the Court immediately below---Whether appeal or Petition for Leave to Appeal---Conduct of advocate---Effect---Respondents raised objection regarding maintainability of appeal against the judgment passed by High Court---Contention of the Advocate, representing the appellants, was that the appellants filed the PLA against the impugned judgment, however, the Assistant Registrar of the Court, raised objection on the maintainability of the PLA and advised for filing direct appeal---Validity- --Such assertion and conduct of the Advocate, who was appearing before the Supreme Court, was regrettable---An Advocate, appearing before this (Supreme) Court has to be well-versed with the Supreme Court Rules and has to file a case against the judgment(s) of the Courts below according to his own wisdom and not on the advice of the Assistant Registrar of the Court---At least, if there was any confusion in understanding the statutory provision, he had to consult with some senior Advocates---Thus, assertion made by the Advocate, being vague in nature was repelled---Present appeal had been filed incompetently and was liable to be dismissed on such sole ground---Appeal was dismissed. Maqbool-ur-Rehman Abbasi and Raja Muhammad Altaf for Appellants. Muhammad Yaqboob Khan Mughal for Respondents. Date of hearing: 9th December, 2024.

Summary: ----S. 3(1) [as amended by Balochistan Maintenance of Public Order (Amendment) Ordinance (IX of 2002)]---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S. 24-A---Preventive detention---Scope and application---Satisfaction of Government---Pre-requisites, absence of---Petitioner assailed order of his detention under S. 3(1) of Balochistan Maintenance of Public Order (Amendment) Ordinance (IX of 2002) (MPO)---Petitioner was detained for adversely affecting the public safety, order and maintenance of law and order---Validity---Section 3 of the MPO empowers the government to detain a person if it is satisfied that such detention is necessary to prevent that person from acting in a manner prejudicial to public safety and maintenance of public order---Law mandates that the authority issuing the detention order must provide clear and cogent reasons for such action, supported by material evidence---Deputy Commissioner must not act arbitrarily or capriciously, rather, the decision must be based upon credible evidence that substantiates the claim of potential harm to public order---In the present case detention order was based merely on surmises and conjectures and detention of the petitioner was neither justified and reasonable nor in accordance with constitutional provisions---Respondent failed to produce a single document or credible evidence to substantiate the claim of potential harm to public order---Detention order failed to articulate the reasons for detention---Authority must provide a reasoned order that reflects the application of mind to the facts of the case and failure to provide reasons for detention had rendered the detention order illegal and void---Order passed by authority was declared to be illegal, unlawful and without lawful authority. Federation of Pakistan v. Amatul Jalil Khawaja PLD 2003 SC 442 rel. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 4, 9 & 10---Preventive detention---Fundamental rights---Scope-- -Right to life, liberty and security---Right of individuals to be dealt with in accordance with law---Scope---Every citizen has the right to enjoy the protection of law and to be treated in accordance with the law---This provision underscores the importance of safeguarding individual liberties against arbitrary state action---Principle of strict interpretation is grounded in the understanding that any law, which imposes restrictions on fundamental rights, must be clear, precise, and unambiguous---Fundamental rights are paramount to ordinary state-made laws and cannot be curtailed without clear legislative intent and such laws are required to be scrutinized rigorously to ensure they do not violate constitutional guarantees. (c) Balochistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance (XXXI of 1960)--- ----S. 3(1) [as amended by Balochistan Maintenance of Public Order (Amendment) Ordinance (IX of 2002)]---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Detention order---Judicial review---Scope---Alternate remedy, availability of---Invoking of constitutional jurisdiction of High Court instead of availing remedy provided under the relevant law would only be justified when the order/action was palpably without jurisdiction---To force an aggrieved person in such a case to approach the forum provided under the relevant statute may not be just and proper---In the present case detention order was not only palpable but also bereft of any legal reasoning, thus, issuance of direction to the petitioner for availing the alternate remedy would be an exercise in futility and would not serve the ends of justice---Constitutional petition was held to be maintainable. Sarwar Khan Mandokhail for Petitioner Zahoor Ahmed Baloch, Additional Advocate General (A.A.G) for Respondents. Date of hearing: 30th October, 2024.

Summary: Per Qazi Faez Isa, CJ. (a) Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act (XVII of 2023)--- ----Preamble---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 184(3)---Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ('the Act'), constitutionality of---Constitutional petitions before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the Act---By majority of 10 to 5, the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ('the Act')was upheld as being in accordance with the Constitution---Detailed reasons stated. There appears to be nothing unconstitutional, illegal or objectionable in the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ('the Act')on a plain reading of its provisions. The measures taken in the Act ensure judicial independence, facilitate access to justice, instill transparency, make the realization of Fundamental Rights more effective, and strengthen the office of the Chief Justice by introducing consultation with the two most senior Judges. The Constitution does not grant to the Chief Justice power to decide cases unilaterally and arbitrarily. The term "Master of the Roster" is not mentioned in the Constitution, in any law or even in the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 ("the Rules"). The word master is offensive in a constitutional dispensation founded on democracy, and servitude negates consultation. History stands witness to the fact that when power is concentrated in an individual, disastrous consequences invariably follow. Irreparable damage is caused to the Judiciary and to the people of Pakistan when the legitimacy, integrity and credibility of the Judiciary is undermined. Mutual respect requires that the Supreme Court should not substitute its own opinion for that of Parliament, no matter how correct it considers it to be. Interventions should be restricted to only when Parliament enacts legislation which is demonstrably unconstitutional. In respect of the Act this has not been demonstrated. Parliament enacted the Act which does not in any manner infringe any of the Fundamental Rights, rather facilitates their enforcement. The Act also grants an appeal to one who is aggrieved by a decision of the Supreme Court which is passed in exercise of the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. The Act does not in any manner violate the Constitution, it does not undermine the Supreme Court, nor does it compromise the independence of the judiciary. In effect it does the very opposite in ensuring the enforcement of Fundamental Rights, strengthening the Judiciary and creating greater independence therein. For the aforesaid reasons these petitions are dismissed and the constitutionality of the Act is upheld. Per Yahya Afridi, J. (b) Precedent--- ----Supreme Court of Pakistan---Full Court---Members of a Full Court are not to be shackled by precedents---No doubt, the Supreme Court has to draw wisdom from the decisions already rendered, but in no way is a Full Court bound by the principle of stare-decisis---To do so, would defeat the very purpose of convening a Full Court to hear and decide a matter. (c) Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act (XVII of 2023)--- ----Ss. 2, 5(1), 5(2) & Preamble---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 184(3)- --Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ('the Act'), constitutionality of---Constitutional petitions before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the Act---Maintainability---In essence, the petitioners through these petitions seek to preserve and protect the independence of the judiciary, which undoubtedly, is beyond the realm of their private or individual concerns, and most certainly covers a more general or wider sphere, spanning the entire society and affecting the public at large---Thus, the present petitions do relate to an issue of 'public importance'---Scope of taking cognizance of a matter by the Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution is much wider and can also be invoked, even if there is no infringement of any fundamental right, but what is essential is that the matter raised in the challenge before the Court relates to ensuring that the fundamental rights of the citizens and/or persons, provided under the Constitution, are effectively exercised---Given this aspect of the jurisdiction that can be invoked under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, the present petitions, fulfill both the conditions precedent for invoking the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court---Accordingly, objection regarding maintainability of present petitions is repelled. (d) Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act (XVII of 2023)--- ----Ss. 2, 5(1), 5(2) & Preamble---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 184(3), 191 & Fourth Sched., Part 1, Entry No. 58---Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ('the Act'), constitutionality of---Constitutional petitions before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the Act---By majority of 10 to 5, the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ('the Act') was upheld as being in accordance with the Constitution---However, His Lordship declared that section 5 of the Act had been enacted by Parliament beyond its ordinary legislative power conferred on it under the Constitution; that section 5 of the Act was, therefore, ultra vires the Constitution, and thus of no legal effect---His Lordship also observed that section 2 of the Act had expanded the scope of regulating the practice and procedure of the Court to "every cause, appeal or matter" before the Court, which was rather excessive, therefore, the Federal Government was urged to move Parliament to reconsider section 2 of the Act---Detailed reasons stated. Saying that a law enacted by a competent legislature cannot regulate the practice and procedure of the Supreme Court would amount to shutting our eyes on the plain language of Article 191 of the Constitution, and thereby offending the settled cardinal principles of interpretation of constitutional provisions. The matter of practice and procedure of the Supreme Court is a matter that relates to the Federation, and thus falls within the scope of Entry 58 of the Federal Legislative List in the 4th Schedule to the Constitution. Parliament, therefore, has the legislative competence to enact the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ('the Act') on the matter of practice and procedure of the Supreme Court. Admittedly, the Act has essentially dealt with the power of constituting Benches and suo motu invocation of the original jurisdiction of this Court under Article 184 of the Constitution. Earlier, the constitution of Benches of the Supreme Court was decided by the Chief Justice alone, whereas the enabling provisions of the Act have conferred the said authority on a Committee, comprising of the Chief Justice and two next most senior Judges of this Court. What is evident is that these powers have remained in and with the Court, that is, its Judges. No power has been conferred on any outsider to the Court. Despite their lengthy arguments, the counsel for the petitioners and other persons opposing the validity of the Act remained unable to explain, how the Act affects the independence of the judiciary in substituting the Chief Justice with the Committee comprising not only the Chief Justice but also the two next most senior Judges to exercise the administrative powers of constituting Benches and invoking suo motu under the original jurisdiction of the Court. Viewed from another legal perspective, it would be interesting to note that, in essence, the Act makes the process of constituting Benches more democratic, fostering a participatory approach in decision-making. No one can dispute that a decision based on mutual consultation of three Judges, instead of the solitary opinion of one Judge, would enhance transparency and responsibility of the process. The expansive scope of authority vested in the Committee under section 2 of the Act is a cause of concern. As per the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill introduced in the Parliament, the primary aim was to regulate the practice and procedure of the Supreme Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution but the compass of section 2 of the Act goes far beyond it, and covers "[e]very cause, appeal or matter" before the Court. This can be regarded as rather excessive. Section 5 of the Act has created a right of appeal against an order passed by the Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. And this right of appeal has been made available, with retrospective effect, to an aggrieved person against whom the order has been made even before the commencement of the Act. By creating the right of appeal against orders passed by the Supreme Court in its existing original jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, Parliament has not 'enlarged' the jurisdiction but has in fact created a separate and new appellate jurisdiction, which was not provided for in the Constitution. By no stretch of the imagination can the word 'enlargement', include the 'creation' of a new jurisdiction. With utmost respect for Parliament, I declare that section 5 of the Act has been enacted by Parliament beyond its ordinary legislative power conferred on it under the Constitution; section 5 of the Act is, therefore, ultra vires the Constitution, and thus of no legal effect. Per Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, J. (e) Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act (XVII of 2023)--- ----S. 5(2) & Preamble---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 4, 8, 9, 10, 10A, 24, 25 & 184(3)---Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ('the Act'), constitutionality of---Constitutional petitions before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the Act---By majority of 10 to 5, the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ('the Act') was upheld as being in accordance with the Constitution---However, His Lordship declared that the provisions of subsection (2) of section 5 of the Act providing the right of appeal to an aggrieved person against whom an order had been made under clause (3) of Article 184 of the Constitution, prior to the commencement of impugned Act were ultra vires under Article 8 of the Constitution as they offended Articles 9, 10, 10-A, 24 & 25 thereof and were arbitrary and unreasonable---Therefore, they shall be deemed non-est from the day of their promulgation---Detailed reasons stated. I generally concur with the majority judgment to the extent of affirming the constitutionality of the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ('the Act'); however, my disagreement pertains solely to the retrospective right of appeal as stipulated in section 5(2) of the Act. This dissent is grounded in a conscientious examination of the potential consequences that such a retrospective operation may yield, both legally and practically. Before the Act, there was no right of appeal against the order passed by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the original jurisdiction under clause (3) of Article 184 of the Constitution. But, the aggrieved person could have sought his remedy by invoking the review jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 188 of the Constitution. An appeal allows for a comprehensive re-examination of a case, unlike a review that focuses on specific aspects of the original decision. More appropriately, the right of appeal and review are not analogous as an appeal is, the review is not the continuation of the same proceedings. The provision of the right of appeal to an aggrieved person against whom an order has been made under Clause (3) of Article 184 of the Constitution is one of the objects of the enactment of the Act as set out in the preamble thereof. By providing the right of appeal, the legislature has achieved its objective. The conferment of the right of appeal is also in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Quran and the Sunnah. Federation of Pakistan v. Public at Large PLD 1988 SC 202 and Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence v. The General Public PLD 1989 SC 6 ref. The legislative framework (i.e. the Act) would uphold the principles of fairness, transparency, and justice within our legal system. Now, independent judges, greater in numbers and uninvolved in the original case, have the opportunity to rehear and decide the matter. This not only reaffirms the core values of impartiality but also strengthens the integrity of the legal system by allowing for a fresh perspective when justice may not have been adequately served in the original proceedings. On a plain reading of the language of subsection (2) of section 5 of the Act, it becomes abundantly clear that the legislature's intent is to provide the remedy of appeal against orders passed by the Supreme Court, even predating the enactment or commencement of the Act. The retrospective expansion thereof raises significant apprehensions, as it threatens to disrupt the finality and certainty that has historically been attributed to judicial pronouncements. The notion of granting a right of appeal against earlier decided cases is not to be taken lightly, as it carries profound implications that extend far beyond the immediate legal proceedings. Such a provision, while intended to ensure justice and fairness, can potentially cast a shadow of prejudice over past and closed transactions, as well as the rights and interests that have been secured under the judgments of the Supreme Court. Introducing a retrospective right of appeal now raises a profound concern. This could further compromise the principle of res judicata and jeopardize the stability and predictability of the legal system. It would open a floodgate of litigation and potentially overburden the Supreme Court with the daunting task of reevaluating numerous pre-settled matters or rights which had accrued on account of determinations validly made under the then-existing law. Chief Land Commissioner, Sindh, and others v. Ghulam Hyder Shah and others 1988 SCMR 715 and Badshah Gul Wazir v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary and others 2015 SCMR 43 ref. By applying the settled principles of law, it has been found that the provision of section 5(2) of the impugned Act unequivocally grants a right of retrospective appeal, a remedy that, by its very nature, has the potential to revisit and reopen all past and closed transactions. This aspect of the matter carries significant consequences, particularly the looming specter of injustice and prejudice that could be inflicted upon the parties in whose favour certain personal rights and liabilities have already rightfully been accrued and secured under the judgments or orders of the Supreme Court. The provision of the right of appeal retrospectively by itself is an infringement of fundamental rights which provide that every citizen shall be entitled to equal protection of law and will not be deprived of life or liberty save in accordance with law as provided under Article 9 read with Article 25 of the Constitution. Bhandari v. the Rehabilitation Authority, Lahore and 2 Others PLD 1961 SC 89; Nagina Silk Mill, Lyallpur v. the Income-Tax Officer, A-Ward Lyallpur and others PLD 1963 SC 322; Ahmad Ali Khan v. Muhammad Raza Khan and others 1977 SCMR 12 and Controller General of Accounts, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and others v. Abdul Waheed and others 2023 SCMR 111 ref. Since the laws are enacted under a written Constitution and have to conform to the does and don'ts of the Constitution, neither prospective nor retrospective laws can be made to contravene the said prescribed limitations, particularly, the fundamental rights, independence of judiciary or its separation from the executive. In view of the foregoing, it is declared that the provisions of subsection (2) of section 5 of the impugned Act providing the right of appeal to an aggrieved person against whom an order has been made under clause (3) of Article 184 of the Constitution, prior to the commencement of impugned Act are ultra vires under Article 8 of the Constitution as they offend Articles 9, 10, 10-A, 24 & 25 thereof and are arbitrary and unreasonable. Therefore, they shall be deemed non-est from the day of their promulgation. Per Muhammad Ali Mazhar, J. (f) Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act (XVII of 2023)--- ----S. 5(2) & Preamble---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 184(3)---Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023('the Act'), constitutionality of---Constitutional petitions before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the Act---By majority of 10 to 5, the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ('the Act') was upheld as being in accordance with the Constitution---However, His Lordship declared that the retrospective/retroactive right of appeal conferred under subsection (2) of Section 5 of the Act was ultra vires the Constitution to the extent of the retrospective application thereof---Detailed reasons stated. Though I have advocated and reinforced the majority view with regard to the legitimacy and constitutionality of the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ('the Act'), but in tandem I have declared the retrospective/retroactive right of appeal conferred under subsection (2) of Section 5 of the Act ultra vires the Constitution to the extent of the retrospective application thereof. The provision of a right of appeal to the Supreme Court through an ordinary act of Parliament is not a unique or novel idea and has, in the past, been supported by various pieces of legislation. Such rights of appeal, or leave to appeal, are in addition to the jurisdiction conferred by Article 185 of the Constitution. The counsel for the petitioners remained unsuccessful in persuading as to how the Act infringes or contravenes the fundamental rights of any person, or how the same is against the public interest. Except to the extent of the right of Intra Court Appeal with retrospective effect, the Act is neither hit by the doctrine of colourable legislation, nor is it ex facie discriminatory or violative of any constitutional provision. The procedural stipulations and the conferral of a right of appeal with prospective effect do not violate any fundamental right, nor do they offend any provision of the Constitution. The Parliament has not curtailed the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by dint of colourable legislation, rather the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has been enlarged in the larger public interest by means of the Act. Providing for an appeal with retroactive effect would open a flood gate of cases which will have serious repercussions on already decided cases and would amount to a reversion to the status quo ante (the previously existing state of affairs), with no end in sight. Though some persons may feel aggrieved by the orders or judgments of the Supreme Court rendered prior to the promulgation of the Act, it is equally true that many persons were found to have benefited from the same, and such rights between the litigants or parties, now having been decided one way or the other, cannot be re-agitated at this juncture and the parties cannot now be repositioned in the state of affairs that existed previously or before the effective date of the Act. The moment a decision is final, either for the reason that no appeal was preferred, or an appeal was filed and subsequently dismissed by the Court, or no right of appeal is provided under the relevant legislation, then neither party will be permitted subsequently to challenge such decision in order to relaunch the matter and argue it de novo. No doubt prior to this Act, no right of appeal was provided, but all those persons aggrieved in the past must have availed the right to file a review petition, and if these review petitions have been decided then it is not possible or feasible to provide a right of appeal to them and reagitate the matter again. Every statute which takes hold of or prejudices vested rights assimilated under existing laws, or contrives a new obligation or enforces a new duty, or characterises a new disability in respect of transactions already past and closed is presumed to have no retrospective effect. In other words, a statute is not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment, especially where the statute is to affect vested rights, past and closed transactions, or facts or events that have already occurred and, instead of promoting or advancing the cause of justice, is creating consequential impediments or causing any disadvantage to any of the concerned parties. Moreover, the provisions of a statute cannot be interpreted in a way that would lead to the devastation of rights and liabilities that have accrued by means of past and closed transactions, therefore the right of Intra Court Appeal with retrospective effect as provided under subsection (2) of Section 5 of the Act is against public policy, as well as the doctrine of finality and immutability of judgments; hence to such extent it is declared ultra vires. (g) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Fourth Sched.---Legislative Lists---Entries, interpretation of---Entries in the legislative lists represent fields of legislation which must receive the broadest and most expansive interpretation, and are construed to encompass all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can reasonably be said to be comprehended in them---In case of discord or overlap with other entries, the rule of harmonious construction is applied to reconcile the conflict for giving effect to each of the entries-- -The items mentioned in the list cannot be read in a narrow or restricted sense but rather should be given a wide and liberal interpretation without constricting it with technical considerations, and each general word should be held to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can reasonably be said to be comprehended in it. Messrs Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and 6 others PLD 1997 SC 582; Government of Sindh through Secretary, Health Department and others v. Dr. Nadeem Rizvi and others 2020 SCMR 1 and Messrs Sui Southern Gas Company Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2018 SCMR 802 ref. (h) Administration of justice--- ----Excessive use of lawful power is in itself unlawful. Independent Newspapers Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. and another v. Chairman, Fourth Wage Board and Implementation Tribunal for Newspaper Employees, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and 2 others 1993 SCMR 1533 ref. (i) Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act (XVII of 2023)--- ----S. 3---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 184(3)---Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ('the Act'), constitutionality of---Constitutional petitions before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the Act---Reading down of section 3 of the Act---An important aspect which needs to be addressed and read down is the provision contained under Section 3 of the Act which elucidates that any matter invoking the exercise of original jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution shall be first placed before the Committee constituted under Section 2 for examination, and if the Committee is of the view that a question of public importance with reference to enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights conferred by Chapter 1 of Part II of the Constitution is involved, it shall constitute a Bench comprising not less than three Judges of the Supreme Court which may also include the members of the Committee, for adjudication of the matter---This is perturbing for the reason that if the Committee administratively decides not to fix a particular matter before the Court because, in their point of view, no question of public importance with reference to the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights conferred by Chapter 1 of Part II of the Constitution is made out, then in that eventuality the matter ends without any further judicial scrutiny or order---Obviously, no appeal lies in Chamber before a single judge in terms of Supreme Court Rules, 1980 on the refusal of Committee to entertain a matter---Therefore, where the Committee refuses to entertain or fix a case, then in such a situation the matter should be fixed before the Court for judicial scrutiny regarding whether any case is made out to exercise the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution; and since the matter is taken up by the Committee on the administrative side, therefore, in case of refusal, the matter may be fixed before any available three-member bench, not including the members of the Committee, on the judicial side. (j) Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act (XVII of 2023)--- ----S. 6---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 184(3) & 188---Supreme Court Rules, 1980, O.XXVI---Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ('the Act'), constitutionality of---Constitutional petitions before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the Act---Change of counsel in review petitions---Under Section 6 of the Act, a right has been accorded to appoint a counsel of choice for filing a review petition, which was not earlier permissible---The right of changing or appointing new counsel of choice to file and pursue the review application/petition shall not be construed as allowing a rehearing of the matter, and the counsel so appointed should not attempt to reargue the whole case, or expect to start from scratch as an opportunity of rehearing to cure or supplant the lacunas, mistakes and/or oversights of the earlier counsel---Mere repetition of old and overruled arguments through a different counsel would be insufficient and impermissible in this regard. (k) Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act (XVII of 2023)--- ----Ss. 2 & 3---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 184(3)---Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ('the Act'), constitutionality of---Constitutional petitions before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the Act---Chief Justice of Pakistan---"Master of the Roster"---Changes made after promulgation of the Act---Prior to the promulgation of the Act, the Chief Justice alone was the master of the roster, and without the issuance of the roster of sittings or the constitution of benches by him, no Judge or bench of Judges could embark on or assume any jurisdiction except for the cases assigned by the Chief Justice, however in order to mitigate and clip off the sole discretion of the Chief Justice, the Act was enacted and now, for all intents and purposes, the functions of the master of the roster which vested solely in the Chief Justice have now been assigned and shifted to the collegium comprising the Chief Justice and the two next most senior judges of this Court as the masters of the roster for issuing the roster of sittings and constituting benches after due deliberation. Per Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, J.; Qazi Faez Isa, CJ,.Sardar Tariq Masood, Amin-ud-Din Khan, Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Athar Minallah and Musarrat Hilali, JJ. agreeing; Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ., partially agreeing (l) Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act (XVII of 2023)--- ----Ss. 2, 3, 4, 5 & Preamble---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts.142, 184(3), 191, 238 & Fourth Sched., Part 1, Entry Nos. 55 & 58--- Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ('the Act'), constitutionality of---Constitutional petitions before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the Act---By majority of 10 to 5, the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ('the Act') was upheld as being in accordance with the Constitution---Detailed reasons stated. The phrase "subject to law" as used in Article 191 of the Constitution does not mean subject to "substantive law" only. The word "law" includes law in all senses - procedural and substantive; enacted directly on the matter of practice and procedure of the Supreme Court or containing only incidental or ancillary provisions. Winberry v. Salisbury 5 N.J. 240 (1950) ref. The power to deal with the subject of rules regulating its practice and procedure, no doubt, primarily vests in the Supreme Court but this is not exclusive to it. This rule-making power of the Supreme Court is subservient to the superior constituent power and ordinary legislative power of the Legislature. The rules made by the Supreme Court are to hold the field unless changed by the Legislature in the exercise of its constituent power under Article 238 or its legislative power under Article 142 of the Constitution. This is the correct understanding of the phrase "Subject to the Constitution and law" as used in Article 191 of the Constitution. Entry 58 of the Federal Legislative List further establishes the legislative competence of Parliament to make law on the subject of practice and procedure of the Supreme Court. No provision in the Constitution has been pointed that prohibits either expressly or by necessary implication the exercise of legislative power of Parliament on the subject of practice and procedure of the Supreme Court, but rather the specific mention of the phrase "subject to law" in Article 191 of the Constitution suggests otherwise and repels the argument of any implied prohibition that could have possibly been raised if this phrase had not been there. When instead of any such prohibition there is a clear permissibility expressed by using the phrase "subject to law" in Article 191, the subject of the practice and procedure of the Supreme Court squarely falls within the scope of Entry 58 of the Federal Legislative List and with respect to it, Parliament is fully competent to make law in the exercise of its legislative power under Article 142(a) of the Constitution. Therefore, the Parliament has competently enacted the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ('the Act')on the subject of practice and procedure of the Supreme Court. Hawkins in Hall v. State 539 So. 2d 1338 (Miss. 1989) ref. Section 5 of the Act also falls within the scope of the subject of regulating the practice and procedure of the Supreme Court, and Parliament has competently enacted it in the exercise of its legislative power under Article 142(a) of the Constitution read with entry 58 of the Federal Legislative List. Even otherwise, if Section 5 of the Act is taken as the one that has conferred a substantive right of appeal on persons aggrieved of an order passed under Article 184(3) and thus enlarged the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the same will then fall within the scope of Entry 55 of the Federal Legislative List. Devolving two of the administrative powers of the office of the Chief Justice (i.e. powers to constitute benches and invoke suo motu original jurisdiction) to the Committee of three Judges, which also includes the Chief Justice, does not in any manner infringe the independence of the judiciary nor does the provision of a right of intra court appeal affect the right of access to justice. His Lordship declared that the doctrine of past and closed transactions is to applied to the acts of constitution of benches and decisions of the cases by those benches during the period of suspension of the operation of the Act; that in order to give effect to the provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act to a possible extent, the review petitions filed against orders passed in jurisdiction under Article 184(3) should be treated as appeals, on applications made in this regard, with permission to file additional grounds of challenge and dealt with accordingly under Section 5 of the Act while the review petitions filed in other cases that fall within the category mentioned in Section 4 of the Act may be fixed for hearing before the Benches comprising not less than five Judges of the Court. (m) Separation of powers, doctrine of--- ----Scope---Doctrine of checks and balances---Concomitant with the doctrine of separation of powers is, however, the doctrine of checks and balances---It acknowledges that while each organ operates independently, there should be some mechanism to restrain each organ within the limits of its power and to counteract whenever such limits are exceeded---It is through checks and balances that each organ is empowered to monitor and, if necessary, undo the actions of the others, ensuring that no organ exceeds its constitutional authority---The very strength of the separation of powers is thus dependent on the checks and balances, making no organ absolutely unchecked---Therefore, in essence, the separation of powers and the checks a

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 498---Pre-arrest bail---Pendency---Practice of not arresting accused---Accused after dismissal of his pre-arrest bail by High Court, approached Supreme Court to seek pre-arrest bail---Held: Any practice whereby police authorities treat mere filing of a petition before Supreme Court as an implied stay or bar to arrest, despite dismissal of pre-arrest bail, indicates a misunderstanding of the purpose of pre-arrest bail---Such relief exists as an exceptional measure to protect individuals against arbitrary or mala fide arrest, where circumstances clearly warrant such protection---Once a competent Court has declined pre-arrest bail, it has necessarily determined that no such exceptional circumstances exist and arrest is lawful and necessary to ensure an effective investigation---Allowing mere act of filing another petition to operate as a de facto stay would render judicial determination meaningless, defeat the objective of ensuring prompt and fair investigation and risk abuse of process by enabling accused persons to indefinitely evade arrest without any legal basis---Judicial orders must remain binding and enforceable unless and until a competent Court expressly orders otherwise---Interim protection is not automatic; it must be specifically sought and expressly granted---In absence of such order, a refusal of bail remains fully operative and must be implemented promptly and in good faith by investigating authorities---Investigating officers and police authorities are legally bound to act upon Court orders dismissing pre-arrest bail immediately, without waiting for further instructions or presuming existence of any stay where none has been granted---Administrative convenience, internal practice, or mere pendency of higher-forum proceedings cannot justify or excuse failure to act in accordance with law---Petitioner withdrew his pre-arrest bail application---Petition was dismissed. Amjad Iqbal Khan, Advocate Supreme Court with the petitioners for Petitioners. Rana Abdul Majeed, Addl. P.G. Punjab, Sarfraz Khan, S.I. and Waqar Azeem, I.O. for the State. Sher Afghan Asadi, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant. Dr. Usman Anwar, I.G., Punjab on Court's Call. Date of hearing: 25th June, 2025.

Summary: (a) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Circulars and administrative directives--- Effect--- Executive clarifications in the form of circulars and administrative directives cannot override, amend or curtail scope of statute itself or rules framed thereunder. (b) West Pakistan Civil Services Pension Rules, 1963--- ----R. 4.10 (3)(a)---Circular No. FD (PCDC) 3 (225)/2022, dated 05-12-2022, issued by Government of Sindh, Finance Department---Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Art. 2(f)---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 14 & 25---Family pension---Divorced daughter, entitlement of---Determining factor---Dispute between parties was with regard to release of family pension to respondent who was daughter of deceased civil servant and was divorced after the death of civil servant---Validity---Dependency is not a metric for financial stability rather it is an assumption that disregards actual economic need and lived experiences of many women---Claim of surviving daughters should be based on need and individual assessment rather than a legal framework built on patriarchal assumptions as to what is stereotypically believed to constitute dependency---This presumptive exclusion based solely on marital status is unconstitutional , discriminatory and a violation of Articles 14, 25, and 27 of the Constitution ---Concept of tying a daughter's eligibility to family pension solely to her marital status results in an unjustifiable distinction---Women are independent right-holders, autonomous and should be entitled to family pension where financial need is established---Pakistan's obligations under international law reinforce the principle that women cannot be denied access to economic entitlements based on marital status alone---As a party to Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Pakistan is required to abolish discriminatory laws and practices that impair women's enjoyment of rights on an equal footing with men---Provision of Article 13 of the Constitution thereof guarantees women equal rights in family benefits, while Article 2(f) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),obliges States to repeal existing laws and regulations that constitute discrimination---Circular, which imposes restrictions unsupported by the Act or the Rules, is void ab initio, unconstitutional, and of no legal effect---Timing of death of civil servant could not lawfully be used to extinguish a surviving daughter's right to claim pension---Supreme Court declined to interfere in the judgment passed by High Court---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. Secretary, Government of Punjab v. M. Ismail Tayer 2014 SCMR 1336; Muhammad Ismail Memon: In the matter of Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 226 of 2006 PLD 2007 SC 35; Government of N.-W.F.P. v. Mohammad Said Khan PLD 1973 SC 514; I.A. Sharwani v. Government of Pakistan 1991 SCMR 1041; Muhammad Yousaf v. Province of Sindh 2024 SCMR 1689; Province of Punjab v. Kanwal Rashid 2021 SCMR 730; Muhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan 2015 SCMR 630; Khajani Devi v. Union of India and others 2016 (4) RCR (Civil) 158; Deokinandan Prasad v. State of Bihar (1971) 2 SCC 330; Bhagwanti v. Union of India AIR 1989 SC 2088; Poonamal v. Union AIR 1985 SC 1196 and Carson and others v. The United Kingdom [20 10] ECHR 338 ref. Sibtain Mehmood, Additional Advocate General, Sindh for Petitioners (via video link, Karachi). Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 10th July, 2025.

Summary: Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ----Art. 128---Birth during marriage conclusive proof of legitimacy---DNA test of minor daughter---Petitioner was aggrieved of denial of conducting DNA test to establish paternity of minor daughter---Validity---Material question relating to paternity of the minor daughter had already been determined by three courts below in earlier round of litigation, on the basis of evidence available on the record---Ex-parte judgment and decree relied upon by petitioner was subsequent to the judgment in family suit and could not nullify earlier judgment, passed by Court of competent jurisdiction, establishing legitimacy of the minor---Supreme Court declined to interfere with the conclusion reached at by High Court which was in favour of legitimacy of minor daughter---Conditions attached to legitimacy are more strict under Muslim Law than under other systems but Muslim jurists and also the Courts have generally been very reluctant to stigmatize a child as illegitimate---As far as possible every presumption is made in favour of legitimacy---Courts are reluctant to declare a child bastard and have generally refused to admit illegitimacy when legitimacy can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. Shah Nawaz and another v. Nawab Khan PLD 1976 SC 767 rel. Aftab Alam Yasir, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 15th April, 2025

Summary: Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched.---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.151---Maintenance allowance for minor daughters---Quantum, enhancement of---Family Court entertaining enhancement application instead of fresh suit for maintenance enhancement---Powers, scope and legality---For consideration of enhancement of maintenance allowance separate suit need not be filed and instead Family Court may entertain application under section 151, C.P.C. for enhancement---Supreme Court remanding the matter to the Trial Court to reconsider the enhancement application under section 151, C.P.C.---Facts in brevity were that the daughters of petitioner filed a suit for recovery of maintenance allowance through their mother which was decreed at Rs.800 per month for each daughter with a 10% annual increment---Their application for enhancement was initially dismissed by the Family Court but the District Court increased it to Rs.1,500 per month, later further enhanced by the High Court to Rs.2,500 per month for each daughter with the same annual increment, considering their day to day and educational expenses---Dissatisfied, the daughters sought further enhancement, while the petitioner challenged the increase before the Supreme Court---Held: Family Court had exclusive jurisdiction relating to maintenance allowance and the matters connected therewith---Once the decree by the Family Court in a suit for maintenance (for minors) was granted, thereafter, if the granted rate for monthly allowance was insufficient and inadequate, in that case, institution of fresh suit was not necessary rather the Family Court could entertain any such application (under section 151, C.P.C.) and if necessary make alteration in the rate of maintenance allowance---In the present matter when the High Court fixed the maintenance allowance of respondents Nos.4 and 5 at Rs.2,500/- per month each, the monthly take home salary (earning) of the petitioner was Rs.33,026/-, however, as per computer generated salary slip submitted by the respondents' side and not denied by the petitioner, the take home salary of the petitioner was Rs.161,148/-, which would have further increased after increment---Therefore, to keep the door open for the parties to further challenge and agitate, if aggrieved of the order of enhancement or otherwise, it was deemed appropriate that in view of the above development, the matter be remanded to the Trial Court to consider the request of the respondents for enhancement of the maintenance allowance, treating the same as an application under section 151 of C.P.C.---Present matter was remitted to the Trial Court to consider the application of the respondents Nos. 4 & 5 for enhancement of the maintenance allowance , obviously, after obtaining reply from the petitioner and dilating upon the evidence, so produced by the parties and decide the matter treating the same as an application under section 151, C.P.C., within a period of not more than one month, even if it had to fix the case on day to day basis, under intimation to the Deputy Registrar, Lahore Registry Branch of the Supreme Court---Present petitions were disposed of, in circumstances. Lt. Col. Nasir Malik v. Additional District Judge Lahore 2016 SCMR 1821 rel. Asif Mumtaz, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.P.L.A. No. 919-L of 2016) and Rana Rashid Akram Khan, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.P.L.A. No. 1056-L of 2016) for Petitioners. Rana Rashid Akram Khan, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.P.L.A No. 919-L of 2016) for Respondents. Date of hearing: 4th June, 2025.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----Ss.12-A & 14(3)---Right of cross-examination struck off by Trial Court---Interlocutory order, challenge to---Scope---The petitioners challenged an interlocutory order passed by the Family Court, whereby, their right to cross-examine the respondents' witnesses was struck off---The order was assailed in a Constitutional petition before the High Court, against dismissal of which, the petitioners then sought leave to appeal---Held: Section 12-A of the Family Courts Act, 1964 made it obligatory for the Trial Court to decide/dispose of a case/family suit within a period of six months from the date of institution---Indeed, every litigant has a right to cross-examine the witnesses deposing evidence but that cannot be stretch down to an unreasonable desire of the counsel and litigant seeking adjournments one after the other and the reasons which were not found sufficient by the Trial Court, as could be seen that numerous opportunities were provided---Moreover, Family Courts Act, 1964 restricted and prohibited challenge to an interim/interlocutory order in terms of section 14(3) of the Family Courts Act, 1964---The impugned order which maintained the order of the Family Court was maintained by the Supreme Court---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, in circumstances, and leave was refused. (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.14(3)---Interim/interlocutory order passed by Family Court, challenge to---Scope---Interim/interlocutory order passed by the Family Court, under the restriction placed in terms of section 14(3) of the Family Courts Act, 1964, is not allowed to be challenged---Trial under the special law especially the Family Courts Act, 1964 requires strict adherence which ought to be complied with, otherwise the essence and effectiveness of the law will be frustrated---If any right is curtailed by any interim order not appealable, it can well be merged with and into the final order and would then, if required, be available for a challenge along with other grounds. Ch. Hafeez Ullah Yaqub, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners. Burhan Latif Khaisori, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents. Date of hearing: 2nd April, 2025.